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First Post
28-04-2025
- Politics
- First Post
Is China's top general's disappearance a result of Xi's corruption purge?
One of China's senior-most generals, He Weidong, was conspicuously missing from a top political gathering last Friday. This is the second big event the 67-year-old has missed in recent times. This has led many to ponder if he is part of President Xi Jinping's anti-corruption drive read more Second-ranked Vice Chairman He Weidong at the opening session of the National People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China on March 5. His absence was apparent at the recent Politburo study session. File image/Reuters In China, top officials keep disappearing. The latest such instance is that of He Weidong, a top Chinese general, who missed yet another top gathering last Friday (April 25). Earlier, He had missed the tree-planting event in the outskirts of the capital Beijing – an annual springtime tradition for the country's military leadership spanning more than four decades. He's absence at the two important events is part of a growing pattern where Chinese military officials go missing. Many report that the disappearance of these personalities is part of President Xi Jinping's purge of the military's top ranks. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Let's take a closer look at who exactly is He and the growing number of military officials going 'missing' in China. He's absence felt Last Friday (April 25), He, who is the second-ranked vice-chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) and one of the 24 members of the Communist Party's Politburo, was absent for a top political gathering — the Politburo study session presided over by Chinese President Xi Jinping. Earlier, He's absence was felt at a two-day, high-profile working conference on neighbourhood diplomacy on April 9. He was also missing from a voluntary tree-planting event in April that he attended last year. State media had also reported that He wasn't present at the symposium, which marked the 20th anniversary of the implementation of the Anti-Secession Law on March 14. He was last seen on March 11 at the closing ceremony of the National People's Congress, China's parliament. He Weidong (keft), second-ranked vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission (CMC) has been a senior official of the Chinese administration and has held roles in the Peoples Liberation Army for the past three decades. File image/AFP All about He Weidong For those who don't know, 67-year-old He is a senior official of the Chinese administration and has held roles in the Peoples Liberation Army for the past three decades. In 2013, he was appointed the commander of the Jiangsu Provincial Military District and a year later, became the commander of the Shanghai Garrison. In 2016, he was made deputy commander and army commander of the Western Theatre Command where he was deputy party secretary of the army committee. In October 2022, Xi appointed He as the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Many had stated that it was an unusual move to appoint someone as vice chairman without going through the top 200 or so Central Committee members in the party hierarchy. However, He is considered close to President Xi and according to a report in Nikkei considered a member of the 'Fujian faction' of Xi's leadership. Chinese officials and their disappearing act The absence of He, according to experts and Chinese observers, is part of President Xi's anti-corruption drive. In recent times, the Chinese leader has removed a long line of officials for alleged corruption. But there's no confirmation on the same. However, Neil Thomas, an expert on elite Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute, told the Financial Times that He's purge would be the first of a serving uniformed vice-chair of the CMC since General He Long in 1967. Xi's purge of top officials dates back to over two years. Last year, Xi had sacked Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu, both defence ministers. Wei served in the role between 2018 and March 2023, and was succeeded by Li. Li disappeared from public view within months and was sacked in October 2023, becoming the country's shortest-serving defence minister. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Former Chinese Defence Minister Li Shangfu. Following weeks into his 'disappearance', China announced that he had been sacked. File image/Reuters Both men had 'gravely hurt the work of the party', the development of defence and the image of senior leaders, a report by the Central Military Commission (CMC), China's top military body, had said in the first official explanation for Li's sudden removal. Interestingly, Dong Jun, who took over from Li in December and was the first navy chief in the role, was also under investigation for corruption. Another high-profile disappearance followed by sacking was that of China's former foreign minister Qin Gang, who vanished from public view in June 2023 months after taking up the job. He was then removed as foreign minister a month later. Former Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang vanished from public view in June 2023 months after taking up the job. File image/Reuters Other officials have also carried out the disappearing act. For instance, Gen Wang Chunning, commander of the People's Armed Police Force. As per a Nikkei report, Chunning has disappeared from the centre stage a while back, missing many key meetings. Other similar examples are ground force commander Li Qiaoming and PLA naval commissar Yuan Huazhi, who reportedly went missing last December. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In 2023, General Li Yuchao, commander of the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, and his deputy, General Liu Guangbin had also gone missing with Xi ordering for their replacements in August. The Chinese president then appointed Wang Houbin, deputy commander of the PLA navy since 2020, as the head of the Rocket Force. Additionally, Xu Xisheng, an air force officer and party central committee member, was named as the Rocket Force's new political commissar. That's not all. In July 2022, Xiao Yaqing, who helmed the ministry of industry and information technology, disappeared from public view. Three weeks later, the state media said he was being investigated for corruption. With inputs from agencies
South China Morning Post
28-04-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
Absence of Chinese general He Weidong from Politburo study session fuels speculation
One of China's most senior generals, He Weidong , missed another top political gathering on Friday, adding to speculation about his whereabouts over the past few weeks. Advertisement Beijing has not offered an official explanation, but He's absence is not expected to affect China's political stability, according to an analyst. He, the second-ranked vice-chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) and one of the 24 members of the Communist Party's Politburo, last appeared in public on March 11. He did not attend a Politburo study session presided over by Chinese President Xi Jinping on Friday, a regular gathering that included Zhang Youxia, the CMC's first vice-president, according to footage aired by state broadcaster CCTV on Saturday. 07:00 China airs 4-part anti-corruption series on prime-time TV amid renewed crackdown on graft China airs 4-part anti-corruption series on prime-time TV amid renewed crackdown on graft He has also been missing in recent weeks from a series of key events at which top CMC leaders would generally be present, according to information and footage released by state media.
South China Morning Post
28-04-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
Absence of China's top general He Weidong from Politburo study session fuels speculation
China's top general He Weidong missed another top political gathering on Friday amid speculation about his whereabouts over the past few weeks. Advertisement Beijing has not offered an official explanation for his absence, although his absence is not expected to affect China's political stability, according to an analyst. He, the second-ranked vice-chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) and one of the 24-member of the Communist Party Politburo, last appeared in public on March 11. He was absent from a Politburo study session presided over by Chinese President Xi Jinping on Friday, according to footage made public by state broadcaster CCTV on Saturday. It showed that Zhang Youxia, the first vice-president of the CMC, was present at the regular gathering of the party's inner circle, but He was not visible. 07:00 China airs 4-part anti-corruption series on prime-time TV amid renewed crackdown on graft China airs 4-part anti-corruption series on prime-time TV amid renewed crackdown on graft He has also been missing in recent weeks from a series of key events at which top CMC leaders would generally be present, according to information and footage made public by state media.
Indian Express
23-04-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
Opinion China is turning the heat on Taiwan
Since the inception of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leader Lai Ching-te's presidency in Taiwan, China's policy signalling vis-à-vis the island has become much harsher and more aggressive. China's stance on Taiwan has taken a more urgent and assertive turn in recent months. The unveiling of the new Shuiqiao amphibious vessels at Zhanjiang port in Guangdong, coupled with heightened activity and aggressive posturing by the PLA's Eastern Theater Command — including the recent Strait Thunder 2025A exercises — signals a sharpened focus on readiness and control. At the same time, internal probes into top military figures such as Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice-Chairman He Weidong, former Political Work Department head Miao Hua, and Eastern Theater Commander Lin Xiangyang have effectively dismantled what was known as the 'Taiwan-Fujian' faction within China's military leadership. Adding to the sense of impending conflict, some outlets, citing unnamed intelligence sources, have suggested that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could occur within six months — further fueling anxiety and speculation. Further, Beijing's critique of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and his party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has intensified, with official rhetoric often referring to him as a 'Thoroughly Dangerous Instigator' or 'Absolute Danger Maker', and calling out the DPP for spreading 'green terror.' This points to a significant lack of political will to resolve tensions through open lines of communication. In this regard, three politico-military developments from the last few months demand attention to understand the messaging from China on Taiwan. China has recently published a revised Cadre Reader on the Taiwan Issue of China (2024 Edition), compiled by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. Launched at the National Library in Haidian, Beijing (the hub for China's armed forces) on March 18, the Cadre Reader is aimed at implementing the Central Committee's decisions and arrangements on Taiwan-related work, unifying ideological understanding, and strengthening publicity and education on Taiwan policies. At the launch event for the Reader, Song Tao, Director of both the Taiwan Affairs Offices of the Party and the government, stated that cadres involved in Taiwan-related work should deeply understand the historical context of the Taiwan issue in a bid to strengthen their 'sense of responsibility and mission,' and 'improve their competence and capabilities in handling Taiwan-related affairs.' In this light, the instruction to political cadres of the CPC on understanding the vitality of reunification with Taiwan, has become firmer. Further, as Beijing marked the 20th anniversary of the adoption and enactment of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law on March 14, China's top legislator, Zhao Leji, spelled similar (but not unusual) rhetoric on curbing Taiwan's 'independence' and getting rid of 'external interference.' Here, it is important to note that Article 8 of the Law stipulates: 'In the event that the 'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.' In this light, it is quite interesting that a People's Daily commentary from April 2, authored by a 'Zhong Yiping' (a pen-name for a CPC member and reunification activist writing for the mouthpiece), refers to the Anti-Secession Law as a 'looming sword.' If mobilised, Zhong argued, it will lead Lai to 'dig his own grave.' These are strong words, in that in the recent past, the provisions of the Law regarding the use of non-peaceful means have rarely been used to incite fear and deterrence. At the Taiwan Affairs Work Conference that took place in February 2025, too, the phrase 'peaceful reunification' was newly missing from the government work report, even as CPPCC Chairman Wang Huning emphasised 'advancing the cause and trajectory of reunification.' To that, Chen Binhua had clarified that China will 'strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity' as long as Taiwan separatists do not 'provoke, coerce, or challenge the bottom line and cross red lines.' To further involve the public in its Taiwan strategy, the Party and State Council's Taiwan Affairs Offices recently launched a new grassroots mechanism: A special platform where citizens can report individuals accused of persecuting pro-China Taiwanese. Introduced on March 26, this reporting column reportedly received 323 submissions within its first nine hours, according to Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Chen Binhua. The early targets of these reports span a wide spectrum — from government officials and legislators like Liu Shih-fang, Shen Boyang, Wu Sih-yao, and Huang Chieh, to prosecutors, activists, and internet personalities including Black Bear Academy's Tsao Hsing-cheng and prominent influencers Wen Ziyu and Chen Boyuan. Even a politically outspoken dentist, Shih Shuhua, was named, underscoring the wide net cast by this campaign. The decision to publicise citizen complaints against Taiwanese politicians and influencers appears to serve a dual purpose: Rallying domestic sentiment against perceived mistreatment of pro-China voices in Taiwan, and portraying Beijing's tough stance as rooted in public will rather than solely directed by the party-state. This strategy aligns with the enforcement of a legal directive issued in June 2024 — The Opinion on Lawfully Punishing Stubborn 'Taiwan Independence' Separatists — which was jointly released by China's top judicial and security bodies. The document outlines a strict legal framework for punishing separatist activity, with penalties ranging from multi-year prison terms and loss of political rights to life imprisonment or even capital punishment in the most severe cases. Finally, and most importantly, China's large-scale military drills and advancements in the PLA Eastern Theatre Command's defence systems, have continued to ring alarm bells for Taiwan. The most recent of the drills that kicked off in August 2022 has been the 'Strait Thunder-2025A', conducted on April 1/ 2, 2025. We know from the 'Joint Sword' Exercises of 2024 that if there is an 'A', there will also be a 'B', and potentially also a 'C', for the Strait Thunder series. What is different about these exercises is also that they were much more comprehensive, widespread, and involved different components — Carrier Battle Group exercises and PLA Rocket Force demonstrations — along with a relatively usual spike in joint sea- and air-related sorties, including beyond the median line of the Taiwan Strait and into the island's Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). The PLARF testing involved testing of its 'cross-Straits killing machines'— multiple modular long-range rocket artillery systems — to carry out live-fire ammunition exercises. These were likely the PHL-16/ PCL-191 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRSs) that have a range of about 300 km, and can easily target sites in the Strait and on Taiwan proper. It is widely reported that the schematics of the target the barrage of 16 missiles was launched at, resemble an LNG storage facility in Kaohsiung's Yong'an District. As much as 40 per cent of Taiwan's electricity grid is powered by LNG — making such energy facilities and key port areas like Kaohsiung province strategically vital targets for the PLA. The assessment of these drills can be combined with more static developments such as the sudden building of commercial Shuiqiao ships in Guangdong province, whose main characteristic are the tusk-like 'Bailey Bridge' extensions that can deploy forces for an amphibious campaign. Analysts have likened these to the artificial floating Mulberry Harbours created by the British to support their D-Day operations against France in 1944. A preliminary assessment suggests the Strait Thunder 2025A set of drills was not as gigantic as the Joint Sword 2024B exercises. While a few targeted simulations were undertaken to demonstrate resource control and choking, the focus was not on testing the 'actual combat capabilities' of troops (as was the case with the latter, which included establishing strike positions, conducting land and naval live-fire exercises, and conducting joint assaults). Nonetheless, the routine of the drills demonstrates that China continues to take the threshold of conflict higher, and its brinkmanship has created a new, dangerous normal in the Strait that makes peace seem elusive.
CNN
10-04-2025
- Politics
- CNN
Top military general ‘missing in action' sparks speculation in China, Ripley reports
One of China's most powerful military leaders, General He Weidong, has been out of the public eye for weeks, raising questions about who is in command of the Chinese military. CNN's Will Ripley reports.
