Latest news with #HeWeidong
The Star
22-07-2025
- Politics
- The Star
China military calls for efforts to repair image after scandals
FILE PHOTO: Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet meets with He Weidong, visiting vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Dec. 4, 2023. CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong, also a Politburo member, has been absent from official events for months, though no public evidence of wrongdoing has emerged. - Xinhua BEIJING: China's top military body has ordered a sweeping overhaul to restore the credibility of political leaders as the commission faces its largest vacancy in years following a series of corruption scandals. The Central Military Commission issued regulations in recent days to "comprehensively purge toxic influence and rebuild the image and credibility of political leaders,' the official People's Liberation Army Daily reported Monday (July 21) on its front page. The regulations direct political leaders to "eradicate poison and eliminate malpractice,' according to the report, which didn't elaborate. The term "liudu,' or widespread poison, is Communist Party parlance for serious offences involving factions of corrupt officials. It previously applied to the cliques of former security chief Zhou Yongkang and ousted Chongqing party boss Bo Xilai. The directive comes as corruption scandals have engulfed the world's largest military by active personnel. They have led to the downfall of two consecutive defence ministers and several officials with ties to the secretive Rocket Force. Former political commissar Miao Hua, who served on the elite Central Military Commission led by President Xi Jinping, was also removed from the CMC last month. CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong, also a Politburo member, has been absent from official events for months, though no public evidence of wrongdoing has emerged. If investigated, He would become the most senior sitting defence official probed since Zhao Ziyang was ousted in 1989 for supporting students during the pro-democracy movement. Separately, the Ministry of Defence recently removed a section for its leadership team from its website. Bloomberg News reported last year that the ministry quietly scrubbed disgraced former defense minister Li Shangfu from the list of top leaders on the site. - Bloomberg
Telegraph
07-07-2025
- Politics
- Telegraph
Xi Jinping may be losing control of China's military
General He Weidong, a vice-chairman of the Communist Party's Central Military Commission and China's number two-ranked uniformed officer, was reportedly last seen in public on March 11. The general was known as a Xi Jinping loyalist in the military. The Financial Times reports that former and current US officials believe that he has been removed from his People's Liberation Army and Party posts. There are even unverifiable rumours that the general died in May – in the PLA's 301 Hospital in Beijing – but in any event General He has evidently been sidelined, no longer able to implement Xi's orders. Many believe that China's leader was the one who sacked the general. 'The fact that Xi Jinping can purge a CMC vice-chair shows how serious he is about stamping out corruption in the military,' Neil Thomas of the Asia Society Policy Institute told the Financial Times. 'Xi wants to turn the PLA into an effective fighting force beyond China's borders but also into a complete servant to his domestic agenda.' The FT apparently agrees with this assessment, labelling General He's treatment 'the most dramatic act of [Xi's] military anti-corruption campaign and first firing of a general in that role in six decades'. Xi has been powerful for a long time, so it's natural that analysts and journalists ascribe every significant action in China to him. It's also true that, at one time, he had almost complete control of the military, which reports not to the Chinese state but to the Communist Party. Xi's continual 'corruption' purges, carried out throughout his rule, and his major reorganisation of the PLA, conducted in the middle of last decade, gave him the opportunity to install loyalists. So, unsurprisingly, the Xi-is-strong narrative has persisted. Australia's ABC argues that General He may have fallen because of Xi's need to control internal politics: 'In He's case, the removal may have been less about personal wrongdoing and more about managing factional rivalry and consolidating political control.' Others have suggested that Xi has become a Stalin-like paranoid who sees enemies everywhere and so churns the ranks of senior officers. But General He is not the only recent uniformed victim, nor the only general to have been toppled who was supposedly loyal to Xi. Also disappeared include General Li Shangfu, a defence minister, General Wei Fenghe, one of Li's predecessors, and General Miao Hua, head of personnel and ideological inspection. 'The continuation of the purges is hard to explain if Xi dominates the political system because his supporters are now being purged,' Charles Burton of the Prague-based Sinopsis think tank told me this month. 'Sometimes the simplest explanations are the most credible. The simplest explanation is that Xi's enemies – not Xi himself – removed Xi's loyalists.' There is evidence indicating that Burton, a former Canadian diplomat in Beijing, is right. According to the Jamestown Foundation, beginning July 9 of last year PLA Daily, the Chinese military's main propaganda organ, ran a series of articles praising 'collective leadership,' a clear criticism of Xi's demand for complete obedience. These articles – apparently written by those aligned with the number one-ranked uniformed officer, Central Military Commission Vice Chairman General Zhang Youxia – are unlikely to have appeared if Xi were in complete control of the military. There is also evidence that Xi has lost influence among civilians. His skipping of the just-completed Brics summit in Rio de Janeiro – the first such gathering he has missed – is a clear signal that he might no longer be in control. Perhaps he is no longer permitted to travel outside China. Some point to the Politburo's establishment of new coordination 'regulations,' announced by Xi himself on June 30, as marking a formal limitation on his power. The Chinese regime has been especially opaque this decade, so it has been even harder to read than in earlier times. Nonetheless, there are obvious signs of instability. Is China's unstable regime more or less dangerous? As an initial matter, strongmen like Xi rarely go quietly. If he is under threat, he may well think that he has to act against the others fast. Among other things, China triggering a war would inhibit other senior CCP leaders from trying to remove him in the midst of fighting, so he may think that provoking a conflict is in his interest. A regime in turmoil is probably not capable of the planning and unity necessary to start large-scale military operations, such as an invasion of the main island of Taiwan. Yet it is more likely to end up in a conflict than a stable one. China has for years been provoking countries on its periphery, from South Korea in the north to Australia in the south. Additionally, Chinese planes and ships have been challenging America in the global commons in risky confrontations. Now, China may be unable to defuse any crisis that it causes, either by accident or on purpose. Because only the most hostile responses are considered acceptable in a militarised and highly turbulent Beijing, regime figures will not be able to deal with others constructively. A weak Xi and a Communist Party in turmoil are dangerous, and probably far more dangerous than a strong leader and a stable ruling group.
ABC News
17-06-2025
- Politics
- ABC News
Top China military official disappears in latest purge under Xi Jinping amid rising factional politics
The disappearance of another high-ranking Chinese military official has demonstrated that no-one is indispensable to President Xi Jinping in achieving his goals. Even those among his closest allies. General He Weidong, China's second-ranking military official and co-vice chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC), has not been seen in public since March 11. His name was also absent from the official list of attendees at the funeral of his former colleague, Xu Qiliang, who was also a co-vice chairman of the CMC. With silence often treated as confirmation in China's highly choreographed political system, He's ongoing absence confirms his removal from power. His disappearance follows a similar pattern of recent high-profile purges. Former foreign minister Qin Gang and former defence minister Li Shangfu also disappeared from public view before they were removed from their positions. He's dismissal comes after a longstanding personal and professional relationship with Xi. Xi and He both served in the local government of Fujian province in the 1990s and 2000s, with He promoted to "full general" — the highest military rank — in 2017 and eventually co-vice chairman in 2022. It's a position that granted him more than just command of the military. It also made him a member of the elite Politburo — the top decision-making body of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). His sudden fall just three years into the role underscores the intensity of internal instability within the CCP. Despite projecting a unified public image, the highest level of China's political system is a pressure cooker of competing ambitions, ideological divides, and factional loyalties. Xi's leadership has been marked by a relentless consolidation of power and a sweeping anti-corruption campaign, but the frequent removal of his own appointees suggests cracks in the system he has built. The timing of He's disappearance could be politically charged. In August, the 4th Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee is scheduled to take place — a key meeting where leadership direction is often recalibrated behind closed doors. It is precisely during such sensitive periods that purges are most common, either as a pre-emptive strike or a signal of discipline. The disappearance of He also exposes the fragility in China's defence system at a time when Beijing is expanding its military footprint and increasing its defence budget. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been conducting joint air and naval exercises in the South China Sea, a move likely aimed at both foreign and domestic audiences. On one hand, the drills serve as a warning to neighbouring countries and the United States. On the other, they reinforce the narrative of a combat-ready PLA under Xi's direct control. Military strength and political authority go hand in hand in China, and Xi's tightening grip on the armed forces is as much about addressing internal rot as external deterrence. Purges at such moments are rarely about a single person. Since 2023, at least three senior generals have been removed from their posts — including two defence ministers hand-picked by Xi — as part of a broader campaign targeting entrenched corruption and disloyalty within the ranks. But in He's case, the removal may have been less about personal wrongdoing and more about managing factional rivalry and consolidating political control. While no-one knows exactly why He was purged, his downfall serves as a warning that even those within Xi's own circle are not immune. China's Communist Party may be a one-party state, but it is far from monolithic. Since the Mao era, internal factions have formed around shared regional ties, ideological leanings, and personal loyalties. Under Xi, many of the traditional groupings — such as the Youth League faction and the "princelings" (descendants of senior CCP members) — have weakened, but factionalism has not disappeared. Instead, it has adapted. He, for instance, was associated with the so-called "Fujian clique", a group of military officials who served in the province of the same name when Xi was governor. That connection, however, did not protect him. Xi's promotions have not been driven solely by factional alignment, but by an emphasis on military preparedness and loyalty. However, when factions grow too influential or individuals are perceived as potential threats — even loyal ones — they may be sidelined or purged by Xi to protect the party's image and his authority. In that sense, purges are not just about corruption or disloyalty, but also about managing internal rivalries and reinforcing Xi's dominance. Still, constant purging fosters distrust, undermines morale, and narrows the pool of reliable successors. At the heart of all these manoeuvres lies a deeper question: who will succeed Xi? Officially, no heir apparent has been named. Laying out a succession plan in China's political system is like walking on eggshells — too much clarity can be just as dangerous as none at all. The absence of a clear plan has fuelled factional rivalry, as competing blocs within the party manoeuvre to position their own candidate for future leadership. But naming a successor too early is risky — once identified, that person can quickly become a political target for rival factions looking to block their rise. Xi's real enemy may not be rival factions but the one-party system he leads. As long as the CCP remains opaque and centralised, leadership transitions will always be fraught with uncertainty. In such an environment, political rivals may not be able to directly challenge Xi, but they can target his allies and undermine his influence from the inside. The disappearance of He is unlikely to be the last. As elite competition intensifies ahead of future leadership changes, more purges are likely. Xi may appear unassailable, but the hollowing out of his inner circle reveals the fragility of his position. After all, power in China is centralised, but it is also precarious. Ultimately, the downfall of a top general is not just a story about one man. It is a window into the inner workings of a regime that has long prized loyalty over stability — and now relies increasingly on purges in place of transparency. The costs of that strategy may not be fully visible yet. But the silence is.
Nikkei Asia
11-06-2025
- Politics
- Nikkei Asia
Analysis: Xi Jinping's generals face a treacherous political battlefield
Katsuji Nakazawa is a Tokyo-based senior staff and editorial writer at Nikkei. He spent seven years in China as a correspondent and later as China bureau chief. He was the 2014 recipient of the Vaughn-Ueda International Journalist prize. It is now indisputable that Gen. He Weidong has been purged, three months after he disappeared from public view, sparking a torrent of speculation within and outside China.
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First Post
28-04-2025
- Politics
- First Post
Is China's top general's disappearance a result of Xi's corruption purge?
One of China's senior-most generals, He Weidong, was conspicuously missing from a top political gathering last Friday. This is the second big event the 67-year-old has missed in recent times. This has led many to ponder if he is part of President Xi Jinping's anti-corruption drive read more Second-ranked Vice Chairman He Weidong at the opening session of the National People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China on March 5. His absence was apparent at the recent Politburo study session. File image/Reuters In China, top officials keep disappearing. The latest such instance is that of He Weidong, a top Chinese general, who missed yet another top gathering last Friday (April 25). Earlier, He had missed the tree-planting event in the outskirts of the capital Beijing – an annual springtime tradition for the country's military leadership spanning more than four decades. He's absence at the two important events is part of a growing pattern where Chinese military officials go missing. Many report that the disappearance of these personalities is part of President Xi Jinping's purge of the military's top ranks. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Let's take a closer look at who exactly is He and the growing number of military officials going 'missing' in China. He's absence felt Last Friday (April 25), He, who is the second-ranked vice-chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) and one of the 24 members of the Communist Party's Politburo, was absent for a top political gathering — the Politburo study session presided over by Chinese President Xi Jinping. Earlier, He's absence was felt at a two-day, high-profile working conference on neighbourhood diplomacy on April 9. He was also missing from a voluntary tree-planting event in April that he attended last year. State media had also reported that He wasn't present at the symposium, which marked the 20th anniversary of the implementation of the Anti-Secession Law on March 14. He was last seen on March 11 at the closing ceremony of the National People's Congress, China's parliament. He Weidong (keft), second-ranked vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission (CMC) has been a senior official of the Chinese administration and has held roles in the Peoples Liberation Army for the past three decades. File image/AFP All about He Weidong For those who don't know, 67-year-old He is a senior official of the Chinese administration and has held roles in the Peoples Liberation Army for the past three decades. In 2013, he was appointed the commander of the Jiangsu Provincial Military District and a year later, became the commander of the Shanghai Garrison. In 2016, he was made deputy commander and army commander of the Western Theatre Command where he was deputy party secretary of the army committee. In October 2022, Xi appointed He as the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Many had stated that it was an unusual move to appoint someone as vice chairman without going through the top 200 or so Central Committee members in the party hierarchy. However, He is considered close to President Xi and according to a report in Nikkei considered a member of the 'Fujian faction' of Xi's leadership. Chinese officials and their disappearing act The absence of He, according to experts and Chinese observers, is part of President Xi's anti-corruption drive. In recent times, the Chinese leader has removed a long line of officials for alleged corruption. But there's no confirmation on the same. However, Neil Thomas, an expert on elite Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute, told the Financial Times that He's purge would be the first of a serving uniformed vice-chair of the CMC since General He Long in 1967. Xi's purge of top officials dates back to over two years. Last year, Xi had sacked Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, both defence ministers. Wei served in the role between 2018 and March 2023, and was succeeded by Li. Li disappeared from public view within months and was sacked in October 2023, becoming the country's shortest-serving defence minister. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Former Chinese Defence Minister Li Shangfu. Following weeks into his 'disappearance', China announced that he had been sacked. File image/Reuters Both men had 'gravely hurt the work of the party', the development of defence and the image of senior leaders, a report by the Central Military Commission (CMC), China's top military body, had said in the first official explanation for Li's sudden removal. Interestingly, Dong Jun, who took over from Li in December and was the first navy chief in the role, was also under investigation for corruption. Another high-profile disappearance followed by sacking was that of China's former foreign minister Qin Gang, who vanished from public view in June 2023 months after taking up the job. He was then removed as foreign minister a month later. Former Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang vanished from public view in June 2023 months after taking up the job. File image/Reuters Other officials have also carried out the disappearing act. For instance, Gen Wang Chunning, commander of the People's Armed Police Force. As per a Nikkei report, Chunning has disappeared from the centre stage a while back, missing many key meetings. Other similar examples are ground force commander Li Qiaoming and PLA naval commissar Yuan Huazhi, who reportedly went missing last December. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In 2023, General Li Yuchao, commander of the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, and his deputy, General Liu Guangbin had also gone missing with Xi ordering for their replacements in August. The Chinese president then appointed Wang Houbin, deputy commander of the PLA navy since 2020, as the head of the Rocket Force. Additionally, Xu Xisheng, an air force officer and party central committee member, was named as the Rocket Force's new political commissar. That's not all. In July 2022, Xiao Yaqing, who helmed the ministry of industry and information technology, disappeared from public view. Three weeks later, the state media said he was being investigated for corruption. With inputs from agencies
