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Arakan Army is key to India's Myanmar strategy: Time to acknowledge it

The successful completion of the Kaladan project is much more than just a 'friendship treaty' between India and Myanmar. It could become the axis around which India manages the growing instability on its northeastern borders read more This week, the Minister of Shipping, Sarbananda Sonowal, announced that the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP) will be operational by 2027. The project aims to connect the eastern Indian seaport of Kolkata with Sittwe in Rakhine State of Myanmar by sea. Further, in Myanmar, it will link Sittwe to Paletwa in Chin State via the Kaladan river route, and from Paletwa to Zorinpui in Mizoram, India by road. Funded by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, the project has faced considerable roadblocks since 2010. Aimed at reducing the distance from Kolkata to Sittwe by 1,328 km and creating an alternative route to the Siliguri Corridor, the critical Paletwa-to-Zorinpui road is yet to be completed, even though the Sittwe port received its first cargo ships from India in 2023. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Sonowal also stated that the 'Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project is the result of the India–Myanmar Friendship Treaty. This is a strategic initiative to enhance connectivity between India's northeast and Myanmar'. To this end, the Shipping Ministry has invested Rs 1,000 crore in developing the waterways for the project. However, since the military-led coup in Myanmar (2021), the future of KMMTTP has seemed uncertain, irrespective of the money injected into it. More from Opinion Tesla touches down, but will it build in India? In post-coup Myanmar, various Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) have emerged as powerful military and political forces crucial to the country's future. Some are fighting for federalism, others for autonomy from the Tatmadaw. Their need to retain territorial control has ensured that conflict remains perpetual. Substantial territory is controlled by the EAOs—some estimates suggest almost 50 per cent—though the majority of the population still lives in Tatmadaw-controlled areas. There are over two hundred EAOs in the country. However, not all EAOs have equal influence, territory, training, or weaponry. Some have also clashed with each other over territorial control. But within this complex mosaic of EAOs and the fight for territory, it is one of the youngest EAOs that has emerged as the most influential. In Rakhine State, where the KMMTTP is situated, the Arakan Army (AA) controls most of the state. Established in 2009 with a strength of just 25, it was founded on the 'Way of the Rakhita' or the Arakan Dream. The group envisions establishing an independent Arakan nation, evoking memories of the once-powerful Arakan Kingdom (1425–1785). With a strength of 30,000 soldiers, the AA is a sophisticated militia that provides training to other smaller EAOs, stationing nearly 6,000 soldiers across territories controlled by their allies. Its young, dynamic leadership, such as Maj. Gen. Twan Mrat Naing, is known for its extensive networks across Myanmar and internationally. The AA is extremely popular among locals and has managed to capture most of Rakhine State and Paletwa in neighbouring Chin State. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Interestingly, out of the 18 townships in Rakhine, 15 are under AA control. However, Sittwe (the capital of Rakhine), Kyaukphyu (where China has critical investments), and the island of Manaung (due to its geostrategic location) remain untouched. One argument is that these territories remain untouched because the AA lacks naval power, unlike the Tatmadaw. While that may be true, there has also been news of the Chinese resuming construction near Kyaukphyu port after striking a deal with the AA to provide protection for Chinese construction workers. It was in 2023 that the China-backed Three Brotherhood Alliance—comprising the MNDAA, Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and the Arakan Army—launched the highly successful Operation 1027 against the Tatmadaw. At the time, China was interested in pressuring the Tatmadaw to curb illegal gambling and cyber-scam operations in northern Shan State, which were directly impacting Chinese citizens. But after securing the Tatmadaw's compliance, China swiftly adjusted its approach by exerting influence on key EAOs as well as the Tatmadaw, even appointing a Special Envoy for negotiations between them. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD China's primary interest in a stable Myanmar is to limit Western influence and ensure the security of its infrastructure projects, such as the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port, power plant, and oil and gas pipelines. Their success in brokering deals with both the Tatmadaw and the AA—reportedly including allowing Chinese security personnel to protect these assets—should be a cause of concern for India. On the other hand, India has taken a measured approach to Myanmar, keeping communication channels open with the State Administration Council (SAC), the governing body of the Tatmadaw, while also providing humanitarian aid after the massive 7.7 magnitude earthquake hit the country on March 28, 2025. India has investments not just in KMMTTP but also in the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway. However, beyond focusing on infrastructure completion and security, India's Myanmar policy should now be driven by the need to secure its northeastern borders—leveraging the on-ground reality that Chinese influence in Myanmar is disliked by large sections of the local population. The ultra-nationalist Tatmadaw and China have had strained relations in the past, and even today, the relationship remains transactional. In contrast, India enjoys a unique cultural and historical connection that can serve as a special pivot. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD To this end, India's engagement with major independent stakeholders in Myanmar is unlikely to face opposition. India could begin with the Arakan Army (AA) in Rakhine State. To find a middle path, one must read between the lines. It is possible that the AA is deliberately refraining from advancing on the three critical revenue-generating townships—Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, and Manaung—not merely because of naval limitations, but also to use them as leverage with external stakeholders like China and India, as well as with the Tatmadaw. They may be aiming to negotiate a revenue-sharing model. In this scenario, the Tatmadaw and the AA could reach a mutual understanding that includes a federal system with an Arakanese Chief Minister—a demand even the National League for Democracy (NLD) failed to deliver. This is where India could play the role of a mediator—not only positioning itself positively among the Arakanese but also building trust with the SAC. The successful completion of the KMMTTP project is much more than just a 'friendship treaty' between India and Myanmar. It could become the axis around which India manages the growing instability on its northeastern borders. India must recognise that the 'strategic initiative', as highlighted by Sonowal, is not limited to finding an alternative to the Siliguri Corridor or merely countering China—it is also essential for the Arakan Army and the people of Rakhine State. The last leg of the project, from Paletwa to Zorinpui, will allow for the supply of essential goods such as food, construction materials, and medical aid. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD If India truly wishes to rise as a regional power, it must ensure that the KMMTTP is completed swiftly. Rami Niranjan Desai is a scholar of India's Northeast and neighbourhood. She is a columnist and author and presently works as Distinguished Fellow at India Foundation, New Delhi. She recently undertook a fieldtrip to Myanmar. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.