Latest news with #India-MiddleEast-EuropeEconomicCorridor
The Hindu
3 days ago
- Business
- The Hindu
India says issuing visas is U.S. prerogative, hopes Indian students will be considered on merit
Issuing visas is a sovereign issue for the U.S. government, the Ministry of External Affairs said on Thursday (May 29, 2025), but added that the government hopes that the process will be completed in time for Indian students to join the U.S. universities they have gained admission to this year. This comes amidst reports that the U.S. missions in India and around the world have temporarily paused scheduling new visa appointments as they await instructions from the U.S. State department on how to enhance their screening of applicants' social media profiles. 'Sovereign function' MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said that the welfare of students was of 'utmost priority'. 'We have seen reports suggesting the U.S. government updated guidance regarding Student and Exchange Visitor visa applicants,' Mr. Jaiswal said at a weekly media briefing. 'While we note that issuance of visa is a sovereign function, we hope that the application of Indian students will be considered on merit and they will be able to join their academic programmes on time,' he added. Mr. Jaiswal also pointed out that more than 3,30,000 Indian students were studying in the U.S., as of 2023-24. Indians made up nearly 30% of the roughly 1.1 million international students in the U.S. that year, the biggest bloc from any country. Foreign Secretary meetings The controversy over the student visas, the latest hiccup to hit India-U.S. relations, came even as Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri ended his three-day visit to Washington. The MEA spokesperson did not confirm whether the pause in visas, or the Trump administration's latest repetition of claims that the U.S. mediated the India-Pakistan ceasefire using trade as leverage, were issues raised during Mr. Misri's meetings, particularly his talks with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau. '[Mr. Landau and Mr. Misri] agreed that technology, trade, and talent will shape the India-U.S. partnership in the 21st century,' Mr. Jaiswal said, adding that they committed to strengthening the comprehensive global strategic partnership between the two countries. 'So whether this particular issue was raised [or not], I would say that all issues of mutual interest was discussed between India and the United States. Mr. Jaiswal said that Mr. Misri had also discussed defence and energy cooperation, as well as efforts to strengthen the Quad, IMEEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), and I2U2 (Israel-India-UAE-U.S.) initiatives. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar is due to travel to Washington at the end of June for a meeting of Quad Foreign Ministers, and India is expected to host the Quad summit in November.
India Today
3 days ago
- Business
- India Today
The great growth sprint: How India must reinvent to become world's second-largest economy
At the turn of the 20th century, the United States sprinted ahead of the United Kingdom to become the world's largest economy—a position it still holds. A hundred years later, China stunned the world by pulling hundreds of millions out of poverty and displacing Japan to claim the No. 2 India stands at a similar inflection point. The country has already surged past Japan to become the world's third-largest economy (behind China and US) in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) data shows that in all probability, India will cross $4.19 trillion in nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the later half of the current fiscal, overtaking Japan in absolute dollar terms. If these trends continue, it will likely surpass Germany in another 18 months. But that's where the easy gains end—and the real race close the yawning gap with China, whose nominal GDP exceeds $17 trillion, and eventually catch up with the US, now at over $27 trillion, India will have to do what no democracy has ever done: grow at a nominal rate of 8-9 per cent every year for the next 25 years, while remaining socially cohesive, environmentally sustainable and politically stable. That will require more than reforms. It demands reinvention—of India's economic model, its state capacity, global ambition and social now, India is warming up well. It remains the world's fastest-growing large economy, averaging over 7 per cent real GDP growth in recent years, with a stable macroeconomic framework. Its expanding middle class is powering consumption, its start-ups are reshaping services, and digital governance is being hailed globally. But the leap from $4 trillion to $10 trillion and beyond will not be a linear stretch of what India is already doing. It will need bold shifts in structure, strategy and The rise of China created space for a global factory. India must now write a different story—not a replica but a reinvention. And the first pillar of that reinvention lies in India's ability to tap into a moment of global flux. Rising wages in China, intensifying geopolitical tensions and the West's 'China + 1' strategy have created a unique but limited opening. Multinational corporations are looking to diversify their supply chains, and India is clearly in the mix. But being in the mix is not enough. India cannot settle for being the back-up option; it must lead with a new narrative—'India Plus Many'.This strategy calls for India to not just be a cost-effective manufacturing base but to become the anchor of a broader economic ecosystem—one that connects value chains through Africa, Southeast Asia, West Asia and Eastern Europe. With strategic initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and the India-UAE trade pact, India is beginning to lay the infrastructure for this vision. But execution will be key. Logistics, customs, compliance norms, power reliability and judicial speed must match the home, the reinvention must begin with a sector that remains the biggest paradox in India's economy—agriculture. Employing over 43 per cent of the population but contributing just 16 per cent to the GDP, Indian agriculture has been growing at a modest 3-4 per cent annually. If India is to unlock rural purchasing power, reduce disguised unemployment and rebalance its lopsided development, agriculture must transform—from subsistence to surplus, from grain-centricity to high-value crops, and from fragmented holdings to digital means investing heavily in irrigation, soil health, market linkages, food processing, agri-logistics and climate-resilient practices. India must build farmer-producer organisations at scale, digitise land records, and integrate smallholders into the formal economy. Schemes like eNAM and PM-Kisan are a start, but much more is needed to drive a rural FY25, India's real GDP was around at Rs 185 lakh crore, while nominal GDP stands at Rs 324 lakh crore. The difference reflects inflation's impact—nominal GDP accounts for current prices, whereas real GDP adjusts for inflation to reflect actual economic growth. With real GDP projected to grow at 6.4 per cent and nominal GDP at 9.7 per cent, the gap underscores the role of price level changes in economic measurement, offering a clearer distinction between value-driven growth and price-driven also indicates that a significant portion of this increase is due to rising prices rather than increased productivity or output. If inflation remains unchecked, it can erode purchasing power, raise interest rates and complicate fiscal planning. This inflation-growth gap also poses a dilemma for sustain long-term economic momentum and achieve India's aspiration of becoming the world's second-largest economy, the focus must shift to productivity-enhancing reforms, efficient public spending, and improving supply-side bottlenecks. Otherwise, high nominal growth without real depth could mask structural weaknesses and lead to overheating or urgency is underlined by a stark statistic: the differential between urban and rural GDP per capita is now 1:12.5. This growing gap, despite unprecedented rural spending by the present government, reflects the limits of redistribution without transformation. Direct transfers help cushion poverty, but only structural productivity gains can ensure enduring prosperity. Rural India must become a production powerhouse—not just a consumption this context, the rise of a new tier of digital-native, regional entrepreneurs from non-metro India is promising. If supported by infrastructure, credit and skilling, they can be catalysts for inclusive growth. The JAM trinity (Jan Dhan-Aadhaar-Mobile), ONDC (Open Network for Digital Commerce), and Account Aggregator frameworks offer the scaffolding. What's needed now is acceleration and integration—turning scattered pilots into a national while agriculture and rural transformation are foundational, India's economic leap will ultimately be powered by urban manufacturing, services exports, infrastructure, energy security, and innovation. The target must be to double manufacturing's share of GDP from the current ~14 per cent to at least 25 per cent. This requires sustained policy consistency, capital inflows, and deep skilling—especially in clean tech, semiconductors, defence manufacturing and Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes are a step in the right direction, but India must move beyond assembly to high-value innovation. Export competitiveness cannot rely solely on subsidies; it needs a full-stack approach: easier land access, judicial clarity, world-class logistics, and sectoral R&D. By 2035, India must aspire to be a $2 trillion export economy—not just in goods, but in services, education, health tech and is another hinge point. No large economy can grow without energy security. India's green transition—solar, wind, green hydrogen, EVs—must be matched by robust grid infrastructure and domestic critical mineral value chains. If the country succeeds, it could turn its climate challenge into a competitive of this will require a dramatically stronger human capital base. India must increase education spending to at least 6 per cent of GDP and shift focus from input metrics to outcomes—especially in government schools. Vocational training needs to become aspirational, digitally enabled, and demand-aligned. Tier 2 and 3 cities must become new hubs of bilingual, digital-savvy, skilled deepening is equally vital. With private credit penetration still under 60 per cent of GDP and corporate bond markets underdeveloped, India must turbocharge its financial system—by empowering NBFCs (non-banking financial companies), expanding retail participation and enabling large-scale pension and insurance penetration. Mumbai must aim to become a true global financial the apex of this entire architecture must be a competent, reform-oriented state. India will need to build institutional capacity at scale: faster courts, smarter regulators, empowered municipal governments, and data-driven public service delivery. Reforms must move beyond laws to implementation. The Centre and states must align on investment priorities, tax rationalisation and job creation. Cooperative federalism cannot just be a slogan; it has to be the engine of parallel, India must wield its geopolitical heft to build economic muscle. It must secure fair trade deals with the EU, US, Australia and East Asian blocs. It must expand its presence in Africa, West Asia, and ASEAN. Institutions like IPEF, BIMSTEC, BRICS, the Quad, and the SCO must become levers of geoeconomic influence, not mere talk shops. India's scale—1.4 billion people, rising incomes, digital governance—gives it leverage, but only if used the road ahead is strewn with pitfalls. The risks are real and complex. Geopolitical flashpoints with China or Pakistan could disrupt capital flows. New Delhi's acceptance of Islambad's request for ceasefire after Operation Sindoor was also deep from this philosophy that India wants to focus on building the economic might along with keeping a notorious Pakistan in shocks could derail consumption. The middle-income trap looms large; India must find a pathway to productivity-led, inclusive growth at around $10,000 per capita. Western protectionism in digital services or data localisation could limit India's export potential. And fragmented federal politics could slow down reform the biggest risk is complacency—the illusion that demographic advantage and incremental growth will somehow carry India forward. The truth is, India's demographic dividend is time-bound. By 2040, the country will begin to age. The next 15 years are not just an opportunity; they are a rise will not look like America's consumer capitalism. It won't mirror China's state-led authoritarianism. It must chart its own path—grounded in self-reliance, competitive markets, empowered citizens, and an inclusive Swadeshi globalism. This means investing in resilience, not just growth; in equity, not just efficiency; and in innovation, not May 27, on his visit to Gujarat, Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a compelling call for 'Swadeshi'—urging citizens to boycott foreign goods and embrace locally made products. He emphasised that building a developed India by 2047 requires collective effort, stating, 'If we have to make this resolve... we will not use any foreign goods.'This appeal aligns with his government's 'Atmanirbhar Bharat' initiative, aiming to reduce dependency on imports and bolster domestic industries. The prime minister's message resonated with attendees, many of whom pledged to promote 'Made in India' products within their is pointing towards same trajectory. This is not a sprint. It is an epic marathon, made harder by global volatility and domestic complexity. But if India gets it right, it could become the world's second-largest economy by mid-century—and, more importantly, a model for democratic development in the 21st century. The baton is now with the policymakers, entrepreneurs, farmers, teachers, engineers and workers. The next chapter of the world economy may well be written in to India Today MagazineMust Watch
India Gazette
4 days ago
- Politics
- India Gazette
"India an important country, its views count," Greece Ex-Envoy to India says
Athens [Greece], May 28 (ANI): Yannis Alexis Zepos, Former Ambassador of Greece to India, has said that Greece has for a long time condemned terrorism in all its forms. Zepos, while talking to ANI, said that as India is an important country in the world, its views are important, and Greece is happy to hear its views. 'We are very happy to receive the delegation. They have several contacts in Athens, and it is important to hear the Indian views on things. India is an important country in the world, and their views count, and we are happy to have them here. These issues [of cooperation between India and Greece on combating terrorism] have already been taken up and have been discussed, and they will be discussed further as our bilateral relation improves and goes ahead,' he told ANI. Zepos said that Greece has always condemned terrorism in all its forms wherever it has happened. 'We have consistently and for a long time condemned terrorism wherever that happens, and this is a basic Greek position that is not to change so basically what is important is we condemn terrorism wherever it happens in the world,' he said. He added that both the countries are already cooperating in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, and can go further if required. 'We are cooperating already on maritime security, and we can go further, and as you know, the IMEC project is something that is very interesting to both sides and we're working with the Indian side also on the IMEC prospect, which also includes, of course, maritime security,' he said. His comments come as the group to visit Spain, Greece, Slovenia, Latvia, and Russia, led by DMK MP Kanimozhi Karunanidhi, is currently in Athens. The delegation includes Rajeev Rai (Samajwadi Party), Mian Altaf Ahmad (Jammu and Kashmir National Conference), Brijesh Chowta (BJP), Prem Chand Gupta (Rashtriya Janata Dal), Ashok Kumar Mittal (Aam Aadmi Party), and Former envoys Manjeev S Puri and Jawed Ashraf. (ANI)
Scroll.in
23-05-2025
- Business
- Scroll.in
Shifting sands of power: The message from Trump's big Gulf trip – and what that means for India
In February 2024, US President Donald Trump called it 'one of the greatest trade routes in all of history'. In April, a US-Italy joint statement referred to it as 'one of the greatest economic integration and connectivity projects of this century '. All of which made it even more striking that, over the course of a four-day visit to West Asia – with stops in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE – Trump appeared to make little mention of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. The IMEC was announced in September 2023 with much fanfare by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and former US President Joe Biden on the sidelines of the G20 summit, with the aim of building a trade corridor that would rival China's Belt and Road Initiative. When conflict broke out in Gaza the following month, its implementation – heavily dependent on Saudi normalisation with Israel – appeared to be consigned to the backburner, although India, the UAE and several European nations continued to drum up support for the initiative, as we discussed here: Moreover, IMEC appeared to be one of the rare multi-lateral initiatives that Trump – never a fan of group assignments, especially ones that include the European Union or those championed by his predecessor – was willing to embrace. Not only did he assert in February that the US was 'going to be spending a lot more ' to make it happen, Trump also said that he along with Modi would convene IMEC partners for a summit midway through the year in order to ' announce new initiatives.' (Perhaps most surprisingly, he hasn't yet sought to rebrand this Biden-era project, even though – given Trump's preferred aesthetic – the (new) 'Golden Road ' is right there for the taking. Maybe that was intended for the summit?) Against this background, it was rather interesting that IMEC didn't find mention in Trump's grand Riyadh speech outlining his vision for the region, which has made news in part for his critique of 'so-called nation-builders, neocons or liberal nonprofits ' and for his assertion that he doesn't believe in ' permanent enemies '. He even seemed to cue himself up for a mention of IMEC towards the end of the speech: 'We're still just at the dawn of the bright new day that awaits for the people of the Middle East, the great, great people of the Middle East. If the responsible nations of this region seize this moment, put aside your differences and focus on the interests that unite you, then all of humanity, will soon be amazed at what they will see right here in this geographic centre of the world.… For the first time in a thousand years, the world will look at this region not as a place of turmoil and strife and war and death, but as a land of opportunity and hope, just like you've done right here – a cultural and commercial crossroads of the planet… In the United States, we've launched the Golden Age of America. It's the Golden Age. We see it. We see it with all that money, trillions and trillions of dollars pouring in, hundreds of thousands of jobs coming in with it. And with the help of the people of the Middle East and the people in this room, partners throughout the region, the golden age of the Middle East can proceed right alongside of us.' But ultimately there was no mention, and IMEC didn't seem to make its way into any headlines or into the White House handouts following Trump's visits to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. (Abu Dhabi, in its press release, did make a passing mention of both the proposed corridor and ' I2U2 ', the India-Israel-US-UAE minilateral that began meeting following the Abraham Accords.). Why the omission from Trump? The most straightforward answer is that, despite all the talk of it being the 'greatest project of the century', there were more immediate deals to be made: economically (with claims of $2 trillion in agreements with Gulf nations, even if those numbers may not stand up to scrutiny), diplomatically (including the remarkable decision to lift sanctions on Syria, and continue negotiations with Iran) and personally (with the Trump family involved in everything from towers and golf courses to crypto ventures in the region). The bigger picture answer may have to do with Trump's evolving approach to Israel. For long, Israel has been the linchpin of US policy in the region it calls the Middle East (West Asia in Indian parlance), with this principle even enshrined in American law at the military level. This has meant an unprecedented level of bipartisan support for Israel regardless of its actions – to a fault – while also making friendship with Tel Aviv a condition for other countries in the region to build ties with the US. This was even the case for India, as Nicolas Blarel recounted in his 2015 book about India-Israel relations, which we discussed here. Over the course of Trump's current Gulf tour, however, it has seemed as if Netanyahu's stubborn unwillingness to end the war in Gaza, among other things, has finally led to a turning point. The US is beginning to see Israel, rather than the Arab states, as an obstacle to achieving its own ends in the region. Jonathan Freedland writes: 'Until this week, a cornerstone of the US-Israel relationship was a US guarantee that Israel would always enjoy military superiority over its neighbours. That looks much less certain now. Indeed, Trump declared that the US has 'no stronger partner' than Saudi Arabia, a status that used to belong to Israel alone. What's more, Trump showed Riyadh all this love with none of the previous strings attached. None of it was conditional on Saudi 'normalisation' of relations with Israel. Trump said Prince Mohammed could do that when he was good and ready, free of US pressure. Trump is now in the business of cutting the deals he wants, regardless of the needs of the US's one-time key ally… As loudly and clearly as he can, Trump is telling Netanyahu that he is no longer No 1 and that he will not get in the way of whatever Trump decides best serves US, and his own, interests. Part of this is born of frustration with Netanyahu for failing to play his part in getting the Middle East to the stability, and therefore prosperity, that Trump thinks is possible and potentially profitable for the US.' What attracted the US to IMEC in the first place? After all it is a corridor connecting India to Europe – not the US – via the Middle East. So what explains Washington's interest? For one, it was seen as a response to China's Belt and Road Initiative. Given fears of weaponised supply chains, IMEC seemed of a piece with a Biden-era policy toolkit including friend-shoring, de-risking and China+1 efforts, coupled with a desire to extend American influence even if its benefits would accrue to allies rather than the US directly. How much does Trump subscribe to this? It's hard to say, given his administration's wildly contradictory policy moves, especially on trade. On the one hand, Trump described IMEC as the project of the century. On the other, he told Apple CEO Tim Cook this week company should not be moving manufacturing to India from China, since he wants those factories back in the US. What use is a global logistics project if all the supply chains are (theoretically) in the US? Or, more realistically, will Trump really want to invest in a project to de-risk far from home, when he's willing to work on trade deals directly with China? The other element of IMEC had to do with the US's Israel policy. The corridor has been described as the ' child of the Abraham Accords ', in which Trump brokered the normalisation of relations between several Arab nations and Israel. IMEC was seen as a way to force the Gulf and Israel (with Jordan presumed to be on board) into an ever-closer economic relationship that would act as a countervailing force to the hostilities that have historically characterised the region ever since the nakba. Gulf countries still have an obvious interest in building IMEC: It would make them players in trade routes that currently bypass the region altogether (either sending goods through the Suez Canal or overland via the Iran-Türkiye 'Southern Corridor ') in part because consistent conflict and land borders have come in the way of trade integration. But if Israeli normalisation is no longer a vital element of US policy in the region, why would Washington expend energy on attempting to solve one of the fundamental conflicts in the region? The Atlantic Council's William F Weschler described US interest in IMEC in this way: 'A completed overland route would reduce the number of ships traveling through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and thus the requirements for the US Navy to defend against Houthi attacks on shipping, something presumably appealing to the Trump team. It would help counter China's Belt and Road Initiative, diminish Tehran's regional influence, reinforce the Abraham Accords – perhaps the most important foreign policy achievement of Trump's first term – and help set the conditions for eventual Saudi-Israel normalisation.' If, given a trade deal with China, there is no need to counter the Belt and Road initiative; if diminishing Tehran were less of an issue following a US-Iran deal; if countering the Houthis required simply concluding a ceasefire with them; if reinforcing the Abraham Accords and setting conditions for Saudi-Israel normalisation were less important, given that Trump is willing to deal directly with the Gulf rather than by way of Tel Aviv, then what interest remains in putting political (if not also financial) capital into a project that rests on the unlikely scenario of goods being able to make their way smoothly between Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel? Weschler suggests what that interest may be: 'Perhaps most appealing to Trump, US taxpayers would not be on the hook to finance this project, and US infrastructure companies could be major beneficiaries of the money that others spend.' But even that may not be appealing enough, given the business success of Trump's Gulf tour, and the president's desire to see ground broken on projects in the US, rather than elsewhere. Moreover, Trump's other moves in the region – lifting sanctions on Syria, coordinating Syria policy with Türkiye, and working on a deal with Iran – all create the space for alternate trade routes that don't require solving the knotty problem of Israel-Saudi normalisation, even if they each come with their own complciations. Of course, this doesn't meant that Trump will suddenly pull out of IMEC. First, none of Trump's moves in the Gulf rest on any principles, other than perhaps, profit. As Marc Lynch noted, were he to completely undo all of his major current efforts – Syria normalisation, the Iran negotiations, distance from Israel – few would be surprised. Moreover, his desire to get to Saudi-Israel normalisation (in pursuit, perhaps, of a Nobel) may eventually become more urgent. Even in Riyadh, he said that 'it's my fervent hope, wish and even my dream that Saudi Arabia… will soon be joining the Abraham Accords,' and then pictured what that may look like – before adding a vital, new qualifier, which I've highlighted in italics: 'It will be a special day in the Middle East, with the whole world watching when Saudi Arabia joins us and you'll be greatly honoring me and you'll be greatly honoring all of those people that have fought so hard for the Middle East. And I really think it's going to be something special, but you'll do it in your own time.' This also doesn't mean that IMEC won't happen. India, the UAE, Israel and several European countries – particularly France, Italy and Greece – all seem committed to the idea and are pushing ahead on it. One question to perhaps ask is if these countries, backed by the European Union, might be sufficient to give it momentum against the context of a distracted US? GMF South's Kristina Kausch writes: 'Unsurprisingly, however, pressure unleashes centrifugal forces among EU member states. As initial plans to establish Greece's Piraeus port as IMEC's main entry point to Europe have been challenged due to Chinese majority ownership in it, France (Marseille) and Italy (Trieste) have been competing for the role. Both have appointed special envoys for IMEC and are engaged in active shuttle diplomacy with the signatory partners. Competition among Southern European countries focusing on national economic gain risks diverting attention away from the bigger picture of the corridor's long-term transformative significance for European strategic autonomy and competitiveness. And then, of course, Europe's geopolitical coming-of-age also means empty coffers. Whether European governments will be able to mobilize the necessary funds for IMEC (current cost estimates are at €500 billion) while simultaneously building European defense capabilities and updating industries and infrastructure at home is doubtful… Similarly, the European private sector, strained by the tariff nuclear bomb, without solid guarantees might be reluctant to invest in a project whose short- and mid-term security and economic profitability is uncertain.' Luckily for India, its element of the proposed corridor – connecting its Western ports with the Gulf – does not face obstacles quite as vexed as the question of Saudi-Israel normalisation, and indeed Indo-Gulf relations are only likely to continue their massive expansion. (It was, however, noteworthy that the Pahalgam terror attack, which led to India-Pakistan clashes earlier this month, forced Modi to cut short what was expected to be a transformative visit to Saudi Arabia, with Gulf states subsequently playing a role, albiety more quietly than Trump, in the ceasefire that followed). Moreover, some of Trump's other moves – most notably with Iran – may even open up the space for India to revisit other grand connectivity plans that have been stalled because of regional issues.
Al Etihad
20-05-2025
- Business
- Al Etihad
UAE highlights commitment to global energy security at BRICS Energy Ministerial Meeting
20 May 2025 11:01 BRASÍLIA (WAM) Eng. Sharif Al Olama, Undersecretary for Energy and Petroleum Affairs at the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure, represented the UAE at the BRICS Energy Ministerial Meeting, hosted under the Brazilian Chairmanship in the capital city of Brasí representatives of BRICS members and partners, Al Olama said, 'We are living through a defining moment in the global energy transition. The world is confronting a dual challenge: to ensure secure and affordable energy access for all, while dramatically reducing emissions to meet climate goals. For the UAE, this is not a dilemma, but an opportunity to drive transformation through innovation, collaboration, and decisive action.'He added, 'The UAE has made energy access a national achievement. Today, we are proud to have 100 per cent access to electricity, clean cooking solutions, and affordable heating and cooling services. We rank first globally in key energy access and affordability indicators."However, we recognise that our work is not complete until this becomes the reality for everyone. That's why we are investing in renewable energy projects in over 70 countries, especially in Africa, the Caribbean, and small island developing states. We are committed to sharing our models on energy financing, public-private partnerships, and technology deployment to support energy justice globally.'In addition, Al Olama invited BRICS nations and partners to join the Global Energy Efficiency Alliance, which the UAE founded to reduce carbon intensity by advancing efficiency standards, fostering knowledge exchange, and supporting joint capacity-building. Through this alliance, BRICS members can play a vital role in accelerating global energy savings and advancing the collective decarbonisation he pointed out that the UAE is interconnected with other GCC states through the Gulf Cooperation Council Interconnection Authority (GCCIA), enhancing regional grid stability and energy security. The UAE actively pursues bilateral and multilateral partnerships to deepen regional and global energy integration. A prominent example is the UAE's collaboration with India, which includes efforts to establish a direct power interconnection and joint participation in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). This strategic corridor aims to bolster economic cooperation, accelerate clean energy deployment, and improve connectivity between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Through these initiatives, the UAE is reinforcing its commitment to cross-border energy trade, decarbonisation, and global energy security. At the meeting, the Brazilian Presidency presented BRICS Energy Research Cooperation Platform (ERCP) Report, which focuses on ensuring access to affordable, reliable, and modern energy, especially for underserved communities, and the Roadmap for BRICS Energy Cooperation for 2025-2030, which provides a strategic vision for advancing cooperation in clean energy, sustainable fuels, grid interconnection, and innovation.
