Greater Qandahar, Loya Paktia and the US

Express Tribune

02-04-2025

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Winston Churchill famously described Soviet Russia as "a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma". This characterisation also fits modern Afghanistan, as amply demonstrated by repeated failures of the modern world in dealing with Afghans and Afghanistan. My research indicates that the root cause is lack of socio-anthropological understanding on the part of the relevant policymakers and most of the Afghanologists in dealing with Afghan affairs.
The present-day political dispensation in the IEA runs along Qandahar (I prefer Qandahar to Kandahar) – Paktia fault lines. Qandahar, or the Greater Qandahar, is where the Taliban Tehreek (movement) under Mulla Umer was born. A seminary student who was unable to finish his formal education, since he took up armed resistance against warlords and strongmen in the early 1990s, the venerable Umer would refer decisions as critical as handing over Osama Bin Laden to the US forces for alleged complicity in the 9/11 attacks, to the ulema. That strand persists in the Movement under the venerable Moulvi Haibatullah Akhundzada (the lineage of holy men, the Akhund) to this day. The fact that Qandahar, the mover and shaker of the Taliban movement, sees everything including foreign presence and girls' education strictly through a religious lens is important; hence my persistent advice to conduct 'religious diplomacy' with Qandahar.
The recent media interview of the IEA Foreign Ministry spokesperson, the suave English-speaking Abdul Qahar Balkhi substantiates this assertion. Eager to engage with the US (there were repeated requests previously to Pakistan/ISI to facilitate this engagement), Balkhi was categorical about presence of intelligence-sharing cooperation with the US; ISIK threat as overblown; and the non-handing over of the abandoned US military equipment, as demanded by the Trump Administration. Balkhi was evasive about human especially the women rights to education and work, citing this as Afghanistan's domestic affair. The puritanical Qandahar takes a long religious view, guided by the early days of Islam, conveniently sidestepping Islam's revolutionary credentials in the Arab universe. IEA has an unsettling conviction about its invincibility, citing the humiliating retreat of two contemporary superpowers from Afghanistan. That hardline is not changing anytime soon.
Loya Paktia (greater Paktia, roughly comprising the provinces of Paktia, Paktika, Khowst and Nangarhar), in the Zadran tribe dominated northern Afghanistan bordering our KP, is the fief of Haqqanis, the students of Darul Uloom Haqqania in Akora Khattak, hence the Haqqani nom-de-guerre. Jalaluddin Haqqani and presently Sirajuddin Haqqani, the venerable Khalifa, are also inextricably linked to North Waziristan District in KP through marital ties, military linkages and logistic basing. Haqqanis are, therefore, natural host to the TTP, who fought alongside Haqqani forces in the Afghan war of liberation, supported by Pakistan and its ISI. The West Plus still accuses Pakistan of playing the double game.
Loya Paktia under Haqqani suzerainty was never incorporated through the force of arms into the Ahmadzai/Mohammadzai tribes' Qandahar-dominated IEA. Haqqanis instead partnered with and were coopted into the IEA, maintaining their status and relative independence within the Movement. Their worldview is diametrically different. From the days of US Congressman Charlie Wilson, during the war against the former USSR when Chalie was made to fire on a Soviet base inside Afghan territory by Haqqanis, Khalifas have a soft corner for Pakistan, ISI and the US. Therefore, TTP hosting is now an enigma for them, as it is becoming too costly for them, is a legacy issue, a logistic burden and a PR liability.
Qandahar sees things differently. Sensitive to TTP's destructive potential in spoiling Kabul's relations with Muslim Pakistan, it remains unable and unwilling to prevail over TTP due to Haqqanis. Haqqanis, on the other hand, have started treating TTP as a 'force-in-being', if and when another round of internecine fighting erupts within IEA. They differ with Qandahar over a host of issues including denial of female education, relations with Pakistan and domestic policies. Sirajuddin Haqqani's recent absence from the scene and his overseas engagements indicate relative uneasiness with Qandahar. So, while eager to resolve the legacy TTP issue with Pakistan, Haqqanis do not want to give up TTP's potential military advantage. Therefore, TTP in my formulation is a bone stuck in the IEA's neck. So, my advice is to give the issue time to resolve itself, while responding decisively and unreservedly to any terrorist challenges. Khalifa et al would look the other way after some noise.
For both Qandahar and Paktia, the existential challenge is unity among the IEA ranks, as without unity internecine squabbling is likely to unravel Afghanistan's clerical enterprise. Qandahar, during Khalifa's recent angry absence, asserted its authority by posting Qandahari troops in the Haqqani enclave along border with Pakistan. Khalifa also prefers independent validation by the West Plus, hence his UAE and Saudi junkets, perhaps at the cost of Qandahar.
The above complexity of Greater Qandahar versus Loya Paktia, TTP versus IEA, TTP versus Haqqanis, IEA versus Pakistan, Haqqanis versus Islamabad, and IEA/Haqqani versus the US need wise handling by Pakistan. Our response should entail continued religious diplomacy with Qandahar, conduct of internation diplomacy under the remits of Doha Agreement, calibrated and relentless military response cis and trans-frontier without making noise, ruthless and resolute fight against terrorism at home, and giving a way out to Haqqanis from their self-created predicament. Patient pursuit of this policy without knee-jerk reactions like border closures should be the hallmark.
Afghanistan's stability is in Pakistan's best and selfish national interest. But the TTP variable can tilt the fragile balance, if not restrained and resolved, as Pakistan's patience, understandably, can wear thin. Without TTP solution, Afghanistan despite its mineral/other resources stays embroiled, notwithstanding Mr Balkhi's claim that Afghanistan is open for business. Resource exploitation would continue to face impediments and delays. And one distant day, when the collective opposition of Northern Alliance, in cahoots with pragmatist Khalifas, bolstered by disenfranchised Pashtuns, and the vestiges of First Republic under the US/NATO-Combine, is strong enough, the tables can be turned against IEA. And Kabul may see another change of hands. And that unfortunate possibility, God forbid, may result into the resurgence of civil strife, or the unfortunate division of Afghanistan.
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