Latest news with #HayatTahrirAl-Sham
Al-Ahram Weekly
01-08-2025
- Politics
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Why are Iraq's Shia afraid of Syria? - World - Al-Ahram Weekly
The efforts made by Syria's Islamist rulers to subdue the country's minorities are stirring up fears in Iraq's Shia community. 'What is going on in Syria is a sign of danger to any [Iraqi] who has even a little bit of a brain,' a leader of a powerful Iraqi militia recently declared. 'Whoever surrenders his weapons should be prepared for shaving off his moustache,' Sheikh Qais Al-Khazali told a congregation marking the anniversary of the martyrdom of the Shia saint Imam Hussein. The leader of the Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH) was referring to videos that appeared to show Syrian Islamist militants forcibly shaving off the moustaches of Druze men in Syria's Sweida Province amid ongoing sectarian conflict earlier this month. Al-Khazali's sounding of the alarm about Syria's political and sectarian chaos was the latest in a series of warnings by Iraqi leaders that their beleaguered country will be deeply affected by the conflict raging in their Western neighbour. The overthrow of the Alawite regime of Bashar Al-Assad in December by rebel forces led by Sunni militant group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) has had a significant impact on Iraq. The upheaval put an end to over 50 years of Al-Assad family's rule in Syria, which was seen by many as part of the 'Shia Crescent,' an imagined geopolitical entity composed of Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon that was aligned with Iran. The arc was broken after the collapse of the Al-Assad regime and the end of an era for Lebanon's Shia Hizbullah Party as a result of the full-scale war Israel launched on Lebanon in the aftermath of Hamas' attack on Israel on 7 October 2023. The subsequent Israel-Hamas war was the primary catalyst for the cascading events that have reshaped the region during the last year and raised fears of further turmoil. With uncertainty growing on its doorstep, Iraq is one country which faces an existential threat if the situation in Syria worsens unless the leaders of the Iraqi communities are capable of addressing the challenges. Atrocities committed during the turmoil triggered by clashes between Sunni tribesmen and factions from the Druze minority in Sweida in Syria have been viewed with growing alarm by Iraqi Shias. Seven months on from Al-Assad's fall, the bloodshed in Sweida, which came three months after the distressing massacres in the Alawite coastal region of the country, have showed that Syria is descending into yet another wave of bloody sectarian violence. Iraq fears that if sectarianism dominates in Syria, it will likely have significant security, political, and other implications for the deeply divided country that suffered from sectarian violence in the aftermath of the 2003 US-led invasion. But more significantly, regime change in Syria and world and regional power competition in the country underscore issues that make Iraqis fear the trajectory could rekindle similar dynamics in Iraq and pose new challenges for the country. Many Iraqi Shias have expressed a renewed sense of anxiety as radical Islamist militants, armed by neighbouring Turkey and supported by key regional Sunni powerhouses and formerly associated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) group, are stepping in as the new leaders of Syria. The Iraqi Shias' stress is amplified when they look at the foreign involvement in Syria and see a regional realignment that pushes for a new geopolitical reality in the Middle East and could create a potential domino effect of regime change in Iraq. Turkey, which shares a 911-km frontier with Syria, was a main backer of the Sunni Islamist-led opposition groups that succeeded in toppling the Al-Assad regime. Emerging as a winner in Syria, it is subtly increasing the pressure to build up broader regional influence primarily in Iraq, a country hit by internal divisions and threatened by a collapsing regional order. When viewed from an Iraqi Shia perspective, as Turkey continues to consolidate its influence in Syria, creating new regional dynamics, Ankara is likely to emerge as an active player pushing to expand its influence in Iraq. The effect on Iraq has been particularly pronounced in Ankara's diplomacy towards Baghdad, since Turkey sees its success in Syria as offering a wider strategic window to deepen engagement in its southern neighbour. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan decided on 20 July to terminate a longstanding Turkey-Iraq Crude Oil Pipeline Agreement that for five decades has been central to Turkey-Iraq energy cooperation. The decision to close the pipeline, which runs through Iraqi Kurdistan, has drawn increased attention in Baghdad to Ankara's strategy in Iraq amid political uncertainty and escalating tensions between the Shia-led government in the capital and the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government. The termination of the agreement raises important questions about Ankara's intentions to pursue a new strategic direction to increase its influence in Iraq. Erdogan's decision came against the backdrop of several developments that have been shaping Turkey's multiple-track strategy in Iraq, including water, trade, and the future of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey. The issue of water is an aggravating factor in Iraq's relations with Turkey. The ongoing dispute between Iraq and Turkey over the flow into the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers stems from concerns over the construction and operation of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) and its impacts on water security in Iraq. Iraq, with a population of about 45 million people, relies on the two rivers for nearly all of its fresh water and is accusing Ankara of constructing unilateral infrastructure projects that have negative effects downstream in Iraq. Turkey, meanwhile, continues to argue that the rivers are not international, but trans-boundary, which limits the scope for international mechanisms on equitable water sharing. Ankara's unilateral approach to the dispute is undoubtedly meant to keep its national control over the two rivers, while Iraq continues to suffer a drought that has strained the country's water resources and affected millions. Trade is another key instrument that Erdogan is using in his Iraq diplomacy as Turkey eyes Iraq's lucrative oil revenues and looks to expanded trade exchanges and energy agreements with Iraq on favourable terms. Turkey has already submitted a draft proposal to Iraq for a new energy agreement to include cooperation in oil, gas, petrochemicals, and electricity, as Ankara feels that current circumstances allow it to seek more advantages in dealing with the country. In December, Turkish Minister of Trade Omer Bolat disclosed that his country is seeking to increase trade exchanges with Iraq from their current level of nearly $20 billion to $30 billion. Turkey also sees the Development Road Initiative, a high-speed road and rail link running from Iraq's port city of Basra on the Gulf to the Turkish border and later to Europe, as an opportunity to expand its influence in Iraq. What should also prompt further reflection is the future of the PKK. Turkey has succeeded in snatching a declaration of peace and reconciliation from the Kurdish Party in a landmark step intended to end decades of conflict. But much of the success of this will depend on Iraq, where the party is still operating amidst uncertainty about implementing the peace agreement and scepticism within its supporters, many of them Iraqi Kurds. The United States is another partner in the network that seeks to rid Iraq of Iran's influence and the 'axis of resistance' it has forged in Iraq and resolve disputes with the US-backed semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region. As Trump deepens ties with longstanding US allies in the region while nurturing more cordial relationships with the new regime in Damascus, his administration is applying pressure on the Iraqi government to achieve these and other goals. The latest bid to push Baghdad to disband Iraq's pro-Iranian militias and allow the resumption of Kurdish oil exports came last week when US Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shiaa Al-Sudani against any reluctance to solve the two issues. Rubio 'reiterated serious US concerns with the Popular Mobilisation Commission (PMC) bill currently pending in the Council of Representatives' in Iraq, emphasising that any such legislation would institutionalise Iranian influence and armed terrorist groups, undermining Iraq's sovereignty, a State Department statement said. One tough message heard in Baghdad and underlies this US policy came from Tom Barrack, US ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Syria and Lebanon, who warned that Syria is developing very quickly. 'If Lebanon doesn't move, it's going to be Bilad Al-Sham again,' Barrack said in an interview, using the historical name for the Syria region. In Baghdad, the biggest worry of many distrustful Shias is if foreign pressure is put on the government could that also mean Iraq would be becoming part of a modern Umayyad Caliphate on the model of the mediaeval one that once ruled the region from Damascus. * A version of this article appears in print in the 6 August, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
Al-Ahram Weekly
31-07-2025
- Politics
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Why are Iraq's Shias afraid of Syria? - World - Al-Ahram Weekly
The efforts made by Syria's Islamist rulers to subdue the country's minorities are stirring up fears in Iraq's Shia community 'What is going on in Syria is a sign of danger to any [Iraqi] who has even a little bit of a brain,' a leader of a powerful Iraqi militia recently declared. 'Whoever surrenders his weapons should be prepared for shaving off his moustache,' Sheikh Qais Al-Khazali told a congregation marking the anniversary of the martyrdom of the Shia saint Imam Hussein. The leader of the Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH) was referring to videos that appeared to show Syrian Islamist militants forcibly shaving off the moustaches of Druze men in Syria's Sweida Province amid ongoing sectarian conflict earlier this month. Al-Khazali's sounding of the alarm about Syria's political and sectarian chaos was the latest in a series of warnings by Iraqi leaders that their beleaguered country will be deeply affected by the conflict raging in their Western neighbour. The overthrow of the Alawite regime of Bashar Al-Assad in December by rebel forces led by Sunni militant group Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) has had a significant impact on Iraq. The upheaval put an end to over 50 years of Al-Assad family's rule in Syria, which was seen by many as part of the 'Shia Crescent,' an imagined geopolitical entity composed of Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq, and Lebanon that was aligned with Iran. The arc was broken after the collapse of the Al-Assad regime and the end of an era for Lebanon's Shia Hizbullah Party as a result of the full-scale war Israel launched on Lebanon in the aftermath of Hamas' attack on Israel on 7 October 2023. The subsequent Israel-Hamas war was the primary catalyst for the cascading events that have reshaped the region during the last year and raised fears of further turmoil. With uncertainty growing on its doorstep, Iraq is one country which faces an existential threat if the situation in Syria worsens unless the leaders of the Iraqi communities are capable of addressing the challenges. Atrocities committed during the turmoil triggered by clashes between Sunni tribesmen and factions from the Druze minority in Sweida in Syria have been viewed with growing alarm by Iraqi Shias. Seven months on from Al-Assad's fall, the bloodshed in Sweida, which came three months after the distressing massacres in the Alawite coastal region of the country, have showed that Syria is descending into yet another wave of bloody sectarian violence. Iraq fears that if sectarianism dominates in Syria, it will likely have significant security, political, and other implications for the deeply divided country that suffered from sectarian violence in the aftermath of the 2003 US-led invasion. But more significantly, regime change in Syria and world and regional power competition in the country underscore issues that make Iraqis fear the trajectory could rekindle similar dynamics in Iraq and pose new challenges for the country. Many Iraqi Shias have expressed a renewed sense of anxiety as radical Islamist militants, armed by neighbouring Turkey and supported by key regional Sunni powerhouses and formerly associated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) group, are stepping in as the new leaders of Syria. The Iraqi Shias' stress is amplified when they look at the foreign involvement in Syria and see a regional realignment that pushes for a new geopolitical reality in the Middle East and could create a potential domino effect of regime change in Iraq. Turkey, which shares a 911-km frontier with Syria, was a main backer of the Sunni Islamist-led opposition groups that succeeded in toppling the Al-Assad regime. Emerging as a winner in Syria, it is subtly increasing the pressure to build up broader regional influence primarily in Iraq, a country hit by internal divisions and threatened by a collapsing regional order. When viewed from an Iraqi Shia perspective, as Turkey continues to consolidate its influence in Syria, creating new regional dynamics, Ankara is likely to emerge as an active player pushing to expand its influence in Iraq. The effect on Iraq has been particularly pronounced in Ankara's diplomacy towards Baghdad, since Turkey sees its success in Syria as offering a wider strategic window to deepen engagement in its southern neighbour. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan decided on 20 July to terminate a longstanding Turkey-Iraq Crude Oil Pipeline Agreement that for five decades has been central to Turkey-Iraq energy cooperation. The decision to close the pipeline, which runs through Iraqi Kurdistan, has drawn increased attention in Baghdad to Ankara's strategy in Iraq amid political uncertainty and escalating tensions between the Shia-led government in the capital and the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government. The termination of the agreement raises important questions about Ankara's intentions to pursue a new strategic direction to increase its influence in Iraq. Erdogan's decision came against the backdrop of several developments that have been shaping Turkey's multiple-track strategy in Iraq, including water, trade, and the future of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey. The issue of water is an aggravating factor in Iraq's relations with Turkey. The ongoing dispute between Iraq and Turkey over the flow into the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers stems from concerns over the construction and operation of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) and its impacts on water security in Iraq. Iraq, with a population of about 45 million people, relies on the two rivers for nearly all of its fresh water and is accusing Ankara of constructing unilateral infrastructure projects that have negative effects downstream in Iraq. Turkey, meanwhile, continues to argue that the rivers are not international, but trans-boundary, which limits the scope for international mechanisms on equitable water sharing. Ankara's unilateral approach to the dispute is undoubtedly meant to keep its national control over the two rivers, while Iraq continues to suffer a drought that has strained the country's water resources and affected millions. Trade is another key instrument that Erdogan is using in his Iraq diplomacy as Turkey eyes Iraq's lucrative oil revenues and looks to expanded trade exchanges and energy agreements with Iraq on favourable terms. Turkey has already submitted a draft proposal to Iraq for a new energy agreement to include cooperation in oil, gas, petrochemicals, and electricity, as Ankara feels that current circumstances allow it to seek more advantages in dealing with the country. In December, Turkish Minister of Trade Omer Bolat disclosed that his country is seeking to increase trade exchanges with Iraq from their current level of nearly $20 billion to $30 billion. Turkey also sees the Development Road Initiative, a high-speed road and rail link running from Iraq's port city of Basra on the Gulf to the Turkish border and later to Europe, as an opportunity to expand its influence in Iraq. What should also prompt further reflection is the future of the PKK. Turkey has succeeded in snatching a declaration of peace and reconciliation from the Kurdish Party in a landmark step intended to end decades of conflict. But much of the success of this will depend on Iraq, where the party is still operating amidst uncertainty about implementing the peace agreement and scepticism within its supporters, many of them Iraqi Kurds. The United States is another partner in the network that seeks to rid Iraq of Iran's influence and the 'axis of resistance' it has forged in Iraq and resolve disputes with the US-backed semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region. As Trump deepens ties with longstanding US allies in the region while nurturing more cordial relationships with the new regime in Damascus, his administration is applying pressure on the Iraqi government to achieve these and other goals. The latest bid to push Baghdad to disband Iraq's pro-Iranian militias and allow the resumption of Kurdish oil exports came last week when US Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shiaa Al-Sudani against any reluctance to solve the two issues. Rubio 'reiterated serious US concerns with the Popular Mobilisation Commission (PMC) bill currently pending in the Council of Representatives' in Iraq, emphasising that any such legislation would institutionalise Iranian influence and armed terrorist groups, undermining Iraq's sovereignty, a State Department statement said. One tough message heard in Baghdad and underlies this US policy came from Tom Barrack, US ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Syria and Lebanon, who warned that Syria is developing very quickly. 'If Lebanon doesn't move, it's going to be Bilad Al-Sham again,' Barrack said in an interview, using the historical name for the Syria region. In Baghdad, the biggest worry of many distrustful Shias is if foreign pressure is put on the government could that also mean Iraq would be becoming part of a modern Umayyad Caliphate on the model of the mediaeval one that once ruled the region from Damascus. * A version of this article appears in print in the 6 August, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
Memri
25-07-2025
- Politics
- Memri
Has Legitimizing HTS Opened The Door To Violence Against The Druze?
Just days after U.S. Special Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack stated that federalism does not work in Syria and emphasized the need for one army, one nation, and one government, armed groups affiliated with the military and security forces under Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) in Damascus launched a brutal attack against the Druze minority in Suwayda, a southern province of Syria. These attacks have been carried out under the direct orders of the transitional president, Ahmad Al-Shara (Abu Muhammad Al-Joulani), and his cabinet ministers, as if they are apparently interpreting Mr. Barrack's statements as a green light to subjugate the remaining components of Syrian society. The bloody attack resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Druze civilians, either through extrajudicial executions or indiscriminate shelling. In addition, there was systematic looting, theft, and burning of property. These acts were accompanied by violations specifically aimed at humiliation and the degradation of human dignity, as well as offenses against the Druze faith, such as forcibly moustache-shaving. This behavior is comparable to the Nazis' treatment of Jews during World War II and recalls the atrocities committed by ISIS against the Kurds in Kobani and Sinjar. Ahmad Al-Sharaa (Abu Muhammad Al-Joulani) The Heroic Resistance Of The Druze Fighters In Suwayda The Druze constitute a unique community, known for its deep-rooted social traditions, a strong emphasis on knowledge, strong attachment to the land, and internal solidarity. Some of their traditions and lifestyle elements – such as growing long moustaches, distinctive dress styles, and a preference for living in mountain regions – bear notable similarities to those of the Yazidi Kurds. Indeed, a Kurdish-Druze dynasty known as the Mandi Dynasty (Mand Prince) ruled the Mount of Kurds region (Çiyayê Kurmênc – Afrin and surrounding areas) in northwestern Syria until the early 17th century, before migrating to Mount Lebanon. Although the Druze speak Arabic, there Druze and Kurds, who are considered among the most ancient peoples of the Middle East, may have a shared origin. The Druze community is spread across Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. Their population in Syria is estimated at around one million, primarily concentrated in Suwayda Governorate and the suburbs of Jaramana and Sahnaya near Damascus. Additionally, there are 18 Druze villages in Idlib, northwest Syria, whose residents were largely forced to flee and have been subjected to violations following Jabhat Al-Nusra's takeover – later known as HTS – a decade ago. The IDF's intervention, at the request of the Druze community in Israel, played a decisive role in preventing a potential ethnic cleansing in the Mount of Druze in Suwayda. The airstrikes carried out by the IDF targeted the militants' supply lines to Suwayda, as well as on the General Command headquarters in Damascus, where the attack on the Druze was being coordinated. These strikes curbed the advance of the attacking groups and sent a firm message to Al-Joulani that he would pay a heavy price unless he halted his militants' offensive on Suwayda and withdrew them. This proves that extremist Islamists respond only to a language of firmness coupled with force, as clearly demonstrated by the recent operations of the IDF and the statement by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. These actions gave a significant moral boost to the heroic resistance of the Druze fighters in Suwayda, who refused to submit to the threats of the HTS authorities and ultimately succeeded in repelling the attacking groups. Nevertheless, threats persist of renewed attacks and repeated violations, as militants mobilize around Suwayda under the name of Bedouin tribal forces. The International community Must Send A Clear Message To Al-Joulani Given the ongoing violations and incitement against various components of the Syrian people including Kurds, Druze, Alawites, Christians, and liberal Sunnis, there is no doubt that Al-Joulani has repeatedly failed to meet the conditions emphasized by Western officials regarding the protection of minorities, the establishment of representative and inclusive governance, and the fight against terrorism. Minorities continue to be subjected to violence, the government operates an Islamist regime of a single hue, marginalizes other communities. Furthermore, extremists and criminals accused of committing war crimes hold high-ranking positions in Al-Joulani's army and security apparatus. The international community, particularly the United States and the European Union, must send a clear and firm message to Al-Joulani that the recent lifting of sanctions and diplomatic engagement with Damascus do not constitute a blank check authorizing him to unleash armed groups to commit violence against Syrians and marginalize key segments of society. The incitement of violence and hatred targeting minorities and other societal components clearly demonstrate that lifting sanctions and channeling funds to the Damascus regime without making them conditional on the fulfillment of its commitments will serve to establish a regime similar to Iran's Wilayat Al-Faqih or Hamas's rule in Gaza, one that thrives on spreading hatred, repressing ethnic and religious minorities, and suppressing freedoms. This poses a serious threat to regional security and stability. Despite the failure of the initial attack, the threat to the Druze in Suwayda continues, with the spiritual leadership of the Druze community declaring it a disaster zone. Voices are now rising among merchants and unions loyal to HTS, demanding a blockade of Suwayda, a ban on the entry of food and fuel, and the obstruction of financial transfers. In response to this siege, which constitutes a crime against humanity, the spiritual leadership of the Druze Community has called for the opening of a border crossing with Jordan, as well as the establishment of a safe corridor linking Suwayda with Rojava. The Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES) has already expressed its willingness to dispatch an urgent humanitarian aid convoy to Suwayda. However, there are concerns that the Damascus authorities may obstruct the convoy's arrival, as they did previously when hindering aid deliveries to the coastal region following the massacres of Alawites in March, which claimed the lives of hundreds of civilians during a wave of sectarian violence carried out by the same groups that attacked Suwayda. A Corridor Could Link Northeastern Syria To The Mount Of Druze Via Al-Tanf Or Palmyra Opening such a corridor between the Kurdish region and Suwayda is practically possible, especially with the potential support of the U.S-led International Coalition. This corridor could link northeastern Syria to the Mount of Druze via Al-Tanf or Palmyra. Such a step would not only break the humanitarian siege imposed on the Druze in Suwayda but also have significant strategic implications. The proposed corridor would enhance the effectiveness of Operation Inherent Resolve by improving coordination and mobility for joint operations targeting ISIS cells in the Syrian Badia. It would also foster a partnership between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Druze factions in Suwayda, aligned with coalition efforts, thereby bolstering the fight against extremism and reinforcing regional security. If the plan succeeds, it could evolve into a trade partnership and a political agreement linking the State of Israel with Rojava, eventually extending to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Such a development would contribute to greater stability, security, and development throughout the region. This vision is consistent with the core principles of the Abraham Accords, which would gain further momentum by the inclusion of the Kurds and Druze. Their participation would represent a united front against the malign ambitions of extremist groups. The emergence of such an alliance would not only reshape geopolitical dynamics but also offer a new model for comprehensive post-conflict cooperation in the Middle East, based on mutual recognition, minority rights, and the rejection of extremism. *Çeleng Omer, a prominent economist from Kurdish-led North and East Syria, is a former resident of Afrin and professor at Afrin University. He was forced to flee the region due to the ongoing Turkish occupation.
Al-Ahram Weekly
23-06-2025
- Politics
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Egypt condemns suicide bombing in Damascus Greek Orthodox church - Foreign Affairs
Egypt has condemned the terrorist attack on a Greek Orthodox church in the Syrian capital Damascus, which resulted in the death of at least 22 people and left 63 others injured on Sunday. In a statement, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs extended Egypt's sincere condolences to the Syrian people and the victims' families, wishing a swift recovery to the injured. Egypt reiterated its rejection of all forms of violence, extremism, and terrorism. The ministry also emphasized the urgency of strengthening regional and international efforts to eradicate terrorism, cut off its sources of financing, and confront acts threatening peace and security. According to Syria's Ministry of Interior, a suicide bomber opened fire on the congregation of the Mar Elias Greek Orthodox Church in Damascus during a Sunday evening service before detonating an explosive vest. This attack marks the first known suicide bombing in the capital since Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) overthrew Bashar Al-Assad in December 2024. Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
Bloomberg
14-05-2025
- Politics
- Bloomberg
What's Happening in Syria, and Why Is Trump Lifting Sanctions?
By and Sam Dagher Save Since the toppling of President Bashar al-Assad's regime in December, Syrians who endured more than half a century of state repression and 13 years of civil conflict finally have a reason for optimism. Most of the country is now ruled by an interim government formed by an Islamist militia, Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, whose surprise push into Damascus forced Assad and his family to flee to Russia. Where once the Assad regime muzzled political discourse by routinely imprisoning and torturing those who spoke out, a vigorous debate over Syria's future is now under way on street corners and in cafes across the country while the new leadership tries to restore order and coax other former rebel groups to join a new national army.
