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Kyodo News
17-07-2025
- Politics
- Kyodo News
OPINION: Ishiba skipping NATO summit exposes gaps in Japan's Europe engagement
WASHINGTON - Since a Japanese prime minister first attended a NATO summit in 2022, Japan has sent its highest-level representative to the event for three consecutive years. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a key catalyst for Tokyo's decision to attend that year, and the 2025 summit in The Hague would have marked the fourth consecutive appearance by a Japanese leader. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba was expected to meet with like-minded NATO partners to deepen cooperation amid the security challenges that link the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters. However, his participation was abruptly canceled, with Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya attending in his place. The decision not to attend personally represents a missed opportunity to strengthen ties with Europe at a time when Japan's strategic thinking is increasingly turning toward this region. Ishiba's glaring absence comes at a sensitive moment for Japan, as it confronts growing Chinese assertiveness while managing a more unpredictable United States. While previous U.S. administrations invested significant diplomatic and political capital in promoting cross-regional cooperation between NATO and its Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) partners, the current Trump administration has shown far less interest in advancing such efforts. In fact, President Donald Trump announced he would not attend a meeting between NATO and the IP4 partners during the summit in The Hague -- a move that likely prompted three of the four Indo-Pacific countries to cancel their leaders' attendance. Trump's emphasis on narrow, transactional negotiations over defense spending within allies' respective regions has broken the momentum for cross-regional cooperation built over the past three years. In this context, Ishiba's decision to skip the summit reflects Tokyo's desire to avoid confrontation with Trump over contentious issues such as defense expenditures and trade. These topics remain especially sensitive given the Japanese government's fragile approval ratings and the upcoming upper house elections in July. Ishiba's absence may have been an effort to preserve strategic flexibility in an increasingly unpredictable environment, but it risks halting the progress that Tokyo is making in advancing defense industrial ties with European NATO partners at a critical juncture. As geopolitical competition intensifies, defense technology innovation and a robust defense industrial base have emerged as indispensable strategic assets. Yet, this is an area where Japan has traditionally lagged, due to the longstanding constraints on its defense industry and heavy reliance on U.S. procurements. The tide, however, appears to be shifting. In its 2022 strategic documents, Tokyo identified reinforcing its defense production and technology base as a national priority. Since 2023, Japan has eased its export controls, allowing the licensed export of domestically produced defense equipment, including lethal systems, to boost competitiveness through economies of scale and access to overseas markets. At the same time, Tokyo seeks to diversify its defense procurement and development partnerships beyond the United States, increasingly turning towards European partners. As Japan carefully balances its security and economic relations with its ally, concerns over U.S. unpredictability have indeed elevated the importance of European partners for Tokyo's foreign and defense policy. Europe now features prominently in Japanese strategic thinking, with Tokyo expanding security cooperation with several European states at the bilateral and multilateral levels, through mechanisms like NATO IP4 and the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). GCAP, a new Japan-Italy-U.K. partnership for the development of a sixth-generation fighter jet, has been described as a "new alliance" since the multilayered cooperation between the three governments, militaries, and industries will inevitably strengthen security ties among the three nations. Japan's extensive and asymmetric dependence on U.S. defense collaboration and procurement has long been a source of frustration for Japanese officials and defense companies. According to a defense expert interviewed in July 2024, Tokyo maintains a "painful memory" of its co-development with the U.S. on the F-2 fighter program in the 1980s, which continues to shape Japanese perceptions. U.S. restrictions on the sharing of confidential technical information, coupled with the inability to freely modify procured systems without U.S. approval, have complicated both co-development programs like the F-2 and procurement of F-35s. An expert on Japan's defense industrial policy, also interviewed in July 2024, observed that the U.S. Foreign Military Sales system remains fundamentally "asymmetrical" since "the Japanese government cannot acquire necessary or valuable technological information." This lack of technological freedom creates persistent challenges for Japan's defense autonomy. In reaction to these concerns, Japan is diversifying defense industrial collaboration. Beyond GCAP, Japan is partnering with the U.K. on Joint New Air-to-Air Missiles (JNAAM) and a universal radio frequency sensor technology (JAGUAR), while collaborating with France on mine countermeasures, and trilaterally with France and Germany on railgun technologies. Reflecting this trend, the Financial Times reported on a notable increase in the presence of European defense companies at Japan's 2025 Defense and Security Equipment International (DSEI) expo. Moreover, in November 2024, Japan and the EU issued the "Japan-EU Security and Defence Partnership," their first-ever document outlining concrete cooperation initiatives in maritime security, space, cybersecurity, and hybrid threats. These efforts have gained urgency with Trump's return to the White House, as his administration's transactional approach to alliances raises new uncertainties for all allies. While these initiatives do not indicate a pivot away from the United States, they mark the growing significance of European partners for Japan. According to the Financial Times, Tokyo canceled the annual "two-plus-two" security dialogue scheduled in Washington after the U.S. suddenly asked its ally to boost defense spending to 3.5 percent -- higher than its previous request of 3 percent. Whether the cancellation was due to Washington's latest demand or a simple scheduling conflict, there is no denying that the two allies will need to face some difficult conversations in the coming months. Lack of technological freedom and overreliance on the U.S. for defense technology risk making Japan a captive of its own alliance, as the U.S. president has shown little hesitation in demanding higher purchases of American weapon systems, including offering the new F-47 to Japan as a bargaining chip in tariff negotiations. As Washington increasingly treats arms sales and security guarantees as transactional tools for managing trade imbalances, Japan, like Europe, faces the challenge of balancing U.S. demands while seeking diversification for its security partnerships. Ishiba's absence from this year's NATO summit, while shielding Japan from potentially difficult discussions with Washington in the short term, is therefore a missed opportunity for advancing ties with NATO partners at a critical moment. One of the objectives of the newly established Mission of Japan to NATO is to enhance European understanding of Japan and the Indo-Pacific. Ishiba's decision not to attend following the cancellations by other IP4 leaders may show a lack of leadership in the region, but it also risks sending the signal to Europeans that the Indo-Pacific is, after all, not as important as when former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida used to repeat "Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow." Ishiba, who replaced Kishida in October 2024, has yet to visit Europe, despite the fact that relations with European countries have taken on increasing importance in recent years. His personal engagement with European leaders would have signaled Japan's commitment to deepening these strategic partnerships -- a gesture increasingly valuable as both Japan and its European partners navigate the uncertainties of managing their respective alliances in the coming years. (Sayuri Romei is a Washington-based senior fellow in the German Marshall Fund's Indo-Pacific program. Her research focuses on U.S.-Japan relations and security issues in the Indo-Pacific region.) (Alice Dell'Era is an assistant professor at the Security Studies and International Affairs Department in the Florida-based Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University)
The Mainichi
16-07-2025
- Business
- The Mainichi
Opinion: Ishiba skipping NATO summit exposes gaps in Japan's Europe engagement
By Sayuri Romei and Alice Dell'Era WASHINGTON (Kyodo) -- Since a Japanese prime minister first attended a NATO summit in 2022, Japan has sent its highest-level representative to the event for three consecutive years. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a key catalyst for Tokyo's decision to attend that year, and the 2025 summit in The Hague would have marked the fourth consecutive appearance by a Japanese leader. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba was expected to meet with like-minded NATO partners to deepen cooperation amid the security challenges that link the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters. However, his participation was abruptly canceled, with Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya attending in his place. The decision not to attend personally represents a missed opportunity to strengthen ties with Europe at a time when Japan's strategic thinking is increasingly turning toward this region. Ishiba's glaring absence comes at a sensitive moment for Japan, as it confronts growing Chinese assertiveness while managing a more unpredictable United States. While previous U.S. administrations invested significant diplomatic and political capital in promoting cross-regional cooperation between NATO and its Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) partners, the current Trump administration has shown far less interest in advancing such efforts. In fact, President Donald Trump announced he would not attend a meeting between NATO and the IP4 partners during the summit in The Hague -- a move that likely prompted three of the four Indo-Pacific countries to cancel their leaders' attendance. Trump's emphasis on narrow, transactional negotiations over defense spending within allies' respective regions has broken the momentum for cross-regional cooperation built over the past three years. In this context, Ishiba's decision to skip the summit reflects Tokyo's desire to avoid confrontation with Trump over contentious issues such as defense expenditures and trade. These topics remain especially sensitive given the Japanese government's fragile approval ratings and the upcoming upper house elections in July. Ishiba's absence may have been an effort to preserve strategic flexibility in an increasingly unpredictable environment, but it risks halting the progress that Tokyo is making in advancing defense industrial ties with European NATO partners at a critical juncture. As geopolitical competition intensifies, defense technology innovation and a robust defense industrial base have emerged as indispensable strategic assets. Yet, this is an area where Japan has traditionally lagged, due to the longstanding constraints on its defense industry and heavy reliance on U.S. procurements. The tide, however, appears to be shifting. In its 2022 strategic documents, Tokyo identified reinforcing its defense production and technology base as a national priority. Since 2023, Japan has eased its export controls, allowing the licensed export of domestically produced defense equipment, including lethal systems, to boost competitiveness through economies of scale and access to overseas markets. At the same time, Tokyo seeks to diversify its defense procurement and development partnerships beyond the United States, increasingly turning towards European partners. As Japan carefully balances its security and economic relations with its ally, concerns over U.S. unpredictability have indeed elevated the importance of European partners for Tokyo's foreign and defense policy. Europe now features prominently in Japanese strategic thinking, with Tokyo expanding security cooperation with several European states at the bilateral and multilateral levels, through mechanisms like NATO IP4 and the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP). GCAP, a new Japan-Italy-U.K. partnership for the development of a sixth-generation fighter jet, has been described as a "new alliance" since the multilayered cooperation between the three governments, militaries, and industries will inevitably strengthen security ties among the three nations. Japan's extensive and asymmetric dependence on U.S. defense collaboration and procurement has long been a source of frustration for Japanese officials and defense companies. According to a defense expert interviewed in July 2024, Tokyo maintains a "painful memory" of its co-development with the U.S. on the F-2 fighter program in the 1980s, which continues to shape Japanese perceptions. U.S. restrictions on the sharing of confidential technical information, coupled with the inability to freely modify procured systems without U.S. approval, have complicated both co-development programs like the F-2 and procurement of F-35s. An expert on Japan's defense industrial policy, also interviewed in July 2024, observed that the U.S. Foreign Military Sales system remains fundamentally "asymmetrical" since "the Japanese government cannot acquire necessary or valuable technological information." This lack of technological freedom creates persistent challenges for Japan's defense autonomy. In reaction to these concerns, Japan is diversifying defense industrial collaboration. Beyond GCAP, Japan is partnering with the U.K. on Joint New Air-to-Air Missiles (JNAAM) and a universal radio frequency sensor technology (JAGUAR), while collaborating with France on mine countermeasures, and trilaterally with France and Germany on railgun technologies. Reflecting this trend, the Financial Times reported on a notable increase in the presence of European defense companies at Japan's 2025 Defense and Security Equipment International (DSEI) expo. Moreover, in November 2024, Japan and the EU issued the "Japan-EU Security and Defence Partnership," their first-ever document outlining concrete cooperation initiatives in maritime security, space, cybersecurity, and hybrid threats. These efforts have gained urgency with Trump's return to the White House, as his administration's transactional approach to alliances raises new uncertainties for all allies. While these initiatives do not indicate a pivot away from the United States, they mark the growing significance of European partners for Japan. According to the Financial Times, Tokyo canceled the annual "two-plus-two" security dialogue scheduled in Washington after the U.S. suddenly asked its ally to boost defense spending to 3.5 percent -- higher than its previous request of 3 percent. Whether the cancellation was due to Washington's latest demand or a simple scheduling conflict, there is no denying that the two allies will need to face some difficult conversations in the coming months. Lack of technological freedom and overreliance on the U.S. for defense technology risk making Japan a captive of its own alliance, as the U.S. president has shown little hesitation in demanding higher purchases of American weapon systems, including offering the new F-47 to Japan as a bargaining chip in tariff negotiations. As Washington increasingly treats arms sales and security guarantees as transactional tools for managing trade imbalances, Japan, like Europe, faces the challenge of balancing U.S. demands while seeking diversification for its security partnerships. Ishiba's absence from this year's NATO summit, while shielding Japan from potentially difficult discussions with Washington in the short term, is therefore a missed opportunity for advancing ties with NATO partners at a critical moment. One of the objectives of the newly established Mission of Japan to NATO is to enhance European understanding of Japan and the Indo-Pacific. Ishiba's decision not to attend following the cancellations by other IP4 leaders may show a lack of leadership in the region, but it also risks sending the signal to Europeans that the Indo-Pacific is, after all, not as important as when former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida used to repeat "Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow." Ishiba, who replaced Kishida in October 2024, has yet to visit Europe, despite the fact that relations with European countries have taken on increasing importance in recent years. His personal engagement with European leaders would have signaled Japan's commitment to deepening these strategic partnerships -- a gesture increasingly valuable as both Japan and its European partners navigate the uncertainties of managing their respective alliances in the coming years. (Sayuri Romei is a Washington-based senior fellow in the German Marshall Fund's Indo-Pacific program. Her research focuses on U.S.-Japan relations and security issues in the Indo-Pacific region.)
Japan Forward
10-07-2025
- Politics
- Japan Forward
Skipping NATO Summit, 3 Indo-Pacific Leaders Show Paltry Sense of Crisis
このページを 日本語 で読む Representatives of the four Indo-Pacific partners (IP4) ー namely Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand ー recently attended the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in the Netherlands. They huddled with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte on the sidelines. Then, on June 25, NATO and the IP4 issued their first joint statement outlining their commitment to strengthening defense industry cooperation. We welcome the deepening of cooperation between NATO and the Indo-Pacific region. Unfortunately, the only IP4 leader in attendance was New Zealand's prime minister, Christopher Luxon. The leaders of Japan, South Korea, and Australia were absent. Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya represented Japan. South Korea's National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lak sat in for his country's new president. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Richard Marles represented Australia. A meeting between US President Donald Trump and the IP4 leaders had been under consideration. However, since only one leader was in attendance, the meeting was postponed. As part of the 2025 NATO Summit Meeting, representatives of the IP4 gather in The Hague. June 25, 2025 (©NATO) Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. For four consecutive years since then, NATO has invited the four Pacific countries to attend its summit. As former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida repeatedly stated, "Today's Ukraine may be tomorrow's East Asia." The existence of collusion among China, North Korea, and Russia constitutes a common threat to Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. Security for Europe and the Indo-Pacific region is inseparable. It is important for NATO and the IP4 nations to demonstrate their collective commitment to tackling common threats together. IP4 leaders also need to continue attending NATO summits to demonstrate that they are essential partners for its member nations. In 2024, leaders of three of the four IP4 attended, namely New Zealand's Prime Minister Luxon, Japan's Prime Minister Kishida, and South Korea's then-President Yoon Suk-yeol. Deputy Prime Minister Marles represented Australia. Kishida made his mark at the summit. "We cannot tolerate the unilateral use of power or force to change the status quo anywhere in the world," he said. His statement alluded to a possible Taiwan emergency and other issues. US President Donald Trump at the 2025 NATO Summit Meeting in The Hague. June 25, 2025 (©NATO) This year, the South Korean government explained that President Lee Jae-myung chose not to attend because he was focusing on "comprehensive consideration of the uncertainty of the Middle East situation and other issues." However, South Korean media reported that the decision was actually made to please pro-China and pro-Russia factions in his administration. Australia is a key player in the southern Indo-Pacific region. Moreover, in the event of an emergency in Taiwan or the South China Sea, Canberra is expected to play a role in deterring China, in cooperation with Japan and the United States. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba also erred in not attending. His presence would have strengthened the Trump administration's engagement in Asia. Only Ishiba could speak about the threats posed to Japan and the region by China, North Korea, and Russia. By their absence, the leaders of Japan, South Korea, and Australia showed their shared paltry sense of crisis. Without a doubt, the three major autocracies in the region were delighted by the outcome. Author: Editorial Board, The Sankei Shimbun このページを 日本語 で読む
The Diplomat
27-06-2025
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Why Did Japan Skip the NATO Summit?
On June 23, Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru canceled his attendance at the NATO summit held in The Hague from June 24 to 25. Ishiba had originally planned to attend to 'reaffirm with NATO allies and others the recognition that the security of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific is inseparable,' according to an announcement from the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry cited 'various circumstances' for Ishiba's cancelation, which came a day after the U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. Japan – along with the other Indo-Pacific 4 (IP4) countries, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand – were invited to the annual NATO summit, as they have been every year since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This year was the first time since then-Prime Minister Kishida Fumio attended in 2022 that the Japanese prime minister skipped the NATO summit. Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi attended the summit instead. During his 30-minute meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, the two sides welcomed the progress in Japan-NATO relations since Rutte's visit to Tokyo in April, and 'concurred to work together to elevate the Japan-NATO cooperation to a new height in various fields, including the defense industry.' In a notable setback for this goal, however, a NATO official confirmed that NATO was not currently discussing opening a Tokyo liaison office. Japan had been pursuing such an office to strengthen ties with NATO at least since spring 2023, but France had opposed it due to concerns about China's backlash. Germany was also cautious. Also at the NATO summit, Iwaya had a 10-minute meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, where they both agreed to support the ministerial-level negotiations on tariffs between the two countries and confirmed that they would communicate closely to maintain the Israel-Iran ceasefire. The 'various circumstances' alluded to with regards to Ishiba's cancelation likely included the U.S. strike on Iran – which would make a Japan-U.S. bilateral summit meeting difficult to schedule – and the decisions of Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung to not attend – which made an IP4-U.S. summit meeting impossible. (New Zealand's prime minister was the only top leader from the IP4 countries present.) Another consideration is the upper house elections in Japan, now scheduled for July 20. Some in Japan have criticized Ishiba for not attending, arguing that the prime minister should have tried harder to get other regional countries to attend. Even with hindsight, it can be difficult to know what the right course of action was, but the limited amount of time between the U.S. strikes on Iran and the start of the summit would have severely constrained Ishiba's freedom of maneuver, even if Albanese and Lee would have been receptive to foreign interference. Such criticism also seems to miss how dramatically the world has changed since the NATO summit of 2022, when Japan was shoulder-to-shoulder with its sole ally rallying international opinion against Russia's war. The NATO summit of 2025 occurred in a context where the U.S. has backtracked on support for Ukraine, and Japan faced a dilemma over how to respond to its ally's actions in Iran. Another possible reason that Ishiba stayed home was continued disagreement between the United States and Japan over Tokyo's defense spending and ample signals that allies' defense spending would be a key theme at the NATO summit. Japan is on track to meet its stated goal of spending 2 percent of its GDP on national security-related spending by 2027. According to a June 20 Financial Times report, however, a sudden demand from Washington for Tokyo to increase defense spending still further led Japan to cancelled the annual '2+2' security dialogue between the Japanese and U.S. foreign affairs and defense chiefs scheduled for July 1 in Washington, DC. However, it is unclear whether the meeting was 'canceled' or 'postponed.' From Japan's perspective, part of the problem is the ever-shifting goalposts for defense spending. U.S. officials have at times urged different benchmarks for defense spending, from 3 percent to 3.5 percent or even 5 percent of GDP. Earlier, in his written response to questions from U.S. senators, then-nominee for under secretary of defense for policy Elbridge Colby (who has since been confirmed) had answered that Japan should spend 'at least 3 percent of GDP on defense as soon as possible.' Following the agreement at the NATO summit that members will increase their defense and related spending to 5 percent of GDP, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt answered a reporter's question about U.S. Asia-Pacific allies: 'If our allies in Europe and our NATO allies can do it, I think our allies and our friends in the Asia-Pacific region can do it as well.' Following the NATO summit, a senior Japanese government official acknowledged, 'There's no doubt that the United States will step up its demands.' An expert panel is currently reviewing the next Defense Buildup Program within the Ministry of Defense, and there is a widespread view within the ministry that increasing Japan's defense spending is inevitable given the severe security environment. However, it is still unclear where the additional funding would come from. The previous Kishida Cabinet had decided to raise income taxes to achieve the 2 percent target yet the timing for the tax hike has not been determined yet.
The Mainichi
27-06-2025
- Politics
- The Mainichi
Japan PM's last-minute no-show at NATO summit questioned at home
TOKYO (Kyodo) -- Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba is facing criticism from within his own party over his last-minute decision to skip a NATO summit in the Netherlands, at a time when fostering ties with the military alliance is seen as vital to counter China's rise in the Indo-Pacific. Ishiba's absence also gave rise to the view that he sought to avoid a situation in which Japan, a non-NATO member but close U.S. ally, would be pressed by U.S. President Donald Trump to spend more on its defense, as NATO leaders at the two-day meeting that ended Wednesday discussed substantially increasing defense spending. Ishiba had planned to make a three-day trip from Tuesday to attend the summit. But the Japanese government canceled the trip only a day before he was due to leave for The Hague, citing "various circumstances." It came after the United States notified other governments that Trump would not be attending a meeting between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners known as the IP4 -- Japan, along with Australia, South Korea and New Zealand. Ishiba's attendance would have made it the fourth straight year since 2022 that a sitting Japanese prime minister attended a NATO summit, underscoring the importance the country attaches to its deepening ties with the group, especially in the wake of Russia's war on Ukraine. "I don't understand why he had to cancel the trip despite all the preparations that went into it," said a lawmaker of the Liberal Democratic Party, which Ishiba heads. In his place, Japan sent Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya to the gathering, which South Korea's new President Lee Jae Myung and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese likewise opted to skip. Ishiba has repeatedly said the security of the Euro-Atlantic and that of the Indo-Pacific are inseparable as he stressed the need for more cooperation between Japan and NATO. The military alliance, which has traditionally sought to respond to threats from Russia, has been expanding its outreach, acknowledging the challenges posed by China's growing military power in the Indo-Pacific. In response to "profound" security challenges, NATO leaders agreed Wednesday to commit to investing 5 percent of gross domestic product annually for defense and security-related spending by 2035. The agreement came when Japan is wary of further pressure from the Trump administration to increase defense outlays, despite already on course to boost related spending to 2 percent of GDP by fiscal 2027 in the face of an assertive China and North Korea's nuclear and missile development. Japan's current military buildup plan marks a drastic change given its war-renouncing Constitution and its commitment to using force only for self-defense that has limited any substantial increases in spending for decades. A Japan-U.S. diplomatic source had said earlier that the Trump administration presented a plan to the Japanese government to raise its defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP. The request is believed to have prompted Tokyo to call off a planned high-level meeting of diplomats and defense officials in Washington, ahead of a national election.
