Latest news with #Haqqanis
Yahoo
23-04-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Opinion - Rare earth, hard choices: America's Haqqani gambit in Afghanistan
Afghanistan hasn't been in the headlines much lately. It's slipped into the background of American consciousness — just another unfinished story in a long list of slow-burning global flashpoints. But out of the attention span of the West, something is shifting that deserves attention. Since the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021, the Taliban haven't operated as a single, unified movement. Power has quietly shifted between two rival factions: the Kandaharis — hardline, ideological and socially rigid — and the Haqqani network, a more pragmatic group known for intelligence ties, political instincts, and long memory. Since the withdrawal, the Kandaharis, led by Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, called the shots. They imposed restrictions on girls' education, shut down civil society and kept foreign engagement at arm's length. It was rule by isolation and decrees. The Haqqanis, for their part, stayed in the background — watching, waiting, building alliances and letting the other faction absorb public frustration. That wait-and-see approach may be over. In recent months, Sirajuddin Haqqani, the network's leader and Afghanistan's interior minister, has stepped into the spotlight. He has been giving interviews to international outlets, hinting at economic revitalization and even suggesting a return to school for girls. It's not a full reversal of Taliban rule, but it's a tonal shift — a signal to the outside world that not all doors are closed. Adding to this picture, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Hezb-e Islami, Afghanistan's second-largest militant group, has voiced concern over the country's direction under Taliban rule. A former mujahideen commander and longtime Islamist figure, Hekmatyar warned Afghanistan is 'not moving in the right direction' and has suggested a 'dignified council' assist the government. Notably, he has aligned more closely with the Haqqani faction, signaling broader discontent with Kandahari leadership and adding weight to the possibility of an internal shift. If that's what it is, then it's time the U.S. started knocking. The Haqqanis are not reformers in any Western sense. They are not allies. But they are power players who understand leverage, and they see that Afghanistan's economy is still on life support. Any U.S. overture would carry political risk and draw scrutiny. Engaging with them would require strict conditions, oversight and a clear-eyed understanding that this is leverage, not legitimacy. With aid frozen, jobs evaporating, and the banking system teetering, over 90 percent of Afghans are living below the poverty line. Humanitarian shipments, informal trade and whatever cash remains in the depleted system fuel the country. The Haqqanis know this is not sustainable. What most Americans may not realize is that Afghanistan sits atop vast untapped mineral wealth — an estimated $1 trillion in resources, including copper, iron, rare earth elements and, most significantly, lithium. China already dominates the global lithium supply chain, and recently suspended rare earth exports to the U.S. in response to the Trump administration's tariffs. In Afghanistan, since the U.S. withdrawal, Beijing has moved aggressively to close mining deals and infrastructure contracts that could cement its influence for decades. Iran and Russia are maneuvering, too. But many Afghan leaders, even within the Taliban, prefer working with the United States — not because they trust us, but because they respect U.S. systems, contracts, transparency and accountability. They may not say it publicly, but quietly signal they don't like China's fast deals and their long-term costs. This isn't a call for recognition or a major infusion of humanitarian aid. It's not about revisiting the past. It's about understanding that in the power vacuum left behind, the U.S. still holds cards — it just needs to play them wisely. What would that look like? First, start small and stay quiet. Identify sectors — mineral development, infrastructure, logistics — where limited engagement could unlock value and provide alternatives to Chinese dominance. Bagram, the sprawling airbase, with its existing infrastructure and strategic location, could serve as a cornerstone for economic development and potentially house a discreet U.S. consulate to support commercial engagement. Tie cooperation to specific outcomes: reopening girls' schools, allowing monitored trade and keeping humanitarian operations safe. Second, offer intelligence coordination on the Islamic State branch that continues to menace Afghanistan. It's a threat both the U.S. and the Haqqanis take seriously, and the Haqqanis have networks on the ground that could prove useful if a trust-building channel is opened. But here's the key: This initiative must not be driven by the same people who shaped the last 20 years. Former officials, Kabul-era consultants or Afghans who fled during the collapse cannot lead this effort. They bring too much baggage, mistrust and complication. The U.S. needs fresh intermediaries, people who understand the new political terrain, who can talk without echoing the past and who can deliver conversations that focus on the future. That's what credibility looks like now. If the U.S. steps back and leaves the field open, China will move in. Beijing won't ask about girls' schools, and they won't worry about development or labor rights. They'll take the minerals, build the roads and tighten their grip. Russia and Iran will carve out their pieces too, building spheres of influence that make the region less stable. Meanwhile, the Kandahari wing will grow stronger, bolstered by money and leverage the Haqqanis could have used to drive modest change. If the U.S. wants any say in what Afghanistan looks like five years from now, the time to act is now. Afghanistan may never be the same. But it's not done evolving. What's happening now — a realignment inside the Taliban, an unspoken preference for U.S. partnership and a recognition that isolation is a dead end — represents one of the few real openings since 2021. The U.S. doesn't need to flood the zone. It just needs to re-enter the room. We missed our chance to shape how the war ended. Let's not miss the chance to shape what comes next. Open a quiet line. Put a real offer on the table — targeted, conditional and strategic. And above all, send a new generation of envoys who are not tied to the ghosts of Kabul's past. There are no guarantees. But there's also no excuse for missing the moment. Ron MacCammon is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel and former political officer for the Department of State. He has worked on humanitarian demining and conventional weapons destruction programs in Afghanistan and Africa. Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
The Hill
23-04-2025
- Politics
- The Hill
Rare earth, hard choices: America's Haqqani gambit in Afghanistan
Afghanistan hasn't been in the headlines much lately. It's slipped into the background of American consciousness — just another unfinished story in a long list of slow-burning global flashpoints. But out of the attention span of the West, something is shifting that deserves attention. Since the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021, the Taliban haven't operated as a single, unified movement. Power has quietly shifted between two rival factions: the Kandaharis — hardline, ideological and socially rigid — and the Haqqani network, a more pragmatic group known for intelligence ties, political instincts, and long memory. Since the withdrawal, the Kandaharis, led by Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, called the shots. They imposed restrictions on girls' education, shut down civil society and kept foreign engagement at arm's length. It was rule by isolation and decrees. The Haqqanis, for their part, stayed in the background — watching, waiting, building alliances and letting the other faction absorb public frustration. That wait-and-see approach may be over. In recent months, Sirajuddin Haqqani, the network's leader and Afghanistan's interior minister, has stepped into the spotlight. He has been giving interviews to international outlets, hinting at economic revitalization and even suggesting a return to school for girls. It's not a full reversal of Taliban rule, but it's a tonal shift — a signal to the outside world that not all doors are closed. Adding to this picture, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Hezb-e Islami, Afghanistan's second-largest militant group, has voiced concern over the country's direction under Taliban rule. A former mujahideen commander and longtime Islamist figure, Hekmatyar warned Afghanistan is 'not moving in the right direction' and has suggested a 'dignified council' assist the government. Notably, he has aligned more closely with the Haqqani faction, signaling broader discontent with Kandahari leadership and adding weight to the possibility of an internal shift. If that's what it is, then it's time the U.S. started knocking. The Haqqanis are not reformers in any Western sense. They are not allies. But they are power players who understand leverage, and they see that Afghanistan's economy is still on life support. Any U.S. overture would carry political risk and draw scrutiny. Engaging with them would require strict conditions, oversight and a clear-eyed understanding that this is leverage, not legitimacy. With aid frozen, jobs evaporating, and the banking system teetering, over 90 percent of Afghans are living below the poverty line. Humanitarian shipments, informal trade and whatever cash remains in the depleted system fuel the country. The Haqqanis know this is not sustainable. What most Americans may not realize is that Afghanistan sits atop vast untapped mineral wealth — an estimated $1 trillion in resources, including copper, iron, rare earth elements and, most significantly, lithium. China already dominates the global lithium supply chain, and recently suspended rare earth exports to the U.S. in response to the Trump administration's tariffs. In Afghanistan, since the U.S. withdrawal, Beijing has moved aggressively to close mining deals and infrastructure contracts that could cement its influence for decades. Iran and Russia are maneuvering, too. But many Afghan leaders, even within the Taliban, prefer working with the United States — not because they trust us, but because they respect U.S. systems, contracts, transparency and accountability. They may not say it publicly, but quietly signal they don't like China's fast deals and their long-term costs. This isn't a call for recognition or a major infusion of humanitarian aid. It's not about revisiting the past. It's about understanding that in the power vacuum left behind, the U.S. still holds cards — it just needs to play them wisely. What would that look like? First, start small and stay quiet. Identify sectors — mineral development, infrastructure, logistics — where limited engagement could unlock value and provide alternatives to Chinese dominance. Bagram, the sprawling airbase, with its existing infrastructure and strategic location, could serve as a cornerstone for economic development and potentially house a discreet U.S. consulate to support commercial engagement. Tie cooperation to specific outcomes: reopening girls' schools, allowing monitored trade and keeping humanitarian operations safe. Second, offer intelligence coordination on the Islamic State branch that continues to menace Afghanistan. It's a threat both the U.S. and the Haqqanis take seriously, and the Haqqanis have networks on the ground that could prove useful if a trust-building channel is opened. But here's the key: This initiative must not be driven by the same people who shaped the last 20 years. Former officials, Kabul-era consultants or Afghans who fled during the collapse cannot lead this effort. They bring too much baggage, mistrust and complication. The U.S. needs fresh intermediaries, people who understand the new political terrain, who can talk without echoing the past and who can deliver conversations that focus on the future. That's what credibility looks like now. If the U.S. steps back and leaves the field open, China will move in. Beijing won't ask about girls' schools, and they won't worry about development or labor rights. They'll take the minerals, build the roads and tighten their grip. Russia and Iran will carve out their pieces too, building spheres of influence that make the region less stable. Meanwhile, the Kandahari wing will grow stronger, bolstered by money and leverage the Haqqanis could have used to drive modest change. If the U.S. wants any say in what Afghanistan looks like five years from now, the time to act is now. Afghanistan may never be the same. But it's not done evolving. What's happening now — a realignment inside the Taliban, an unspoken preference for U.S. partnership and a recognition that isolation is a dead end — represents one of the few real openings since 2021. The U.S. doesn't need to flood the zone. It just needs to re-enter the room. We missed our chance to shape how the war ended. Let's not miss the chance to shape what comes next. Open a quiet line. Put a real offer on the table — targeted, conditional and strategic. And above all, send a new generation of envoys who are not tied to the ghosts of Kabul's past. There are no guarantees. But there's also no excuse for missing the moment. Ron MacCammon is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel and former political officer for the Department of State. He has worked on humanitarian demining and conventional weapons destruction programs in Afghanistan and Africa.
Express Tribune
02-04-2025
- Politics
- Express Tribune
Greater Qandahar, Loya Paktia and the US
Listen to article Winston Churchill famously described Soviet Russia as "a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma". This characterisation also fits modern Afghanistan, as amply demonstrated by repeated failures of the modern world in dealing with Afghans and Afghanistan. My research indicates that the root cause is lack of socio-anthropological understanding on the part of the relevant policymakers and most of the Afghanologists in dealing with Afghan affairs. The present-day political dispensation in the IEA runs along Qandahar (I prefer Qandahar to Kandahar) – Paktia fault lines. Qandahar, or the Greater Qandahar, is where the Taliban Tehreek (movement) under Mulla Umer was born. A seminary student who was unable to finish his formal education, since he took up armed resistance against warlords and strongmen in the early 1990s, the venerable Umer would refer decisions as critical as handing over Osama Bin Laden to the US forces for alleged complicity in the 9/11 attacks, to the ulema. That strand persists in the Movement under the venerable Moulvi Haibatullah Akhundzada (the lineage of holy men, the Akhund) to this day. The fact that Qandahar, the mover and shaker of the Taliban movement, sees everything including foreign presence and girls' education strictly through a religious lens is important; hence my persistent advice to conduct 'religious diplomacy' with Qandahar. The recent media interview of the IEA Foreign Ministry spokesperson, the suave English-speaking Abdul Qahar Balkhi substantiates this assertion. Eager to engage with the US (there were repeated requests previously to Pakistan/ISI to facilitate this engagement), Balkhi was categorical about presence of intelligence-sharing cooperation with the US; ISIK threat as overblown; and the non-handing over of the abandoned US military equipment, as demanded by the Trump Administration. Balkhi was evasive about human especially the women rights to education and work, citing this as Afghanistan's domestic affair. The puritanical Qandahar takes a long religious view, guided by the early days of Islam, conveniently sidestepping Islam's revolutionary credentials in the Arab universe. IEA has an unsettling conviction about its invincibility, citing the humiliating retreat of two contemporary superpowers from Afghanistan. That hardline is not changing anytime soon. Loya Paktia (greater Paktia, roughly comprising the provinces of Paktia, Paktika, Khowst and Nangarhar), in the Zadran tribe dominated northern Afghanistan bordering our KP, is the fief of Haqqanis, the students of Darul Uloom Haqqania in Akora Khattak, hence the Haqqani nom-de-guerre. Jalaluddin Haqqani and presently Sirajuddin Haqqani, the venerable Khalifa, are also inextricably linked to North Waziristan District in KP through marital ties, military linkages and logistic basing. Haqqanis are, therefore, natural host to the TTP, who fought alongside Haqqani forces in the Afghan war of liberation, supported by Pakistan and its ISI. The West Plus still accuses Pakistan of playing the double game. Loya Paktia under Haqqani suzerainty was never incorporated through the force of arms into the Ahmadzai/Mohammadzai tribes' Qandahar-dominated IEA. Haqqanis instead partnered with and were coopted into the IEA, maintaining their status and relative independence within the Movement. Their worldview is diametrically different. From the days of US Congressman Charlie Wilson, during the war against the former USSR when Chalie was made to fire on a Soviet base inside Afghan territory by Haqqanis, Khalifas have a soft corner for Pakistan, ISI and the US. Therefore, TTP hosting is now an enigma for them, as it is becoming too costly for them, is a legacy issue, a logistic burden and a PR liability. Qandahar sees things differently. Sensitive to TTP's destructive potential in spoiling Kabul's relations with Muslim Pakistan, it remains unable and unwilling to prevail over TTP due to Haqqanis. Haqqanis, on the other hand, have started treating TTP as a 'force-in-being', if and when another round of internecine fighting erupts within IEA. They differ with Qandahar over a host of issues including denial of female education, relations with Pakistan and domestic policies. Sirajuddin Haqqani's recent absence from the scene and his overseas engagements indicate relative uneasiness with Qandahar. So, while eager to resolve the legacy TTP issue with Pakistan, Haqqanis do not want to give up TTP's potential military advantage. Therefore, TTP in my formulation is a bone stuck in the IEA's neck. So, my advice is to give the issue time to resolve itself, while responding decisively and unreservedly to any terrorist challenges. Khalifa et al would look the other way after some noise. For both Qandahar and Paktia, the existential challenge is unity among the IEA ranks, as without unity internecine squabbling is likely to unravel Afghanistan's clerical enterprise. Qandahar, during Khalifa's recent angry absence, asserted its authority by posting Qandahari troops in the Haqqani enclave along border with Pakistan. Khalifa also prefers independent validation by the West Plus, hence his UAE and Saudi junkets, perhaps at the cost of Qandahar. The above complexity of Greater Qandahar versus Loya Paktia, TTP versus IEA, TTP versus Haqqanis, IEA versus Pakistan, Haqqanis versus Islamabad, and IEA/Haqqani versus the US need wise handling by Pakistan. Our response should entail continued religious diplomacy with Qandahar, conduct of internation diplomacy under the remits of Doha Agreement, calibrated and relentless military response cis and trans-frontier without making noise, ruthless and resolute fight against terrorism at home, and giving a way out to Haqqanis from their self-created predicament. Patient pursuit of this policy without knee-jerk reactions like border closures should be the hallmark. Afghanistan's stability is in Pakistan's best and selfish national interest. But the TTP variable can tilt the fragile balance, if not restrained and resolved, as Pakistan's patience, understandably, can wear thin. Without TTP solution, Afghanistan despite its mineral/other resources stays embroiled, notwithstanding Mr Balkhi's claim that Afghanistan is open for business. Resource exploitation would continue to face impediments and delays. And one distant day, when the collective opposition of Northern Alliance, in cahoots with pragmatist Khalifas, bolstered by disenfranchised Pashtuns, and the vestiges of First Republic under the US/NATO-Combine, is strong enough, the tables can be turned against IEA. And Kabul may see another change of hands. And that unfortunate possibility, God forbid, may result into the resurgence of civil strife, or the unfortunate division of Afghanistan. Save this piece some place!
