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India.com
16-05-2025
- Science
- India.com
Can earthquakes be caused from inside a laboratory? What is the seismic weapon theory? Which countries have..., India is...
(AI image) New Delhi: In recent days, several Asian countries have been experiencing mild tremors of earthquakes continuously. Coincidentally, all these countries, including Pakistan, are against India. Pakistan's Balochistan and China's Xinjiang regions are both strategically sensitive. In such a scenario, with earthquakes occurring one after the other in these areas, the seismic weapon theory is gaining attention. According to this theory, several countries are working on utilizing earthquakes as a weapon against the enemy. What is seismic weapon theory The seismic weapon theory suggests that humans can utilize earthquakes as a weapon against their enemies. The most notable reference to this is HAARP (High-Frequency Active Auroral Research Program), which the United States began in 1993. The U.S. Air Force, the University of Alaska, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency collaborated to establish HAARP in Alaska. Its purpose was to study the ionosphere, which is the upper part of the atmosphere. This part is crucial for satellite communication. Although public information about HAARP has been provided from the beginning, suspicion only started when heavy military funding was revealed. Initially, it was only mentioned that the University of Alaska was involved. Many documents were classified, which deepened the suspicion. The biggest accusation has been that HAARP can artificially create earthquakes. The earthquake that struck Haiti in 2010 caused devastation. At that time, the country's president, Hugo Chavez, accused America of using his country for its experiments. Several Iranian leaders also claimed that HAARP was causing tremors in the earth through Washington. Venezuela made similar accusations as well. Theory of seismic weapons Scientists who support this theory believe that high-frequency radio waves or deep drilling can create disturbances in the Earth's tectonic plates. If the Earth's fault line, that is, the cracks in the plates, can be targeted, then it is possible to induce artificial earthquakes. However, for now, we can only create micro-seismic activity, meaning we can only cause small vibrations. Inducing earthquakes unnaturally is currently beyond our means. However, it is also true that countries like the United States and Russia have definitely thought about weather weapons. When earthquakes start occurring repeatedly in a specific location or under specific circumstances, questions are naturally raised. For example, recently several terrorist hideouts were destroyed in Pakistan. There is heightened separatist activity in Balochistan. On the other hand, China has faced allegations of human rights violations regarding Xinjiang and Tibet. In such cases, earthquakes are linked to weapon theory. South and East Asia more susceptible to frequent earthquakes The region where India, Pakistan, China, Nepal, and Afghanistan are located is part of the Himalayan tectonic belt. Here, the Indo-Australian Plate and the Eurasian Plate are colliding with each other. This collision has been ongoing for millions of years and is the reason for the formation of the Himalayan Range. The plates are still not stable, and due to the collision, earthquakes occur frequently. Continuous light tremors could be a sign that a major natural disaster may occur soon.
The Independent
14-05-2025
- Politics
- The Independent
How Trump could subvert the Constitution and stay in office for a third term
United States President Donald Trump has repeatedly floated the idea of remaining in office after his second term ends in 2029. Since the 22nd Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1951, no U.S. president has challenged the two-term limit it established. However, attempts to circumvent constitutional term limits are not unprecedented elsewhere. Virtually every country in Latin America has enshrined constitutional term limits as a safeguard against tyranny. These rules vary: some allow only a single term, some permit two, while others enable non-consecutive re-election. Yet several presidents have managed to defy these provisions. Recent examples include Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. Although the institutional norms and political cultures of these countries differ from those of the U.S., examining how term limits have been dismantled offers valuable insights into how any similar efforts by Trump might unfold. How presidents have overstayed their term The most common tactic is for presidents to first ensure their political party in the legislature is fully subservient to them, and then leverage a loyal majority to amend the constitution — a move that has already been initiated in the U.S. Ortega and Correa successfully used their legislative majorities to pass constitutional amendments that eliminated term limits in Nicaragua and Ecuador. Whether Trump has achieved the same level of unwavering loyalty among Republicans is debatable, but getting amendments through the U.S. Congress is significantly more difficult. The process requires a two-thirds majority vote in both houses, followed by ratification from three-quarters of state legislatures. In contrast, Nicaragua's constitution can be amended with a 60 per cent majority and, as in Ecuador, sub-national jurisdictions have no say in the matter. Another crucial step involves co-opting or capturing the judiciary. In Bolivia, Morales achieved a controversial third term in 2014 supported by a partisan Constitutional Tribunal. More recently, El Salvador's Bukele secured a 2021 Supreme Court ruling (from judges he appointed) allowing him to seek immediate re-election in 2024, despite a constitutional prohibition on consecutive terms. We have seen a worrying pattern of subservience to Trump by the U.S. Supreme Court. The limits of this deference are increasingly uncertain. Securing popular support Some presidents have turned to plebiscites to legitimize constitutional tampering by appealing directly to the electorate and framing the move as a democratic exercise. Chávez employed this strategy in Venezuela, winning a 2009 referendum to abolish term limits. The absence of a national referendum mechanism in the U.S. — where popular consultations are organized at the sub-national (state) level — limits the options available to a president seeking to remove term limits through this type of populist ploy. Related to this, populist presidents who have successfully circumvented term limits have typically done so while enjoying extraordinarily high levels of public support. Correa maintained approval ratings near 70 per cent during much of his presidency, while independent polls have put Bukele's support at well over 80 per cent. Both, along with Morales and Chávez, leveraged their popularity to justify constitutional changes through legislative and judicial channels, framing their actions as carrying out the will of the people. In contrast, Trump's approval ratings have consistently remained far lower. Currently, his favorability sits in the low 40s, making any attempt to claim a broad popular mandate for a third term both dubious and precarious. The military matters Due to inevitable opposition, military support is central to any leader's attempt to defy the constitution. In much of Latin America, the military is highly politicized, and armed forces have historically been shaped by doctrines of internal control rather than external defence. Rooted in Cold War-era national security ideologies, this orientation casts domestic dissenters ('socialists,' Indigenous movements, unionists) as internal enemies, legitimizing repression as a patriotic duty. In some countries, military oaths reflect this politicization. In both Nicaragua and Venezuela, these oaths increasingly emphasize loyalty to the president or ruling party and their revolutionary legacy, undermining institutional neutrality. By contrast, in the U.S., military personnel swear an oath to defend the Constitution, not the president. While they must follow orders, these must align with constitutional and legal boundaries. The absence of a tradition of using soldiers against American citizens and an institutional culture of constitutional loyalty and political neutrality may, at least in principle, provide some protection against the authoritarian overreach that has allowed certain Latin American presidents to remain in power indefinitely. But a substantial portion of the U.S. armed forces leans politically to the right, like their counterparts in Latin America, raising concerns that partisan sympathies within the military could influence its response to a constitutional crisis. Furthermore, the increasing use of non-military security forces — such as local police and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) — against civilians demonstrates that the state has a range of instruments at its disposal for exercising control. The U.S. government's use of ICE is reminiscent of how governments in countries like Venezuela and Nicaragua have used police and paramilitary units loyal to the president with impunity to suppress dissent. The perils of complacency Many in the West still hold on to the belief that constitutional erosion is something that only happens in the Global South. Some believe that American institutions are uniquely resilient and therefore capable of withstanding any attempt to subvert the constitution. For much of U.S. history, this confidence may have been justified, but today, it's not only complacent but dangerous. The strength of democratic institutions depends on the political will to defend them. Time will tell if the barriers that exist in the U.S. are strong enough to withstand the pressures now being placed upon them. What is clear is that relying on increasingly tenuous institutional resilience or historical exceptionalism is no substitute for vigilance and active defence of democratic norms.
The Independent
12-05-2025
- Politics
- The Independent
Donald Trump could remain in office after his term ends. Here's how
United States President Donald Trump has repeatedly floated the idea of remaining in office after his second term ends in 2029. Since the 22nd Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1951, no U.S. president has challenged the two-term limit it established. However, attempts to circumvent constitutional term limits are not unprecedented elsewhere. Virtually every country in Latin America has enshrined constitutional term limits as a safeguard against tyranny. These rules vary: some allow only a single term, some permit two, while others enable non-consecutive re-election. Yet several presidents have managed to defy these provisions. Recent examples include Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. Although the institutional norms and political cultures of these countries differ from those of the U.S., examining how term limits have been dismantled offers valuable insights into how any similar efforts by Trump might unfold. How presidents have overstayed their term The most common tactic is for presidents to first ensure their political party in the legislature is fully subservient to them, and then leverage a loyal majority to amend the constitution — a move that has already been initiated in the U.S. Ortega and Correa successfully used their legislative majorities to pass constitutional amendments that eliminated term limits in Nicaragua and Ecuador. Whether Trump has achieved the same level of unwavering loyalty among Republicans is debatable, but getting amendments through the U.S. Congress is significantly more difficult. The process requires a two-thirds majority vote in both houses, followed by ratification from three-quarters of state legislatures. In contrast, Nicaragua's constitution can be amended with a 60 per cent majority and, as in Ecuador, sub-national jurisdictions have no say in the matter. Another crucial step involves co-opting or capturing the judiciary. In Bolivia, Morales achieved a controversial third term in 2014 supported by a partisan Constitutional Tribunal. More recently, El Salvador's Bukele secured a 2021 Supreme Court ruling (from judges he appointed) allowing him to seek immediate re-election in 2024, despite a constitutional prohibition on consecutive terms. We have seen a worrying pattern of subservience to Trump by the U.S. Supreme Court. The limits of this deference are increasingly uncertain. Securing popular support Some presidents have turned to plebiscites to legitimize constitutional tampering by appealing directly to the electorate and framing the move as a democratic exercise. Chávez employed this strategy in Venezuela, winning a 2009 referendum to abolish term limits. The absence of a national referendum mechanism in the U.S. — where popular consultations are organized at the sub-national (state) level — limits the options available to a president seeking to remove term limits through this type of populist ploy. Related to this, populist presidents who have successfully circumvented term limits have typically done so while enjoying extraordinarily high levels of public support. Correa maintained approval ratings near 70 per cent during much of his presidency, while independent polls have put Bukele's support at well over 80 per cent. Both, along with Morales and Chávez, leveraged their popularity to justify constitutional changes through legislative and judicial channels, framing their actions as carrying out the will of the people. In contrast, Trump's approval ratings have consistently remained far lower. Currently, his favorability sits in the low 40s, making any attempt to claim a broad popular mandate for a third term both dubious and precarious. The military matters Due to inevitable opposition, military support is central to any leader's attempt to defy the constitution. In much of Latin America, the military is highly politicized, and armed forces have historically been shaped by doctrines of internal control rather than external defence. Rooted in Cold War-era national security ideologies, this orientation casts domestic dissenters ('socialists,' Indigenous movements, unionists) as internal enemies, legitimizing repression as a patriotic duty. In some countries, military oaths reflect this politicization. In both Nicaragua and Venezuela, these oaths increasingly emphasize loyalty to the president or ruling party and their revolutionary legacy, undermining institutional neutrality. By contrast, in the U.S., military personnel swear an oath to defend the Constitution, not the president. While they must follow orders, these must align with constitutional and legal boundaries. The absence of a tradition of using soldiers against American citizens and an institutional culture of constitutional loyalty and political neutrality may, at least in principle, provide some protection against the authoritarian overreach that has allowed certain Latin American presidents to remain in power indefinitely. But a substantial portion of the U.S. armed forces leans politically to the right, like their counterparts in Latin America, raising concerns that partisan sympathies within the military could influence its response to a constitutional crisis. Furthermore, the increasing use of non-military security forces — such as local police and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) — against civilians demonstrates that the state has a range of instruments at its disposal for exercising control. The U.S. government's use of ICE is reminiscent of how governments in countries like Venezuela and Nicaragua have used police and paramilitary units loyal to the president with impunity to suppress dissent. The perils of complacency Many in the West still hold on to the belief that constitutional erosion is something that only happens in the Global South. Some believe that American institutions are uniquely resilient and therefore capable of withstanding any attempt to subvert the constitution. For much of U.S. history, this confidence may have been justified, but today, it's not only complacent but dangerous. The strength of democratic institutions depends on the political will to defend them. Time will tell if the barriers that exist in the U.S. are strong enough to withstand the pressures now being placed upon them. What is clear is that relying on increasingly tenuous institutional resilience or historical exceptionalism is no substitute for vigilance and active defence of democratic norms.
Irish Independent
30-04-2025
- Business
- Irish Independent
Smurfit Westrock unit warned it risks $473m Venezuela case being thrown out
A Dutch unit of the packaging company headed by chief executive Tony Smurfit filed a petition against Venezuela last year in the US in an effort to enforce an arbitration award made in its favour after the government of the South American country seized its assets there. Between 2003 and 2018, the Venezuela government – first under president Hugo Chavez and later under his successor, Nicolas Maduro – 'engaged in a series of actions and omissions, including expropriation' that 'destroyed the value' of Smurfit Kappa's investment in the country and deprived it of control of its business there, the packaging group told the New York court. Smurfit Kappa finalised a deal last year to merge with US-based peer WestRock, with the enlarged group becoming Smurfit Westrock. For a number of years after Venezuela's economy started to collapse during the last decade, its government had zeroed in on Smurfit Kappa's operations. It had production plants in Caracas, as well as other cities to the west of the capital. It also operated paper mills, a forestry unit, a sales office and a recycling plant in the country. Its operations in the country were seized by the government in August 2018, with some employees arrested. The group said the Venezuela government subsequently failed to respond to its Vat refund requests in a timely manner, or at all. The packaging company said the government also impeded its ability to repatriate distributable profits in a timely manner, or at all. The company then took a case to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, which found in Smurfit Kappa's favour on a number of grounds. It awarded Smurfit $395m with interest compounded from 2018 until the date of the award in 2024. The company was also awarded $4.5m in costs, the interest on which is compounded from last year until the date of payment. The defendant has not responded, and the plaintiff has taken no additional steps to prosecute this case The government of Venezuela was deemed served of the notice of the petition filed in New York on February 1 this year. It had until April 2 to respond. 'The defendant has not responded, and the plaintiff has taken no additional steps to prosecute this case,' noted the New York court. 'Thus, the court orders the plaintiff to file an affidavit of default by May 6, 2025, or show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.' Tony Smurfit said in 2018 that agents from Venezuela's military counter-intelligence had also been harassing Smurfit Kappa workers in the country. Although Venezuela's economy was being devastated and marked by hyperinflation, Smurfit Kappa was able to keep manufacturing products at its facilities in Venezuela for export. Mr Smurfit revealed in 2019 that the company spirited 23 employees – all Venezuelan nationals – from the country in 2018 to protect their safety. The employees were moved from the country before its borders were closed and redeployed at other Smurfit Kappa facilities.
Bloomberg
25-03-2025
- Business
- Bloomberg
China Refiners Face Yet Another Blow as Trump Presses Venezuela
China's private refiners, long plagued by excess capacity and paper-thin margins, are facing yet another setback as the Trump administration imposes a 25% tariff on any buyer of Venezuelan oil and gas. Beijing has had close commercial and political ties to Venezuela for years, fostering close connections to both Hugo Chavez and his successor, Nicolas Maduro. China has been a key source of funding as well as the single largest buyer of the country's crude, taking more than 40% of its oil exports in February.
