Latest news with #IR-9
News18
21-07-2025
- Politics
- News18
Iran Out Of IAEA: How Does The Global Watchdog Monitor Nuclear Activities? Explained
Last Updated: Iran Out Of IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguard toolkit includes physical surveillance, material tracking, data analytics and scientific sampling In a world with multiple ongoing wars, the role of a nuclear watchdog like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains crucial. Iran announced on June 28 that it has ended its cooperation with the IAEA. It removed the monitoring devices, including surveillance cameras, from centrifuge halls. This move followed the news by the IAEA that Iran's enrichment activities are well outside of allowed levels. Iran now operates sophisticated uranium centrifuges, like models IR-6 and IR-9. What exactly is the role of IAEA? Can countries opt out of it? What happens then? What does IAEA do? When a country seeks to develop a peaceful nuclear energy program, with a promise not to build a nuclear weapon, the global community verifies that stated intent via the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Once a country signs the treaty, IAEA provides continuous and technical proof that the country's nuclear program is peaceful. The Associated Press reported that the IAEA ensures that countries operate their programs within the limits of non-proliferation agreements: low enrichment and no reactor misuse. Part of the agreement allows the IAEA to inspect nuclear-related sites, including unannounced surprise visits. These are not just log reviews. Inspectors know what should and should not be there. When the IAEA is not on site, cameras, tamper-revealing seals on equipment, and real-time radiation monitors are working full-time to gather or verify inside information about the program's activities. — IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency ⚛️ (@iaeaorg) July 19, 2025 What is the IAEA safeguards toolkit? The IAEA safeguards toolkit is designed to detect proliferation activities early. Much of the work is fairly technical. The safeguards toolkit combines physical surveillance, material tracking, data analytics, and scientific sampling. Inspectors are chemists, physicists, and nuclear engineers. They count spent fuel rods in a cooling pond. They check tamper seals on centrifuges. Often, the inspectors walk miles through hallways and corridors carrying heavy equipment. How does IAEA keep track of a nuclear program? According to the AP report, around the facilities, whether for uranium enrichment or plutonium processing, closed-circuit surveillance cameras monitor for undeclared materials or post-work activities. Seals around the facilities provide evidence that uranium gas cylinders have not been tampered with or that centrifuges operate at the declared levels. Beyond seals, online enrichment monitors allow inspectors to look inside centrifuges for any changes in the declared enrichment process. When the inspectors are on-site, they collect environmental swipes: samples of nuclear materials on surfaces, in dust, or in the air. These can reveal if uranium has been enriched to levels beyond those allowed by the agreement. Or if plutonium, which is not used in nuclear power plants, is being produced in a reactor. Swipes are precise. They can identify enrichment levels from a particle smaller than a speck of dust. But they take time, days, or weeks. Inspectors analyze the samples at the IAEA's laboratories using sophisticated equipment called mass spectrometers. In addition to physical samples, IAEA inspectors look at the logs of material inventories. They look for diversion of uranium or plutonium from normal process lines, just like accountants trace the flow of finances, except that their verification is supported by the ever-watching online monitors and radiation sensors. They also count items of interest and weigh them for additional verification of the logs. Beyond accounting for materials, IAEA inspectors verify that the facility matches the declared design. For example, if a country is expanding centrifuge halls to increase its enrichment capabilities, that's a red flag. Changes to the layout of material processing laboratories near nuclear reactors could be a sign that the program is preparing to produce unauthorized plutonium. In its 20th year, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material has expanded the treaty to include nuclear smuggling and sabotage of nuclear facilities as on: — IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency ⚛️ (@iaeaorg) July 14, 2025 Has IAEA ever spotted a violation? Thanks to the IAEA, the world learned in April 2021 about Iran pushing uranium enrichment from reactor-fuel-grade to near-weapons-grade levels. IAEA inspectors were able to verify that Iran was feeding uranium into a series of centrifuges designed to enrich the uranium from 5%, used for energy programs, to 60%, which is a step toward the 90% level used in nuclear weapons. What does removing IAEA access mean? Removing IAEA access means that the international community loses insight into how quickly Iran's program can accumulate weapon-grade uranium, or how much it has produced. Also lost is information about whether the facility is undergoing changes for proliferation purposes. These processes are difficult to detect with external surveillance, like satellites, alone. An alternative to the uranium enrichment path for producing nuclear weapons material is plutonium. Plutonium can't be mined, it has to be produced in a nuclear reactor. Iran built a reactor capable of producing plutonium, the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor at the Arak Nuclear Complex. Iran modified the Arak reactor under the now-defunct Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to make plutonium production less likely. During the June 2025 missile attacks, Israel targeted Arak's facilities with the aim of eliminating the possibility of plutonium production. With IAEA access suspended, it won't be possible to see what happens inside the facility. Can the reactor be used for plutonium production? Although a lengthier process than the uranium enrichment path, plutonium provides a parallel path to uranium enrichment for developing nuclear weapons. The IAEA's Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre offers state-of-the-art nuclear security courses to help countries maintain the highest level of nuclear security. Watch this ⤵️ — IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency ⚛️ (@iaeaorg) July 19, 2025 Has it ever been done in the past? top videos View all North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors in 2009. Within a few years, they restarted activities related to uranium enrichment and plutonium production in the Yongbyon reactor. The international community's information about North Korea's weapons program now relies solely on external methods: satellite images, radioactive particles like xenon – airborne fingerprints of nuclear activities – and seismic data. With AP Inputs About the Author News Desk The News Desk is a team of passionate editors and writers who break and analyse the most important events unfolding in India and abroad. From live updates to exclusive reports to in-depth explainers, the Desk More Get Latest Updates on Movies, Breaking News On India, World, Live Cricket Scores, And Stock Market Updates. Also Download the News18 App to stay updated! tags : iaea iran nuclear view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: July 21, 2025, 15:36 IST News explainers Iran Out Of IAEA: How Does The Global Watchdog Monitor Nuclear Activities? Explained Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
Memri
09-06-2025
- Politics
- Memri
Former Iranian Nuclear Chief Ali-Akbar Salehi on Iran's Growing Domestic Nuclear Capabilities: Iran Now Produces IR-9 Centrifuges, Expanding Nuclear Facilities Nationwide; Needs 100 Tons of Uranium fo
In a June 4, 2025 interview on IRINN TV (Iran), former Iranian nuclear chief Ali-Akbar Salehi discussed the progress of Iran's nuclear program amid ongoing challenges with international cooperation. He said that while China initially helped Iran begin uranium mining, around 30 years ago Iran also launched a project with China at the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF), but the Chinese abandoned it halfway through. According to Salehi, the chairman of the China Atomic Energy Authority claimed that the United States pressured China to exit Iran's nuclear program after the JCPOA was signed, but Iran ultimately completed the project on its own. Salehi went on to describe Iran's turbulent nuclear cooperation with Russia, noting that Russia is currently building two new power plants in Bushehr. He explained that while Iran uses imported fuel for foreign-made reactors, it still requires domestically manufactured fuel - which in turn requires 100 tons of natural uranium - for its domestically built reactors. Emphasizing Iran's growing domestic capabilities, Salehi stated that the country is now producing its own centrifuges and has reached the IR-9 model, which is 50 times more powerful than the IR-1. He also discussed ongoing plans to expand nuclear facilities across the country.
