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Time of India
15-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Territorial ambitions of China in South China Sea & the future of rule-based Indo-Pacific
Dr. Prashant Prabhakar Deshpande has post-graduated in Economics with a Gold Medal in 1976 and was awarded a Ph.D in Social Sciences from Nagpur University in 2007. At the third India-France-Australia trilateral focal points meeting in Delhi on 19th June 2024, the three countries have vowed to work jointly towards a free, open, inclusive, and rules-based Indo-Pacific amid China's growing muscle-flexing in the region. The three sides reportedly reviewed progress made under the three pillars of trilateral cooperation, namely: Maritime safety and security; Marine and environmental cooperation, and; Multilateral engagement. The meeting identified new proposals for furthering the trilateral cooperation under the framework of the Indo Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) mechanisms. The Ministry of External Affairs had stated in a statement that, the 3 countries have reaffirmed their commitment to advancing their shared values working together towards a free, open, inclusive, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. The IPOI is an open, inclusive, non-treaty based, global initiative that was announced by PM Narendra Modi at the 14th East Asia Summit in November 2019 to promote collaborative efforts among like-minded nations to better manage, conserve and secure the Indo-Pacific maritime domain, while, the IORA is an inter-governmental organisation, aimed at strengthening regional cooperation. New China rules to detain foreigners in South China Sea China claims almost the entire South China Sea brushing aside the competing claims from several Southeast Asian nations including the Philippines, although The Hague Tribunal had concluded in 2016 that China's claims to historic rights within the 9-dash line were contrary to UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and have no lawful effect beyond the maritime entitlements granted under the convention. The panel had also held China's activities within the Philippines' 200 nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), such as illegal fishing and environmentally ruinous artificial island construction infringed on Philippines' sovereign rights. Disregarding the claims of Southeast Asian nations & the international ruling, China however continues to deploy coast guard and other boats to patrol the waters and has turned several reefs into militarised artificial islands. Chinese and Philippines vessels also had a series of confrontations in the disputed areas. Under the New Chinese coast guard rules that took effect from June 15, 2024, it can detain foreigners for trespassing in the disputed South China Sea. The Group of Seven bloc (G7) has also criticised the incursions by China in the waterway as being dangerous, opposing China's militarisation & intimidation activities in the South China Sea. The US Navy and others undertake voyages in the South China Sea to assert the freedom of navigation in international waters which Beijing considers as violations of its sovereignty. In the past, China had objected to the US and other Western warships sailing through the South China Sea & Chinese and US forces having had a series of close encounters in the South China Sea. Importance of South China Sea South China Sea is a vital waterway through which trillions of dollars of ship-borne trade annually passes. Huge unexploited oil and gas deposits are also believed to lie under its seabed & the sea is also important as a source of fish for the growing populations. Malaysia and Brunei also have overlapping claims in some parts. However, most recently confrontations between China and the Philippines have raised fears of a wider conflict over the sea that could involve the United States and other allies. The flashpoints An escalating diplomatic row and recent maritime run-ins between China and the Philippines are said to have made the highly strategic South China Sea a flashpoint. Central to the recent standoffs between the Philippines and China are two hotly contested features located inside Philippines's 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone, which China claims as its own. China uses the so-called 9-dash line that takes in about 90% of the South China Sea to assert its claim to sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal, a submerged reef coveted for its bountiful fish stocks, and the Second Thomas Shoal, home to a small contingent of Filipino sailors living aboard a rusty warship that Philippines intentionally grounded in 1999 to further its territorial claims. China has deployed hundreds of coastguard vessels to patrol these areas, alarming the Philippines, rival claimants and other states operating in the South China Sea. The United States is also said to be wary of China's growing military power and territorial ambition. Encounters between the Philippines and China in Asia's most contested waters have grown more tense and frequent over the past year as China has pressed its claims and Philippines has refused to cease its fishing and resupply activities to Filipinos at the two shoals which China considers to be illegal intrusions and has therefore tried to repel the vessels. China's coastguard has stepped up so-called grey-zone activities such as, use of water cannon, collision, and ramming tactics, and, according to Philippines, use of a military-grade laser to try to stop the Philippines resupply and patrol missions & has also deployed an armada of fishing boats which the Philippines and allies consider militia. China's actions have also drawn international condemnation and concern from major powers including the United States, Japan, Australia, France, and Britain. Epilogue Amid the rise in tensions with China, the Philippines has strengthened its partnerships with other Indo-Pacific neighbours & signed deals to increase base access, joint exercise training, and weapons transfers with the United States. Japan has also stepped up its presence in recent years by selling military equipment to the Philippines and Vietnam to improve maritime security capacity. However, to prevent China's prospective domination of a main artery of global trade, nothing less than a multilateral approach is considered necessary through an optimal combination of engagement and deterrence. Like-minded powers and China's besieged neighbours need to collectively deploy a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military countermeasures to uphold a free and open order in the world's most dynamic region. The India-France-Australia trilateral focal points meeting in Delhi therefore assumes importance in the emerging scenario. Facebook Twitter Linkedin Email Disclaimer Views expressed above are the author's own.
Asia Times
07-04-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
Modi's holistic plan for breaking China's Indo-Pacific hold
When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid his first state visit to Mauritius in March 2015, he launched India's Security and Growth for All in the Region, or SAGAR, doctrine. A decade later, in March 2025, during another visit to Mauritius, Modi announced the launch of the Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions, or MAHASAGAR, policy – an upgraded and more comprehensive version of SAGAR. MAHASAGAR signals a multilayered, comprehensive, long-term and more ambitious Indian vision to the Indo-Pacific, one that extends beyond security concerns to include development, technology sharing and economic cooperation. During Modi's visit to Mauritius, India upgraded its bilateral relationship with Mauritius to an Enhanced Strategic Partnership. Modi's new vision of MAHASAGAR – which means 'sea' in Hindi – seeks to integrate trade-driven development, capacity-building for sustainable growth and a mutual security framework to ensure a stable future. Concessional financing, technological cooperation and institutional support are expected to play key roles in this initiative. How the MAHASAGAR policy, as with SAGAR 2.0, will be implemented, however, remains to be seen. Over the past decade, SAGAR has served as India's strategic framework for maritime engagement in the evolving Indo-Pacific dynamics, emphasizing India's contribution to ensuring a safe, secure and stable regional order. Modi's keynote speech at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue further sharpened India's Indo-Pacific approach, situating it in a broader geopolitical context. At the 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue, Vikram Misri, then India's Deputy National Security Advisor (now Foreign Secretary), delineated five core pillars of SAGAR, namely: Security cooperation; Capacity-building; Collective action; Sustainable development; and, Maritime connectivity These principles have guided India's engagement with regional partners. India's Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) was introduced as a complementary mechanism to SAGAR, providing an open and non-treaty-based platform for collaboration. The IPOI promotes cooperation in maritime ecology, resource management, disaster response and security coordination. Key Indo-Pacific stakeholders, including the US, Japan, Australia, ASEAN, France and New Zealand, have aligned with India on IPOI, underscoring its inclusive and cooperative approach to Indo-Pacific governance. India has strategically embedded itself within regional security and economic frameworks to operationalize SAGAR. Initiatives such as the BIMSTEC, Colombo Security Conclave (established in 2020 with Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Maldives) and India's observer status in the Indian Ocean Commission (comprising Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar, Mayotte and Réunion) underscore its commitment to institutionalized maritime cooperation. Beyond multilateral engagements, India has undertaken significant capacity-building measures to reinforce maritime security and regional stability. These include sharing white shipping information, improving maritime domain awareness and strengthening humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) frameworks. Mauritius exemplifies India's proactive role in capacity-building, benefiting from extensive Indian assistance in its Coast Guard modernization, infrastructural development and economic partnerships. India has undertaken various developmental projects in Mauritius, such as the metro project, the new Supreme Court building, the 956 housing project, a new ENT hospital and others Despite India's efforts, China's growing influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) necessitates a recalibrated approach. The geopolitical rivalry between India and China, exacerbated by the Galwan border clash in 2020, has reinforced strategic competition, particularly in the IOR. China has systematically expanded its economic and military influence in the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, challenging India's traditional regional role. China's economic leverage is a major concern for India as Mauritius' bilateral trade with China (US$1.1 billion) is nearly double that with India ($554 million), reflecting Beijing's stronger financial influence. India's challenge lies in bridging this economic gap while maintaining its strategic partnerships. The shift from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR seemingly aims to counter this challenge by scaling up developmental and security cooperation with the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region. Against the backdrop of the return of a transactional US foreign policy under the Trump administration, fast-evolving US-China rivalry, the often predatory nature of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – and its growing footprints in the IOR and the Pacific Island Region – all necessitate the move from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR. The gaps between persistent non-traditional security threats and the preparedness of littoral states positions India as a credible and reliable net security provider to the IOR and wider Indo-Pacific region. However, India faces critical financial hurdles to scaling up its ambitions. A review of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) annual report reveals a decline in the budget allocated to the ministry, undermining India's ability to provide aid and sustain large-scale support for the Technical and Economic Cooperation (TEC) programs of the MEA. The Fourth Report of the Committee on External Affairs (2024-25) of the 18th Lok Sabha of highlights the shortfall and recommends 'a phased increase of at least 20% annually in the MEA budget over the next five years to address resource deficits and alignment with long-term goals.' Without adequate financial commitment, MAHASAGAR risks becoming an ambitious diplomatic acronym without the funds to back its transformational aims. The transition from SAGAR to MAHASAGAR reflects India's recognition of the need for a broader, more dynamic engagement strategy in the Indo-Pacific. For this vision to materialize into action, India must address several key challenges, including but not confined to scaling up financial commitments, strengthening partnerships with ASEAN, the Quad members (US, Japan, Australia) and key IOR nations. To establish the policy's credibility, it must shore up economic engagement by diversifying trade and investment partnerships to counterbalance China's economic dominance in the region. India's proactive role in regional groupings like the IPOI and the Colombo Security Conclave should be further institutionalized to ensure long-term stability. Ultimately, India's success in realizing the MAHASAGAR's goals will depend on its ability to match strategic ambition with financial and diplomatic execution. If effectively implemented, MAHASAGAR could reinforce India's position as a preeminent power and net security provider in the Indo-Pacific, balancing regional security, economic growth and strategic influence in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape. Rahul Mishra is associate professor at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, and a senior research fellow at the German-Southeast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance, Thammasat University, Thailand. He can be reached at and followed on X at @rahulmishr_ Harshit Prajapati is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for Indo-Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. He can be reached at harshi55_isn@ and followed on X at @harshitp_47
