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The New Pragmatism Reshaping Syria, and the Risks Ahead
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Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa didn't take office through an election. He took it after a dominant military victory. His forces swept into Damascus last winter, ending Bashar al-Assad's decades-long rule and installing a transitional government with himself at the top. But for all the baggage he brings with him, as a former rebel commander, a onetime affiliate of jihadist networks, and a man who once ruled Idlib with an iron grip, there's a strange twist to the story: He wants in.
Not only into Damascus, but into the world.
From every credible indication, al-Sharaa is trying to internationalize Syria, economically, politically, and diplomatically. He's lobbying for trade, courting Western governments, and talking openly about modernization, transparency, and inclusion. This isn't window dressing for foreign cameras. It's a strategic reorientation, and by all appearances, he means it.
But meaning it and achieving it are different things. And on that front, Syria's new president has a challenge.
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa after a meeting at the Elysee Palace in Paris, on May 7, 2025.
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa after a meeting at the Elysee Palace in Paris, on May 7, 2025.
STEPHANIE LECOCQ/POOL/AFP via Getty Images
The institutions that surround him weren't built for reform. They were built to survive. And survival has meant control—tight, centralized, often opaque. Even now, in what is nominally a transitional government, those old instincts remain.
Al-Sharaa leads the cabinet himself. There is no prime minister. Of the 23 ministries, the most powerful, interior, defense, justice, are run by longtime loyalists from his Idlib-era base, and notably, just one is occupied by a woman. A third of the planned legislature will be selected by him directly. These are not the building blocks of pluralism. They're hedges against instability. And while politically understandable, they're also structurally limiting.
The issue isn't that al-Sharaa is pretending to be a reformer. The issue is that his government still functions like a movement, loyal, insular, and wary of disruption. That presents a dilemma not only for Syrians, but for the foreign governments now racing to re-engage.
Look no further than the Captagon crisis. Syria under Assad became the epicenter of the global amphetamine trade. When al-Sharaa's forces seized power, they made it clear the trade would end. Trafficking rings were exposed. Public burnings of seized pills were publicized.
And yet the drug keeps moving.
Captagon production hasn't disappeared, it's adapted. Supply chains have shifted, not vanished. Massive amounts are still flowing through Syria, with countries like Sudan now growing as a new transit point. Al-Sharaa promised a crackdown. What he delivered, so far, is merely a start.
The same pattern is unfolding across the economy. Earlier this year, a Reuters investigation uncovered a quiet seizure campaign: more than a billion dollars in Assad-era assets transferred to the state, many via back-channel deals brokered by al-Sharaa's brother. In theory, this was a way to purge corruption and jumpstart recovery. In practice, it replaced one circle of insiders with another. It's not theft. But it's not reform either.
This is where the friction lies. Al-Sharaa knows what's needed to bring Syria out of isolation. Western investment, diplomatic recognition, and the lifting of sanctions don't come without institutional change. He understands that. He says the right things, meets with the right people, and has made visible overtures to minority communities, international donors, and even U.S. allies.
But the people he needs to hold the country together, the war-era operators, the militia commanders, the political loyalists, are not necessarily aligned with that vision. He is trying to drag a hardened system into a world it was never designed to join. That's not dishonesty. It's friction.
And that's where the West needs to be careful.
It's easy to assume Syria has turned a corner simply because its leader now wears a suit and talks about economic growth. But transitions aren't defined by optics. They're defined by what happens when the cameras leave.
Al-Sharaa may be serious about rebuilding Syria. He may want to leave the insurgent years behind. But the road ahead will test his willingness to let go of the tools that brought him here: control, consolidation, and a closed circle of power.
The international community should support his goals. But that support must be conditional. Recognition should be earned, not granted wholesale. Sanctions relief should be calibrated, not swept aside. Reform can't be assumed just because the rhetoric has improved.
What al-Sharaa wants and what he can deliver aren't yet the same. The intent is real. But the structure may not be ready.
And if we confuse one for the other, we won't be helping Syria emerge from its past. We'll be paving the way for it to repeat it, just under a different name.
Brett Erickson is the managing principal of Obsidian Risk Advisors. He serves on the advisory boards of Loyola University Chicago School of Law's Center for Compliance Studies and DePaul University Driehaus College of Business.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
