Latest news with #GrapheneOS
Android Authority
2 days ago
- Android Authority
The Pixel's most powerful privacy tool doesn't come from Google, but I'd install it in a heartbeat
Calvin Wankhede / Android Authority Google's Pixel phones have long been sold as some of the most secure Android devices you can buy, thanks to the inclusion of the Titan M2 chip and regular security patches over several years. There's a bit of irony to that statement, of course — Google's entire business model revolves around selling ads. Indeed, the search giant has quite a bit of insight into the way you use your device along with a host of other analytics and location data. Having said that, Pixel phones have one unique advantage: they are compatible with GrapheneOS, an open-source alternative to the default Pixel operating system. GrapheneOS makes it extremely difficult for apps — Google's included — to phone home in the background. Of course, what makes the Pixel the first choice for privacy purists isn't something Google likes to advertise. It's the fact that you can strip everything Google out of the phone. Here's why you might want to make the jump. Hardening your Pixel is easier than you think Calvin Wankhede / Android Authority Installing a third-party operating system might seem daunting and reckless — especially if you never flashed custom ROMs back in the Wild West days of Android modding. But GrapheneOS is perhaps the only one among them all that makes the entire process remarkably painless. In fact, I'd argue that it's easier than installing Windows on a laptop. Most of the installation process takes place in a web browser, and the only hardware you'll need is a computer and a USB cable. GrapheneOS' documentation is clear and walks you through each step — that's as good as it gets in the world of aftermarket software. That's partly because GrapheneOS only supports one family of devices: Pixel phones and tablets. With no fragmentation to account for, the instructions are easy to follow with little to no caveats. Why doesn't GrapheneOS support non-Pixel devices? GrapheneOS maintains a dedicated FAQ page explaining why the project currently only targets Pixel phones. The long and short of it is that only Pixel devices meet the project's security standards. Furthermore, Google is the only major phone maker allowing us to install an alternative OS at the moment. Finally, the company provides consistent security patches over a definite support window that GrapheneOS can use as a base for updates. The GrapheneOS team has hinted at a partnership with a phone manufacturer, but there are no public details yet. Still, I've seen one common misconception: that installing GrapheneOS means weakening your phone's defenses. After all, doesn't unlocking the bootloader open up security holes? Not quite. While you do need to unlock your bootloader in order to install a different operating system, you're supposed to relock it for GrapheneOS. It also explicitly mandates a locked bootloader and enforces Verified Boot, meaning the same stringent integrity checks you'd find on the stock Pixel OS. Once again, this is different from the old days of Android customization — most of us didn't relock the bootloader, and left a custom recovery installed with full filesystem access to app and user data. Finally, my favorite aspect about installing GrapheneOS is that it just works — it's the opposite of the old days when we'd install half-baked CyanogenMod nightlies and crossed our fingers. And unlike those setups that often relied on root access for most of the meaningful features, GrapheneOS doesn't use root at all. That's just the setup process. Once installed, GrapheneOS offers the regular smartphone experience plus a whole lot more. From better permissions to What you gain from using GrapheneOS Calvin Wankhede / Android Authority Before I talk about any of the more flashy privacy features that make GrapheneOS such a refreshing change of pace compared to Pixel OS, it's worth highlighting that the best part is perhaps what you don't see on the surface. Specifically, GrapheneOS' open source nature means that its community is constantly looking to patch new security holes — at a pace that's often faster than Google and other tech companies. Case in point: I discovered the TapTrap vulnerability the other day and was pleasantly surprised to find that GrapheneOS has patched it. Meanwhile, Google first got wind of this potential exploit last year but even the latest Android 16 build remains vulnerable to it. GrapheneOS builds on top of Android's monthly security patches instead of just shipping whatever Google deems fit. That alone might be worth making the switch for some privacy advocates. But the real power of GrapheneOS becomes more evident once you start using the phone: Sandboxed Google apps : The pre-installed Google apps on Android phones run in a privileged manner — meaning they have deep system-level access to your device. Whether it's network activity or your location via GPS, there's little you can do to stop Google from knowing it all. This is how traffic data is always so accurate on Google Maps, for example. But on GrapheneOS, if you need Google Play Services, you can install a sandboxed version directly from the OS. Better yet, it treats Google apps like regular apps. You can shut off access to specific permissions or everything, and your phone will still work as expected. : The pre-installed Google apps on Android phones run in a privileged manner — meaning they have deep system-level access to your device. Whether it's network activity or your location via GPS, there's little you can do to stop Google from knowing it all. This is how traffic data is always so accurate on Google Maps, for example. But on GrapheneOS, if you need Google Play Services, you can install a sandboxed version directly from the OS. Better yet, it treats Google apps like regular apps. You can shut off access to specific permissions or everything, and your phone will still work as expected. Scoped permissions : Instead of giving an app full access to your files, GrapheneOS lets you pick and choose which ones you'd like to share. But it's not just files, it extends to contacts too. This is because most apps will refuse to function if you deny permissions. In the future, GrapheneOS also plans to introduce location scopes to send a mock location to singular apps. Likewise, camera scopes will send an image or recorded video to the app instead of your live camera feed. : Instead of giving an app full access to your files, GrapheneOS lets you pick and choose which ones you'd like to share. But it's not just files, it extends to contacts too. This is because most apps will refuse to function if you deny permissions. In the future, GrapheneOS also plans to introduce location scopes to send a mock location to singular apps. Likewise, camera scopes will send an image or recorded video to the app instead of your live camera feed. Extra permissions : In addition to the added granularity for existing permissions, GrapheneOS also gives you additional ones like sensor and internet access. This prevents apps on your phone from knowing your activity, phone usage, and other important metrics that could be used to profile you for advertising or other reasons. : In addition to the added granularity for existing permissions, GrapheneOS also gives you additional ones like sensor and internet access. This prevents apps on your phone from knowing your activity, phone usage, and other important metrics that could be used to profile you for advertising or other reasons. Enhanced multi-user profiles : While Android has offered multiple user profiles for years, it has never been useful from a privacy point of view. However, GrapheneOS encourages you to isolate apps in different user profiles and can forward notifications across profiles. This means you can banish Google apps to a secondary or tertiary profile where they cannot see or interact with the rest of the device. GrapheneOS is the only Android fork I've seen that pushes notifications to the primary user profile, making the feature much more useful. : While Android has offered multiple user profiles for years, it has never been useful from a privacy point of view. However, GrapheneOS encourages you to isolate apps in different user profiles and can forward notifications across profiles. This means you can banish Google apps to a secondary or tertiary profile where they cannot see or interact with the rest of the device. GrapheneOS is the only Android fork I've seen that pushes notifications to the primary user profile, making the feature much more useful. Auto reboot : When your phone first boots up, all of your data is encrypted and locked behind your password or PIN. GrapheneOS can automatically reboot your device periodically to ensure that someone cannot extract unencrypted data from the phone's memory. This is a minor feature but still nice to have. : When your phone first boots up, all of your data is encrypted and locked behind your password or PIN. GrapheneOS can automatically reboot your device periodically to ensure that someone cannot extract unencrypted data from the phone's memory. This is a minor feature but still nice to have. Duress PINs: What if you're in danger and forced to hand over your unlocked device? GrapheneOS lets you set a second PIN that will completely wipe all data on your device including eSIM profiles. These are just a handful of what's available — GrapheneOS also packs its own hardened web browser, PDF reader, and camera app. Not to mention, smaller security and privacy tweaks like a scrambled PIN input pad on the lockscreen. GrapheneOS' cons and why they're not deal-breakers Joe Maring / Android Authority Back when I first wrote about GrapheneOS, it had two major downsides: it didn't support Android Auto, and Google Pay/Wallet would not run on the OS. Two years later, I'm happy to report that Android Auto now works on GrapheneOS in a completely sandboxed manner. And while Wallet will likely never work because of Google's restrictions, there are easy workarounds to this problem. First off, contactless payments are still absolutely supported and possible on GrapheneOS. Even if Google Wallet doesn't work, plenty of banks worldwide support NFC payments using their own app. You simply set it as the default and carry on as usual. As for banking apps themselves, most of them work on GrapheneOS because the latter enforces the same strong security standards as any other flavor of Android. And if your bank's app doesn't natively support NFC payments, there's yet another way: simply get a wearable. Google Wallet will work fine on a Pixel Watch, for example, as will Samsung Pay on a Galaxy Watch. This does translate to a bit of extra cost if you don't already own one, but I upgrade my wearables far less often than any other device. In fact, I still have a fully functional Samsung Pay setup on my Gear S3 from 2017. NFC payments don't work via Google Wallet, but your bank app might support it instead. Other than that, you're inevitably going to miss a few bleeding-edge software features on GrapheneOS, namely those that rely heavily on Google services. The most impactful ones I've found are Circle to Search, Now Playing, and Call Screening. Whether or not these matter to you is a matter of personal preference, but I believe the pros of GrapheneOS outweigh these omissions. Luckily, hardware-based features still work, including Pro Camera controls and the thermometer on newer Pixel Pro phones. Still, if all of the above isn't enough to convince you to switch, you can at least take some solace in knowing that GrapheneOS has made some important upstream contributions to the AOSP codebase. This means the project's efforts have made all Android phones a bit more secure, even those running Pixel OS. It's hard to argue against such an altruistic mission. In the end, GrapheneOS proves that robust privacy doesn't require immense sacrifice. By building on the solid foundation of the Pixel, it delivers a stable and user-friendly experience that puts you firmly in the driver's seat. Still the irony is clear: the Pixel's most powerful privacy tool isn't one Google created, but one it merely makes possible. Follow
Android Authority
18-07-2025
- Android Authority
GrapheneOS makers take a knife to this 'Google-free' phone coming to the US
Paul Jones / Android Authority TL;DR The team behind the GrapheneOS platform has criticized the Fairphone Gen 6 for apparent security issues. The team added that the Fairphone model sold in the US lacks 'bare minimum' privacy and security protections. Even the standard Fairphone Gen 6 was criticized for delayed software patches and the lack of a secure element. The Fairphone Gen 6 is one of the best Android phones to get if you want a repairable and sustainable smartphone experience. The device is also coming to the US with the Google-free /e/OS software instead of the conventional Android OS. However, it seems like you should think twice about getting this variant if you care about security. The team behind the security-focused GrapheneOS Android platform has made some extremely concerning claims about the Fairphone Gen 6 running /e/OS. Is the US Fairphone Gen 6 a security nightmare? Fairphone Gen 6 devices running /e/OS apparently lag 'very far behind' the Android Open Source Project in terms of OS and browser patches. Furthermore, the team alleges that /e/OS 'disables or cripples' important privacy and security protections. Unfortunately, the standard Fairphone Gen 6 wasn't immune to criticism, either: Fairphone 6 does not keep up with standard Android privacy/security patches and has no secure element to provide working disk encryption for typical users not using a strong password, among other flaws. 'Lack of secure element throttling for disk encryption means users with a typical 6-8 digit PIN or basic password will not have their data protected against extraction,' the team explained. 'Brute forcing the PIN or password set by the vast majority of users is trivial without secure element throttling.' How does this compare to other phones? The team noted that Pixel phones and iPhones have a 'high-quality' secure element while recent Samsung phones have a 'basic' secure element. However, the GrapheneOS developers alleged that /e/OS was worse than the standard Fairphone Gen 6 software as it 'misleads' users. More specifically, the team claimed that /e/OS changes the UI for the security patch level to 'mask' what's really being provided. The alternative Fairphone OS also has an 'inaccurate' security patch level as it ignores certain portions of security patches. Furthermore, /e/OS is said to have 'major issues' providing browser updates. That's a significant problem, as many apps default to the OS Webview, which effectively uses the system web browser. Finally, the developers claim that /e/OS has its own 'invasive' services and still uses various Google services despite the deGoogled claims. We've contacted both Fairphone and Murena (the company behind /e/OS) for comment on these claims. We'll update the article as soon as the companies get back to us. Got a tip? Talk to us! Email our staff at Email our staff at news@ . You can stay anonymous or get credit for the info, it's your choice.
The Verge
15-07-2025
- The Verge
ICEBlock isn't ‘completely anonymous'
The developer of ICEBlock, an iOS app for anonymously reporting sightings of US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials, promises that it 'ensures user privacy by storing no personal data.' But that claim has come under scrutiny. ICEBlock creator Joshua Aaron has been accused of making false promises regarding user anonymity and privacy, being 'misguided' about the privacy offered by iOS, and of being an Apple fanboy. The issue isn't what ICEBlock stores. It's about what it could accidentally reveal through its tight integration with iOS. Aaron released ICEBlock in early April, and it rocketed to the top of the App Store earlier this month after US Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem called it an 'obstruction of justice.' When calls for an Android version followed, however, the developer said it wasn't possible. 'Our application is designed to provide as much anonymity as possible without storing any user data or creating accounts,' reads part of the lengthy message. 'Achieving this level of anonymity on Android is not feasible due to the inherent requirements of push notification services.' The statement rankled some. The developers of GrapheneOS, an open-source, privacy-focused take on Android, took to BlueSky to accuse ICEBlock of 'spreading misinformation about Android' by describing it as less private than iOS. The developers said that ICEBlock ignores data kept by Apple itself and claims it 'provides complete anonymity when it doesn't.' Aaron told The Verge ICEBlock is built around a single database in iCloud. When a user taps on the map to report ICE sightings, the location data is added to that database, and users within five miles are automatically sent a push notification alerting them. Push notifications require developers to have some way of designating which devices receive them, and while Aaron declined to say precisely how the notifications function, he said alerts are sent through Apple's system, not ICEBlock's, letting him avoid keeping his own database of users or their devices. 'We utilized iCloud in kind of a creative way,' Aaron said. No security model is 100 percent safe, but in theory, ICEBlock has managed to limit the risks for people both reporting and receiving information. The Department of Homeland Security could demand information on who submitted a tip, but per Aaron's explanation, the app wouldn't have user accounts, device IDs, or IP addresses to hand over. Likewise, if ICE thinks someone used the app to find an operation and interfere, it could seek records from ICEBlock tied to who received a particular push notification — and again, it should come away empty-handed. That trick is iOS-only, though. The ICEBlock iOS app can piggyback on Apple's iCloud infrastructure to route push notifications because every iPhone user is guaranteed to have an iCloud account. Android users aren't similarly required to create Google accounts, so 'some kind of database has to be created in order to capture user information,' Aaron said. (Sharing reports across both phone platforms would create its own privacy challenges, too.) I spoke to Gaël Duval, founder and CEO of /e/OS, another privacy-focused version of Android, and he admitted that Android's push notifications require 'a registration token that uniquely identifies a given app on a given device' and that this 'would normally be saved on ICEBlock's server.' 'It's a long and random string,' he said, that doesn't include either an Android ID or the IMEI that identifies a specific phone. 'Google can still map it back to the hardware on their side, but for ICEBlock, it's pseudonymous until you link it to anything else.' So, indeed, Android notifications would require ICEBlock to store potentially identifiable information. Normally, iOS would, too, but a clever workaround lets ICEBlock avoid just that. But you might have spotted the problem: ICEBlock isn't collecting device data on iOS, but only because similar data is stored with Apple instead. Apple maintains a database of which devices and accounts have installed a given app, and Carlos Anso from GrapheneOS told me that it likely also tracks device registrations for push notifications. For either ICEBlock's iOS app or a hypothetical Android app, law enforcement could demand information directly from the company, cutting ICEBlock out of the loop. Aaron told me that he has 'no idea what Apple would store,' and it 'has nothing to do with ICEBlock.' For people who submit reports, Duval suggested that there might also be 'a residual risk' from matching report timings and telemetry data, and Anso echoed a similar worry. But without the precise details of ICEBlock's design — which Aaron is understandably reluctant to share — that's impossible to verify. 'Absolutely not,' Aaron said when I asked if it's a concern. He insisted that 'there is no risk' of Apple having data on which users have submitted reports. Aaron said ICEBlock stores essentially no data on its users on iOS right now and that he couldn't achieve the same setup on Android, a web app, or an open-source design. Critics argue he's offering a false sense of security by offloading the risk to Apple. And while it's not clear exactly what data Apple has on ICEBlock's users, it's enough to cast doubt on the claim that 'there is no data.' The question then is how safe that data is with Apple. Aaron insisted that 'nothing that Apple has would harm the user,' and he was confident that Apple wouldn't share it anyway. 'Apple has a history, that when the government tries to come after them for things, they haven't divulged that information, they've gone to court over it,' he said. 'They've fought those battles and won.' That isn't entirely true. While Apple has engaged in some high-profile privacy fights with governments and law enforcement — including efforts to get into the San Bernardino shooter's iPhone or its recent refusal to build a backdoor into iCloud encryption in the UK — it complies with the majority of government requests it receives. In its most recent transparency report, for the first half of 2024, Apple said it agreed to 86 percent of US government requests for device-based data access, 90 percent for account-based access, and 28 percent for push notification logs. Many of these will be benign — they include help tracking lost or stolen phones, for example — but others relate to cases where an 'Apple account may have been used unlawfully.' Demanding push notification data from both Apple and Google has become a key way for law enforcement to identify suspected criminals. People have a constitutional right to record public police operations and share tips about sightings. As Aaron said, an app like ICEBlock — contrary to Noem's claims — 'is in no way illegal' under current American law. But during a period where neither the president nor the Supreme Court have much regard for constitutional rights, the question isn't whether ICEBlock is legal, it's whether any information that runs through it could expose people who resist ICE, legally or not. 'We don't want anything,' Aaron said. 'I don't want a private database. I don't want any kind of information on my side at all.' And there's the rub. ICEBlock says your data is safe because it doesn't have any, but that doesn't mean it isn't out there. Do you have as much faith in Apple as Aaron does?
Android Authority
12-07-2025
- Android Authority
Cops say criminals use a Google Pixel with GrapheneOS — I say that's freedom
Calvin Wankhede / Android Authority Police in Spain have reportedly started profiling people based on their phones; specifically, and surprisingly, those carrying Google Pixel devices. Law enforcement officials in Catalonia say they associate Pixels with crime because drug traffickers are increasingly turning to these phones. But it's not Google's secure Titan M2 chip that has criminals favoring the Pixel — instead, it's GrapheneOS, a privacy-focused alternative to the default Pixel OS. As someone who has used a Pixel phone with GrapheneOS, I find this assumption a bit unsettling. I have plenty of reasons to use GrapheneOS, and avoiding law enforcement isn't on the list at all. In fact, I think many Pixel users would benefit from switching to GrapheneOS over the default Android operating system. And no, my reasons don't have anything to do with criminal activity. Why I use and recommend GrapheneOS A privacy-focused operating system may seem more trouble than it's worth. But when I replaced Google's Pixel OS with GrapheneOS, I found it to be a transformative experience. For one, the installation was painless, and I didn't lose any modern software features. Installing aftermarket operating systems used to equal a compromised smartphone experience, but I didn't find that to be true in the case of GrapheneOS. Case in point: even though GrapheneOS doesn't include any Google services, I was surprised to find that you can install the Play Store with relative ease and almost all apps work flawlessly — even most banking ones. This is impressive for any open-source fork of Android, but GrapheneOS goes above and beyond in that it also has some major privacy and security benefits. Primarily, it locks down various parts of Android to reduce the number of attack vectors and enforces stricter sandboxing to ensure that apps remain isolated from each other. GrapheneOS just works, with almost no feature or usability compromises. Take Google apps as an example. On almost all Android phones sold outside China, Google has far-reaching and system-level access to everything: your precise location, contacts, app usage, network activity, and a load of other data. You cannot do anything to stop it, whether you'd like to or not. However, you can with GrapheneOS because it treats Google apps like any other piece of unknown software. This means Google apps are forced to run in a sandbox where they have limited access to your data. GrapheneOS' sandboxing extends to invasive apps like Google Play Services and the Play Store. You can explicitly disable each and every permission for these apps manually — in fact, most permissions are disabled by default. Even better, you can create different user profiles to isolate apps that require lots of permissions. GrapheneOS can forward notifications to the primary user profile, unlike stock Android. GrapheneOS limits Google's reach into your phone more than any other flavor of Android. On the subject of app permissions, GrapheneOS builds on that, too. For example, you can stop apps from accessing the internet and reading your device's sensors — stock Android doesn't expose such granular control. And while Android permissions often take the all-or-nothing approach, GrapheneOS lets you select only the exact contacts, photos, or files that you want visible to an app. Finally, my favorite GrapheneOS feature is the ability to set a duress PIN. When entered, this secondary PIN will initiate a permanent deletion of all data on the phone, including installed eSIMs. If I'm ever forced to give up my phone's password, I can take solace in the fact that the attacker will not have access to my data. If you have nothing to hide… Sensors permission Auto reboot Disallowed permissions You might be wondering: if I don't have anything to hide, why should I bother using GrapheneOS? That's a fair question, but it misses the point. I don't use GrapheneOS because I have something to hide — I use it to exercise control over the device I own. I find it comforting that Google cannot collect data to nearly the same extent if I use GrapheneOS instead of Pixel OS. The benefits of using GrapheneOS extend far beyond just hiding from Google, though, and it's why the project has landed under the scanner of law enforcement. I believe that GrapheneOS catching attention from law enforcement just proves how much it raises the bar on privacy. GrapheneOS has built a number of app isolation-based safeguards to ensure that your phone cannot be infected remotely. The technical details are longer than I can list, but in essence, the developers stripped out parts of Android's code that could be exploited by bad actors. Some security improvements have even been suggested and incorporated into AOSP, meaning GrapheneOS' efforts have made all of our devices a tiny bit more secure. Does GrapheneOS take privacy and security too far? Megan Ellis / Android Authority GrapheneOS is one of many tools that now face suspicion and political pressure simply for making surveillance harder. Take the Signal app as another example. The encrypted messaging app has been repeatedly targeted by EU lawmakers in recent years. Specifically, a proposed 'Chat Control' legislation would compel secure messaging platforms to scan all communication — including those protected by end-to-end encryption — for illegal content such as Child Sexual Assault Material. Messaging apps in the EU would be required to scan private communications before they're encrypted, on the user's device, and report anything that looks suspicious. While encryption itself wouldn't be banned, Signal's developers have rightly pointed out that mandatory on-device scanning essentially equals a backdoor. A rogue government could misuse these privileges to spy on dissenting citizens or political opponents, while hackers might be able to steal financial information. Regulators have long asked privacy apps to compromise on their singular mission: privacy. There's a bitter irony here, too, as GrapheneOS recently pointed out in a tweet. The Spanish region of Catalonia was at the center of the massive Pegasus spyware scandal in 2019. Pegasus, a sophisticated surveillance tool sold exclusively to governments, was reportedly used to hack phones belonging to Members of the European Parliament and eavesdrop on their communications. Yet, police in this very region are now scrutinizing savvy Pixel and GrapheneOS users for hardening their devices against unlawful surveillance and other attack vectors. Open source developers cannot control what their software is used for, and that's true for GrapheneOS and Signal. Sure, some criminals will naturally want to take advantage of the privacy and security tools the rest of us use. One could say the same thing about matchboxes being used for arson and cash being used for money laundering, but no one's calling on regulators to outlaw either. In fact, law enforcement profiling is frowned upon by most of us. So, if I use GrapheneOS on my Pixel to keep my data away from Big Tech, potential hackers, or even eavesdropping governments, that alone should not put me in the same league as drug dealers. But if it does, so be it.
Android Authority
03-07-2025
- Android Authority
Cops in this country think everyone using a Google Pixel must be a drug dealer
C. Scott Brown / Android Authority TL;DR Pixel phones are apparently the phone of choice for criminals, drug dealers, and gang members in Spain's Catalonia. Police say every time they spot someone with a Pixel, they think they must be a drug dealer. The popularity of Pixels among the wrong crowd has little to do with Google phones and everything to do with Android's open nature. Police in Spain, specifically in the autonomous region of Catalonia, are very alert when they spot someone using a Google Pixel phone. As weird as it sounds, Pixels are highly preferred by those involved in organized crime, according to the Catalan police. 'Every time we see a Google Pixel, we suspect it might belong to a drug dealer,' said a police official leading the anti-drug operation in Catalonia, as per Xataka Android (machine translated). But why are Pixels popular among criminals in that region? It really has little to do with how Google makes its phones and everything to do with the open nature of Android, which lets users use alternative operating systems. Specifically, organized crime members in Catalonia use GrapheneOS, a privacy and security-focused operating system that keeps your data out of Google's reach. Criminals and gang members in Spain prefer using GrapheneOS on Pixel phones, and there's a good reason for it. GrapheneOS implements full disk and metadata encryption, a security feature exploited by miscreants. But it works best on Pixels. Even though GrapheneOS can be installed on any unlocked Android phone, the company's FAQ section strongly recommends using a Pixel phone 'due to better security and a long minimum support guarantee from launch for full security updates and other improvements.' The page specifically mentions the Pixel 8 and Pixel 9 series, 'for the incredibly powerful hardware memory tagging security feature as part of moving to new ARM V9 CPU cores.' Additionally, like most Android phones, Pixel devices are on Google's Find My Device network, which allows users to remotely lock or wipe their phones, a feature that's ironically valued by criminals. In fact, one of the Pixel's standout features — its cameras — is something these criminals don't even use and often have physically removed, along with the GPS and microphone. In Catalonia, a Pixel sighting now raises more than just tech curiosity, it raises red flags. The police's solution to counter these clever tricks is to infect Pixels with malware to gain full access to apps, media, documents, and more. Even GrapheneOS is not immune to malware attacks. So while Google surely didn't intend for Pixels to become the phone of choice for criminals, their security hardware, mod-friendly nature, and support for GrapheneOS have made them unexpectedly attractive to the wrong crowd. In Catalonia, a Pixel sighting now raises more than just tech curiosity, it raises red flags. Got a tip? Talk to us! Email our staff at Email our staff at news@ . You can stay anonymous or get credit for the info, it's your choice.
