Latest news with #GreatGame
Business Times
05-08-2025
- Politics
- Business Times
What will happen when the small Pacific states disappear under the sea?
WHAT happens when climate change meets the 21st-century version of the Great Game? The destiny of the tiny Pacific nation of Tuvalu may hold some clues. This country has a population of just 10,643 at last count and is located midway between Hawaii and Australia. Tuvalu is an archipelago of six coral atolls and three islands with an area of just 26 sq km. To say that the islands are low-lying – most inhabited places being just four to five metres above sea level – is to belabour the point. There are no rivers. Rain and wells provide the fresh water. The islands used to be a British colony but became independent in 1978 and a member of the United Nations on Sep 5, 2000. And it has a functioning government answerable to an elected parliament. Despite the dearth of farm land and the fact that most people make a living through fishing and from overseas remittances, it is classified as an upper middle-income nation. But then the government has a steady revenue stream, estimated at US$10 million a year, thanks to its internet domain designation as '.tv'. Video streaming companies pay good money to use that designation. Yet, their situation must be dire. Otherwise, how can anyone account for the fact that, in July 2025, about half of its citizens applied for a visa to permanently migrate to Australia? The islanders were availing themselves of a scheme Canberra offered to the Tuvalu government in return for a say in its foreign policies. Only 280 people are allowed to permanently migrate to Australia each year. The overarching rationale behind the scheme was not any outpouring of Australian generosity or concern for the plight of islanders facing rising sea levels. Rather, it was a geostrategic move to counter any ambition China may have of getting small island states on to its side. Australia has a similar deal with Nauru, another tiny Pacific island nation. BT in your inbox Start and end each day with the latest news stories and analyses delivered straight to your inbox. Sign Up Sign Up Canberra's initiative grew out of a reaction to a deal the Solomon Islands struck with Beijing in 2022. China had agreed to help Honiara maintain social order, provide aid during natural disasters and help safeguard Solomon Islands' national security. Western media played it up as Beijing's thrust into Australia's backyard and, by extension, into the West's bailiwick. This triggered much anxiety in Canberra and consternation in Washington. Since then, rivalry between the West, in this particular instance led by Australia, and China, has meant that Australian taxpayers have had to shell out large sums in grants and loans as Pacific islanders set their terms for leaning politically their way. Thus, the Great Game is playing out, this time in the Pacific. But Tuvalu faces a unique problem. Even at the current pace of migration, Tuvalu will be mostly empty of people in about 15 years. What happens then, assuming that some bits of the archipelago remain above sea level in 2040? There will be marine and seabed resources to be had from the exclusive economic zones of almost 720,000 square metres under the Law of the Sea. Could Australia take it over and build artificial islands, a la China in the South China Sea? Would the former citizens of Tuvalu still have a claim on its wealth? There are many questions but few answers in what might become the common fate of small island nations facing the rising sea.
Indian Express
18-07-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
Why has Russia formally recognised Afghanistan's Taliban government?
Written by Tabshir Shams At a meeting on July 3, Russia's Ambassador to Kabul Dmitry Zhirnov conveyed to Taliban Acting Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi that Moscow had decided to formally recognise the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The Afghan foreign ministry described Russia's decision as 'a historic step that will set a good example for other countries'. It remains to be seen whether China, Pakistan, and other countries follow Russia's lead. Days after Moscow's recognition of the Afghan regime, the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands, issued arrest warrants against Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani, saying there were 'reasonable grounds' to suspect them of carrying out gender-based persecution. History of Russia's involvement in Afghanistan Pre-revolution Russia had a deep strategic interest in Afghanistan, which led to an intense rivalry with Britain in the 19th century that was famously described by the British intelligence officer Arthur Conolly as the 'Great Game'. Afghanistan, which stood as a buffer between Britain's colonial possessions in South Asia and Russia, was of great strategic importance to both imperialist empires. As a Great Game imperative, Britain had long tried to control Afghanistan, and had sought to impose itself on the country through the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars of 1839-42 and 1878-80 respectively. In 1919, the Emir of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan, made an attempt to shake off the British, which resulted in the Third Anglo-Afghan War. The Bolsheviks, who had taken power in Russia after the October Revolution of 1917, were opposed to colonialism and imperialism. They renounced various treaties and agreements of Tsarist Russia, and gave up its colonial possessions, which profoundly impacted anti-colonial movements everywhere. In 1919, Vladimir Lenin offered the hand of Soviet friendship to Amanullah Khan. He wrote to the Emir that 'flourishing Afghanistan is the only independent Muslim state in the world', and that 'the Workers' and Peasants' Government [of the Soviet Union] is inclined to grant such assistance on the widest scale to the Afghan nation, and, what is more, to repair the injustice done by the former government of the Russian tsars…by adjusting the Soviet-Afghan frontier so as to add to the territory of Afghanistan at the expense of Russia'. In the early decades of the Cold War, as Pakistan joined the anti-communist Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and the US and Britain attempted to run Iran through the puppet Shah, the Soviet stakes in Afghanistan increased greatly. It was crucial for Moscow to have influence in Afghanistan in order to maintain the USSR's regional security dominance, to prevent instability in Soviet Central Asia, and to assert itself as a global power against the capitalist West. As part of its ideological project, the Soviet Union propped up communist parties and governments in Eastern Europe and Asia, including the People's Democratic Party (PDPA) in Afghanistan. In April 1978, the PDPA led the Saur Revolution, a military coup in which the country's autocratic President Mohammad Daoud Khan was overthrown and killed, and a socialist government aligned with Moscow came to power. Several months of violence and repression followed as the Pashtun-led Khalqist faction of the PDPA cracked down on the so-called enemies of the revolution. This triggered armed resistance, and as uprisings against the socialist regime started to break out at various places, the Red Army marched into the country in December 1979. The invasion was justified on grounds of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which saw any threat to socialist rule in a Soviet bloc country in East Europe and Central Asia as a threat to them all. Thus began a decade of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and a bruising war in which the Afghan mujahideen were backed financially and logistically by the US-led West, which finally ended with the humiliating withdrawal of Soviet forces from the country. The Soviet-Afghan war of 1979-89 witnessed the deaths of around 20,000 Soviet soldiers, and more than 1.5 million Afghans. The recognition of the Taliban by Russia marks a strategic shift in what was once a relationship of animosity and mistrust. Post-communist Russia under President Vladimir Putin offered support to the US 'Global war on terror' in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which also gave Russia the international legitimacy to pursue its own wars in Chechnya and Dagestan. The first Taliban regime (1996–2001) had recognised Chechnya's independence, and allowed a Chechen embassy to open in Kabul. As the government of President Ashraf Ghani steadily lost its grip over the country and war-weariness grew in the US, Moscow sought to re-insert itself into the Afghan picture. The Moscow Format Consultations were initiated in 2017 as a regional platform for discussions on the Afghan reconciliation process among special envoys from Russia, Afghanistan, India, Iran, China, and Pakistan. Russia was concerned that a power vacuum in Afghanistan could make it an exporter of narcotics and terrorism, and a destabilising factor in the region. On August 15, 2021, as the last American soldiers left Afghanistan amid chaos, the Russian embassy in Taliban-controlled Kabul remained formally open. In September 2022 Russia and the Taliban signed a major preliminary agreement for Russia to supply Afghanistan with discounted petroleum products and wheat. This was the first major foreign economic deal struck by the new rulers of Afghanistan. During the fifth Moscow Format Consultation in 2023, there was special focus on the activities of the ISIS-K, the Islamic State in Khorasan Province. On March 23, 2024, ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack in Moscow's Crocus City Hall in which more than 145 people were killed. That July, President Vladimir Putin called the Taliban 'allies in the fight against terrorism'. Later in 2024, representatives of the Afghan government participated in the COP29 summit in Baku, Azerbaijan, the highest-level multilateral engagement by the country since the Taliban takeover. In April 2025, Russia's Supreme Court removed the ban on the Taliban as a 'terrorist organisation', which paved the way for Russia to formally recognise the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The two countries can now conduct bilateral cooperation in trade, security, technology, and energy, even as the Taliban continue with their grave violations of human rights, denying Afghan women the right to study and work, and imposing severe restrictions on their day-to-day living. In September 2023, China had become the first country to formally name an envoy to Afghanistan, Zhao Xing. Pakistan, the UAE, Turkey, and Azerbaijan have appointed permanent ambassadors in Kabul this year. India has a 'technical team' in Afghanistan, which oversees humanitarian assistance, and in November 2024, the Taliban regime appointed Ikramuddin Kamil as 'acting consul' in the Afghan mission in Mumbai. A changed geopolitical context Why did President Putin choose to recognise the Taliban government? As outlined above, Afghanistan, the so-called 'heart of Asia' because of its location, has long been a theatre of geopolitical contestation. This 'graveyard of empires' has seen long-running wars and turmoil interspersed with short spells of stability. The decisive victory of the Taliban in 2021 signalled the arrival of relative political stability – some pockets of resistance in the north and activities of terrorist groups like ISIS notwithstanding – and the potential for a resumption of trade and economic activity. Dhananjay Tripathi, who teaches international relations at South Asian University, put the Russian decision to recognise the Taliban government in a larger geopolitical context that includes the war in Ukraine and its many fallouts. 'In the current geopolitical situation, Russia is facing immense pressure due to the economic isolation from the US and the West. The Ukraine war is draining them, and militarily they are dependent on China. Almost 40% of their ammunition is supplied by China via North Korea. So, it will be a good opportunity for Russia to build economic and military ties with the Taliban in Afghanistan,' Prof Tripathi said. Also, 'The power vacuum after the USA left Afghanistan, almost in a rush, had to be filled.' The Afghan economy has been devastated by decades of war, and presents a potential opportunity for a range of Russian exports. The Russian Business Center in Afghanistan estimates that bilateral trade reached $1 billion in 2024, and is set to reach $3 billion by 2025. At the St Petersburg International Economic Forum in June, Russia announced an expansion of its labour market to include Afghan specialists. In the absence of international recognition, investments have been a challenge for the Taliban regime. In May 2025, Afghanistan agreed to join the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a project of the Belt and Road initiative of China, but Beijing remains reluctant to invest in Afghanistan. The only known major Chinese investment is the $49 million that Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Co. has spent on developing oil fields near Herat. What this move by Russia means for India India has a shared history, cultural bonds and old civilisational ties, and deep economic and strategic stakes in Afghanistan. It also retains significant goodwill among large sections of the Afghan population. Over the years, India has invested more than $3 billion in projects like the Afghan Parliament, the Salma Dam, and the Zaranj–Delaram highway, which links Afghanistan to Iran's Chabahar port. India has built hospitals, schools, and offered thousands of scholarships to students. More than 3,000 Afghan students, including 300 girls, are studying in India, according to the Indian government. 'India needs to closely monitor developments in Afghanistan. With Russia diplomatically recognising the Taliban and China establishing close ties, India risks facing implications if it remains passive during this crucial period. Now is the time for India to recalibrate its approach and establish better diplomatic relations with the Taliban. A significant step that could earn India considerable goodwill is the issuance of student and medical visas,' Prof Tripathi said. A calibrated strategic engagement with the Taliban, driven by pragmatism, is in India's interest. Afghanistan is crucial for the Connect Central Asia policy that India launched in 2015, and it remains a relevant partner in tackling cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan. The writer is a Master's student of International Relations at South Asian University and a summer intern at The Indian Express.
Times
27-06-2025
- Politics
- Times
Iranian distrust of the British runs deep
B ritain has not bombed Iran, nor called for regime change in Tehran, nor mobilised against the mullahs. Britain's stance on preventing Iran from gaining nuclear weapons has not changed. And yet there is deep anxiety in Whitehall and the intelligence services that the conflict between Iran and Israel will become our fight, and Iranian anger and hostility will now turn on Britain. It already has. That is because suspicion of the UK, as the 'hidden hand' behind every plot and confrontation, is deeply embedded in Iran's politics, language, rhetoric and self-image. Distrust and dislike of Britain is part of Iran's cultural DNA. From the Iranian point of view, Britain has been meddling in Iran ever since the Great Game of the early 19th century, when the rival empires of Britain and Russia tussled for control of Central Asia using bribery, proxy forces, political manipulation, competing spheres of influence and, from time to time, direct military intervention.
Express Tribune
07-04-2025
- Politics
- Express Tribune
A new great game in Afghanistan?
In the old and new Great Game, Afghanistan has held a central position. Peter Hopkirk, in his pathbreaking book The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, chronicled the 19th-century geopolitical chessboard involving Britain and Russia. To prevent an armed conflict between British India and the Russian empire, both powers decided to declare Afghanistan as a buffer state – until the end of the Cold War reshaped Central, South, and West Asian dynamics. Following the complete US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, and the re-assumption of power by Taliban, the conflict-ridden country plunged into a legitimacy crisis, reflecting a coercive order in which political pluralism and emancipation of women became major casualties. Now, almost four years down the road, the United States, under the new Trump administration, is again to re-establish its influence in Afghanistan by seeking control of the strategic Bagram air base. For the first time after August 2021, a high-powered US delegation led by veteran Afghanistan expert Zalmay Khalilzad visited Kabul in March, ostensibly to negotiate the release of detained American tourist George Glezmann. Taking advantage of that opportunity, Khalilzad and US hostage envoy Adam Boehler held talks with Afghanistan's Foreign Minister and other Taliban officials. According to reports, the Taliban's Foreign Ministry stated that Mr Glezmann's release was "on humanitarian grounds" and "a goodwill gesture", while US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called the deal a "positive and constructive step". Qatar facilitated the American delegation's visit to Kabul and mediated Glezmann's release. In a post on X, Afghanistan's Foreign Ministry added that the deal showed "Afghanistan's readiness to genuinely engage all sides, particularly the United States of America, on the basis of mutual respect and interests". Why is there a relative thaw in the US-Taliban relations? Will the Taliban regime hand over Bagram airbase to the United States? What are the implications of this recent shift for Pakistan and the wider region? President Trump had earlier criticised the Biden administration's chaotic military withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, calling it incompetent and claiming that it compromised US national security interests, particularly by leaving around 80 billion dollars of weapons and abandoning Bagram air base. After resuming power in January 2025, President Trump now resolves to regain influence in Afghanistan without the use of hard power. The nature of the projected deal between the Trump administration and the Taliban, and whether Washington will extend diplomatic recognition to Kabul, remains to be seen. While countries like India, Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan maintain low-key de facto ties with the Taliban, Kabul still lacks diplomatic and political legitimacy. Unlike Presidents Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, who ruled Afghanistan for two decades with the US-Nato support and at least a semblance of democracy, the Taliban's interim government rejects political pluralism, democracy and exclusive mode of governance. By barring girls and women from education and depriving half the population of their legitimate human rights, the Taliban have reverted to policies like their previous regime from 1996-2001. Even then, some countries, including the United States, are attempting to re-engage with Kabul to protect their strategic and economic interests. This signals a new phase of the Great Game in Afghanistan, reflective of a 200-year history of invasions, interventions, and occupations by Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. The new Great Game can be analysed from three angles. First, Afghanistan is infamous as a geopolitical trap that lures a potential aggressor, and once the country is occupied by a foreign power, it launches resistance. History has witnessed Britain, the Soviet Union and the US, all experiencing this fate. Foreign occupation has never been possible without local support, and it is well known that Afghan loyalty can be bought. After 9/11, millions of dollars were used to buy the loyalty of Afghan tribal chiefs who deserted Taliban leading to the Taliban's collapse. This time, the new Great Game is employing a similar strategy as Trump seeks control of Afghanistan, particularly its strategic Bagram airbase, by offering carrots to the Taliban. In the coming weeks, increased American involvement in Afghanistan is expected via soft power: aid, investments and diplomacy. Second, Trump's core objective in reclaiming the Bagram airbase is to gain strategic leverage over Iran and Pakistan. Notably, it was from Bagram airbase that US Navy SEALs sneaked into Abbottabad, Pakistan, on May 2, 2011, to get hold of global terrorist Osama bin Laden. In the wake of Khalilzad's mission to Kabul, alarmist conspiracy theories also suggest that the US may use Bagram as a base to intervene in Pakistan if political instability threatens its nuclear arsenal, to ensure that it does not reach Islamist forces. While these claims can be rejected, the timing of America's demand for Bagram base from the Taliban is significant. Since long, questions have been raised about the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons in case there is an internal upheaval. Pakistan's nuclear control and command hierarchy has ruled out any threats to the safety and security of its nuclear arsenal. The Taliban government's reaction to the US demand for Bagram airbase for strategic use remains to be seen. Critics point to the unreliability of the Taliban regime in Kabul and its perceived anti-Pakistan stance. The growing Indo-US nexus may influence the Taliban to allow Washington to take control of Bagram air base. In return, the US may help end the Taliban's diplomatic isolation and possibly hand over the 80 billion dollars worth of weapons left behind during the 2021 withdrawal as a gift to Kabul. Additionally, the US might offer maintenance for these advanced weapons, thereby augmenting the Taliban's military power. Third, the resurgence of the new Great Game in Afghanistan is now a reality which poses fresh challenges for Pakistan in days to come. For that purpose, Pakistan must stabilise its internal affairs to deal with new strategic equation between Taliban and the US.
Russia Today
21-03-2025
- Politics
- Russia Today
India can stabilize geopolitical rifts in Arctic
Russia has lauded India's growing interest in and constructive approach towards the Arctic, highlighting the country as a stabilising factor amid rising geopolitical tensions in the region. Russian Ambassador to India Denis Alipov on Thursday stressed the potential for collaboration between Moscow and New Delhi in scientific research, economic development, and polar navigation. Alipov told a bilateral conference on cooperation in Arctic, organised by Russia's North Forum and India's leading think tank Vivekananda Foundation, that 'Russia sees India's interest in increasing its presence in the Arctic as a stabilising factor. We view India as a strategic partner in the joint development of the Arctic area and coordinated scientific, environmental, and commercial efforts.' Climate change has opened new avenues for economic activities, including shipping and resource extraction, making the Arctic a key area for international cooperation and competition, the ambassador said. However, he cautioned that NATO's growing military activity in the Arctic has escalated tensions, affecting regional security. Alipov noted that NATO countries' activities have negatively impacted the Arctic Council, a key governance forum for Arctic affairs, which has been largely inactive since 2022. 'In contrast to their hostile approach, we value India's constructive approach in the Arctic Council since its accession as an observer in 2013,' he said. 🇷🇺🇮🇳 On March 20, #Russia 'n Ambassador to #India Denis Alipov addressed the international conference "Uniting #North & #South for Sustainable Development in the #Arctic " jointly organized by the Northern Forum and @vifindia .👉🏻 #RussiaIndia #DruzhbaDosti — Russia in India 🇷🇺 (@RusEmbIndia) March 20, 2025 India's Deputy National Security Advisor Pavan Kapoor, warned the conference of 'great risks of damage to the delicate Arctic ecosystem.' 'The claims for resources and territorial claims have to be managed carefully, the fact that there are geopolitical tensions in the Arctic don't make it easier. We hope that things will improve becuase there is a great potential for many countries,' Kapoor stated. Read more The Great Game in the Arctic: Why the region is the next flashpoint between superpowers He pointed out that New Delhi sees multiple tangible benefits through operations in the Arctic. For example, the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic Ocean, linking Europe to Asia, could help India reduce the cost of energy and other vital commodities, said Kapoor, who also served as Ambassador to Russia from 2021 to 2024. Moscow and New Delhi have been engaging in scientific collaboration in the region, which includes research on climate change, atmospheric and geosciences, glaciology, and polar biology. Indian scientists, for instance, are currently investigating how Arctic climate patterns influence monsoons in South Asia. Additionally, both countries are exploring joint ventures for extracting Arctic resources, particularly energy deposits and rare earth elements. In 2024, the two nations signed a memorandum of cooperation to enhance scientific research in the Arctic. Alipov noted that Indian firms are considering investments in projects led by Russian energy giants such as NOVATEK and Gazpromneft, particularly in the Dolginsky oil field and the Vostok oil cluster, in collaboration with Rosneft. Further potential sits with the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG-2 projects. Russia has also welcomed India's growing expertise in polar navigation and ice-class vessel construction. As part of their cooperation, Moscow has offered to train Indian seafarers in navigating the Arctic's challenging waters.
