Latest news with #ICBMs
Economist
a day ago
- Business
- Economist
Cuts to food stamps are about to hit in America
United States | Coupon clipping Photograph: Erin Schaff/The New York Times/Redux/Eyevine Jul 24th 2025 | SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO | 4 min read B Y DAYBREAK in Santa Fe, the line of cars already snakes down the street. Families in sedans, builders in trucks and one off-duty taxi queue up to get frozen chicken, a sack of potatoes and a gallon of milk. Everyone in line at the Food Depot, a food bank, gets served, but one couple in their 50s arrived at 5:20am just to be sure. They receive money for food through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Programme ( SNAP ), a federal welfare programme. It lasts them five days. The Epstein uproar has revealed an unexpected danger—for the president—of a Justice Department that seems partisan Fed up with the traditional joints, these businesswomen are shooting their shot What happens when a president sues a press baron? The cost of replacing ageing ICBMs is soaring as a new arms race looms A vast right-wing conspiracy comes for the president The college drop-out fighting to preserve Donald Trump's youth vote
Express Tribune
3 days ago
- Politics
- Express Tribune
India's 'more options' ICBMs
Listen to article India's strategic consideration is to extend the range of its ICBMs beyond the territories of its rivals — China and Pakistan. It's a worrisome development for those who played a significant role in allowing India to extend the ranges of its ICBMs. In the future, Western capitals will fall within India's ICBM targeting range. ICBMs are one of the potent modes of carrying weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear-tipped ICBMs can cause havoc on rivals and are instrumental in ensuring mutual vulnerabilities. This adds lethality to these weapons that rivals keep a wary eye on the development of each other's ICBMs. India's friends kept a blind eye on its ICBMs. Is it because India has been granted the status of 'Net Security Provider' and 'Major Defence Partner' in the Indian Ocean Region by the United States? Likewise, a Cold War power also covertly assisted India in developing its ICBM programme through its space launch vehicles. However, there are no permanent enemies, nor are there permanent friends; only interests. Therefore, there is a need to debunk the perception that India's extending ICBM ranges are only to target Pakistan and China. India's ICBMs can also pose a potent threat to its allies in the future. Once such a capability is achieved, it will not be easy to reverse it. Recently, the world has witnessed the US bombing of bunker busters on Iran's nuclear facilities. The intense bombing damaged Iran's nuclear facilities but not beyond repair, as per the IAEA. This also lends credence to India's ICBM programme, which has extended ranges. It has taken advantage of Western capitals' blind spot on its deadly development. Once India develops ICBMs with extended ranges, Western capitals will be permanently on its target list. The workhorse of India's ICBM arsenal is Agni-V, recently deployed by its Strategic Forces Command, representing a significant step in target acquisition beyond its rivals' territories. Agni-V was first tested in 2012 with a declared range of 5,500km. Officially, it was a long-range ballistic missile (LRBM). Chinese experts initially assessed that the Agni-V range was under-declared, and its actual range is 8,000km. However, the Indian strategic community maintained a strategic silence on its range. ANI first broke the news in 2022, reporting that India could extend the range of Agni-V up to 7,000km by replacing the steel content with composite materials. Presently, Agni-V is now Multiple Independent Targetable Re-entry Vehicle, providing more options for utility to the Indian Strategic Force Command during conflicts. Now, after all these years, Indian media and analysts openly suggest that the Agni-V range is 8,000km. What about Agni-VI and Surya ICBMs? Will these two ICBMs provide India with more options? Of course, these two will be utilised for more options. News about Surya first came to the public in 1999. The development was kept secret but accidentally revealed by Indian Minister of State for Defence (and former head of DRDO) Bachi Singh Rawat. He told the media that India is developing an ICBM known as Surya that would have a range of up to 5,000km. Mr Rawat was later stripped of his position after disclosing the ICBM. He dropped a bombshell on the international community by revealing India's top-secret, under-development ICBM. Indian rocketry received significant assistance from the Space Launch Vehicle programme, which it obtained with foreign support. Notably, India received Cryogenic engines for its SLV programme from Ukraine and Russia in the 1990s. It is believed that the same cryogenic engines are now Surya's test-bed. In the early 2000s, Russian and Western intelligence assessments indicated that India was developing an ICBM with more than 5000km range, which can be extended to 10,000km. Nevertheless, Western powers conspicuously kept mum on this, knowing that they would eventually be on India's targeting list. Independent analysis also suggests that Agni-VI has a range of 10000-12000km. Agni-VI and Surya are under development, and to date, no test or trial of these systems by DRDO has been conducted. The Indian decision not to test Agni-VI and Surya may be due to unseen pressure from the US. Previously, the US has least criticised India on its anti-satellite test in 2019, despite overtly criticising China and Russia's ASAT missile tests in the past. India may test Agni-VI and Surya by ignoring US pressure, as it completely ignored the US pressure when it tested its ASAT missile. India does not deny the development of both. However, India never openly discussed it due to the possibility of pressure from London, Paris, Moscow and Washington, as they were already aware of such developments. Instead, Washington and its allies are busy alleging that other powers are developing ICBMs. What is this "more options" strategy? Is there any rocket science required to understand more options strategy? No, India's intermediate-range and long-range ballistic missiles are enough to achieve targets within the territories of Pakistan and China. Therefore, "a more option" strategy is linked with Agni-VI and Surya to acquire targets well beyond Pakistan and China. London, Paris, Moscow and Washington may reconsider their position and think about being included in the "more options" strategy. The Western powers have helped India develop its ICBM capability while also allowing the interchangeability of space and missile components and systems, which has contributed to India's space and ballistic missile programmes. Now, the onus lies on them to think about India's "more option" strategy.
West Australian
5 days ago
- Politics
- West Australian
Top NATO official says China's rapid nuclear build-up poses a deterrence challenge to the US
One of NATO's top officials says China's rapid nuclear build-up poses a deterrence challenge to the United States amid warnings China and Russia could embroil the West in a two-front war as early as 2027. Pentagon official, Jim Stokes and now the head of NATO's Nuclear Policy, made the comments, speaking exclusively to The Nightly in an interview for the Latika Takes podcast. China has added around 100 new warheads to its stockpile since 2023, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, meaning its nuclear arsenal is the fastest-growing in the world. The Institute said China currently has around 600 nuclear warheads and could potentially have at least as many Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) as either Russia or the USA by the 2030s. China has previously said it had no comment on the Institute's estimates and claimed it does not participate in an arms race. Mr Stokes said one explanation for China's quest to stockpile so many nuclear weapons could be to acquire leverage 'if it ever tries to do anything vis-a-vis Taiwan.' 'That does present a deterrence challenge to the United States and all of its allies in terms of how do you potentially deter conflict in two regions and perhaps simultaneously in the Indo-Pacific region and also the Euro-Atlantic region,' Mr Stokes said. 'A lot of people are talking about what that two-nuclear peer challenge would look like.' Last week, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe Alexus Grynkewich warned that the Alliance's 32 members must be ready for the possibility that Russia and China could launch wars in Europe and the Pacific simultaneously, possibly in 2027 — the same year that China's President Xi Jinping has ordered his military to be ready to take Taiwan, with force, if necessary. There are nine nuclear-armed countries in the world: the US, UK, France, China, Russia, North Korea, Pakistan, India and Israel, which does not publicly acknowledge possessing nuclear weapons. Asked specifically what Australia, which is not a member of NATO but a partner country, should do in light of China's nuclear build-up, Mr Stokes recommended deepening engagement with NATO and drawing the United States, Australia's top security ally, closer. 'I would say for Australia, while it's good to have dialogue with other Indo-Pacific nations and European nations and other nations from around the world, talk to the United States, continue to cultivate that bilateral relationship there,' he said. 'And if it's a discussion about nuclear issues, that's the power that you should be talking to. 'Engage with the United States and have an understanding about how it is thinking through nuclear strategy and posture, doctrine and capabilities. 'In much the same way, the US has had a more structured dialogue with Japan and also with South Korea in recent years about nuclear issues. 'It's similar in the way that we have consultation mechanisms within NATO about nuclear issues. 'That's one way non-nuclear states can have a better understanding of these things and also some influence or some input into the decision making of nuclear powers by having those relationships and being able to talk about these things, to be able to have their input into, say, policies or any decisions that may be made, and then also be able to better explain it to their own populations.' He also urged engagement with NATO to show combined political will and come up with ways to 'tackle some of these really hard deterrent and defence challenges that we face.' Prime Minister Anthony Albanese skipped NATO this year for the second year in a row, despite being one of only four leaders from the Indo-Pacific invited to the annual leaders' summit. He has taken two international trips since his 94-seat landslide, opting to meet the Pope at the Vatican and last week spending six days in China visiting President Xi Jinping with his fiancée Jodie Haydon, to promote deepening business and tourism ties with Beijing. By contrast, he has not visited the White House or met Donald Trump since his re-election last November and inauguration in January. The opposition's foreign spokeswoman, Senator Michaelia Cash urged the Prime Minister to strengthen, and not diminish, the US Alliance. 'We have known for some time that the world faces myriad strategic challenges,' Senator Cash said. 'Mr Albanese has said we live in the most dangerous strategic circumstances since World War II. 'The Opposition has continually called on Mr Albanese to do two things – lift Australia's spending on defence and focus his international attention on securing the AUKUS alliance. 'At a time of global uncertainty, now is a time to strengthen the US-Australia alliance by building our influence in Washington, not diminishing it.' The Prime Minister's Office declined to comment when asked if Mr Albanese raised China's nuclear build-up with President Xi during last week's marathon trip. Mr Stokes said China remained coy on why it was building such an enormous stockpile in peacetime and that while Beijing claimed to have a 'no first-use' policy of using nuclear weapons, it was to be treated with scepticism. 'That buildup … and the diversity of weapons and the delivery systems and why, what is that really for?' Mr Stokes said. 'They're not going to pull some document off the shelf and say, what did it say, what did Chairman Mao talk about back in the 1960s? 'They tried to use that to promote the fact that their nuclear deterrent is peaceful, but then they're using it to obfuscate the fact that they're also building up. 'Ultimately, I believe that decision-making is made by the Chinese President, and so I don't know that any leader is going to feel beholden to some doctrine that's written somewhere. 'They're going to make decisions perhaps in a crisis situation or even a conflict situation based on the advice that they're given, based on their own beliefs.' He said, unlike Western nuclear powers, the US, UK and France, China had never engaged in bilateral arms control talks, risk reduction measures or hotlines. 'There's a lot more that we could do with China if they had it in their interest, but they've shown they're clearly not willing to do that,' he said. Earlier this month, Foreign Minister Penny Wong told the Institute for Strategic and International Studies on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia that China was projecting its military power further into the region. 'And we have seen the worrying pace of China's nuclear and conventional military buildup without the transparency that the region expects,' Senator Wong said.
Memri
16-07-2025
- Politics
- Memri
Iranian Security Expert Abolfazl Bazargan: Iran Must Build and Test a Large Nuclear Bomb; Tactical Device Is Not Enough - 'That Beautiful Mushroom Rise' Would Deter Enemies and Warn Tel Aviv; Iran's S
In an interview on the Khate Energy YouTube video posted on July 13-15, 2025, Iranian international security expert Abolfazl Bazargan discussed Iran's need for a large nuclear bomb that would serve as a deterrent. He said that smaller, tactical nuclear weapons are meant to be used but are not powerful enough, whereas larger bombs that can be tested would serve as an effective deterrent. He said that Iran needs to produce a large nuclear bomb, test it, and have 'that beautiful mushroom rise' which would tell Iran's enemy that if it continues its attacks and threatens Iran's existence, Tel Aviv will be next. He further claimed that Iran can absolutely build an atomic bomb, noting that, according to an IAEA report, Iran conducted a 'cold test' prior to 2003. Citing Dr. Fereydoon Abbasi, the former head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization who was assassinated during the June Iran‑Israel war, Bazargan said Iran had tested hypersonic missiles, ballistic missiles, ICBMs, and satellite launchers, and Iran could conceivably achieve the technology to develop a nuclear bomb. Bazargan concluded that Iran's survival, future, and territorial integrity depend on whether it obtains an atomic bomb, stating that an atomic bomb is not optional but a necessity.
AllAfrica
07-07-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
China's nuclear triad still a one-legged giant
China's rare DF-5 missile disclosure signals growing confidence in its land-based nuclear might – but beneath the display lies a triad still plagued by imbalance and vulnerability. Last month, South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China has publicly disclosed key specifications of its DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for the first time, marking a rare glimpse into the country's traditionally secretive nuclear program. In a broadcast, state media CCTV described the DF-5 as China's first-generation strategic intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), capable of carrying a single nuclear warhead with an explosive yield of 3 to 4 megatons, approximately 200 times more powerful than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The two-stage missile, developed in the 1970s and commissioned in 1981, has a maximum range of 12,000 kilometers and an accuracy of 500 meters, enabling it to strike targets across the continental United States and Western Europe. It measures 32.6 meters long, 3.35 meters in diameter, and weighs 183 tons at launch. Former PLA instructor Song Zhongping said the DF-5 was instrumental in establishing China's nuclear credibility. He saw the disclosure as a signal that more advanced, silo-based systems may soon be introduced as China phases out older platforms. The move comes amid China's broader modernization of its arsenal, including multiple-warhead variants of the DF-5 and mobile systems. China maintains a no-first-use nuclear policy despite the rapid expansion of its deterrent. SCMP has also noted that China's DF-31 and DF-41 ICBMs mark successive stages in the country's strategic deterrence evolution. The DF-31, first deployed in 2006, is a three-stage solid-fuel missile with variants—DF-31A and DF-31AG—capable of striking targets up to 13,200 kilometers away and delivering up to four warheads via multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The DF-31AG is road-mobile and off-road capable, enhancing survivability through terrain flexibility. In contrast, the DF-41, unveiled in 2019, is a fourth-generation, solid-fuel ICBM with a range of 12,000 – 15,000 kilometers and can carry up to 10 MIRVs, although experts estimate a typical load of three warheads plus decoys. With road-mobile, rail-mobile, and silo-based variants, the DF-41 represents a leap in mobility, payload, and launch survivability. Both systems underscore China's shift toward a more flexible and survivable nuclear deterrent, with the DF-41 eclipsing its predecessors in range, speed (up to Mach 25), and strategic versatility. Despite rapid modernization, China's nuclear triad remains unbalanced, with significant capability gaps in its sea and air-based legs. This situation forces China to rely on a nuclear strategy founded on shaping perceptions to sustain its no-first-use and assured retaliation posture amid intensifying great power competition. Citing a March 2025 report by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) notes that China's land-based arsenal remains the cornerstone of its nuclear deterrent, as its nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) leg has far less significant capability, and that its air-based leg, still in early stages of development, is far less capable than its US counterpart. Exploring the limitations of China's sea-based nuclear deterrent, David Logan notes in a November 2023 China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) report that China's efforts to build a sea-based nuclear deterrent remain constrained by significant operational and technical limitations. He adds that although China has six Type 094 ship submersible ballistic nuclear submarines, the PLA Navy's subs are reportedly noisier than Cold War-era Soviet models, raising doubts about their survivability against advanced US anti-submarine warfare capabilities. He explains that communication vulnerabilities further compound risks, as US surveillance networks across the Pacific can likely detect Chinese submarine transmissions. He states that the JL-2 missiles carried by earlier SSBNs cannot reach the US mainland from Chinese waters, while newer JL-3 missiles offer more extended range but are not yet widely deployed. He mentions that geographic chokepoints and detection risks also challenge open-ocean patrols, while a bastion strategy near Chinese coasts limits strategic flexibility. As for China's air-based nuclear arsenal, Aita Moriki mentions in a March 2024 National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) report that China's efforts to establish a credible air-based nuclear deterrent remain constrained by legacy platforms and technical delays. Aita argues that while the People's Liberation Army Air Force has resumed a nuclear role with the H-6N bomber, its limited range and reliance on aerial refueling restrict its ability to strike the US mainland. He adds that the upcoming H-20 stealth bomber, intended to correct this imbalance, may be delayed to the 2030s according to US assessments, amid skepticism over China's ability to master the necessary technologies. He expresses skepticism about whether the H-20, even if unveiled soon, will match the capabilities of US counterparts or meaningfully rebalance China's historically missile-centric nuclear triad. But what do these capability gaps mean for China's nuclear strategy? Hongyu Zhang mentions in an article published this month in the peer-reviewed Chinese Journal of International Politics that China may be using a stopgap 'manufactured deterrence' nuclear strategy. Despite China's stated 'assured retaliation' and 'no-first-use' policies, Zhang argues that significant second-strike capability gaps force it to pursue opaqueness and ambiguity to create uncertainty in adversary counterforce planning, thereby producing deterrent power. In the context of great power competition, Zhang says China is increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal to bridge the gap between assured retaliation and its stopgap manufactured deterrence strategy. Adding credence to Zhang's views, Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda state in a June 2025 report for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) that China's nuclear arsenal totaled at least 600 warheads in January 2025, expanding faster than any other nation. They add that since 2023, China has added approximately 100 warheads annually and completed 350 new ICBM silos. However, they point out that while this growth positions China to potentially match Russia or the US in silo count by 2030, its projected 1,500 warheads by 2035 still fall short of US and Russian stockpiles. The DF-5 disclosure reflects confidence in China's land-based deterrent, but enduring gaps in its sea and air legs reveal a triad still built more on opacity than capability, laying bare the strategic tension between China's assured retaliation policy and its uneven nuclear evolution.
