Latest news with #GabrieliusLandsbergis
CBC
a day ago
- Business
- CBC
The time when foreign invasions were impossible is over, former diplomats tell defence conference
Social Sharing At the onset of the First World War, Britain's veritable foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, remarked that the lamps were going out all over Europe and "we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime." The metaphor has long been considered as the unofficial epitaph to what at the time was the longest run of peace and prosperity on the continent. The retelling of that story has become commonplace since the invasion of Ukraine. It was hard not to think of it this week when listening to both a former NATO secretary general and the man who was Lithuania's foreign minister as they each delivered stark assessments of where the world is going and how it got here. Neither Lord George Robertson, who led the Western military alliance from 1999 to 2003, nor Gabrielius Landsbergis, the Baltic nation's top diplomat for years, argued that we're on the cusp of war. Rather, they both called for clear-eyed deterrence as they delivered separate, sobering messages at the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries annual gathering of defence contractors in Ottawa, known as CANSEC. Even still. The post-Cold War era where nations didn't have to worry about their sovereignty and territorial defence is over, Robertson told the conference. "That world has evaporated, and it will not return even in our children's lifetime," he said. NATO's Article 5 — the pledge of collective defence and that an attack on one was an attack on all — gets all of the attention, Robertson said. But he argued that the third article of the Washington Treaty, which established NATO in 1949, will get more and more attention in the coming months and years. That clause says members must have the individual and collective capacity to resist an armed attack. "In other words, there is an obligation to defend your own homeland, an obligation that was, too often in the past, overlooked as we've looked at the [terrorist] enemy abroad," Robertson said. "There's no longer room for business as usual." It's been that way for more than a decade, he said, following the Russian annexation of Crimea. "As we see every day in the east of Ukraine, the threat of naked aggression and wonton violence in the Euro Atlantic region — it's no longer theoretical, no longer just a remote possibility," Robertson said. "It's real. It's brutal and it's very, very close to us." The challenge today for nations, including Canada, is to stop believing that some things, such as invasions, are impossible. "We need to be alert and wide awake," said Robertson, who admitted in a later interview to being frustrated with Canada's anemic record of defence spending. But he added he's encouraged to see promises to do more from Prime Minister Mark Carney's government. Canada is hoping to soon sign on to a major $1.25-trillion European Union defence-industrial plan known as ReArm Europe. Landsbergis was intensely critical of European leaders, who he says have been hitting the snooze button on defence since the 2008 Russian invasion of neighbouring Georgia. His reaction to the ReArm Europe plan could be summed up in two words: about time. "We're finally starting to see our leaders talk about serious money," Landsbergis said. "The European ReArm plan might be the first step in the right direction." Landsbergis said Europe simply allowed the crisis to build following Russia's annexation of Crimea, rather than taking decisive action. It has been, he said, a wasted decade. "During that time, Europeans said all the right things, but unfortunately very little preparation," Landsbergis said. "After the 2022 [Ukraine] invasion, there was hope that the situation would change dramatically and European factories would start rolling out tanks, howitzers and ammunition. This happened, but not to the extent that one would have hoped." WATCH | Canada plans military buildup in the Arctic: Canada plans Arctic military expansion as part of sovereignty push 15 days ago Duration 2:02 Canada is planning a major Arctic military expansion, boosting its presence by several months each year and inviting more NATO troops to join. The move aims to assert sovereignty and respond to pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump. NATO does its best to put things in context, saying over the past decade, European allies and Canada have steadily increased their collective investment in defence — from 1.43 per cent of their combined gross domestic product in 2014, to 2.02 per cent in 2024. (Canada currently sits at 1.37 percent of GDP) The increase represents $485 billion US in defence, the alliance says. Landsbergis's criticism, however, was not restricted to the political establishment. He said defence contractors and the corporate world have been equally stuck on the notion of business as usual. "Every conversation I had with defense industry representatives during the years of war would end with a phrase: 'I'm not building anything until you show me the money,'" he said. "And that was the crux of the problem. Europe would talk nice but spend little and business leaders, Putin or anyone who's good at math would see right through it." The lack of urgency, Landsbergis said, was evident in Ukraine's life-and-death fight to hold the line from the advancing Russian army. As a Lithuanian who understands life under Russian occupation, the arming of Ukraine in fits and starts was painful to watch, he said. "Whenever another baby step is taken, I must show gratitude and whisper to myself, 'Better late than never,'" Landsbergis said.
Forbes
3 days ago
- Business
- Forbes
As Donald Trump Tugs On NATO Ties, Europe Thinks About Plan B
Former Lithuanian foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis sums up his concerns about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russian President Vladimir Putin with an image borrowed from quantum mechanics: Schrödinger's cat. 'We're in an ambiguous position,' Landsbergis told me in an interview last week. President Donald Trump makes inflammatory statements about the alliance, threatening to walk away unless Europe steps up to carry more of the cost. But then Secretary of State Marco Rubio appears in Brussels, or some other forum, and calms European leaders down—Landsbergis calls it 'normalizing the situation.' The upshot: confusion and uncertainty. 'NATO is challenged and not challenged at the same time,' the former diplomat says. And in his view, this creates a perfect, bone-chilling opportunity for Putin. It isn't hard to imagine how the scenario would play out. If Putin can convince the White House that the U.S. will benefit from a better relationship with Moscow—as he apparently has—Trump may hesitate to jeopardize the opportunity, even if a NATO ally is attacked. It's Landsbergis' worst nightmare: 'Trump will say, 'I'm in the middle of a conversation with Putin. I can't break it off. I'm sorry, guys. I'm unable to help. You're on your own.'' As the Lithuanian sees it, Putin has already maneuvered the U.S. into a kind of 'limbo position' that poses grave dangers for the alliance. 'Putin may think this is the moment to act—to change the reality' on the ground in Europe. No wonder leaders across the continent are starting to think about Plan B. Trump doesn't have to withdraw from NATO, as he has threatened repeatedly over the years. He is already destroying the trust that made the transatlantic alliance so effective, protecting its members and deterring its enemies through the Cold War and beyond. One such Plan B is the self-dubbed 'coalition of the willing' that came together to support Ukraine after Trump's brutal Oval Office encounter with Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelensky. Among its goals: continued military aid for Kyiv, tougher negotiations with the Kremlin, and a just, lasting peace, guaranteed by a European 'reassurance force' stationed on Ukrainian soil. Landsbergis has been sharply critical of the effort. 'Why is it so hard to find evidence that the coalition of the willing is actually willing to do anything meaningful, let alone game-changing?' he asked in a recent online post. The group's premise isn't wrong, he explains to me. 'We're seeing our world unravel. But something needs to be done—something more—to avert the threat.' Landsbergis' own Plan B starts with his home region, the Baltic countries, which have been among the most stalwart in warning the world about Russian aggression and providing aid for Ukraine. Absorbed by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, and occupied for nearly 50 years (until 1991), the three Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—understand Russian imperialism better than almost anyone except maybe Ukraine. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, the three small states—along with Denmark, also on the Baltic Sea—have spent proportionately more to support Ukraine than any other country, including the U.S. (The Baltic countries have contributed between 1.5% and 2.2% of GDP, the U.S. just .5%.) These three small nations alone—total population, just over 6 million—can't hope to fill in for NATO. But they'd stand a better chance, Landsbergis argues, in coalition with seven other states that also front or depend on the Baltic Sea: Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Poland, and Germany. All 10 already belong to an existing international organization, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, that Landsbergis and a coauthor of a recent report, former Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves, believe could be recast and reinvented as a powerful regional alliance. Formed in 1992 as a kind of beginners' club—a forum to help the Baltic states and Poland, all just emerging from the Soviet sphere of influence, understand what it would mean to join Europe. The group long ago outlived its original mission. 'In ordinary circumstances, if we felt NATO was strong enough,' Landsbergis explains, 'we wouldn't be having this conversation. We'd thank the CBSS for what it did, and that would be that. But our world is changing. We need alternative security formats.' The former diplomat sees the Baltic council as a 'bit more than a coalition of the willing.' It comes with a ready-made organizational infrastructure—rotating leadership, working groups, a secretariat, and staff. In the short term, it would be largely a political forum focused on the northern response to Russian hybrid warfare—sabotage, disinformation, undersea cable-cutting, and the like. But if the climate were to get worse—if NATO continued to lose power and influence—it could take on a larger role, including regional defense planning and military coordination. 'Look,' Landsbergis says. 'The Baltic countries are nervous.' He points to the bilateral security agreement signed earlier this month by France and Poland. 'Does France think Europe ends in Warsaw? We need to protect ourselves.' A coalition that includes Poland, currently NATO's biggest defense spender, and the newly re-arming Germany, would have significant military muscle. 'Germany is going to spend half a trillion euros on defense in coming years,' Landsbergis notes. 'We need to keep its eyes focused north.' What about NATO itself? Why, I ask skeptically, are Landsbergis and other worried Europeans focused on regional alliances? Aren't they just putting patches on a collapsing roof? Wouldn't it make more sense to rethink NATO? Landsbergis doesn't disagree. His report recommending an overhaul of the CBSS is suitably deferential: 'Ultimately, major security decisions will always flow through NATO and the EU,' it states. But he admits he and his coauthor were being diplomatic. And in the long run, he recognizes, there may be a need for more fundamental, far-reaching reform. The problem is no one wants to abandon ship until it's absolutely necessary. European leaders are worried about what Landsbergis calls a 'self-fulfilling prophecy.' The continent could trigger the breakup of the alliance just by talking about it, prompting Trump's anger and a sudden U.S. withdrawal. 'Our ministers are in a tough position,' the former diplomat says empathetically. 'They will be forced to deny the reality until the very last moment.' He has no expectations for the upcoming NATO summit, scheduled to take place in The Hague at the end of June. Far from confronting alliance tensions, he predicts, it will continue to paper over reality with an upbeat message about increased military spending. All 32 members, with the possible exception of Spain, are expected to commit to reaching Trump's target, spending 5% of GDP on defense and related infrastructure. 'They will raise the hand of a barely alive person,' Landsbergis forecasts sardonically, 'and say, 'Look, it's waving.'' Where does that leave Europe in the short term, as Russia escalates attacks on Ukraine and expands its military presence on NATO's eastern flank, increasing defense spending and building bases along the Finnish border? Maybe the only answer for now is a patchwork of Plan B partial alternatives. 'I'm speaking as someone who is worried about the future of my country,' Landsbergis explains. 'We need to be able to defend ourselves. How long would we have to fight if we were fighting alone?'
Forbes
3 days ago
- Business
- Forbes
Europe Looks For Alternatives To A Changing NATO
Gabrielius Landsbergis, then the foreign minister of Lithuania, speaks to the press in December ... More 2024. (Photo by BOB REIJNDERS/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images) Former Lithuanian foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis sums up his concerns about NATO with an image borrowed from quantum mechanics: Schrödinger's cat. 'We're in an ambiguous position,' Landsbergis explained in an interview last week. President Donald Trump makes inflammatory statements about the alliance, threatening to walk away unless Europe steps up to carry more of the cost. But then Secretary of State Marco Rubio appears in Brussels or some other forum and calms Europe down—Landsbergis calls it 'normalizing the situation.' The upshot: confusion and uncertainty. 'NATO is challenged and not challenged at the same time,' the former diplomat says. And in his view, this creates a perfect, bone-chilling opportunity for Russian strongman Vladimir Putin. It isn't hard to imagine how the scenario would play out. If Putin can convince the White House that the U.S. will benefit from a better relationship with Moscow—as he apparently has—Trump may hesitate to jeopardize the opportunity, even if a NATO ally is attacked. It's Landsbergis' worst nightmare: 'Trump will say, 'I'm in the middle of a conversation with Putin. I can't break it off. I'm sorry, guys. I'm unable to help. You're on your own.'' As the Lithuanian sees it, Putin has already maneuvered the U.S. into a kind of 'limbo position' that poses grave dangers for the alliance. 'Putin may think this is the moment to act—to change the reality' on the ground in Europe. No wonder leaders across the continent are starting to think about Plan B. Trump doesn't have to withdraw from NATO, as he has threatened repeatedly over the years. He is already destroying the trust that made the transatlantic alliance so effective, protecting its members and deterring its enemies through the Cold War and beyond. One such Plan B is the self-dubbed 'coalition of the willing' that came together to support Ukraine after Trump's brutal Oval Office encounter with Ukraine's Volodymyr Zelensky. Among its goals: continued military aid for Kyiv, tougher negotiations with the Kremlin, and a just, lasting peace, guaranteed by a European 'reassurance force' stationed on Ukrainian soil. Landsbergis has been sharply critical of the effort. 'Why is it so hard to find evidence that the coalition of the willing is actually willing to do anything meaningful, let alone game-changing?' he asked in a recent online post. The group's premise isn't wrong, he explains to me. 'We're seeing our world unravel. But something needs to be done—something more—to avert the threat.' Landsbergis' own Plan B starts with his home region, the Baltic countries, which have been among the most stalwart in warning the world about Russian aggression and providing aid for Ukraine. Absorbed by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II and occupied for nearly 50 years, until 1991, the three Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—understand Russian imperialism better than almost anyone except maybe Ukraine. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, the three small states—along with Denmark, also on the Baltic Sea—have spent proportionately more to support Ukraine than any other country, including the U.S. (The Baltic countries have contributed between 1.5% and 2.2% of GDP, the U.S. just .5%.) These three small nations alone—total population, just over 6 million—can't hope to fill in for NATO. But they'd stand a better chance, Landsbergis argues, in coalition with seven other states that also front or depend on the Baltic Sea: Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Poland, and Germany. All 10 already belong to an existing international organization, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), that Landsbergis and a coauthor of a recent report, former Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves, believe could be recast and reinvented as a powerful regional alliance. Formed in 1992 as a kind of beginners' club—a forum to help the Baltic states and Poland, all just emerging from the Soviet sphere of influence, understand what it would mean to join Europe—the group long ago outlived its original mission. 'In ordinary circumstances, if we felt NATO was strong enough,' Landsbergis explains, 'we wouldn't be having this conversation. We'd thank the CBSS for what it did, and that would be that. But our world is changing. We need alternative security formats.' The former diplomat sees the Baltic council as a 'bit more than a coalition of the willing.' It comes with a ready-made organizational infrastructure—rotating leadership, working groups, a secretariat, and staff. In the short term, it would be largely a political forum focused on the northern response to Russian hybrid warfare—sabotage, disinformation, undersea cable-cutting, and the like. But if the climate were to get worse—if NATO continued to lose power and influence—it could take on a larger role, including regional defense planning and military coordination. 'Look,' Landsbergis says. 'The Baltic countries are nervous.' He points to the bilateral security agreement signed earlier this month by France and Poland. 'Does France think Europe ends in Warsaw? We need to protect ourselves.' A coalition that includes Poland, currently NATO's biggest defense spender, and the newly re-arming Germany, would have significant military muscle. 'Germany is going to spend half a trillion euros on defense in coming years,' Landsbergis notes. 'We need to keep its eyes focused north.' What about NATO itself? Why, I ask skeptically, are Landsbergis and other worried Europeans focused on regional alliances? Aren't they just putting patches on a collapsing roof? Wouldn't it make more sense to rethink NATO? Landsbergis doesn't disagree. His report recommending an overhaul of the CBSS is suitably deferential: 'Ultimately, major security decisions will always flow through NATO and the EU,' it states. But he admits he and his coauthor were being diplomatic. And in the long run, he recognizes, there may be a need for more fundamental, far-reaching reform. The problem: no one wants to abandon ship until it's absolutely necessary. European leaders are worried about what Landsbergis calls a 'self-fulfilling prophecy.' The continent could trigger the breakup of the alliance just by talking about it, prompting Trump's anger and a sudden U.S. withdrawal. 'Our ministers are in a tough position,' the former diplomat says empathetically. 'They will be forced to deny the reality until the very last moment.' He has no expectations for the upcoming NATO summit, scheduled to take place in The Hague at the end of June. Far from confronting alliance tensions, he predicts, it will continue to paper over reality with an upbeat message about increased military spending. All 32 members, with the possible exception of Spain, are expected to commit to reaching Trump's target, spending 5% of GDP on defense and related infrastructure. 'They will raise the hand of a barely alive person,' Landsbergis forecasts sardonically, 'and say, 'Look, it's waving.'' Where does that leave Europe in the short term, as Russia escalates attacks on Ukraine and expands its military presence on NATO's eastern flank, increasing defense spending and building bases along the Finnish border? Maybe the only answer for now is a patchwork of Plan B partial alternatives. 'I'm speaking as someone who is worried about the future of my country,' Landsbergis explains. 'We need to be able to defend ourselves. How long would we have to fight if we were fighting alone?'
Yahoo
6 days ago
- Politics
- Yahoo
Former Lithuanian foreign minister tweets sarcastic reminder that Ukraine was promised Taurus missiles and anti-Russian sanctions
Following Russia's latest massive missile attack on Ukraine, former Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis has tweeted a sarcastic reminder of the new German chancellor's as-yet-unfulfilled promise to supply Taurus missiles to Ukraine and the pledge by Western countries to impose crippling sanctions on Russia. Source: Landsbergis on X (Twitter), as reported by European Pravda Details: Landsbergis is known for his outspoken criticism of Russian aggression against Ukraine, and he didn't hold back. He posted the message on Sunday after a night of extensive Russian airstrikes on Ukrainian cities and villages. "Hello, sorry to disturb you, but have you heard anything about Taurus and those crippling sanctions? Let me know, thanks," Landsbergis said. Background: Before taking office, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz had criticised his predecessor Olaf Scholz for refusing to supply Ukraine with Taurus missiles. He even proposed an ultimatum to Vladimir Putin, stating that if Putin did not cease attacks on Ukraine within 24 hours, Kyiv would receive the missiles. After assuming office, Merz altered his stance, stating that any decision on missiles would be made in coordination with allies. He also indicated that he preferred not to discuss specific weapons systems for Ukraine publicly. On 10 May, during a visit to Kyiv, the leaders of France, the UK, Poland and Germany demanded that Russia halt its attacks for an extended period from 12 May, threatening massive sanctions if it failed to comply. But the world's attention then shifted to the peace talks in Istanbul, which yielded no significant outcomes, and the European leaders made no further mention of their ultimatum. The US Senate frequently threatens devastating sanctions against Russia for rejecting peace, but no substantial new restrictions have been implemented. Support Ukrainska Pravda on Patreon!
New York Times
12-05-2025
- Politics
- New York Times
‘Doubt Has Crept In': Three European Diplomats on Trusting America
Serge Schmemann hosted a video conversation with three former European diplomats, Wolfgang Ischinger of Germany, Judith Gough of Britain and Gabrielius Landsbergis of Lithuania, to talk about how the Trump administration has profoundly shaken the U.S.-European foundation of shared ideals, commitment to freedom, economic ties and democratic values. Serge Schmemann: What I'd like to ask you, as three prominent former diplomats, is to reflect on what America meant to you in your work, how you react personally to the administration's approach to the bonds with Europe and what you believe the impact may be on the world. Wolfgang Ischinger: My personal ties to the United States have gone far beyond the professional realm. I've spent a total of more than a dozen years in the country — as a high school student, as a postgraduate student at Harvard Law School, as a young diplomat and then in the early 2000s for almost five years as ambassador. We had issues in those days, especially over the Iraq war. But I felt very confident as a German in the 1990s or 2000s that for the first time in many decades Germany was now on the right side of history, that after the years under the kaiser and then the Nazis, Germany was identifying with the West and invited to be part of the West — especially by the United States. So the German relationship with the United States until now has been something that created tremendous joy and satisfaction for Germans. That is why I think what has happened in the West between the United States and her European allies and others has created more pain, more convulsion, more crisis in the mind of German elites than in the minds of most other European elites. Schmemann: Ms. Gough, can you identify a specific moment or situation in which the United States was critical to your own outlook? Judith Gough: I don't think there's a specific moment, but I think there is a theme that runs through both of my postings, first as British ambassador to Georgia, but then as ambassador to Ukraine, which is that Britain and the United States were very much partners in terms of supporting the progression of democracy in both Georgia and Ukraine, and fighting corruption in Ukraine, supporting reform, the rule of law, human rights. Of course, there were variances of opinions, particularly around, for example, L.G.B.T.-plus rights, where there were nuances and differences. But I think what I felt as an ambassador was very much a sense of a partnership with America. Schmemann: Today, when you follow American handling of peace talks for Ukraine, how do you react? Gough: You know, the vision and the goal is the correct one, which is to bring peace to Ukraine. I think the challenge comes in terms of conducting negotiations. Ukraine has to be at the table, and so do the Europeans. On the one hand, the United States quite rightly wants Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense and its own security. But by that token, Europe has to be at the table and playing a serious role. Schmemann: Mr. Landsbergis, as a Lithuanian you're a citizen of a country directly threatened by a hostile Russia, and as foreign minister you've been a direct participant in the shaping of a post-Soviet universe. Can you describe a concrete instance when the United States shaped your perceptions or actions? Gabrielius Landsbergis: There's one particular point in history which I think is quite important to my country. This was just before Lithuania joined NATO, when President George W. Bush came. It was the first time a U.S. president visited my country. He gave a very memorable speech in which, at least as far as we know, he went off script because he was feeling really warmhearted by the amount of people that had gathered there in the main square of Vilnius, all of them wavering U.S. flags and chanting 'U.S.A.! ' And he said something like whoever would choose Lithuania as their enemy would choose United States as their enemy as well. Apparently these words were unscripted. Yet they are now on a plaque on the town hall of Vilnius. A kid in school could probably quote these words. So this is how deeply our fate and our security are bound to our ally across the Atlantic. So you can imagine what not just me, but the whole country, is experiencing right now. It's like something in your body being torn, because we grew up with this, we lived with this, we believed in this. Schmemann: Maybe we could follow that up, if I could ask all of you to describe ways in which the United States of an earlier time embodied values that you and your people regarded as critical, that benefited the world? Gough: I think the values that the United States stood for were extremely clear. I can remember when the Soviet Union dissolved: It was one of the reasons I decided to study Russian and embark upon the career that I did. You could see a new world opening up, you could see a new direction and the values that prevailed, and they were very much values that were put forward by the United States. The challenge now is trying to understand what values the United States stands for: What are the values that American diplomats go forth and defend and uphold? Schmemann: Wolfgang, would you agree? Half of your nation was part of the East. Were there similar sentiments toward the United States, or were they different? Ischinger: I remember very well when President George W. Bush visited Berlin in 2002, and before he arrived there were the usual anti-American demonstrations in parts of Berlin. I remember a Berlin taxi driver who said to me, if you see President Bush, please tell him this: We Berliners know that these demonstrators owe the fact that they can demonstrate for and against whatever they please to the fact that our city was protected and kept free by the United States for the last 60 years. I'm proud to say I actually managed to transmit that message to President Bush, who loved it and told the story to some American television reporter. We're having this conversation almost exactly 30 years since my friend, the late Richard Holbrooke, published an important piece in Foreign Affairs titled 'America, a European Power.' There was no question mark at the end of the title. I think it's very important to read that piece today because most of it rings totally true. It is in America's interest to make sure that Europe remains at peace and stable. It seems to me that we are now at a crossroads as far as the development of Europe is concerned. For many decades, the idea was that Europe was going to be protected and supported by the United States. I think we are now facing a very different situation, where America is now suggesting to us that maybe you guys should take your security into your own hands. That is something totally revolutionary, if the United States is no longer willing to serve as the big protector which takes care of European security now and essentially forever. It requires the European project, which was focused for many decades only on economic and social integration, to add a totally new dimension — a Europe which can protect itself by itself. Schmemann: There have been differences, of course, but Wolfgang speaks of a 'revolution.' Differences between Republican and Democratic administrations is one thing, but are we now in something totally new? Gough: We are at something new in terms of how the United States is conducting its business. But I don't think I'm massively surprised. We have a U.S. administration that signaled quite clearly what its intentions were. Whether people chose to listen to that and understand is a different matter. I think it is incumbent upon Europe to think proactively: What are we going to do? How are we going to engage? Hand-wringing will get us nowhere. Schmemann: How about you, Gabrielius? Did you ever imagine an America such as we have today? Landsbergis: Well, we'd seen Donald Trump in the first administration. We talked about it. We had all the time to prepare. But we didn't do that. So it's very difficult for us to admit that this is happening. And nobody could have prepared for somebody who would shatter the fundamentals, the foundations of trans-Atlantic relations. What sort of U.S. involvement we will be seeing in Europe? No more troops? No more NATO? No more Article 5? No more nuclear umbrella? I mean, how far does it go? Schmemann: What about you, Wolfgang? Ischinger: Let me first respond to what Gabrielius just said. There is a growing concern all over Europe about future U.S. intentions regarding NATO. But it's important to note that as we speak, no U.S. troops have been withdrawn from Europe. There are still many tens of thousands of American soldiers all over the European continent. Not one nuclear weapon based in Europe has been withdrawn. In other words, NATO still exists. There may be changes coming. We are worried about that; but they have not started. What has started, however, is that doubt has crept in, a loss of mutual trust. Loss of trust in diplomacy or in international relations is very similar to a loss of trust in a relationship between persons: It's very easy to lose, but rebuilding trust is very complicated. Schmemann: Do you think that Europe will finally take a closer and more serious look at its own security? Gough: Diplomats are hard-wired to see a silver lining in any situation and to look for the positive and look long term. Look at how quickly Europe actually moved on Ukraine, largely led by Britain and France, but with vital input from everybody. It's very hard to look at the defense of Europe at the moment without U.S. engagement and without U.S. hardware. But I think you will see that when the chips are down, Europe will do that. Schmemann: Gabrielius, do you see any silver lining in this retreat of the United States? Landsbergis: Yes and no. On one hand I see positive signs when it comes to specific countries pulling a lot more weight than they probably figured that they would ever need to. I would stress the importance of the announcements that are coming from the German government. I mean, Germany alone is investing billions of euros into defense. That's an enormous decision for Germany, for Europe, for my country. It's a signal to Putin. That is huge. What I'm worried about is this: When we talk about the European Union, when we talk about the institutions, I would like to see more belief in ourselves. We are a continent of 450 million people. We have an enormous economy that, if it wants to, can achieve things. It can reinvent itself and it can actually defend itself. But I'm worried that we lack the belief that this is the European hour, our make-it-or- break it moment. We have to transform ourselves into a continent that actually believes in itself and is able to defend itself. So the shock is healthy, unless it kills the patient. Schmemann: Wolfgang, do you think this is a moment when Europe might pull together? Ischinger: In the long run, yes, but this is not what the original European Community was built for. The idea was integrating, not defending against the outside. We are going to be facing a totally new challenge to make of this European Union something that can play this role. In the long term, there's no reason not to be optimistic. But it'll take time. Building up a Europe that can protect itself, even if we spend a lot of money, will take years. This is why I am quite skeptical and worried. I hope the United States is not going to abandon us at this very critical juncture. Schmemann: What scenarios do you fear most immediately? Ischinger: It's worth noting that China has so far not officially recognized Crimea to be part of Russia, nor has China recognized the four oblasts in Donbas that Russia claims to be part of Russia. It's very important from a legal point of view that the United States also remind itself of how it once refused to recognize Soviet occupation of the Baltic countries. It's crucially important that even if certain compromises may be required to obtain a peaceful settlement of the Ukraine war, there should be no legal recognition of territorial occupation. If we neglect these principles, we would really be in trouble in Europe. Schmemann: Judith, do you have any nightmare scenarios in all this? Gough: They're not dissimilar to Wolfgang's. As somebody who served in Ukraine, my nightmare scenario is that a short-term peace deal is favored over a long-term perspective that will hold. We have to be really clear that Russia is actually not interested in a bit of Ukraine. It is interested in ensuring that Ukraine is not a sovereign nation able to make its own choices and decide its own destiny, which includes drawing closer to Europe. There's a very old saying that's attributed to Lenin — and I have no idea whether he said it or not — which is that if you have a bayonet and you push against something soft, you keep on pushing, but if you hit something hard, you stop. What really needs to be in place is some really hard resolve that says to Russia, stop. If we accept that borders can be changed by force and aggression in Ukraine, then where else can that happen? Schmemann: And you, Gabrielius, what keeps you awake at night? Landsbergis: Well, my scenarios are close to home, so to say. My biggest worry is that the signaling of the last couple of months to the Russians might change their calculations as to how and when to test other countries in NATO and the E.U. As Wolfgang mentioned, in the short term, Europe might not be ready. If we know this, so does Putin. And if he is given a respite in Ukraine, he might decide that maybe this is a time he could test whether NATO is still alive. This is the stuff of nightmares for any European country. Schmemann: If the United States has indeed abdicated its role as the beacon of freedom, what is the alternative? What can or should Europe do? Landsbergis: First of all, leave the door open. I think that there are enough people in the United States who hold the same values we do, who want to be part of building the world in that idealistic image. I'm convinced there will be a turnaround. But we cannot just wait. Until we are back in this reinforced, reinvigorated, trans-Atlantic arrangement, there are countries and people out there looking for a beacon of freedom, for somebody to light it up. If the United States cannot do it, well, Europe has to do it. Schmemann: Judith? Gough: The key thing for us in Europe to remember is that we haven't changed. Neither have our interests. We need to be confident and we need to keep engaging and need to keep talking with the United States. You are still our closest partner. We need to keep sticking up for our values and articulating our values and articulating our interests. Schmemann: Wolfgang? Ischinger: We should not despair about what some of us may see as unfortunate developments across the Atlantic. There are so many governors and senators and intellectuals and academics who are totally aware of how important American soft power has been and continues to be; how important the partnership and alliance and other links with Europe are for the United States. We need to remind our American friends that we're in this together. So engage, engage, engage, that would be my final word. Schmemann: In fact, that is exactly what we have tried to facilitate today. The chance to engage, to keep talking. So I want to thank the three of you very sincerely.
