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Yahoo
2 days ago
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- Yahoo
Turkey and Russia Hold the Keys to Libya's Future
Recent clashes between pro-government militias in Tripoli once again threatened to unravel Libya's tenuous frozen conflict. Yet beyond the headline-grabbing instability, a quieter power struggle is unfolding, one in which Turkey and Russia are emerging as the most consequential actors, with both Ankara and Moscow utilizing the country's stalemate to entrench their own influence. From a domestic perspective, the risk of that frozen conflict heating back up became clear in May, when clashes erupted between rival militias aligned with the Government of National Unity, or GNU, under Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, killing at least eight people. The fighting broke out when a militia known as the 444th Brigade turned on Dbeibah, who relies on a coalition of armed groups to stay in power. Pro-GNU security forces managed to subdue the revolt, but amid the fighting, Abdel Ghani al-Kikli—the leader of the 444th Brigade—was assassinated. Dbeibah announced a 'ceasefire' two days after the fighting began, but anti-GNU protests broke out in the capital, marking one of the largest such demonstrations since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 and further highlighting the fragility of Libya's status quo. Indeed, speculation loomed that forces loyal to Gen. Khalifa Haftar and the House of Representatives, or HoR—a rival government based in Tobruk, in eastern Libya—might also intervene, which would further destabilize the capital. Still, the political and military fault lines that divide Libya are increasingly shaped by Turkey and Russia, who have settled into what analysts characterize as a 'managed rivalry' or 'adversarial collaboration,' as previously seen in other theaters where their interests simultaneously collide and overlap, such as Syria and the South Caucasus. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. The two powers backed opposing sides during Libya's civil war, with Turkey supporting the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord until it was superseded by the GNU in March 2021, while Russia backed Haftar's self-styled Libyan National Army, LNA, which fought in support of the Tobruk-based government. Nevertheless, Ankara and Moscow ultimately reached a tacit agreement not to escalate the conflict, despite deepening their economic and military engagement with their respective camps. Turkey's military intervention in 2020 decisively shifted the balance in Libya's civil war, repelling an offensive on Tripoli launched by Haftar in April 2019 and setting the stage for the United Nations-brokered ceasefire that ended the fighting between the Tripoli and Tobruk governments later that year. Since then, Turkey has remained the GNU's key patron, supplying military equipment such as Turkish-made armored vehicles, drones, air defense systems and artillery. The Turkish parliament has continued to renew the military mandate for its forces in Libya, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan citing risks to Turkish interests if the GNU were to come under renewed assault. That deep level of support was almost certainly the decisive factor allowing Dbeibah and the GNU to retain the upper hand amid the recent unrest in Tripoli. While Turkey's military intervention had guaranteed it a seat at Libya's political table, Ankara has also secured oil and gas exploration deals with successive Tripoli-based administrations, beginning with a Memorandum of Understanding signed with the GNA in 2019 and later ratified by Dbeibah's government in October 2022. Although the Tripoli Court of Appeal ruled against the deal in February 2024, the GNU ultimately overrode the court's decision. That underscores how Ankara's outreach to Tripoli's powerbrokers has advanced its maritime and energy interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, even as Turkey's offshore territorial claims sparked tensions with Greece and Egypt, which said they infringed upon their own sovereignty. Moreover, Turkey's decision to side with Dbeibah in a spat with former Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha, who was previously a key Turkish ally, demonstrated Ankara's willingness to recalibrate quickly to maintain its influence. Indeed, beyond securing Tripoli, Ankara has also set its sights on improving its position in eastern Libya. After Storm Daniel and the collapse of Derna's dams in September 2023—described as 'Libya's 9/11'—Turkey provided swift humanitarian assistance, opening channels of communication with authorities in the East. In April, too, Turkey hosted Saddam Haftar—the son of Khalifa Haftar—for meetings with the Turkish defense minister and other military officials in Ankara, where they discussed supplying equipment and providing training to LNA forces. This marked a striking shift, considering that only a few years earlier, Khalifa Haftar denounced Turkish involvement in western Libya as an 'occupation.' Yet, with Khalifa Haftar now 81, Ankara appears to be hedging its bets by cultivating ties with Saddam, who has positioned himself as his father's successor. Evidently, Turkey is complementing its military power in the West with soft power and defense ties in the East, which would mean that any future political solution to Libya's divisions would almost certainly necessitate Turkish engagement. Russia's engagement in Libya has also been consequential, but was previously subtler. Moscow had initially maintained a modest military presence in the form of Wagner mercenaries and Syrian fighters aligned with Haftar's LNA. Since the October 2020 ceasefire, Russia has deepened its footprint, while cementing considerable influence in Libya's South and East. Moscow has become more open in its ties to Haftar, particularly following the fall of former dictator Bashar Al-Assad's regime in Syria. In May, both Khalifa and Saddam Haftar traveled to Moscow for Russia's World War II Victory Day celebrations, where they met senior officials and discussed expanding military cooperation, for which the elder Haftar expressed his gratitude. The deepening relationship comes at a time when Moscow is looking to reassert its Mediterranean presence following its loss of influence in Syria, which had guaranteed it an Eastern Mediterranean naval base in Tartus. In February, satellite imagery showed Russia's development of the Maaten Al Sarra airbase in southern Libya, where it had shipped S-300 and S-400 air defense systems. Around 1,000 Russian military personnel have also relocated to Libya from Syria. The added forces complement the former Wagner mercenaries—officially incorporated into Russia's military as the Africa Corps following Yevgeny Prighozin's death in 2023—who are already embedded within the LNA. Moreover, Russia reportedly seeks a naval base in Libya, with Tobruk itself cited as a potential location. Russia's growing influence with the LNA would likely make approval for building a naval base easier. Haftar's forces depend on Russia for their logistical networks and reportedly even require Russian approval to use certain military installations, indicating how much leverage Moscow has established over him. Yet rather than being an unconditional ally, Russia arguably views Haftar as a means to an end, a tool to maintain influence in Libya and extend its reach into Africa. Still, the fact Haftar and his son have engaged with Ankara, too, shows that the family is willing to leverage the competing powers to gain recognition. Thus, Russia and Haftar's ties can be deemed a 'marriage of convenience.' Indeed, like Turkey, Russia has also looked to the rival camp to hedge its bets. Moscow's outreach to Tripoli has gained momentum over the past two years, with a delegation traveling to Tripoli to meet with GNU officials—including Dbeibah—as recently as April. Beyond potentially allowing Moscow to use western Libya as a launchpad for power projection deeper into Africa, this balancing act advances Russia's energy interests, as Russian firms are now in talks with the Tripoli-based Presidential Council, which is aligned with the GNU, for exploration deals. Russia's entrenched role serves as a geopolitical bargaining chip, compelling European powers to engage with Moscow and advancing President Vladimir Putin's stated vision of a multipolar world order. There is also a potential risk of Russia of weaponizing Libya's energy sector; Haftar has previously blockaded oil facilities to pressure Tripoli, a tactic Moscow could exploit to disrupt or manipulate European energy supplies. Even short of active sabotage, a future Russian naval base in Libya would almost certainly raise alarm in European capitals. Yet all of this would likely be consolidated within a frozen conflict, one increasingly sustained by competing Russian and Turkish involvement. Still, the balance is increasingly tilting in Ankara's favor. That's showcased by how European states, which have remained reactive to events in Libya, have shifted their approach toward Turkey, especially in light of U.S. President Donald Trump's shaky support for NATO and Ukraine. While France was long a vocal critic of Turkish influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, it has softened its criticism of Ankara's foreign policy moves in recent years. Moreover, under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, Italy has deepened engagement with Turkey, viewing Ankara as indispensable to securing its goals in Libya of stemming migration and securing energy contracts. This was highlighted in Meloni's meeting with Erdogan on April 30, which also saw the two sides strengthen defense ties. Meanwhile, Washington has largely disengaged from Libya's conflict, aside from recent inflammatory suggestions that it would relocate migrants and even displaced Palestinians from Gaza to Libya. Both proposals were swiftly condemned, in part due to the country's lack of security and high risk of human trafficking. With Western involvement waning, any U.N.-backed efforts to unify the rival administrations under a single government, push for domestic reform or hold elections will almost certainly require Turkish buy-in. Persuading Moscow to scale back support for Haftar and relinquish its strategic foothold in the Mediterranean and Africa, will prove far more difficult. One pragmatic antidote to the stalemate could be deeper Western coordination with Turkey on Libya, aimed at forging a political solution. Yet with European Union member states showing varying appetites for engaging with Ankara, combined with Washington's continued detachment, Turkey is likely to maintain its 'adversarial collaboration' with Moscow. Turkey and Russia will likely continue their delicate balancing act and avoid risking direct confrontation. After all, the May 26 meeting in Moscow between President Putin and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan underscored their shared interest in maintaining communication, particularly over Ukraine and Black Sea stability, and avoiding a deeper rupture in ties. As for Libya, a continued stalemate risks entrenching the country's divisions rather than resolving them. If so, May's clashes, like last year's tensions in Tripoli that rattled oil markets and threatened Libya's banking system, may end up being a preview of even worse instability ahead. Jonathan Fenton-Harvey is a British analyst and journalist whose work has focused largely on Gulf Cooperation Council affairs, as well as geopolitical and economic issues pertaining to the wider Middle East and Indo-Pacific. He has worked with or written for a wide range of think tanks and publications based in the U.S., the U.K. and the Middle East. The post Turkey and Russia Hold the Keys to Libya's Future appeared first on World Politics Review.
Libya Review
3 days ago
- Politics
- Libya Review
Will Russia Attack Europe Through Libya?
Russia is reportedly preparing to install medium and long-range missile systems at the Sebha military base in southern Libya, aiming them at Europe, according to a source cited by Agenzia Nova. The base, located in the Fezzan region under General Khalifa Haftar's control, is seen as a strategic launch site due to its proximity to European territories such as Lampedusa. The plan, said to be in an advanced stage, is allegedly supported by Russia and Belarus. The report claimed that Haftar, together with his son Saddam, is reportedly using the recent chaos in Tripoli to push towards the capital. This follows the assassination of Abdulghani al-Kikli, known as 'Ghaniwa', leader of the Stability Support Apparatus, by Brigade 444 – a militia loyal to Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbaiba. The killing sparked one of the most violent escalations in Tripoli in years. Sources claim the Russians are backing Haftar's expansion and may deploy advanced air defence systems like the Tor-M1 to protect the Sebha installation. The system, recently displayed in Benghazi, can intercept enemy missiles, drones and aircraft. Another layer to the alleged plan includes a proposed transfer of one million Palestinians from Gaza to Libya, with the mediation of Turkey and possible US backing. This transfer would reportedly involve Palestinians who do not support Hamas, and those resettled in Libya could receive citizenship from Haftar in exchange for political loyalty and control of Libya's oil assets. A second relocation, involving around 800,000 Gazans, could go to Syria under a separate US-brokered arrangement with the new Syrian leadership. While the reports remain unverified, they have sparked speculation about regional re-alignments involving Russia, Turkey, the US, and Gulf countries. Cyrenaican outlets have also reported Haftar's troops joining NATO's 'Anatolian Phoenix 25' exercises in Turkey. Between 1,500 and 2,000 LNA fighters are allegedly training there and acquiring Turkish drones. Tags: europekhalifa haftarlibyaMissilesRussiaSebha
Libya Review
4 days ago
- Politics
- Libya Review
Haftar Inaugurates Military City as Foundation for Libya's Army Reform
On Wednesday, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, Commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), affirmed that the newly inaugurated 'Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar Military City' represents a significant leap in Libya's military development, emphasizing its role as a cornerstone in building a modern, professional armed force. Haftar made these remarks during a high-level visit to the military city, located in eastern Libya, alongside House of Representatives Speaker Ageela Saleh, Libyan Government-designate Prime Minister Osama Hammad, and senior military officials. The inspection tour took place on the sidelines of a major military parade marking the 11th anniversary of Operation Dignity (Al Karama). According to the General Command's media office, the delegation toured multiple facilities, including advanced training centers, accommodation units, command buildings, and logistics hubs. The complex has been equipped with state-of-the-art systems and infrastructure designed to meet international military standards and support the long-term development of Libya's armed forces. Haftar praised Lieutenant General Khaled Haftar, Chief of Staff for Security Units, for his key role in overseeing the planning, execution, and supervision of the project. He emphasized that the outcome reflects a clear vision for a disciplined, well-trained army capable of protecting Libya's sovereignty and stability. 'This military city is not just a set of buildings; it is a message of our determination to build a unified, capable national force,' said Haftar. 'It is a model of organization and ambition, and it represents the future of Libya's defense strategy.' The city includes specialized centers for combat training, tactical simulations, medical services, and intensive military education, making it one of the most advanced facilities of its kind in the country. Haftar added that the military city aligns with his broader strategy to rebuild Libya's armed forces on solid institutional foundations, emphasizing professionalism, operational readiness, and advanced technical capabilities. Tags: benghazikhalifa haftarlibyaLibyan armyMilitary City
Al Arabiya
4 days ago
- Business
- Al Arabiya
Foreign competition does not serve Libya's interests
Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar's meeting on May 10 at the Kremlin with Russian President Vladimir Putin drew attention once more to the Libyan strongman's ever-growing ties to Moscow. Visiting Russia to attend the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the country's victory over Nazi Germany, the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) also met with several top Russian military figures, including Defense Minister Andrey Belousov. For a while, Haftar's Russia connection has been a matter of great concern to the US and Europe, which led to a renewed focus on Libya and paving to way for an unprecedented flurry of US contacts with officials from western and eastern parts of the country. In early May, the minister of defense of the Tripoli government, Abdulsalam Al-Zoubi, was received in the Pentagon. He was the first Libyan defense official to hold talks in Washington in years. Saddam Haftar, the son and presumably pre-ordained successor to Haftar, was also welcomed for a meeting with several senior US officials at the State Department, in late April. During the same period, Haftar's other son, Belqassim, was the guest of honor at a business forum in Washington. As part of a well calibrated effort to treat Tripoli and Benghazi as equals in the ongoing diplomatic-military dance, the USS Mount Whitney (LCC-20), a US 6th Fleet vessel docked last April in both ports of Tripoli and Benghazi. In February, two US Africa Command (Africom) generals visited Libya where they met with leaders in Tripoli and Benghazi, including Khalifa and Saddam Haftar, as well as GNU Prime Minister Abdulahamid Dbeibah. The State Department summed up Washington's objectives as continuing 'to engage officials from western and eastern Libya and to support Libyan efforts to unify their military institutions as Libyans secure their autonomy.' Behind the US outreach, as explained by US Army Lieutenant General John W Brennan, Deputy Commander of Africom, there was before anything else a US desire 'to defeat malign actors who threaten North Africa and US security interests.' Fears of 'malign actors' unmistakably meant Russia. US re-engagement has in fact mirrored NATO's realization, as expressed by the alliance's May 2024 independent expert report about its southern neighborhood strategy, that 'Libya deserves particular attention' in North Africa. Part of that strategy was to court Haftar in the hope of weaning him away from relying on the Russians. Haftar's ties to Moscow and his frequent meetings in Benghazi with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov were a source of utmost concern. The US even sent two B-52 Stratofortress bombers to 'conduct Libyan military tactical air controllers' near Sirte. In August 2024, AFRICOM Commander, General Michael Langley, met Haftar in Benghazi. There is however a lot of skepticism about Washington's ability to win over Haftar, considering his deeply-vested interests with Moscow. Nevertheless the US seemed willing to takes its chances with the LNA commander as concerns about Russian encroachment mushroomed since Moscow started redeploying troops and materiel from Syria to Libya, in December 2024, hence making the North African country its de facto launch-pad for the rest of the continent. With nearly 2,000 to 2,500 Russian 'Africa Corps' troops reportedly present in several military bases in Libya, NATO saw a growing threat to the security of Europe especially that Russia's military deployment was coupled with anti-Western disinformation campaigns, which could only make worse NATO's image problem. The Atlantic alliance was often blamed for the legacy of chaos and strife in Libya and the Sahel since it backed the uprising which toppled long-time ruler Muammar Gadhafi in 2011 but subsequently bailed out without a proper exit-strategy. Now, Western strategists see a Russian threat in the Mediterranean including a naval presence in Libya and possible attempts to weaponize migration flows across the sea from Europe. Moscow is also suspected of using Libya as a launchpad for activities south of the Sahara. During the last three years, the West's position in the Sahel region has deteriorated while Russia moved in. France was pushed out of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Chad, while the US had to depart its anti-terrorism base in Niger. The competition between international and regional powers comes with a cost to Libya which finds itself caught in the middle while its vantage point is rarely considered. The struggle for influence is dragging Libyans into fights that are not their own and is making the murky Libyan political landscape even murkier. The Russian military bases (but also other bases that host foreign troops such as Turkey's) do not project a sense of Libya's sovereignty nor guarantee its peace. Outside military presence can only add to the fragmentation of Libya's domestic scene by entrenching the already deep domestic divides around foreign actors. Recent episodes have also shown that competition for influence between foreign powers can fuel factional strife within Libya. The latest reports about the US intent to deport illegal migrants with a criminal record to Libya threw the country's social media into a frenzy as people wondered if Washington was taking advantage of the muddled political scene and exploiting its vulnerabilities of to carry out a questionable agenda that could only further destabilize Libya. On May 23, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio linked the leaked news reports of Washington's attempted deportation of criminal elements to Libya and other parts of Africa to Libya's upheaval saying they have emboldened rebel forces in Libya, igniting the worst street fighting in three years in the Libyan capital. That particular episode has created many doubts over the US strategy in Libya as Washington seemed to be prioritizing a set of expedient objectives despite their predictably adverse effects on the North African country. The uproar which erupted in the first week of May over the shocking video of kidnapped MP Ibrahim el-Dirsi (held with chains around his neck) was seen by many in Libya as an attempt by Haftar's rivals to quash Washington's overtures to the LNA commander. Amid the turmoil which engulfed Tripoli at the end of May over the future of the Dbeibah government, Russia and Turkey tried to paint their encroachment in Libya 'in order to prevent a new escalation that threatens to turn into a resumption of hostilities'. Moscow and Ankara were clearly putting the best face on their more self-serving agendas. Most Libyans suspect foreign actors of being after the country's oil, gas and vast underground riches. They believe Libya's stability is at best a secondary goal for regional and international powers seeking to curtail the footprint of their rivals. But nobody consulted them before inviting foreign armies and their mercenary subordinates and none of the local sponsors is seriously discussing their removal. It is true that the United Nations and some people of good-will have spared no effort to help Libyans steer the ship of state to safe harbor despite the stormy seas. But the complex web of intertwined interests between domestic and foreign stakeholders has so far caused an insurmountable headwind blocking any real progress. Furthermore, the role played by foreign powers has been too often a measure of Libyan protagonists' dependence on outside forces to ensure their own political survival and promote their selfish agendas in an environment awash in corruption and human rights abuses. Not much headway towards a political process that would ensure the reunification of the country's institutions is possible until vying Libyan actors themselves are convinced of the need to put Libya's interests first. That might mean waiting for another generation of wiser and less greedy elites.
Libya Review
5 days ago
- Health
- Libya Review
Belgassem Haftar Oversees Construction Progress of Major Hospitals in Benghazi
On Tuesday, the Director-General of the Libyan Reconstruction and Development Fund, Belgassem Khalifa Haftar, conducted a site visit to inspect two of the most important ongoing healthcare infrastructure projects in Benghazi: a specialized Pediatric Surgery and Medicine Hospital and a Women's Maternity Hospital. The Pediatric Hospital will provide 490 beds and is designed to deliver advanced care for children requiring surgery, intensive care, and other specialized treatments. The Maternity and Women's Hospital, with a 200-bed capacity, will focus on maternal health, obstetrics, and gynecological care. Both facilities are being constructed according to modern international healthcare standards. Haftar's visit aimed to evaluate the progress of construction and ensure that work was advancing according to the technical specifications approved by the fund. He also reviewed the quality of materials and medical equipment being installed, with a focus on ensuring that the hospitals will be fully equipped with state-of-the-art facilities upon completion. The dual hospital project represents a strategic investment in Benghazi's public health system and is part of a broader plan by the Reconstruction and Development Fund to enhance Libya's healthcare capacity, particularly in underserved regions. When complete, the facilities are expected to significantly improve access to specialized medical services for women and children, reduce strain on existing hospitals, and serve as training hubs for future medical professionals. Officials highlighted that the initiative is not only about constructing new buildings but about transforming the quality and accessibility of healthcare services in eastern Libya. By investing in essential infrastructure like hospitals, the Libyan government seeks to demonstrate its commitment to social development and the welfare of its citizens, despite ongoing political and economic challenges. Tags: Belgasim HaftarbenghaziHealth Projectslibya
