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Express Tribune
10 hours ago
- Politics
- Express Tribune
Chehlum: Section 144 imposed in 13 districts
In view of security concerns surrounding Chehlum, the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa government has imposed Section 144 in 13 districts of the province. According to a notification issued by the Home and Tribal Affairs Department, the restrictions will apply for one week in Peshawar, Kohat, Hangu, Bannu, Tank, Dera Ismail Khan, Abbottabad, Mansehra, Haripur, Nowshera, Kurram, Mardan, and Lakki Marwat. The ban covers wall chalking, pillion riding, inflammatory speeches and slogans, gatherings of five or more people, display of weapons, use of loudspeakers, dissemination of objectionable material, tinted vehicle windows, aerial firing, sale or purchase of petroleum products in bottles, fireworks, presence on rooftops along chehlum procession routes, stay of unidentified persons in guesthouses, movement of Afghan nationals in public places, entry of outsiders into the districts, and any attempt to disrupt chehlum processions. Authorities have urged the public to strictly follow these directives to maintain law and order. The restrictions will remain in force from August 9 to August 15.


News18
5 days ago
- Politics
- News18
Pakistan's Move To Deport Afghan Refugees By Sept 1 Raises Concern From UNHCR
According to Pakistan's Interior Ministry, over 1.3 million Afghan refugees currently hold PoR cards, which have historically allowed them to stay in Pakistan without a valid visa. However, in a statement released last week, the Ministry declared that all PoR cardholders would be considered unlawful residents following the expiration of their documents. Afghans who have fled to Pakistan over the past four decades are currently allowed to reside with PoR cards issued by Pakistani authorities. These cards were valid until June 30, 2025, and the government has refused to renew them anymore. The refugees will now be allowed a 25-day 'grace period" from August 4 to August 31, to return voluntarily to Afghanistan, according to Lateef-ur-Rehman, spokesperson for the Home and Tribal Affairs Department. In a letter dated August 4, the Interior Ministry instructed provincial chief secretaries, police chiefs, and other top bureaucratic officials to begin implementing the IFRP. The ministry also requested local authorities to submit comprehensive data on PoR cardholders to provincial, divisional, and district-level repatriation committees. As reported by PTI, the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) and the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) will assist in identifying and processing deportees.


Express Tribune
16-07-2025
- Politics
- Express Tribune
Reviving Jirgas: undoing constitutional gains
The writer is a former Secretary to Government, Home and Tribal Affairs Department and a retired IGP. He can be reached at syed_shah94@ Listen to article Recent discussions at the federal level about reviving the Jirga system in the merged tribal districts are deeply concerning and deserve serious national scrutiny. These proposals, if pursued, will mark a dangerous reversal of one of Pakistan's most significant constitutional reforms — the merger of the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa under the 25th Constitutional Amendment carried out in 2018. Let us be clear — this is not a benign attempt to honour local traditions. It is a calculated effort to restore an extra-constitutional governance system that historically denied due process, judicial recourse and civil rights to millions. The Jirga system, once embedded in the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), operated without legal representation, judicial oversight or accountability. Its revival would amount to institutional regression — unconstitutional, undemocratic and unjust. The 25th Amendment was not a cosmetic change. It abolished FATA's special status, repealed the FCR, extended the jurisdiction of the superior judiciary and brought its people under the same constitutional protections as other Pakistani citizens. It was a democratic milestone that ended over a century of legal and political isolation. Undoing this would mean reneging on a solemn constitutional promise. Under Pakistan's federal structure, the Constitution clearly delineates the domains of the federal and provincial governments. Justice administration and local governance are provincial subjects. Any attempt by the federal government to reintroduce Jirgas in the merged districts — whether directly or indirectly — would violate these constitutional boundaries and erode the authority of provincial institutions. Worse still, such a move contradicts the spirit and letter of the National Action Plan (NAP), which aimed at integrating FATA into the national mainstream through constitutional, legal and administrative reforms. Reviving Jirgas undermines this integration and promotes the dangerous notion that certain regions are unfit for constitutional governance. Proponents of Jirga revival often frame it as a culturally rooted mechanism for community-based dispute resolution. However, historical realities contradict this romanticised view. The Jirga system was an instrument of colonial control, working alongside political agents under laws that enforced collective punishment and denied civil liberties. Far from resisting militancy, these structures often coexisted with non-state actors and failed to provide justice or security. One must ask: before the merger, did Jirgas ensure justice? Did they resist militants? The answer is a resounding no. The pre-merger system fostered a dual governance structure — state-imposed on one side and militant-enforced on the other. The merger was intended to end this dangerous ambiguity and place the region firmly under constitutional rule. Rolling back this reform would restore that confusion and embolden non-democratic forces. It is important to acknowledge that progress since the merger has been uneven. Governance remains weak, development inadequate, and public services insufficient. But the remedy lies in accelerating reforms — not abandoning them. Instead of reviving outdated systems, efforts should focus on strengthening local governments, expanding the formal justice system, ensuring equitable development and building trust in constitutional institutions. The socio-economic realities of the merged districts are stark. With a population of over 5.743162 million across 27,000 square kilometres, the region remains among the most underdeveloped in the country. The literacy rate stands at a dismal 33%, with female literacy as low as 12.7%, compared to the national average of 47% for women. Healthcare infrastructure is alarmingly poor, with one hospital bed for 2,574 people and just one doctor available for 6,630 residents. Only 43% of the population has access to safe drinking water. These figures point to decades of neglect. In 2015-16, a mere Rs19.7 billion were allocated to development activities for the entire region. Such chronic underinvestment contributed to the backwardness and governance vacuum that the merger sought to address. The solution lies not in reviving Jirgas but in redoubling efforts for institutional reform and economic uplift. Reinstating the Jirga system would not only roll back hard-won constitutional rights but also reinforce a narrative of exclusion and inequality. It sends a chilling message: that some citizens are less deserving of constitutional protections than others. This is not only unlawful — it is unacceptable in a democratic polity. The path forward is clear. Uphold the Constitution. Empower elected local institutions. Strengthen formal justice mechanisms. Honour the promises made to the people of the merged districts. The constitutional integration of these areas is not just a legal matter — it is the foundation of any lasting peace, justice, and development. Pakistan made a historic and bold choice by extending the full scope of constitutional rights, responsibilities, and protections to all its citizens. To retreat from this commitment would be to step back into a legal and institutional darkness that the country can ill afford.


Express Tribune
23-06-2025
- Business
- Express Tribune
K-P's rightful share
The writer is a former Secretary to Government, Home and Tribal Affairs Department and a retired IGP. He can be reached at syed_shah94@ Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa is facing severe financial crisis for the last so many years. Rather than stabilising, the crisis is deepening due to spiraling energy costs, unchecked inflation, a volatile border policy with Afghanistan and persistent threat of terrorism. These challenges have collectively eroded the province's fiscal capacity and stalled both its economic growth and social development. The situation is further exacerbated by structural issues. The Newly Merged Districts (NMDs), with a population of 24.149 million, and Malakand Division, home to 10 million people, have rising expectations for basic services. Yet, with a limited taxable population and chronic tax evasion, the burden is disproportionately borne by the rest of the province. This fiscal imbalance hampers the government's ability to invest in education, healthcare and infrastructure development - areas that fall squarely within the provincial domain under the Constitution. While the Constitution entrusts provinces with responsibility for social services and development, these obligations remain unfulfilled due to the federal government's delays and reluctance in releasing constitutionally mandated funds - particularly under the Net Hydel Profit (NHP) mechanism as per the AGN Qazi Methodology. To break this deadlock and enable meaningful development, K-P, like other provinces, is fully justified in demanding the convening of the 11th National Finance Commission (NFC). Article 160 of the Constitution mandates that the NFC Award should consider multiple indicators, not just population size. These include poverty, revenue generation, security expenditure and geographic disadvantages. Moreover, following the merger of tribal districts, K-P's share in NFC Award stands at 19.46% - something that the federal government is constitutionally obligated to accept. But again, in the federal budget for the coming fiscal year, the enhanced share as per the addition of the population is missing. K-P's case for greater weightage in the NFC Award is grounded in logic and law. The province contributes significantly to national revenue through its oil and gas resources, and bears an extraordinary burden of security-related expenses due to its proximity to Afghanistan and the impact of terrorism. Despite this, K-P continues to suffer from delayed payments and withheld arrears under the NHP mechanism. Article 161(2) of the Constitution entitles provinces to NHP payments, and the AGN Qazi Committee's methodology - endorsed by the Council of Common Interests (CCI) and the Supreme Court - lays down the formula. Yet, the arrears continue to pile up. While the province was paid Rs6 billion in 1992 based on this methodology, inconsistencies have led to an estimated Rs75 billion in unpaid dues, with some sources placing the figure above Rs1 trillion. Under an interim arrangement approved by the CCI in 2016, a rate of Rs1.10 per kilowatt-hour with 5% annual indexation was set. Yet, even this has not been consistently honored. According to the White Paper on Budget 2025-26, excise duty on oil is not paid to the province, as the rate has not been determined yet. K-P produces more than 50% of the national oil production which means it absorbs the highest loss from the unavailability of this duty. The federal government collects Petroleum Development Levy on different petroleum products. This collection is not distributed among the provinces as it is excluded from the federal divisible pool of the NFC, which is a violation of the rights of the provinces. Also, despite multiple efforts, excise duty on oil is not determined despite constitutional provision. K-P government's Adviser on Finance Muzammil Aslam is on record saying that the province had last received Rs90 billion less due to the reduction in tax collections from the federal government. Similarly, K-P seeks a fairer and more transparent share of royalties on oil and gas produced within its borders. Article 161(1)(b) mandates that these royalties should accrue to the province where the wellhead is located. Moreover, Article 172(3), inserted into the Constitution through the 18th Amendment, clearly states that the ownership of natural resources is to be shared between the Centre and the provincial governments. This necessitates amendments to the Petroleum Act, Rules and Policy, enabling joint decision-making and equitable benefits for resource-producing provinces. Despite this constitutional clarity, the federal government maintains centralised control, which K-P rightly views as unconstitutional post-18th Amendment. The province's repeated demands for financial autonomy, timely fund releases and greater decision-making in resource governance are not just political rhetoric - they are rooted in constitutional rights and fiscal necessity. The Chief Minister of K-P has, through a letter, aptly highlighted the province's precarious financial position and urged the federal government to release the pending dues, especially those for the development of NMDs. This is not just about numbers on a balance sheet; it's about ensuring peace, promoting economic activity and healing the wounds of decades of marginalisation. Justice Munir once observed that the most persistent constitutional challenge in Pakistan has been the equitable distribution of power and resources between the federation and the provinces. Today, the Constitution provides a clear framework for resolving this longstanding issue. What remains is the political will to implement it in both letter and spirit. K-P is not asking for favours; it is demanding its rightful share under the Constitution. Fulfilling these demands will not only uphold constitutional justice but also help allay longstanding grievances and the deep-rooted sense of deprivation felt across the province.


Express Tribune
15-06-2025
- Business
- Express Tribune
Realism and shifting tides of international relations
The writer is a former Secretary to Government, Home and Tribal Affairs Department and a retired IGP. He can be reached at syed_shah94@ Listen to article In the ever-evolving arena of international politics, the concept of permanent alliances or perpetual hostilities often proves to be a myth. As Lord Palmerston had put it long ago, "We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." This preposition remains central to realist thought in foreign policy, where national interest overrides ideological consistency or historical ties. Recent geopolitical developments — from the US President Donald Trump's unconventional diplomacy to shifting alliances in South Asia -— demonstrate these powerful illustrations of this timeless truth. Trump recently visited the Middle East and had diplomatic engagements amid scenes of pomp and show. He had interactions with Saudi Arabia - which is poles apart from the US from an ideological perspective. One espouses democratic values and the other Sharia law with a dynastic rule. However, overridding considerations of lucrative arms deals and mutual economic benefits set all those ideals to naught. Trump even declared Saudi Arabia as a model for a reimagined Middle East, emphasising the promise of economic prosperity over instability in a region reeling from multiple wars. Similarly, Trump's brief chat with President Ahmed al-Sharaa of Syria, though on the sidelines of his diplomatic initiatives, was widely speculated and analysed. He also announced easing sanctions on Syria to give the country "a chance at peace". Trump's remarks and subsequent actions, however melodramatic in presentation, reflect the primacy of interest over principle. In the complex chessboard of international relations, strategic considerations often overshadow moral judgments. Perhaps one of the most glaring examples of realist foreign policy was observed during the US-Taliban talks culminating in the 2020 Doha Agreement between the two. After nearly two decades of warfare that claimed thousands of lives and cost billions of dollars, the US opted to negotiate directly with its once-archenemy. The very group that had been the target of a massive military campaign post-9/11 was now being recognised as a legitimate stakeholder in Afghanistan's future. This position from combat to the negotiating table, sidelining Ashraf Ghani and finally abandoning his government, was not a reflection of ideological transformation but rather a calculated move to pull out the US troops from a protracted and unwinnable conflict. It was a textbook case of interest-based diplomacy. This trend is not unique to the United States. China's recent diplomatic initiatives further portray the realist approach. The trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan in Beijing marked a strategic reevaluation in the region. Expressing unanimity of views, the three states agreed to shore up diplomatic and economic engagement, assuring a cooperative stance on counterterrorism. From a Chinese perspective this move would further enhance security along its western borders, ensuring the success of the Belt and Road Initiative, and countering the influence of rival powers in a geopolitically sensitive area. Pakistan's participation in this meeting also reflects a realist recalibration. Once a frontline ally in the US-led War on Terror, Pakistan is increasingly leaning towards regional partnerships that align more closely with its evolving strategic and economic interests. The re-engagement with Afghanistan, under Taliban leadership no less, is a nod to regional stability over ideological divergence. It's a pragmatic choice aimed at containing security threats and fostering economic integration. The meeting has also provided a fair chance to the de facto rulers of Afghanistan to gain legitimacy and economic lifelines. By engaging with regional powers like China and Pakistan, the Taliban seek to break out of international isolation and gain access to trade routes, infrastructure investments and diplomatic recognition. Once again, national interest overrides historical enmities or ideological moorings. All those aforementioned events, underscore the relevance and utility of realism in international politics. Realism postulates that the international system is anarchic and that states primarily follow the law of self-preservation and prosperity. In such a system, moral principles, while not entirely absent, are often subordinated to strategic calculations. Ideological allies may quickly turn into enemies and former foes may transform into partners as dictated by the circumstances. Critics of realism often decry its perceived cynicism and lack of moral compass. However, proponents argue that it is a sober and necessary lens through which to view global affairs. Idealism may inspire, but it is realism that governs the actions of states when stakes are high and options are limited. Moreover, the real-world consequences of deviating from realism can be severe. History is replete with examples where ideological rigidity led to strategic blunders — from the Vietnam War to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Conversely, moments of pragmatic diplomacy — such as Nixon's visit to China or the Iran nuclear deal — have often yielded more sustainable outcomes.