27-06-2025
Why is Mob Violence So Common in Bangladesh?
On June 23, Bangladesh's former Chief Election Commissioner K.M. Nurul Huda, who oversaw the controversial 2018 national elections, was attacked by an angry mob. Police subsequently arrested him at his home in Uttara, Dhaka.
A disturbing video circulating on social media shows Huda wearing a white T-shirt and lungi, with a garland of shoes hung around his neck. An angry mob surrounds him and at one point, a bearded man begins slapping him with a shoe, even as the mob chants: 'Nurul Hudar dui gale, juta maro taley taley' (Slap Nurul Huda with shoes on both cheeks).
Mob beatings have become common in Bangladesh. The Human Rights Support Society (HRSS) reported that at least 119 people were killed and 74 others injured in 114 mob incidents between August 2024 and March 2025, i.e. since the interim government took charge after the ouster of the Sheikh Hasina government. According to HRSS, most of the post-August mob incidents were related to political score settling.
However, mob violence is not a recent phenomenon in Bangladesh. Neither is it a creation of the Muhammad Yunus government. Rather, the recent incidents are a carryover of past experiences. According to HRSS, over 1,000 mob incidents were reported between 2015 and 2024, resulting in 792 deaths and 765 injuries. Pre-August 2024 mob incidents were mostly connected with suspicions of theft, robbery, and mugging.
So why do people indulge in vigilante violence? What drives them to take the law into their own hands? The absence of the rule of law is the main reason for mob violence. Some argue that at the core of this crisis is a deep breakdown in public trust in institutions. Years of politically influenced policing and a sluggish justice system have left many Bangladeshis disillusioned with those in power. A 2024 survey by the Manabadhikar Shongskriti Foundation (MSF) found that 72 percent of people believed that police would not respond to crimes effectively.
However, in Bangladesh, mob violence is not just about lack of trust in criminal justice institutions and processes. Since its independence 54 years ago, Bangladesh has struggled to build a solid foundation for national solidarity or inclusivity. National identity has oscillated between secularism and Islam.
The Mujib government introduced secularism in the 1972 constitution. Many argue that the concept was imposed from above against popular will due to pressure from the Soviet Union and India. Secularism was later removed from the constitution in 1978, and 'absolute faith and trust in Almighty Allah' was added to the constitution. The subsequent military ruler, Gen Hussain Muhammad Ershad, went one step further and declared Islam as the state religion of Bangladesh. Sheikh Hasina restored secularism in 2013, but kept Islam as the state religion.
This oscillation and ambiguity has left Bangladesh without a shared identity. It has divided society into two opposing groups — Shapla (Hefazat) and Shahbag (Ganojagoran Moncho).
Shapla is the embodiment and protector of Islam, while Shahbag refers to those who call themselves progressive and defenders of liberal values. Both groups view the other as a threat to its very existence. Shapla demanded capital punishment for blasphemy and Shahbag wanted a ban on religion-based politics and capital punishment for Islamist leaders accused of crimes against humanity.
These opposing visions led to violent clashes and the tragic killings of bloggers in 2013 and 2014. Over time, this conflict planted the seeds of deep resentment and intolerance, making it harder for people to accept differing viewpoints. Both groups failed to live by their ideals. While secularists helped Hasina become authoritarian, Islamists did not promote a value-based society. As a result, Bangladeshi society now faces a growing crisis of polarization and hostility toward dissenting voices and actions.
Bangladesh's political culture has also played a role in promoting mob violence. Since the end of military rule in 1990 and the return of democracy, three troubling features have come to define Bangladesh's political landscape: crowd politics, street violence, and extortion.
Mass gatherings — often orchestrated by political parties — have become a routine tool for showing strength. These crowds aren't just about protest; they're about power, visibility, and pressure. In many ways, crowd politics has become woven into the fabric of how politics is done in Bangladesh.
Street violence, meanwhile, has long been used as a blunt instrument to force the ruling party to respond to opposition demands.
Nearly 2,000 individuals were killed in political violence in just nine years between 2009 and 2017. Yet justice remains elusive — no trials, no accountability. This has sent a chilling message: violence can be used with impunity.
Extortion is rampant; so common is its practice that most people have either experienced it or know someone who has. Often carried out by groups linked to political actors, extortion is used to fund muscle power and maintain control. Victims rarely get help from the police, who are either powerless or unwilling to intervene. For many, this has become an accepted part of daily life.
Together, these practices have normalized mob culture where force, fear, and informal power often override law and justice. Breaking free from this cycle will require more than just political reform. It calls for a deep transformation of the country's political, institutional, and social culture.
