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Indian Express
6 days ago
- Politics
- Indian Express
Pen Pictures from NDA to Op Sindoor: a legacy of brotherhood, jointmanship
AS INDIA secured a formidable geopolitical and strategic edge over Pakistan in Operation Sindoor — which showcased exemplary jointness and strategic foresight — the Indian Armed Forces were under the leadership of Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan, along with the three service chiefs: General Upendra Dwivedi, Admiral Dinesh Kumar Tripathi and Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh. The roots of this unparalleled synergy germinated on the hallowed grounds and rugged terrain of the National Defence Academy (NDA) at Khadakwasla, where these military leaders first imbibed the ethos of jointmanship and inter-service camaraderie. Here is a journey back in time to their NDA days, drawn from the personal archives and collections of Dr Kishori Lal — an author and retired professor from the NDA — whose early years at the Academy coincided with the formative cadet days of these four future military leaders. Jointness in Operation Sindoor Launched in the early hours of May 7, Operation unfolded across land, air, and sea — a seamless demonstration of synergy between the Indian Army, Air Force, and Navy. The Indian Air Force (IAF) played a crucial role in delivering precision strikes against terror infrastructure across Pakistan. The Air Force's air defence ecosystem proved pivotal in protecting Indian airspace during retaliatory drone and UAV attacks from across the border. The IAF's Integrated Air Command and Control System enabled real-time coordination of air assets, allowing Indian forces to neutralise aerial threats efficiently and maintain network centric operations. Simultaneously, the Indian Army demonstrated its preparedness and effectiveness in both defensive and offensive roles. The Army's air defence units worked in tandem with the Air Force, deploying a wide array of systems. These units were instrumental in countering waves of drones and loitering munitions launched by Pakistan. The Indian Navy played a critical role in asserting maritime dominance by operating as a composite networked force. The Navy deployed its Carrier Battle Group (CBG) equipped with MiG-29K fighter jets and airborne early warning helicopters. The CBG maintained a powerful air defence shield that prevented hostile aerial incursions. The Navy's presence created a strong deterrent and effectively bottled-up Pakistani air elements along their western seaboard, denying them any operational space. Roots in the Academy Dr Lal, 78, retired from the NDA in 2007. He has till now written over half a dozen books which document various facets of the NDA, including a book that is dedicated to the humorous side of the premier triservices institute. He says that the driving force behind his works has been his long innings as a faculty member at the academy and also as the chief editor of the NDA Journal for more than a dozen years. Speaking to Express, Dr Lal said, 'If we trace the history of NDA as a tri-service academy, we will come to know that in the 1940s, the renowned military training academies of the world were run by individual services. At the time, the Indian officers and cadets used to be trained in the service specific military academies in the UK. The military commanders of India envisaged that if any war came to be fought in India, in the years ahead, it would have to be fought by it to protect its territory and integrity. After the attainment of Independence, the founding fathers and foresighted leadership took a conscious call to depart from the Western custom of having separate academies to an integrated training Academy. When we talk of success in Operation Sindoor, due credit has to be given to this vision.' Dr Lal has brought out these aspects in his book The National Defence Academy of India (1949 — 2024) which he presented to Gen Chauhan in May last year. Dr Lal said, 'Integration and synergy are the key words for armed forces world over. But their most essential prerequisites are mutual understanding, teamwork, interdependence, and seamless unity between any two or three fighting forces. These values cannot be grafted on the battlefield but have to be ingrained in training.' Walk down memory lane Dr Lal said, 'When I joined the department of English at the NDA in 1980, the then now General and then Cadet Anil Chauhan, who is from the 58th course, was in his sixth term. General Upendra Dwivedi and Admiral Dinesh Kumar Tripathi were schoolmates at Sainik School Rewa in Madhya Pradesh. Air Chief Amar Preet Singh and Gen Dwivedi are course mates from the 65th course at the NDA who trained alongside the Navy Chief Admiral Tripathi who is from the 66th course. On this timeline, all were contemporary to me. I distinctly remember cadet Amar Preet Singh as a student in the third term. At the peak of military hierarchy, with Gen Chauhan as Chief of Defence Staff, this exceptional team of the Academy luminaries are together again and concurrently occupying the highest echelons, leading the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. I feel proud and privileged to have seen them as cadets undergoing rigorous training and also of the fact they have carried with them the legacy of the NDA and the hopes of the nation that looked to them to safeguard its sovereignty and integrity.' Following are some interesting details about the four from their academy days with the highlight being the short and crisp testimonials referred to as 'pen pictures' in the NDA collectively written by their junior term cadets — especially second term cadets — for the passing out cadets The details have been obtained from the personal collection and archives of Dr Lal which includes issues of the NDA journal, which he was editor of. General Anil Chauhan joined the NDA in May 1977 with the 58th Course and passed out in May 1980. He was from the J (Juliet) squadron. At the time of his passing out, his junior cadets collective wrote in his pen picture: 'As OIC (referred to as officer-in-charge in lighter vein) Battalion Entertainment, attracted the whole Academy.' General Dwivedi was from the 65th Course C (Charlie) Squadron. He joined the NDA in January 1981 and passed out in December 1983 as Division Cadet Captain. His junior course cadets wrote in their testimonial: 'The PT captain proved to be a jazz DCC (Division Cadet Captain).' Admiral Dinesh Kumar Tripathi joined the NDA in the 66th Course in D (Delta) squadron in June 1981 and passed out as CQMS (Company Quartermaster Sergeant) Dinesh Kumar Tripathi in June 1984. His pen picture by juniors read: 'Good at x-country (cross country) and boxing. Academic torchie (An award winner for academic performance).' Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh joined the NDA in the 65th Course in K (Kilo) squadron in January 1981 and passed out in December 1983 as the Squadron Cadet Captain. His pen picture read: 'had all the metal torches, the light of which illuminated his cheerful disposition.' Sushant Kulkarni is a Special Correspondent with The Indian Express in Pune with 12+ years of experience covering issues related to Crime, Defence, Internal Security and Courts. He has been associated with the Indian Express since July 2010. Sushant has extensively reported on law and order issues of Pune and surrounding area, Cyber crime, narcotics trade and terrorism. His coverage in the Defence beat includes operational aspects of the three services, the defence research and development and issues related to key defence establishments. He has covered several sensitive cases in the courts at Pune. Sushant is an avid photographer, plays harmonica and loves cooking. ... Read More
NDTV
22-05-2025
- NDTV
In Pics: The Air Defence System That Gave India Edge During Op Sindoor
India's Air Defence Systems proved their prowess at the height of the tensions with Pakistan during 'Operation Sindoor', intercepting numerous drones, missiles, micro UAVs, and loitering munitions, emerging as a globally actionable defence asset. Here is a look at India's 'Guardians Of The Sky' that gave it edge during Operation Sindoor India's integrated air defence system is an automated system integrates data from forces to combat aerial threats. It includes systems operated by the Army, Navy and the Air Force, which was brought together under the Integrated Air Command and Control System. This is followed by a second layer that includes to-a-point defence systems to protect specific areas or assets. The fourth, for area-defence, are long-range SAMs fired from the Russian-made S-400 and the fighter jets.
India Today
21-05-2025
- Politics
- India Today
Operation Sindoor Breakdown: India's Air Defence Tactics and the Escalation Ladder Ft. Sandeep Unnithan
In this episode, veteran defence journalist Sandeep Unnithan joins host Dev Goswami to decode Operation Sindoor — India's response to Pahalgam terrorist attack. Sandeep and Dev dive deep into how India's layered air defence network, including the IACCS (Integrated Air Command and Control System), played a pivotal role in thwarting Pakistani aerial threats. What was the X factor that gave India the edge? Was the much-talked-about S-400 system deployed? What was sitaution like in the commmand and control centre? The two also explore the escalation ladder — a concept from military theory — and how India used it both during the days of fighting of Operation Sindoor and more broadly to counter Pakistan's nuclear posturing. Why is this theory studied so deeply in strategic circles? And how does it play out in real-time decision-making? Sandeep and Dev also look at the Indian Navy's posturing during the conflict as well as the roles played by the Indian Army and Indian Air Force. And as a final thought, the two discuss Pakistan's Kirana Hills and the speculation that the nuclear weapons storage site may have been hit during the operation. Produced by Prateek Lidhoo Sound mix by Suraj Singh
Time of India
18-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Operation Sindoor: Limited operation with potent messaging
1 2 Operation Sindoor has been described by noted strategic expert Brahma Chellaney as shorter than the shortest — six-day Arab-Israel war of 1967. Unless resumed, this paused conflict has defied the recent global trend of unending and festering wars: notably, the Ukraine-Russia and Gaza conflicts. Yet, it cannot be dismissed as mere skirmish because of the potency and significance of messages delivered. These, of course, require consolidation. While signalling the new normal, it has also left few unanswered queries, which need to be examined. The most important one many asked by using an analogy from cricket: why declare when on the threshold of a century? Characterisation of operation It is difficult to propose an exact description for a mere 88-hour exchange, triggered 14 days after a dastardly terrorist mayhem at Pahalgam, accounting for 26 innocent lives. Notwithstanding brevity, conflict threatened to transit into the nuclear domain, bringing nuclear facilities in Kirana Hills, in our daily debates. The operation was limited to a non-contact domain with aerial delivery of lethal destruction, more like a futuristic, sci-fi exchange. Large formations were not even mobilized, so intention to mount conventional offensive had not been firmed up. Missiles (beyond visual range) and drones were battling air-defence grids — Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), Akash-Teer, and Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System (C-UAS). by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like 35 & Earning? Protect Your Family with ₹1 Cr Life Cover ICICI Pru Life Insurance Plan Get Quote Undo All three make an indigenous version of the Israels' famed Iron Dome, but ours combines equipment of diverse origin — Russia, France, Israel, USA, and indigenous developments. Defying the limitation of medium, spatially, geographic spread, it stretched from North Skardu to South Bholari (Karachi). Most importantly, the operation touched the very heartland of Pakistan Punjab — Rawalpindi, Muridke near Lahore, Sialkot and Bhawalpur. Military targets degraded included key air-defence installations, command and control and logistics nodes, Sargodha, Chaklala and Nur Khan (Rawalpindi) bases. Suspension of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) has given India a long-term, choke-hold leverage over the agricultural economy of Pakistan's Punjab. Pakistan is already pleading for reconsideration, but we need to remain focused on a pragmatic review. Politically, while India projected control and purpose; Pakistani hierarchy displayed disparate voices and desperation. Pindi would certainly be in turmoil with attacks on terror hubs of JuD (LeT), JeM and HuM, described by PM Modi as the "universities of global terrorism". All bases/determinants, postulated in Pakistani nuclear expert Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai's famous matrix of red lines for nuclear threshold, were attacked — spatial, military, economic and political. Pakistan's nuclear sabre-rattling got completely debunked, once again. India has cemented space for conventional escalation, created after Kargil and Balakot and enlarged it manyfold. India has also operationalised and refined its integrated response matrix, synergising a large number of imported and indigenous platforms and systems. In mid-2016, when I retired, the considered view was that Pakistan had an edge over India in Air-Defence Control and Reporting (AD-C&R) with dedicated AD Theatre Command. It is great credit to our air defence warriors that we not only fended off attacks, but degraded their defences, laying bare critical vulnerabilities. By some estimates, the Pakistan Air Force has lost 15%-20% capability. New doctrine and ceasefire The new Modi doctrine has outlined three postulates. First, certainty of response, decisive retaliation on India's terms. Second, no tolerance for nuclear blackmail. Third, no distinction between terrorists and their sponsors/controllers. In his signature style, the PM ruled out terror and talks, and terror and trade. He amplified this by saying that blood and water will not be allowed to flow together. There is a lot of chatter on the escalation ladder and suspension of exchange, which is sought to be now converted into a ceasefire to conform to agreements of 2003 and 2021. While we may not want to be seen to be pushed into a ceasefire, it is difficult to deny that conflict between the two nations, armed with nukes, will inevitably draw in global and regional powers. Ladder is a complex matrix, and it would be influenced by the USA, China, Russia and even Arabs. With external dependencies, stamina for extending conflict in the high-tech domain by both sides is limited. The ladder has got complicated with addition of new domains of cyber and drones. Calibration of matrix and pace of escalation needs to be further refined. It appeared to have outstripped the planned escalation in the current round. The masterstroke was defining punishment delivered just before cessation. Strategically, we have achieved our objectives and avoided a debilitating conflict, which could have impeded our journey towards Viksit Bharat. Way Forward The country is galvanized with patriotic fervour and it is time to build on national consensus. The govt should go the extra mile to connect with sane elements in opposition on issues of national security. It is also time we address our internal fault-lines, which are sought to be exploited by Pakistan. To begin with, we need to redouble efforts towards socio-political initiatives in J&K, Northeast and fix accountability for lapses. While we have managed to put it across to our prickly and persistent adversary Pakistan, the primary one, Dragon (China), lurks in shadows. It would have mapped our capabilities and gathered electronic intelligence. It has also tested its weapons. We need to prepare to dissuade China and Pakistan in collusive mode. There is enough evidence that we cannot bank too much on external support. We need to revamp our diplomatic outreach to bolster support. 'Ekla Chalo Re' and 'Atam Nirbharata' are inspiring, and even heady, but we can do co-operative joint ventures, which could be rebranded as 'Smart Atam Nirbharata'. There is a definite and urgent imperative to refine our strategic communication. More importantly, rein-in our electronic channels, who made a mockery of a refined operation In conclusion, one can only reiterate two guiding parameters. First, we need to adopt 'Josh with Hosh' as bigger challenges await us. Finally, for 'Viksit Bharat', we have to develop the culture of 'Viksit Samvad'. (Author is former GOC-in-C of Western Command, Indian Army)
NDTV
14-05-2025
- Politics
- NDTV
Six Big - But Less Noticed - Takeaways From Operation Sindoor
The abrupt end to Operation Sindoor was a bolt from the blue - actually, like an 'out of syllabus' event. It is good that full-scale war was avoided, and one hopes ceasefire violations will die down. Even as the armed forces keep a wary eye on our borders, there are some takeaways that can be deduced as a hot debrief. Flawless Choreography First, the present tri-services system worked and the joint operational planning done between that fateful day of terrorist killings in Pahalgam on April 22 and the commencement of attacks on terrorist targets on May 7 delivered results. The intense engagements and the next three days till ceasefire commencement were also expertly choreographed by the Indian Air Force and the army through joint plans. Pakistani drone and missile attacks were relentless, intense and dense, and so were our responses in equal measure. That almost all Pakistani projectiles (UAVs, missiles, armed and unarmed drones) were engaged successfully is a tribute to the Indian Air Force's (IAF) homegrown Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) that synthesises all military and civilian radars into one composite air situation picture. The threats from targets are prioritised electronically and by fighter controllers, and the most suitable weapon system that can engage them is authorised to take action. A Largely Aerial Affair Second, the four days of engagement was majorly, if not wholly, a kinetic affair through the medium of air. The engagements took place in a dense air defence environment where both sides were operating in a contested airspace, unlike the uncontested environment that the western air forces faced in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, or the Israelis in their operations in Gaza and Lebanon. It is but natural that losses would occur, but it is the nature of conflict that the force on the offensive would incur some damage; one is sure that those would be analysed critically by the IAF. From photographic evidence now available, India's UAV and missile strikes were very effective, and the fact that 11 of Pakistan's frontline airbases spread along the length and breadth of the country were addressed is testimony to the IAF's operational reach and the effectiveness of its weapons. However, innumerable commentaries have been written about the depleting IAF squadron strength, and given that our borders will remain active, the potency of the IAF's bite needs careful monitoring. Weapon systems, encrypted communications and combat enablers like Airborne Warning and Control Systems, aerial flight refuellers and modern cutting-edge weapons need immediate attention. In the final analysis, it must be remembered that this was another example where air power effectiveness enabled the flow of political and diplomatic negotiations towards peace. Hat-Tip To Indigenous Capabilities Third, though the S-400 Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system hogged media limelight, it was the indigenous radars, SAM and Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems that formed the backbone of our ground-based air defence, highlighting the value of indigenous armament; the fact these were a combination of DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) and private sector products is indeed heartening. The wide availability of drones and anti-drone systems could also be a result of the emergency powers given to the Vice Chiefs and Commanders-in-Chief of regional commands. Institutional ingenuity in the form of an IAF-designed short-range anti-aircraft system, the Surface to Air Missile for Assured Retaliation (SAMAR), came in very handy. SAMAR has refurbished life-expired Russian R73 and R27 air-to-air missiles - which would normally have been junked - used in the surface-to-air missile role. This is a pointer that we have smart minds within our own organisations that need encouragement. Here, an appreciation of the wonderful work done by the tireless Army air defence gunners (who operated legacy equipment like L-70 anti-aircraft guns) and BSF troopers (with their anti-UAV systems) would only be apt. The Need For An Honest Assessment Fourth, to a layman who had access only to news from the media, the civil-military-diplomatic machinery appeared to have clicked well. An honest assessment needs to be undertaken, on whether this measured up to the events leading to the ceasefire deal and the assurances obtained before accepting the formulation of the ceasefire. The answer would lie in the response to a single question: would there be a necessity to go for kinetic action every time a terrorist action takes place? The Prime Minister has hinted at this in his address to the nation, and Pakistan must understand that a repeat occurrence down the line would elicit a punitive response. Did We Achieve What We Aimed For? Fifth, is the ceasefire indicative of having achieved the aim for which we nearly went to war? A few questions need clarity. Where are the Pahalgam terrorists who started it all with their merciless killings? Has an assurance been given that they would be tracked by Pakistan and handed over? This is vital as they could have crossed the Line of Control in the three weeks that have elapsed since the killings. An equally important aspect is that the Simla agreement mandated only a bilateral settlement of mutual concerns, a position reiterated by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson on May 13. So, why is there an insistence by the US leadership on being the architects of the ceasefire? The statement of US Secretary Marco Rubio, about India having agreed to "...discuss all issues at a neutral venue", along with President Donald Trump reclaiming ownership of the ceasefire and lauding Rubio in public in Saudi Arabia (after the MEA clarification), is intriguing. A Key Question And finally, but very importantly, one needs clarity as to whether the Chief of Defence Staff system, which was put to test for the first time, worked as advertised. Who was planning missions and prosecuting the 'war'? Was it the integrated defence staff, or were the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and Air Force regional command headquarters synergising action? Even though the expanse of the engagements was limited to the aerial domain, the answer to this question would be an invaluable input for the ongoing revision of our higher defence organisation structure (read theaterisation). A better experience than a wartime crucible would be impossible to find again. That, indeed, would be a fitting tribute to the valiant men and women who spearheaded Op Sindoor.
