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Asia Times
26-03-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
Why Russia priortized a ceasefire at sea
Away from the grueling land battles and devastating airstrikes, the Ukraine war has, from its outset, had a naval element. Soon after the February 2022 invasion, Russia imposed a de facto naval blockade on Ukraine, only to see its fleet stunningly defeated during a contest for control of the Black Sea. But that war on the waves looks like it could be ending. Under the terms of a deal announced on March 25, 2025, by the US and agreed upon in Saudi Arabia, both sides of the conflict committed to ensuring 'safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea,' according to a White House statement. The naval aspect of the Ukraine war has gotten less attention than events on land and in the skies. But it is, I believe, a vital aspect with potentially far-reaching consequences. Not only have Russia's Black Sea losses constrained Moscow's ability to project power across the globe through naval means, it has also resulted in Russia's growing cooperation with China, where Moscow is emerging as a junior party to Beijing on the high seas. The tradition of geopolitical theory has tended to paint an oversimplification of global politics. Theories harkening back to the late 19th century categorized countries as either land powers or maritime powers. Thinkers such as the British geopolitician Sir Halford Mackinder or the US theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan characterized maritime powers as countries that possessed traits of democratic liberalism and free trade. In contrast, land powers were often portrayed as despotic and militaristic. While such generalizations have historically been used to demonize enemies, there is still a contrived tendency to divide the world into land and sea powers. An accompanying view that naval and army warfare is somewhat separate has continued. And this division gives us a false impression of Russia's progress in the war with Ukraine. While Moscow has certainly seen some successes on land and in the air, that should not draw attention away from Russia's stunning defeat in the Black Sea that has seen Russia have to retreat from the Ukrainian shoreline and keep its ships far away from the battlefront. As I describe in my recent book, 'Near and Far Waters: The Geopolitics of Seapower,' maritime countries have two concerns: They must attempt to control the parts of the sea relatively close to their coastlines, or their 'near waters'; meanwhile, those with the ability and desire to do so try to project power and influence into 'far waters' across oceans, which are the near waters of other countries. The Black Sea is a tightly enclosed and relatively small sea comprising the near waters of the countries that surround it: Turkey to the south, Bulgaria and Romania to the west, Georgia to the east, and Ukraine and Russia to the north. Control of the Black Sea's near waters has been contested throughout the centuries and has played a role in the current Russian-Ukraine war. Russia's seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 allowed it to control the naval port of Sevastopol. What were near waters of Ukraine became de facto near waters for Russia. Controlling these near waters allowed Russia to disrupt Ukraine's trade, especially the export of grain to African far waters. But Russia's actions were thwarted through the collaboration of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey to allow passage of cargo ships through their near waters, then through the Bosporus into the Mediterranean Sea. Ukraine's use of these other countries' near waters allowed it to export between 5.2 million and 5.8 million tons of grain per month in the first quarter of 2024. To be sure, this was a decline from Ukraine's exports of about 6.5 million tons per month prior to the war, which then dropped to just 2 million tons in the summer of 2023 because of Russian attacks and threats. Prior to the announcement of the ceasefire, the Foreign Agricultural Service of the US Department of Agriculture had forecasted a decline in Ukrainian grain exports for 2025. But efforts to constrain Russia's control of Ukraine's near waters in the Black Sea and Russia's unwillingness to face the consequences of attacking ships in NATO countries' near waters meant Ukraine was still able to access far waters for economic gain and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. Alongside being thwarted in its ability to disrupt Ukrainian exports, Russia has also come under direct naval attack from Ukraine. Since February 2022, using unmanned attack drones, Ukraine has successfully sunk or damaged Russian ships and whittled away at Russia's Black sea fleet, sinking about 15 of its prewar fleet of about 36 warships and damaging many others. Russia has been forced to limit its use of Sevastopol and station its ships in the eastern part of the Black Sea. It cannot effectively function in the near waters it gained through the seizure of Crimea. Russia's naval setbacks against Ukraine are only the latest in its historical difficulties in projecting sea power and its resulting tendency to mainly focus on the defense of near waters. In 1905, Russia was shocked by a dramatic naval loss to Japan. Yet even in cases where it was not outright defeated, Russian sea power has been continually constrained historically. In World War I, Russia cooperated with the British Royal Navy to limit German merchant activity in the Baltic Sea and Turkish trade and military reach in the Black Sea. In World War II, Russia relied on material support from the Allies and was largely blockaded within its Baltic Sea and Black Sea ports. Many ships were brought close to home or stripped of their guns as artillery or offshore support for the territorial struggle with Germany. During the Cold War, meanwhile, though the Soviet Union built fast-moving missile boats and some aircraft carriers, its reach into far waters relied on submarines. The main purpose of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet was to prevent NATO penetration into the Black Sea. And now, Russia has lost control of the Black Sea. It cannot operate in these once secure near waters. These losses reduce its ability to project naval power from the Black Sea and into the Mediterranean Sea. Faced with a glaring loss in its backyard and put in a weak position in its near waters, Russia, as a result, can project power to far waters only through cooperation with a China that is itself investing heavily in a far-water naval capacity. Joint naval exercises in the South China Sea in July 2024 are evidence of this cooperation. Wang Guangzheng of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy's Southern Theater said of the drill that 'the China-Russia joint patrol has promoted the deepening and practical cooperation between the two in multiple directions and fields.' And looking forward, he claimed the exercise 'effectively enhanced the ability to the two sides to jointly respond to maritime security threats.' Warships of the Chinese and Russian navies take part in a joint naval exercise in the East China Sea. Photo: Li Yun / Xinhua via Getty Images This cooperation makes sense in purely military terms for Russia, a mutually beneficial project of sea power projection. But it is largely to China's benefit. Russia can help China's defense of its northern near waters and secure access to far waters through the Arctic Ocean – an increasingly important arena as global climate change reduces the hindrance posed by sea ice. But Russia remains very much the junior partner. Moscow's strategic interests will be supported only if they match Chinese interests. More to the point, sea power is about power projection for economic gain. China will likely use Russia to help protect its ongoing economic reach into African, Pacific, European and South American far waters. But it is unlikely to jeopardize these interests for Russian goals. To be sure, Russia has far-water economic interests, especially in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. And securing Russian interests in Africa complements China's growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean to secure its own, and greater, global economic interests. But cooperation will still be at China's behest. For much of the Ukraine war, Russia has been bottled up in its Black Sea near waters, with the only avenue for projecting its naval power coming through access to Africa and Indian Ocean far waters – and only then as a junior partner with China, which dictates the terms and conditions. A maritime deal with Ukraine now, even if it holds, will not compensate for Russia's ongoing inability to project power across the oceans on its own. Colin Flint is distinguished professor of political science, Utah State University This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Yahoo
25-03-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Maritime truce would end a sorry war on the waves for Russia that set back its naval power ambitions
Away from the grueling land battles and devastating airstrikes, the Ukraine war has from its outset had a naval element. Soon after the February 2022 invasion, Russia imposed a de facto naval blockade on Ukraine, only to see its fleet stunningly defeated during a contest for control of the Black Sea. But that war on the waves looks like it could be ending. Under the terms of a deal announced on March 25, 2025, by the U.S. and agreed upon in Saudi Arabia, both sides of the conflict committed to ensuring 'safe navigation, eliminate the use of force, and prevent the use of commercial vessels for military purposes in the Black Sea,' according to a White House statement. The naval aspect of the Ukraine war has gotten less attention than events on land and in the skies. But it is, I believe, a vital aspect with potentially far-reaching consequences. Not only have Russia's Black Sea losses constrained Moscow's ability to project power across the globe through naval means, it has also resulted in Russia's growing cooperation with China, where Moscow is emerging as a junior party to Beijing on the high seas. The tradition of geopolitical theory has tended to paint an oversimplification of global politics. Theories harkening back to the late 19th century categorized countries as either land powers or maritime powers. Thinkers such as the British geopolitician Sir Halford Mackinder or the U.S. theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan characterized maritime powers as countries that possessed traits of democratic liberalism and free trade. In contrast, land powers were often portrayed as despotic and militaristic. While such generalizations have historically been used to demonize enemies, there is still a contrived tendency to divide the world into land and sea powers. An accompanying view that naval and army warfare is somewhat separate has continued. And this division gives us a false impression of Russia's progress in the war with Ukraine. While Moscow has certainly seen some successes on land and in the air, that should not draw attention away from Russia's stunning defeat in the Black Sea that has seen Russia have to retreat from the Ukrainian shoreline and keep its ships far away from the battlefront. As I describe in my recent book, 'Near and Far Waters: The Geopolitics of Seapower,' maritime countries have two concerns: They must attempt to control the parts of the sea relatively close to their coastlines, or their 'near waters'; meanwhile, those with the ability and desire to do so try to project power and influence into 'far waters' across oceans, which are the near waters of other countries. The Black Sea is a tightly enclosed and relatively small sea comprising the near waters of the countries that surround it: Turkey to the south, Bulgaria and Romania to the west, Georgia to the east, and Ukraine and Russia to the north. Control of the Black Sea's near waters has been contested throughout the centuries and has played a role in the current Russian-Ukraine war. Russia's seizure of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 allowed it to control the naval port of Sevastopol. What were near waters of Ukraine became de facto near waters for Russia. Controlling these near waters allowed Russia to disrupt Ukraine's trade, especially the export of grain to African far waters. But Russia's actions were thwarted through the collaboration of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey to allow passage of cargo ships through their near waters, then through the Bosporus into the Mediterranean Sea. Ukraine's use of these other countries' near waters allowed it to export between 5.2 million and 5.8 million tons of grain per month in the first quarter of 2024. To be sure, this was a decline from Ukraine's exports of about 6.5 million tons per month prior to the war, which then dropped to just 2 million tons in the summer of 2023 because of Russian attacks and threats. Prior to the announcement of the ceasefire, the Foreign Agricultural Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture had forecasted a decline in Ukrainian grain exports for 2025. But efforts to constrain Russia's control of Ukraine's near waters in the Black Sea, and Russia's unwillingness to face the consequences of attacking ships in NATO countries' near waters, meant Ukraine was still able to access far waters for economic gain and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. Alongside being thwarted in its ability to disrupt Ukrainian exports, Russia has also come under direct naval attack from Ukraine. Since February 2022, using unmanned attack drones, Ukraine has successfully sunk or damaged Russian ships and whittled away at Russia's Black sea fleet, sinking about 15 of its prewar fleet of about 36 warships and damaging many others. Russia has been forced to limit its use of Sevastopol and station its ships in the eastern part of the Black Sea. It cannot effectively function in the near waters it gained through the seizure of Crimea. Russia's naval setbacks against Ukraine are only the latest in its historical difficulties in projecting sea power and its resulting tendency to mainly focus on the defense of near waters. In 1905, Russia was shocked by a dramatic naval loss to Japan. Yet even in cases where it was not outright defeated, Russian sea power has been continually constrained historically. In World War I, Russia cooperated with the British Royal Navy to limit German merchant activity in the Baltic Sea and Turkish trade and military reach in the Black Sea. In World War II, Russia relied on material support from the Allies and was largely blockaded within its Baltic Sea and Black Sea ports. Many ships were brought close to home or stripped of their guns as artillery or offshore support for the territorial struggle with Germany. During the Cold War, meanwhile, though the Soviet Union built fast-moving missile boats and some aircraft carriers, its reach into far waters relied on submarines. The main purpose of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet was to prevent NATO penetration into the Black Sea. And now, Russia has lost control of the Black Sea. It cannot operate in these once secure near waters. These losses reduce its ability to project naval power from the Black Sea and into the Mediterranean Sea. Faced with a glaring loss in its backyard and put in a weak position in its near waters, Russia as a result can project power to far waters only through cooperation with a China that is itself investing heavily in a far-water naval capacity. Joint naval exercises in the South China Sea in July 2024 are evidence of this cooperation. Wang Guangzheng of the Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy's Southern Theater said of the drill that 'the China-Russia joint patrol has promoted the deepening and practical cooperation between the two in multiple directions and fields.' And looking forward, he claimed the exercise 'effectively enhanced the ability to the two sides to jointly respond to maritime security threats.' This cooperation makes sense in purely military terms for Russia, a mutually beneficial project of sea power projection. But it is largely to China's benefit. Russia can help China's defense of its northern near waters and secure access to far waters through the Arctic Ocean – an increasingly important arena as global climate change reduces the hindrance posed by sea ice. But Russia remains very much the junior partner. Moscow's strategic interests will be supported only if they match Chinese interests. More to the point, sea power is about power projection for economic gain. China will likely use Russia to help protect its ongoing economic reach into African, Pacific, European and South American far waters. But it is unlikely to jeopardize these interests for Russian goals. To be sure, Russia has far-water economic interests, especially in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa. And securing Russian interests in Africa complements China's growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean to secure its own, and greater, global economic interests. But cooperation will still be at China's behest. For much of the Ukraine war, Russia has been bottled up in its Black Sea near waters, with the only avenue for projecting its naval power coming through access to Africa and Indian Ocean far waters – and only then as a junior partner with China, which dictates the terms and conditions. A maritime deal with Ukraine now, even if it holds, will not compensate for Russia's ongoing inability to project power across the oceans on its own. Editor's note: This is an updated version of an article originally published by The Conversation U.S. on Oct. 3, 2024. This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Colin Flint, Utah State University Read more: How US foreign aid cuts are threatening independent media in former Soviet states Trump's desire to 'un-unite' Russia and China is unlikely to work – in fact, it could well backfire Giorgia Meloni's government is still supporting Ukraine and backing NATO. Italy's aerospace and defence sectors help explain why Colin Flint does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Asia Times
03-03-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
Ukraine debacle signals the death of Atlanticism
The public spat between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump at the White House last week sent shockwaves through Europe, and rightly so. With Trump advocating for an end to the Ukraine war and signaling a hard shift in US policy, Europe finds itself caught in a geopolitical non-man's land. It alienated China, severed economic ties with Russia and failed to anticipate Trump's historic strategic shift. Making matters worse, Europe disqualified itself as a reliable interlocutor after EU leaders publically admitted that the Minsk negotiations were used to buy time for Ukraine's military buildup. In a few short years, Europe managed to isolate itself on the world stage. Henry Kissinger once said that the US has no permanent friends, only interests. The war in Ukraine is a case in point. Starting about 30 years ago, most European countries, influenced by a neoliberal wave in the US, elected a slew of Atlanticist-minded political leaders who agreed with US neoliberal policies. Consecutive US administrations, including Bush, Clinton and Obama, supported NATO expansion. The pretext was the spread of democracy and freedom, which obscured the geopolitical and economic reasons that can be traced to the colonial era. The Heartland Theory, developed by British geographer Halford Mackinder in the early 20th century, argued that Western hegemony relied on a divided Eurasian continent. Mackinder addressed the battle as one between emerging maritime powers (mostly Western European) and land-based powers (Russia, China, India). The development of railroads challenged the maritime hegemonic power of the West. From Halford Mackinder's Heartland Theory. Railroads changed military logistics. In the 1980s, American geopolitical strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski updated the Heartland Theory and identified Ukraine as the pivotal nation in the battle for the Eurasian continent. NATO's expansion since the 1990s was orchestrated by Brzezinski's proteges, and championed by successive US administrations. Only by keeping the Eurasian continent divided, the reasoning was, could the maritime powers of the West remain global hegemony. China's Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), which stretches across the Eurasian continent, also concerned the Atlanticists. China's Belt & Road Initiative will ultimately integrate the Eurasian continent. From an Atlanticist perspective, the Ukraine war accomplished its mission: cutting Europe off from the Eurasian continent. Blowing up the Nord Stream pipeline connecting Russia and Europe was part of the program. But the Atlanticists could not have foreseen that Trump would so drastically change the strategic chess board. The old adage 'Follow the money' still holds true. The US is facing a growing and unsustainable national debt, a perennial budget deficit and ever-growing trade deficits. These triple deficits can only be sustained as long as the dollar is the world's reserve currency. The US earns trillions as the 'toll booth' of the global dollar system. However, the US government has now borrowed US$36 trillion to cover its budget deficits. Interest payments on the national debt are larger than the defense budget, and rising. On the current trajectory, the US is heading for default or hyperinflation. Trump's priority is restoring the fiscal health of the US, and to make sure the dollar remains the world's reserve currency. It explains both his ruthless cost-cutting and why he threatens sanctions on countries that try to de-dollarize. The West was never able to convince Russia that NATO expansion to the Russian border was no threat to it. Unconcerned about the possible Russian reaction, they framed NATO expansion as an exercise of democracy and freedom. Ideology trumped pragmatism. But the climb down will be painful. Early on in the war, Western media depicted Russia as weak and corrupt, with a dying economy and an inefficient military. Overly confident or historically naive, the West relied on three pillars that crumbled one after another: – Sanctions to weaken or collapse the Russian economy and cause an uprising against Putin failed – Isolating Russia from the Global South, including China and India, failed – Inflicting strategic defeat on Russia with superior NATO weapons failed Convinced that Russia could be brought to its knees, the West did not bother to formulate a backup plan. When it became clear Russia was not to be defeated, the West flipped the script. Russia was no longer a weak state with an impotent military, it was an existential threat to Europe. Russia has an economy the size of Spain, less than one-third of the European population, and a quarter of the European defense budget (about $84 billion vs Europe's $326 billion). But Europeans are now told that if they don't defend Ukraine, they may have to fight the Russians at their own borders. Fully in denial that the end game has begun and incapable of offering peace proposals, the Europeans are doubling down on their strategic folly. They are discussing a collective European defense fund, and building up a defense industry that does not rely on the US. Experts predict that it could take ten years for Europe to reach military self-sufficiency, not to mention that a growing number of countries in Europe are expressing dissatisfaction with the Ukraine policy. Most EU leaders have approval ratings of under 30%. Europe's weakness is intrinsic and can't be papered over. A Chinese geopolitical analyst recently described the dilemma: 'Europe consists of small countries and countries that don't realize they are small (in the context of geopolitics).' Should the US, Russia, and China discuss a postwar architecture – a Yalta II – Europe may find itself relegated to the sidelines. When the chips are down, Europe lacks the strategic leverage that can be yielded by the 'Big Three.' The biggest challenge for the EU elite is to manage public opinion during the unavoidable climb-down from their ideological crusade. Since 2014, when Russia regained control of Crimea, the Western media has served as the propaganda arm of the Atlanticists, some sponsored by USAID. They demonized Putin and Russia 24/7. Anyone uttering a word of critique of Zelensky or Ukraine was depicted as a Russian asset. The non-stop barrage of anti-Russian propaganda was highly effective. A recent poll in Britain indicated 80+% in favor of boots on the ground in Ukraine. Never mind that the entire British army would fit in Wembley Stadium. The Atlanticist virus that infected Europe in the past three decades has transformed the ideological landscape. Today, the proverbial right, like the AfD in Germany, calls for peace, while the proverbial left, including the 'Greens', are the cheerleaders for continuing the war. This historic role reversal is hardly discussed in Europe. Europe's Green Parties have roots in the student uprisings of 1968 and the anti-Vietnam war protests in the early 1970s. The Dutch Green Party resulted from the merger of pacifists and environmentalists, yet the 'Green' major of Amsterdam displayed a burned-out Russian tank in the center of Amsterdam as a war trophy. When peace returns to Ukraine, Europe would do well to analyze the ideological role reversal that contributed to the Ukraine tragedy.
