Latest news with #GRU
&w=3840&q=100)
First Post
5 days ago
- First Post
Russian sabotage wave sweeps Europe, intel agencies cite over 70 incidents since Ukraine invasion
Russian sabotage operations across Europe have surged dramatically since the invasion of Ukraine, with intelligence agencies reporting over 70 incidents read more European intelligence agencies have reported a dramatic rise in Russian sabotage operations across the continent since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 which were initially limited to disinformation and cyber operations. Gradually these attacks have evolved into a broad campaign of physical sabotage targeting key sectors. According to data compiled by The Associated Press, over 70 such incidents have occurred, with a sharp uptick in 2024, marking nearly triple the number of attacks compared to the previous year. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The targets now include critical transportation systems, energy infrastructure, government facilities, water supplies, civil aviation and industrial sites. Attack methods have expanded to include arson, explosives, electronic sabotage and direct assaults using blunt weapons. A European intelligence official quoted anonymously by The Associated Press warned that the shift from digital to physical threats increases the potential for civilian harm as violence escalates in both frequency and intensity. Amateur operatives and high stakes Authorities indicate that Russia's military intelligence service, the GRU, is orchestrating many of these acts by recruiting untrained local individuals, foreigners and others with no criminal backgrounds. This decentralised strategy, often conducted through intermediaries and online platforms like Telegram, has allowed Moscow to maintain plausible deniability while creating a flexible network of saboteurs. In the March 2024 arson of a London warehouse storing supplies for Ukraine, including Starlink satellite equipment, British courts found multiple young men guilty of aggravated arson. Prosecutors stated that the plot had been guided by agents linked to Russia's Wagner mercenary group, now under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defence, Al Jazeera reported. The organiser, Dylan Earl, was recruited via Telegram and communicated with his Russian handler using Google Translate. The case revealed the depth of Russian recruitment efforts among disaffected youth in Europe, some of whom were lured with small payments and promises of espionage glory. The trial exposed not only the extent of the damage — an estimated £1 million — but also how close the fire came to causing casualties. A truck driver narrowly escaped injury, and residents of a nearby apartment building had to evacuate as the flames raged close to their homes. According to ABC News, oficials described the attack as reckless, warning that the reliance on amateurs significantly raises the risk of unintended consequences, including death. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Destabilisation as a strategy Western security officials believe these attacks are intended to destabilise European societies, undermine support for Ukraine and demonstrate Russia's ability to penetrate deep into Nato and EU territory. A senior analyst at Finland's Security and Intelligence Service noted that this sabotage campaign is consistent with Russia's hybrid warfare approach, one that complements conventional military efforts in Ukraine by sowing chaos abroad. From setting fires to disrupting undersea cables, to attempted bombings and assassination plots, the breadth of the sabotage campaign has grown alarmingly. Officials in Lithuania revealed that a Ukrainian teenager was recruited to plant a bomb at an IKEA store, resulting in a large-scale fire, ABC News reported. Meanwhile, British intelligence disrupted further plots, including plans to target businesses owned by exiled Russian tycoon Evgeny Chichvarkin, a vocal critic of the Kremlin. Earl, the same individual behind the warehouse arson, had allegedly plotted to set fire to Chichvarkin's Mayfair wine shop and restaurant, and even discussed kidnapping him, Al Jazeera said in a report. Europe's struggles to respond Despite the mounting threats, European countries have found it difficult to craft a coordinated and effective response. Intelligence officials told The Associated Press that while agencies have increased monitoring and attempted to harden critical infrastructure, current measures remain insufficient. There is growing concern among security experts and policymakers that Europe lacks a continent-wide deterrence framework capable of dissuading or quickly responding to Russian sabotage. A senior European intelligence official remarked that as the campaign continues, it has taken on a life of its own, becoming more violent and harder to control. They emphasised that while Moscow attempts to exert 'strict operational control,' the use of unreliable middlemen often results in miscommunication, unintended escalation and operational failures. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD This was evident in the London warehouse case, where the Russian handler later chastised Earl for acting without permission, stating that his unauthorised arson made compensation 'impossible' and jeopardised future missions, ABC News said in a report. Strengthening defences In light of these developments, European governments are under pressure to boost resilience against what one official described as a 'rolling campaign of psychological and material sabotage'. Debates are intensifying about the need for stronger counterintelligence, legal frameworks and coordinated strategic deterrence. Britain's recent application of the National Security Act to prosecute individuals acting on behalf of foreign intelligence is seen as a step forward, but officials caution that a broader, pan-European approach is essential. Western analysts stress that the attacks are not isolated incidents but components of a systematic effort to destabilise and divide. As Russia continues its military campaign in Ukraine, its concurrent strategy of chaos abroad appears aimed at eroding the political will and societal cohesion of its adversaries. In response, European unity and vigilance may be tested like never before.
Balkan Insight
04-07-2025
- Politics
- Balkan Insight
Russia's psychological operations in Georgia: a multifaceted strategy of control
July 4, 2025 - Grigol Julukhidze - Articles and Commentary A man standing next to barbed wire on the separation line between Georgia and the breakaway region of South Ossetia in Khurvaleti. Photo: Shutterstock Psychological operations (psyops) are planned activities designed to influence the emotions, motives, reasoning and behaviour of individuals, groups or societies to achieve strategic objectives. This is often achieved through the use of information, symbols and actions. In military and geopolitical contexts, psyops aim to weaken an adversary's resolve, sow confusion, or shape perceptions to align with the operator's goals. Unlike propaganda, which primarily focuses on disseminating information – often biased or misleading – to shape public opinion through mass media, psyops encompass a broader range of tactics. For example, they can involve physical actions, psychological manipulation and targeted messaging, often with a specific strategic intent. While propaganda seeks to persuade through widespread narratives, psyops are more calculated, often covert, and may involve direct interventions like troop movements or staged events to create psychological effects. Since the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Moscow has employed a sophisticated array of psychological operations aimed at weakening Georgia's sovereignty, eroding societal resilience, and reinforcing its dominance in the South Caucasus. These operations, often orchestrated with the involvement of Russian military intelligence (GRU), exploit Georgia's historical traumas, geopolitical vulnerabilities, and aspirations for western integration. This article explores three key psychological operations Russia has conducted in Georgia since 2013: the creeping annexation and kidnappings along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL); the persistent threat of war to instil fear; and the propagation of narratives that demoralize Georgian society while promoting the myth of an invincible Russia with a legitimate claim to regional dominance. Creeping annexation and kidnappings: eroding sovereignty and societal resolve One of Russia's most visible psychological operations in Georgia is the strategy of a 'creeping annexation' along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) separating Georgia from the Russian-occupied regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Since 2013, Russian and separatist forces have incrementally advanced the ABL deeper into Georgian territory, often under the cover of night, by moving border markers, installing barbed wire fences, and erecting 'State Border' signs. This process, known as 'borderization', has resulted in the loss of farmland, homes and livelihoods for Georgian villagers, who sometimes wake up to find their properties suddenly within occupied territory. For instance, in the village of Tamarasheni, South Ossetian troops and their Russian allies shifted border poles overnight, forcing farmers to harvest crops under a 72-hour ultimatum before being expelled. Unlike propaganda, which might amplify these actions through media, this psyop relies on the physical act of borderization to instil fear and helplessness directly in affected communities. The psychological impact of this operation is profound. By repeatedly violating Georgia's territorial integrity in small, incremental steps, Russia tests the resilience of Georgian society and its government. The constant threat of losing more land creates a pervasive sense of insecurity. Villagers living near the ABL face the daily risk of arbitrary detention or kidnapping by Russian-controlled forces, with over 126 Georgians illegally detained in 2017 alone for 'illegal border crossing'. These detentions, sometimes involving minors or elderly individuals, are rarely investigated by the de facto authorities, fostering a climate of impunity that further demoralizes local communities. The deliberate use of kidnappings as a psyop tactic, rather than mere propaganda, targets specific communities to create a direct psychological effect, amplifying fear beyond what media narratives alone could achieve. This strategy is designed to exhaust Georgian resistance over time. By 2013, the initial outrage over borderization began to wane as communities grew fatigued by the unrelenting pressure. The lack of a robust international response – beyond statements from the EU and US – has amplified this fatigue, as Georgians perceive their plight as being ignored by the global community. The psychological toll is evident in the stagnation of villages near the ABL, where economic activity has plummeted, and residents live in fear of straying too far from home. The message Russia sends is clear: Georgia's sovereignty is fragile, and resistance is futile against a determined occupier. The threat of war: exploiting Georgia's traumatic past Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, another psychological operation has gained prominence: the deliberate amplification of war rhetoric to scare Georgians into submission. Georgia's traumatic history with Russia, particularly the devastating 2008 war that resulted in the loss of 20 per cent of its territory, makes its population highly susceptible to fears of renewed conflict. Russian psyops exploit this trauma by perpetuating narratives that warn of imminent war unless Georgia aligns with Moscow's interests. This operation intensified in 2022, as Russia's actions in Ukraine served as a stark reminder of its willingness to use military force against perceived adversaries. The Kremlin has promoted the idea that pursuing NATO or EU membership will provoke Russia into another devastating war. For example, in 2024, political campaigns in Georgia featured billboards contrasting peaceful Georgian cities with devastated Ukrainian ones, implying that resistance to Russia risks a similar fate. This messaging taps into the collective memory of the 2008 war, where Russian forces overwhelmed Georgia in just five days, displacing thousands and leaving lasting scars. By framing Russia as a guarantor of peace, the Kremlin seeks to deter Georgia from pursuing its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. While propaganda might spread these narratives through media, the psyop incorporates real-world actions, such as Russian troop movements near the ABL, to heighten the perceived threat. Russian military intelligence has played a key role in amplifying these threats. The GRU has been linked to disinformation campaigns, including statements from Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) accusing the West of plotting a 'Tbilisi Maidan' to destabilize Georgia. These claims, disseminated through Russian media, aim to sow fear of western-induced chaos and position Russia as a stabilizing force. The psychological effect is to paralyze Georgian society, making alignment with Moscow seem like the only path to avoid catastrophic conflict. Demoralization and the myth of invincible Russia Perhaps the most insidious psychological operation is Russia's effort to demoralize Georgian society by promoting the narrative that resistance is pointless and that Moscow is an invincible force with a legitimate right to dominate the South Caucasus. This operation, which gained momentum in 2024, seeks to erode Georgia's national morale and undermine its democratic aspirations. By portraying Russia as an unstoppable power, the Kremlin aims to instil a sense of futility, convincing Georgians that no matter their efforts – whether political, economic or military – Russia will ultimately prevail. Unlike propaganda, which might rely solely on media to spread this narrative, this psyop includes tangible actions like asset transfers to reinforce Russia's dominance. This narrative is propagated through a combination of disinformation and economic coercion. Russian-backed media and organizations in Georgia, reportedly numbering in the dozens, spread anti-western messages, downplay Russia's occupation of Georgian territories, and whitewash its aggression. For instance, in 2024, statements emerged claiming that Russia's actions in Georgia and Ukraine were defensive responses to western provocation. Such narratives aim to shift blame from Moscow and erode trust in western institutions. The myth of Russia's invincibility is further reinforced through symbolic actions, such as the transfer of strategic assets like the Bichvinta Dacha in Abkhazia to Russian control in 2024. This move, framed as a legitimate assertion of Russian influence, signals to Georgians that Moscow can act with impunity in their territory. The GRU's involvement in these operations is evident in the sophisticated coordination of propaganda, which often portrays Russia as the natural hegemon of the South Caucasus, entitled to dictate Georgia's foreign policy. Economic interdependence is another tool in this psychological arsenal. Russia's trade with Georgia reached 2.39 billion US dollars in 2023, a 47 per cent increase from 2021. This fostered a dependency that undermines Georgia's ability to resist Russian influence. By controlling key economic levers, Russia reinforces the perception that Georgia cannot thrive without Moscow's approval. This economic coercion, combined with disinformation, creates a demoralizing narrative: Georgia's efforts to align with the West are doomed to fail, and submission to Russia is inevitable. The role of Russian military intelligence Russian military intelligence, particularly the GRU, has been instrumental in orchestrating these psychological operations. The GRU's expertise in hybrid warfare – combining disinformation, cyber operations and proxy activities – has enabled Russia to wage a relentless campaign against Georgia's national psyche. From coordinating borderization efforts to disseminating propaganda through various channels, the GRU ensures that these operations are executed with precision and maximum psychological impact. The 2008 war itself was a precursor to these tactics, with Russian forces rehearsing operations in the Caucasus 2008 exercise and deploying proxies like the Vostok Battalion to sow chaos. A battle for Georgia's soul Russia's psychological operations in Georgia since 2013 represent a calculated effort to undermine the country's sovereignty and demoralize its people. Creeping annexation and kidnappings erode territorial control and societal resilience; the threat of war exploits historical traumas to deter western alignment; and the myth of Russia's invincibility fosters despair and submission. These operations, driven by Russian military intelligence, have pushed Georgia to a crossroads, where it must choose between succumbing to Moscow's influence or rallying international support to preserve its democratic aspirations. Grigol Julukhidze is the director of the Foreign Policy Council, a think tank in Tbilisi. He specializes in security studies and propaganda research. He is also an Associate Professor at Caucasus University. New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. Please support us and help us reach our goal of $10,000! We are nearly there. Donate by clicking on the button below. borderization, Georgia, Georgian politics, Russian foreign policy, Russian interference, South Caucasus, South Ossetia
Washington Post
04-07-2025
- Politics
- Washington Post
Arson attack on a Ukrainian restaurant in Estonia was ordered by Russian intelligence, a court says
An arson attack on a restaurant and supermarket in Estonia this year were ordered by Russian intelligence, an Estonian court said Wednesday. The attack was one in a series across Europe tracked by The Associated Press and linked to Russia by Western officials. The goal, they asserted, is to sow division in Western societies and undermine support for Ukraine. The Harju County Court in Estonia said the perpetrators were two Moldovan men who are cousins, both named Ivan Chihaial. One was sentenced to 6 1/2 years in prison for the arson attack on the restaurant and supermarket, which the court said was carried out on behalf of Russia's security services. The other Ivan Chihaial was an accomplice and sentenced to 2 1/2 years in prison. In a statement, the court said the first Chihaial was tasked with the operation by Russian military intelligence, known as the GRU. It said he carried out a trial operation on behalf of the GRU in January 2025, setting fire to a Co-op supermarket in the village of Osula in southeastern Estonia. The next day someone acting on behalf of the GRU tasked him with setting fire to the Slava Ukraina restaurant in the capital, Tallinn. Chihaial drove with his cousin to the restaurant on the night of Jan. 31, 2025, then they set fire to it and left Estonia. The court said Chihaial's cousin was unaware he was working for the GRU. The court said the defendants set fire to the supermarket and the restaurant by breaking a window, pouring in gasoline, placing a bag with a gasoline can inside and igniting it. Authorities in Latvia, Lithuania and Poland worked to detain the men who were apprehended in Italy before being sent to Estonia to face trial, said State Prosecutor Triinu Olev-Aas. The arson is the latest attack on Estonia since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In prior cases, Estonia suffered cyberattacks and the windows of cars belonging to a politician and journalist were smashed. Previous attackers have been recruited inside Russia, which shares a border with Estonia. The Estonian Internal Security Service said the fact that Russia's intelligence agencies used Moldovans who were sent to the country showed they are finding it increasingly difficult to recruit, including among dual citizens. Russia has been accused of a widespread sabotage campaign by Western officials since its invasion of Ukraine. As well as cases of arson, the attacks across Europe range from stuffing car tailpipes with expanding foam in Germany to a plot to plant explosives on cargo planes , hacking that targeted politicians and critical infrastructure and spying by a ring convicted in the U.K. President Vladimir Putin's spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, has told the AP that the Kremlin has never been shown 'any proofs' supporting accusations of a broader sabotage campaign and said 'certainly we definitely reject any allegations.'
Euronews
03-07-2025
- Politics
- Euronews
Russia instructed arson attack on Ukrainian restaurant, Estonia says
Arson attacks on a restaurant and supermarket in Estonia last year were ordered by Russian intelligence, an Estonian court said on Wednesday. The attack was one in a series across Europe, tracked and linked to Russia by Western officials. The goal, they asserted, is to sow division in Western societies and undermine support for Ukraine as it continues to fend off Russia's more than three-year-long all-out war against its neighbour. The Harju County Court in Estonia stated that the perpetrators were two related Moldovan men, both named Ivan Chihaial. One was sentenced to six and a half years in prison for the arson attack on the restaurant and supermarket, which the court said was carried out on behalf of Russia's security services. The other Ivan Chihaial was an accomplice and sentenced to two and a half years. In a statement, the court said the first Chihaial was tasked with the operation by Russian military intelligence, known as the GRU. The court says he carried out a trial operation on behalf of the GRU in January 2024, setting fire to a co-op supermarket in the village of Osula in southeastern Estonia. The next day an individual acting on behalf of the GRU tasked him with setting fire to the Slava Ukraini restaurant in the capital Tallinn. Chihaial drove with his cousin to the restaurant on the night of 31 January, 2024, where they then proceeded to set fire to the establishment before departing Estonia. The court said Chihaial's cousin was unaware he was working for the Kremlin. Authorities in Latvia, Lithuania and Poland worked to detain the two men who were apprehended in Italy before being sent back to Estonia to face trial, said State Prosecutor Triinu Olev-Aas. The arson is the latest in a string of Russian attacks on Estonia since it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. In prior cases, Estonia suffered cyberattacks and vandalism to the windows of cars belonging to vocal anti-Kremlin politicians and journalists. Previous attackers have been recruited inside Russia, which shares a border with Estonia. The Estonian Internal Security Service said the fact that the GRU used Moldovans who were sent to the country showed they are finding it increasingly difficult to recruit. Russia has been accused of a widespread sabotage campaign by Western officials since its invasion of Ukraine. The attacks across Europe range from stuffing car tailpipes with expanding foam in Germany to a plot to plant explosives on cargo planes, to hackings that targeted politicians and critical infrastructure and spying by a ring convicted in the UK. Russian President Vladimir Putin's spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, has denied such allegations, adding that the Kremlin has yet to be presented 'any proof' supporting accusations of a broader sabotage campaign.
Euronews
03-07-2025
- Politics
- Euronews
Estonia says arson attack on Ukrainian restaurant was order by Russia
An arson attack on a restaurant and supermarket in Estonia last year were ordered by Russian intelligence, an Estonian court said on Wednesday. The attack was one in a series across Europe tracked linked to Russia by Western officials. The goal, they asserted, is to sow division in Western societies and undermine support for Ukraine as it continues to fend off Russia's more than three-year long full-scale invasion. The Harju County Court in Estonia said the perpetrators were two Moldovan men who are cousins, both named Ivan Chihaial. One was sentenced to six-and-a-half years in prison for the arson attack on the restaurant and supermarket, which the court said was carried out on behalf of Russia's security services. The other Ivan Chihaial was an accomplice and sentenced to two-and-a-half years. In a statement, the court said the first Chihaial was tasked with the operation by Russian military intelligence, known as the GRU. The court says he carried out a trial operation on behalf of the GRU in January 2024, setting fire to a Co-op supermarket in the village of Osula in southeastern Estonia. The next day someone acting on behalf of the GRU tasked him with setting fire to the Slava Ukraina restaurant in the capital, Tallinn. Chihaial drove with his cousin to the restaurant on the night of 31 January, 2024, where they then proceeded to set fire to the establishment before departing Estonia. The court said Chihaial's cousin was unaware he was working for the Kremlin. Authorities in Latvia, Lithuania and Poland worked to detain the two men who were apprehended in Italy before being sent back to Estonia to face trial, said State Prosecutor Triinu Olev-Aas. The arson is the latest in a string of Russian attacks on Estonia since it launched its offensive on Ukraine in February 2022. In prior cases, Estonia suffered cyberattacks and vandalism to the windows of cars belonging to vocal anti-Kremlin politicians and journalists. Previous attackers have been recruited inside Russia, which shares a border with Estonia. The Estonian Internal Security Service said the fact that the GRU used Moldovans who were sent to the country showed they are finding it increasingly difficult to recruit. Russia has been accused of a widespread sabotage campaign by Western officials since its invasion of Ukraine. The attacks across Europe range from stuffing car tailpipes with expanding foam in Germany to a plot to plant explosives on cargo planes, to hackings that targeted politicians and critical infrastructure and spying by a ring convicted in the UK. Russian President Vladimir Putin's spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, has denied such allegations, adding that the Kremlin has yet to be presented 'any proofs' supporting accusations of a broader sabotage campaign.
