Latest news with #InterimNationalDefenseStrategicGuidance
Yahoo
12-05-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Opinion - Hegseth's pivot to China leaves the rest of the world to fend for itself
In late March, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth issued the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance to the Pentagon. According to the guidance, as quoted by The Washington Post, 'China is the Department's sole pacing threat, and denial of a Chinese fait accompli seizure of Taiwan — while simultaneously defending the U.S. homeland is the Department's sole pacing scenario.' The Pentagon is instructed, per the report, to plan only for contingencies with China. Given the trends in the new administration, none of this is surprising, but it is shocking. The document is a blueprint for geopolitical malpractice. The guidance's identification of China as a major security threat, and thus a priority, is appropriate. But the prescribed downgrading of American commitments in Europe and the Middle East is a recipe for global instability, including in Asia. Violent conflagrations will follow. The document evinces little understanding of the world's interconnectedness. From Alexander's invasion of India to the emergence of the Silk Road to Genghis Khan's transcontinental imperium, history teaches us that the Eurasian continent is a unified political space. Localized political, economic and societal events can and do have far-reaching effects that span the landmass — and eventually hit here in the U.S. That nature is immutable, and evolutions in transportation technologies and global commerce continue to magnify it. Even the creation of the U.S. was an extension of Eurasian politics. The British raised taxes on the colonials to recover from the Seven Years' War, fought in North America as the French and Indian War. It also affected Asian commerce, as the tea tossed into Boston Harbor had been imported from China. The guidance document directs the Pentagon to 'assume risk in other theaters,' namely Europe and the Middle East. This is an assumption that, even if American partners fail to invest in their defenses, such risk is tolerable and containable. Neither is the case. Europe is America's largest export destination. The U.S. cannot turn a blind eye to war in Free Europe. It cannot ignore conflict in the Middle East either, especially as long as fossil fuels remain an important component of the energy mix of America, its allies and its adversaries. America's Asian allies and partners — all key to containing and deterring China — are deeply reliant on oil and natural gas imports from the Middle East. China's dependence on such imports is a major vulnerability. There can be no doubt that tumult in the western stretches of Eurasia will ripple across the continent. The typically isolated North Korea is now sitting pretty, bolstered by Russian diplomatic, economic, and technical support thanks to the war in Ukraine. China has provided military, diplomatic and economic support to Russia against Ukraine. It also implicitly sided with Hamas in the Gaza war in an effort to gain sway with global Muslim populations. And Beijing's 25-year strategic partnership agreement with Tehran is proof positive of China's willingness to sow discord in the Middle East. Turbulence in Eurasia and the Middle East, meanwhile, threatens freedom of navigation, which Hegseth has called 'a core national interest.' The two disruptions to sea trade in recent years — one in the Black Sea and the other in the Red Sea — are the results of land wars in Europe and the Middle East. Both of these wars are themselves the results of diminishing U.S. involvement in those regions since the early 2010s in pursuit of a 'pivot to Asia.' Another attempt to pivot to Asia, as the interim guidance envisions, will create the conditions for crisis elsewhere — if unmitigated, it will mean crisis everywhere. Moreover, there are three problems with adopting China as the 'pacing threat' and a Taiwan Strait scenario as the 'pacing scenario.' First, by eschewing forces needed to fight in Europe and the Middle East, the administration makes its policy irreversible for successor administrations without first forming national and congressional consensuses for its policy. While there is substantial overlap in the types of capabilities that conflicts in Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific require, those notional conflicts will look quite different given significant differences in geography and combatants. A laser-beam focus on preventing a fait accompli in the Taiwan Strait will leave the U.S. underinvested in the types of units and weapons systems that will be needed elsewhere. Second, once American political leaders do awaken to the depth of their mistake, that underinvestment will take time to correct. The U.S. will have foregone years of potential weapons development, military training and regional studies education. Perhaps the Pentagon will have kept pace with the People's Liberation Army, but it will have fallen behind other adversaries with no way of rapidly catching up. Even the Trump administration's focus on China will be ineffective. According to the report, an important element of the strategy against China is 'pressuring' Taiwan to boost its own defense, while the secretary has ordered 8 percent cuts across all services. This will leave the force inadequate for a Chinese contingency even if all of the remaining resources are spent on stability in the Americas and Asia. The administration claims that it is sacrificing Europe and the Middle East on the altar of deterring China, but it appears that it is taking the opposite measure of what is necessary to prepare itself for the Asian theater. China's armed forces are rapidly modernizing and may soon be capable of invading Taiwan while preventing American intervention. Even if everything goes according to the administration's wishes, Hegseth's defense cuts will counteract Taiwan's boost in spending, and a gap between China's ability to invade and the collective ability to defend Taiwan will emerge. Finally, the guidance insists the nuclear umbrella will remain, but allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East and even Asia will have little choice but to consider their own nuclear arsenals. No European nor Middle Eastern state has a defense production base. Acquiring scientific knowledge and creating the production base will take, at best, more than a decade. Meanwhile, consecutive administrations have sparked among allies a wariness toward buying American weapons and parts — former President Biden by restricting the supply to Ukraine of European-made weapons with American components, and President Trump by threatening to forcefully annex allied territory. As they slowly invest in defense production capacity, Europeans will have no choice but to resort to nukes. Polish President Andrzej Duda has already raised the question publicly. And Asians will know that the U.S. is only ever one election away from turning on them as well. This will no longer be an academic exercise. The U.S. may soon live in a world teeming with nuclear weapons. Hegseth's strategy reflects an administration policy ungrounded in history and current trends. Its best-case scenario still requires a lot of luck for existing conflicts to be contained. The worst-case scenario is another global war. Michael Mazza is a senior director at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Security (formerly the Project 2049 Institute). Shay Khatiri is vice president of development and senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute. Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
The Hill
12-05-2025
- Business
- The Hill
Hegseth's pivot to China leaves the rest of the world to fend for itself
In late March, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth issued the Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance to the Pentagon. According to the guidance, as quoted by The Washington Post, 'China is the Department's sole pacing threat, and denial of a Chinese fait accompli seizure of Taiwan — while simultaneously defending the U.S. homeland is the Department's sole pacing scenario.' The Pentagon is instructed, per the report, to plan only for contingencies with China. Given the trends in the new administration, none of this is surprising, but it is shocking. The document is a blueprint for geopolitical malpractice. The guidance's identification of China as a major security threat, and thus a priority, is appropriate. But the prescribed downgrading of American commitments in Europe and the Middle East is a recipe for global instability, including in Asia. Violent conflagrations will follow. The document evinces little understanding of the world's interconnectedness. From Alexander's invasion of India to the emergence of the Silk Road to Genghis Khan's transcontinental imperium, history teaches us that the Eurasian continent is a unified political space. Localized political, economic and societal events can and do have far-reaching effects that span the landmass — and eventually hit here in the U.S. That nature is immutable, and evolutions in transportation technologies and global commerce continue to magnify it. Even the creation of the U.S. was an extension of Eurasian politics. The British raised taxes on the colonials to recover from the Seven Years' War, fought in North America as the French and Indian War. It also affected Asian commerce, as the tea tossed into Boston Harbor had been imported from China. The guidance document directs the Pentagon to 'assume risk in other theaters,' namely Europe and the Middle East. This is an assumption that, even if American partners fail to invest in their defenses, such risk is tolerable and containable. Neither is the case. Europe is America's largest export destination. The U.S. cannot turn a blind eye to war in Free Europe. It cannot ignore conflict in the Middle East either, especially as long as fossil fuels remain an important component of the energy mix of America, its allies and its adversaries. America's Asian allies and partners — all key to containing and deterring China — are deeply reliant on oil and natural gas imports from the Middle East. China's dependence on such imports is a major vulnerability. There can be no doubt that tumult in the western stretches of Eurasia will ripple across the continent. The typically isolated North Korea is now sitting pretty, bolstered by Russian diplomatic, economic, and technical support thanks to the war in Ukraine. China has provided military, diplomatic and economic support to Russia against Ukraine. It also implicitly sided with Hamas in the Gaza war in an effort to gain sway with global Muslim populations. And Beijing's 25-year strategic partnership agreement with Tehran is proof positive of China's willingness to sow discord in the Middle East. Turbulence in Eurasia and the Middle East, meanwhile, threatens freedom of navigation, which Hegseth has called 'a core national interest.' The two disruptions to sea trade in recent years — one in the Black Sea and the other in the Red Sea — are the results of land wars in Europe and the Middle East. Both of these wars are themselves the results of diminishing U.S. involvement in those regions since the early 2010s in pursuit of a 'pivot to Asia.' Another attempt to pivot to Asia, as the interim guidance envisions, will create the conditions for crisis elsewhere — if unmitigated, it will mean crisis everywhere. Moreover, there are three problems with adopting China as the 'pacing threat' and a Taiwan Strait scenario as the 'pacing scenario.' First, by eschewing forces needed to fight in Europe and the Middle East, the administration makes its policy irreversible for successor administrations without first forming national and congressional consensuses for its policy. While there is substantial overlap in the types of capabilities that conflicts in Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific require, those notional conflicts will look quite different given significant differences in geography and combatants. A laser-beam focus on preventing a fait accompli in the Taiwan Strait will leave the U.S. underinvested in the types of units and weapons systems that will be needed elsewhere. Second, once American political leaders do awaken to the depth of their mistake, that underinvestment will take time to correct. The U.S. will have foregone years of potential weapons development, military training and regional studies education. Perhaps the Pentagon will have kept pace with the People's Liberation Army, but it will have fallen behind other adversaries with no way of rapidly catching up. Even the Trump administration's focus on China will be ineffective. According to the report, an important element of the strategy against China is 'pressuring' Taiwan to boost its own defense, while the secretary has ordered 8 percent cuts across all services. This will leave the force inadequate for a Chinese contingency even if all of the remaining resources are spent on stability in the Americas and Asia. The administration claims that it is sacrificing Europe and the Middle East on the altar of deterring China, but it appears that it is taking the opposite measure of what is necessary to prepare itself for the Asian theater. China's armed forces are rapidly modernizing and may soon be capable of invading Taiwan while preventing American intervention. Even if everything goes according to the administration's wishes, Hegseth's defense cuts will counteract Taiwan's boost in spending, and a gap between China's ability to invade and the collective ability to defend Taiwan will emerge. Finally, the guidance insists the nuclear umbrella will remain, but allies and partners in Europe, the Middle East and even Asia will have little choice but to consider their own nuclear arsenals. No European nor Middle Eastern state has a defense production base. Acquiring scientific knowledge and creating the production base will take, at best, more than a decade. Meanwhile, consecutive administrations have sparked among allies a wariness toward buying American weapons and parts — former President Biden by restricting the supply to Ukraine of European-made weapons with American components, and President Trump by threatening to forcefully annex allied territory. As they slowly invest in defense production capacity, Europeans will have no choice but to resort to nukes. Polish President Andrzej Duda has already raised the question publicly. And Asians will know that the U.S. is only ever one election away from turning on them as well. This will no longer be an academic exercise. The U.S. may soon live in a world teeming with nuclear weapons. Hegseth's strategy reflects an administration policy ungrounded in history and current trends. Its best-case scenario still requires a lot of luck for existing conflicts to be contained. The worst-case scenario is another global war. Michael Mazza is a senior director at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Security (formerly the Project 2049 Institute). Shay Khatiri is vice president of development and senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute.
Wakala News
17-04-2025
- Politics
- Wakala News
Questions Congress should ask about DOD ‘peace through strength' plan
Less than two months after becoming the 29th Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth published an ' Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance ' memo, reflecting President Donald Trump's desire to reshape U.S. defense strategy. It defines how the US military protects national security interests and shapes U.S. force structure, posture, war-fighting concepts and budget decisions. The document replaces the Biden administration's 2022 National Defense Strategy and marks a shift in Pentagon priorities under the new administration, offering an early look into what the second Trump administration's 'peace through strength' approach will mean in practice. While the memo itself is classified, public reporting on the guidance tells us the reordered priorities for the Pentagon: China and homeland defense, followed by everything else. U.S. military departments and combatant commands must now adjust their strategies and resourcing accordingly. Congress and US allies and partners must also assess the memo's implications — Congress for oversight and funding, and others to adapt their strategies in accordance with new Pentagon priorities. Top priorities: homeland defense and China While China was considered the main threat in the past two National Defense Strategies, it appears to be the singular overseas focus of the interim guidance. And aside from concerns regarding Chinese influence over the Panama Canal (and presumably the Western Hemisphere more broadly), the Indo-Pacific remains the primary overseas focus for the U.S. military. The national objectives that underpinned the Biden and first Trump administrations — to protect the American people and expand economic prosperity —will likely remain. But the interim guidance signals a shift in how the administration perceives the strategic environment and the ways and means it will use to achieve its objectives. While the Biden administration focused on advancing democratic values to promote international stability, the Trump administration has emphasized peace through strength — the notion that military power helps ensure peace, a stance it now seeks to reaffirm. The Biden administration's 2022 NDS identified five major threats: China (the 'pacing' threat), Russia (the 'acute' threat), Iran, North Korea and violent extremist organizations — aligning with the first Trump administration. Biden's team prioritized those threats regionally, placing the homeland first, followed by the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the Middle East. This approach, a continuation of U.S. military strategy since the 1990s, is what a RAND study termed 'expeditionary defense in depth.' It emphasized maintaining a sizable global posture and projecting power, i.e., deploying forces, across significant distances to crisis zones. The 2025 interim guidance reverts to an earlier U.S. strategic approach suited for great power competition, what the same study calls 'consolidated defense in depth.' Reports of the guidance indicate a shift from emphasizing the U.S. military's ability to project power to crisis zones around the globe to a narrower prioritization on China and U.S. homeland defense. Previous strategies framed homeland defense around terrorism and overt military threats, but this guidance emphasizes holistic border security and protecting American interests in the Western Hemisphere, such as ensuring access to the Panama Canal and combatting cartels and transnational criminal organizations in Latin America. The trade-offs: less focus on Europe and the Middle East Every strategy involves trade-offs — prioritizing resources in one area means deprioritizing them elsewhere. The trade-off for a stronger U.S. focus on China and the Western Hemisphere in this guidance seems to be a diminished focus on Europe and the Middle East. Since the end of World War II, the United States has viewed a stable and peaceful Europe — composed of its closest like-minded allies and supported by a strong US role in NATO, security backing, training, and interoperability efforts — as strategically vital to its own security. This imperative may now be shifting. While European allies and partners rely heavily on U.S. support against Russian aggression, the Trump administration expects them to carry the brunt of that burden moving forward, which this guidance reportedly affirms. The estimated median defense expenditure among European NATO members in 2024 was 2.1%. This stark reprioritization will send a clear signal to European allies — the United States will likely do less in Europe, so regional deterrence and defense will require strong European leadership, investment and modernization of their military forces. The Middle East, while less stable than Europe and with allies that are spending more on defense (Israel, 5.3% of GDP; Saudi Arabia, 7.1% of GDP; United Arab Emirates, 5.6% of GDP; etc.), is another region that will likely face reduced U.S. military focus. Still, allies and partners should not believe that the United States will simply evacuate these regions. In some ways, the current trends might be thought of as a neo- Nixon Doctrine. As Nixon put it, this meant recognizing that 'the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot … undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world.' The United States, according to this doctrine, would 'help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.' The same is likely to hold true now — this strategic guidance likely means a reevaluation of how the United States supports and enables allies and partners, not abandonment. A recent report in The Washington Post supports this assessment and further suggests that a Heritage Foundation report from last summer might be a major influence on the interim strategy. If these assumptions are true, then the United States will need to define where its involvement is uniquely necessary compared to what allies can handle independently, and, potentially, what it expects in return. Aligning Washington's expectations for allied capabilities with the reality of where those allies currently stand may prove challenging. 4 crucial questions policymakers will need to answer The DoD's memo makes clear the reprioritization of its strategic threats and likely changes to how it will pursue its objectives. But it also raises crucial questions about what implementation will look like, what the Defense Department will ultimately ask of allies and partners, and how Congress can appropriate the funds to put these ambitions into practice. First, what will 'peace through strength' mean in practice? This guidance offers a first glimpse. A key attribute appears to be close U.S. control over its most vital interests, especially in the Western Hemisphere — reminiscent of a modern Monroe Doctrine. The original 1823 doctrine warned competitors against meddling in the Western Hemisphere while asserting U.S. dominance and a policy of non-interference in return. It also signals a heightened focus on homeland defense — deterring threats and protecting U.S. citizens and critical infrastructure from foreign attacks — particularly through nuclear deterrence and missile defense, as seen in the Golden Dome for America initiative. The Pentagon will also need to clarify where else it will invest to bolster homeland defense. Homeland defense can partially be achieved through strategic capabilities and border control — as reporting suggests the memo emphasizes — but threats to the homeland in the cyber and information spaces also abound. These are areas where the military can play a role, particularly in protecting critical infrastructure. If the administration intends to take a comprehensive approach to homeland defense, these aspects should also be considered. How the Defense Department clarifies its role, prioritization and resourcing of these areas will be important to watch in the coming months. Second, how will this guidance translate into changes in U.S. force structure and posture? For nearly a decade, the U.S. military prioritized developing forces to project power into the western Pacific to deter against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. For years, U.S. leaders have argued for increased defense spending to create a military capable of fighting and winning in multiple theaters simultaneously. Several of those leaders — National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and Senator Roger Wicker, for example — are now in key positions to influence U.S. defense strategy and resourcing. There may be support for a version of the multiple theater force construct proposed by the congressionally mandated 2024 bipartisan Commission on the National Defense Strategy, with significant responsibilities for allies and partners. But will an emphasis on China-first result in a strategy geared toward countering Chinese aggression and influence primarily in the Indo-Pacific region, or will forces and resources be geared toward countering China globally — across multiple regions and domains in which it is present? The answer to this will have significant implications for U.S. force structure and posture. North America and Europe will potentially face the most dramatic shifts in U.S. force structure and posture. Building a Golden Dome and accelerating nuclear modernization will consume vast resources. Increasing U.S. shipbuilding, aircraft and munitions production will further add to the bill. Moreover, using conventional ground and special operations capabilities along the southern border will create more costs and readiness issues. Europe is likely where these trade-offs will be felt most. European states and NATO should prepare for the U.S. military to act as an enabler rather than core provider of the bulk of any combat force. The United States can and should provide capabilities that European states will struggle to produce. Examples include command and control, space and cyber capabilities and bomber aircraft. However, Europe should expect to carry the burden for less unique military requirements, especially land combat roles. How this logic may translate to changes in American force posture in Europe is unclear, but experience from the last Trump administration suggests that some forces, especially land forces, may either withdraw from Europe or move out of Germany and Italy to posts farther east. The Middle East may continue to receive military resources similar to its current levels, though there will likely be pressure for partners to assume leading roles where they can. To begin, the force posture there is small relative to what it was just fifteen years ago. secon, the renewed maximum pressure campaign on Iran coupled with Israel's embroilment in several connected conflicts suggests that the administration will be unlikely to reduce support to Israel or Arab allies anytime soon. The desire to stabilize the region and pressure Iran back to the negotiating table are powerful imperatives to maintain commitments in the region. However, the United States may expect partners to do more. For example, European allies may be pressed to increase their presence in the Red Sea and assume more responsibility for common problems, such as countering the Houthi threat. Third, what is the role of the military in securing the U.S. border? While militaries are fundamentally tasked with securing a state against outside actors, the U.S. military has not focused on border security for over a century. Since the 1916 Mexican expedition, the United States has primarily secured itself by promoting stability abroad. As a result, border security shifted from a military role to a law enforcement function with defense undertones. A notable exception is air and missile defense, as seen in the combined US-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command. A century of this strategy has shaped the U.S. military to project power overseas and defend the air and sea approaches to North America. U.S. leaders will need to decide if they want to transition border security back to the military or if using military forces on the border is a temporary measure. If it is permanent, how will border security affect the overall military force structure, especially of the Army? If it is temporary, what conditions are the troops at the border to create and how will those conditions be sustained by traditional border security elements once the troops depart? Fourth, and most importantly, how will these changes be funded? The interim guidance seems to represent a major shift in strategy, which requires a significant change in the associated resourcing strategy. Continuing resolutions will not allow this strategy to be realized. Given that fiscal year 2025 is almost half over and a 2026 budget is nowhere to be seen, congressional leaders will need to act with a sense of urgency not typically associated with the budgeting process if the Trump administration wants to see these major efforts take shape. The interim guidance memo provides an early glimpse into the second Trump administration's defense priorities. Clearly, the new administration has a different assessment of strategic threats and a distinct approach to ways and means compared to the previous administration. However, many details of how 'peace through strength' will be implemented remain undefined — an unsurprising reality given the early days of the administration. Nevertheless, with pressing security threats, it is critical to articulate these plans quickly. In the coming months, the administration will need to clarify how it plans to adjust U.S. force structure and posture, shift more security responsibilities to allies in Europe and the Middle East, and define the U.S. military's role in border security. While much is still taking shape, this initial insight into the administration's strategic thinking provides a foundation for Congress and U.S. allies and partners to begin adapting to the Defense Department's shifting priorities. Clementine Starling-Daniels is Director and Senior Fellow of the Forward Defense Program, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Theresa Luetkefend is Assistant Director in the Forward Defense Program, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.
Yahoo
16-04-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Questions Congress should ask about DOD ‘peace through strength' plan
Less than two months after becoming the 29th Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth published an 'Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance' memo, reflecting President Donald Trump's desire to reshape U.S. defense strategy. It defines how the US military protects national security interests and shapes U.S. force structure, posture, war-fighting concepts and budget decisions. The document replaces the Biden administration's 2022 National Defense Strategy and marks a shift in Pentagon priorities under the new administration, offering an early look into what the second Trump administration's 'peace through strength' approach will mean in practice. While the memo itself is classified, public reporting on the guidance tells us the reordered priorities for the Pentagon: China and homeland defense, followed by everything else. U.S. military departments and combatant commands must now adjust their strategies and resourcing accordingly. Congress and US allies and partners must also assess the memo's implications — Congress for oversight and funding, and others to adapt their strategies in accordance with new Pentagon priorities. While China was considered the main threat in the past two National Defense Strategies, it appears to be the singular overseas focus of the interim guidance. And aside from concerns regarding Chinese influence over the Panama Canal (and presumably the Western Hemisphere more broadly), the Indo-Pacific remains the primary overseas focus for the U.S. military. The national objectives that underpinned the Biden and first Trump administrations — to protect the American people and expand economic prosperity —will likely remain. But the interim guidance signals a shift in how the administration perceives the strategic environment and the ways and means it will use to achieve its objectives. While the Biden administration focused on advancing democratic values to promote international stability, the Trump administration has emphasized peace through strength — the notion that military power helps ensure peace, a stance it now seeks to reaffirm. The Biden administration's 2022 NDS identified five major threats: China (the 'pacing' threat), Russia (the 'acute' threat), Iran, North Korea and violent extremist organizations — aligning with the first Trump administration. Biden's team prioritized those threats regionally, placing the homeland first, followed by the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the Middle East. This approach, a continuation of U.S. military strategy since the 1990s, is what a RAND study termed 'expeditionary defense in depth.' It emphasized maintaining a sizable global posture and projecting power, i.e., deploying forces, across significant distances to crisis zones. The 2025 interim guidance reverts to an earlier U.S. strategic approach suited for great power competition, what the same study calls 'consolidated defense in depth.' Reports of the guidance indicate a shift from emphasizing the U.S. military's ability to project power to crisis zones around the globe to a narrower prioritization on China and U.S. homeland defense. Previous strategies framed homeland defense around terrorism and overt military threats, but this guidance emphasizes holistic border security and protecting American interests in the Western Hemisphere, such as ensuring access to the Panama Canal and combatting cartels and transnational criminal organizations in Latin America. Every strategy involves trade-offs — prioritizing resources in one area means deprioritizing them elsewhere. The trade-off for a stronger U.S. focus on China and the Western Hemisphere in this guidance seems to be a diminished focus on Europe and the Middle East. Since the end of World War II, the United States has viewed a stable and peaceful Europe — composed of its closest like-minded allies and supported by a strong US role in NATO, security backing, training, and interoperability efforts — as strategically vital to its own security. This imperative may now be shifting. While European allies and partners rely heavily on U.S. support against Russian aggression, the Trump administration expects them to carry the brunt of that burden moving forward, which this guidance reportedly affirms. The estimated median defense expenditure among European NATO members in 2024 was 2.1%. This stark reprioritization will send a clear signal to European allies — the United States will likely do less in Europe, so regional deterrence and defense will require strong European leadership, investment and modernization of their military forces. The Middle East, while less stable than Europe and with allies that are spending more on defense (Israel, 5.3% of GDP; Saudi Arabia, 7.1% of GDP; United Arab Emirates, 5.6% of GDP; etc.), is another region that will likely face reduced U.S. military focus. Still, allies and partners should not believe that the United States will simply evacuate these regions. In some ways, the current trends might be thought of as a neo-Nixon Doctrine. As Nixon put it, this meant recognizing that 'the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot ... undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world.' The United States, according to this doctrine, would 'help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.' The same is likely to hold true now — this strategic guidance likely means a reevaluation of how the United States supports and enables allies and partners, not abandonment. A recent report in The Washington Post supports this assessment and further suggests that a Heritage Foundation report from last summer might be a major influence on the interim strategy. If these assumptions are true, then the United States will need to define where its involvement is uniquely necessary compared to what allies can handle independently, and, potentially, what it expects in return. Aligning Washington's expectations for allied capabilities with the reality of where those allies currently stand may prove challenging. The DoD's memo makes clear the reprioritization of its strategic threats and likely changes to how it will pursue its objectives. But it also raises crucial questions about what implementation will look like, what the Defense Department will ultimately ask of allies and partners, and how Congress can appropriate the funds to put these ambitions into practice. This guidance offers a first glimpse. A key attribute appears to be close U.S. control over its most vital interests, especially in the Western Hemisphere — reminiscent of a modern Monroe Doctrine. The original 1823 doctrine warned competitors against meddling in the Western Hemisphere while asserting U.S. dominance and a policy of non-interference in return. It also signals a heightened focus on homeland defense — deterring threats and protecting U.S. citizens and critical infrastructure from foreign attacks — particularly through nuclear deterrence and missile defense, as seen in the Golden Dome for America initiative. The Pentagon will also need to clarify where else it will invest to bolster homeland defense. Homeland defense can partially be achieved through strategic capabilities and border control — as reporting suggests the memo emphasizes — but threats to the homeland in the cyber and information spaces also abound. These are areas where the military can play a role, particularly in protecting critical infrastructure. If the administration intends to take a comprehensive approach to homeland defense, these aspects should also be considered. How the Defense Department clarifies its role, prioritization and resourcing of these areas will be important to watch in the coming months. For nearly a decade, the U.S. military prioritized developing forces to project power into the western Pacific to deter against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. For years, U.S. leaders have argued for increased defense spending to create a military capable of fighting and winning in multiple theaters simultaneously. Several of those leaders — National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and Senator Roger Wicker, for example — are now in key positions to influence U.S. defense strategy and resourcing. There may be support for a version of the multiple theater force construct proposed by the congressionally mandated 2024 bipartisan Commission on the National Defense Strategy, with significant responsibilities for allies and partners. But will an emphasis on China-first result in a strategy geared toward countering Chinese aggression and influence primarily in the Indo-Pacific region, or will forces and resources be geared toward countering China globally — across multiple regions and domains in which it is present? The answer to this will have significant implications for U.S. force structure and posture. North America and Europe will potentially face the most dramatic shifts in U.S. force structure and posture. Building a Golden Dome and accelerating nuclear modernization will consume vast resources. Increasing U.S. shipbuilding, aircraft and munitions production will further add to the bill. Moreover, using conventional ground and special operations capabilities along the southern border will create more costs and readiness issues. Europe is likely where these trade-offs will be felt most. European states and NATO should prepare for the U.S. military to act as an enabler rather than core provider of the bulk of any combat force. The United States can and should provide capabilities that European states will struggle to produce. Examples include command and control, space and cyber capabilities and bomber aircraft. However, Europe should expect to carry the burden for less unique military requirements, especially land combat roles. How this logic may translate to changes in American force posture in Europe is unclear, but experience from the last Trump administration suggests that some forces, especially land forces, may either withdraw from Europe or move out of Germany and Italy to posts farther east. The Middle East may continue to receive military resources similar to its current levels, though there will likely be pressure for partners to assume leading roles where they can. To begin, the force posture there is small relative to what it was just fifteen years ago. secon, the renewed maximum pressure campaign on Iran coupled with Israel's embroilment in several connected conflicts suggests that the administration will be unlikely to reduce support to Israel or Arab allies anytime soon. The desire to stabilize the region and pressure Iran back to the negotiating table are powerful imperatives to maintain commitments in the region. However, the United States may expect partners to do more. For example, European allies may be pressed to increase their presence in the Red Sea and assume more responsibility for common problems, such as countering the Houthi threat. While militaries are fundamentally tasked with securing a state against outside actors, the U.S. military has not focused on border security for over a century. Since the 1916 Mexican expedition, the United States has primarily secured itself by promoting stability abroad. As a result, border security shifted from a military role to a law enforcement function with defense undertones. A notable exception is air and missile defense, as seen in the combined US-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command. A century of this strategy has shaped the U.S. military to project power overseas and defend the air and sea approaches to North America. U.S. leaders will need to decide if they want to transition border security back to the military or if using military forces on the border is a temporary measure. If it is permanent, how will border security affect the overall military force structure, especially of the Army? If it is temporary, what conditions are the troops at the border to create and how will those conditions be sustained by traditional border security elements once the troops depart? The interim guidance seems to represent a major shift in strategy, which requires a significant change in the associated resourcing strategy. Continuing resolutions will not allow this strategy to be realized. Given that fiscal year 2025 is almost half over and a 2026 budget is nowhere to be seen, congressional leaders will need to act with a sense of urgency not typically associated with the budgeting process if the Trump administration wants to see these major efforts take shape. The interim guidance memo provides an early glimpse into the second Trump administration's defense priorities. Clearly, the new administration has a different assessment of strategic threats and a distinct approach to ways and means compared to the previous administration. However, many details of how 'peace through strength' will be implemented remain undefined — an unsurprising reality given the early days of the administration. Nevertheless, with pressing security threats, it is critical to articulate these plans quickly. In the coming months, the administration will need to clarify how it plans to adjust U.S. force structure and posture, shift more security responsibilities to allies in Europe and the Middle East, and define the U.S. military's role in border security. While much is still taking shape, this initial insight into the administration's strategic thinking provides a foundation for Congress and U.S. allies and partners to begin adapting to the Defense Department's shifting priorities. Clementine Starling-Daniels is Director and Senior Fellow of the Forward Defense Program, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Theresa Luetkefend is Assistant Director in the Forward Defense Program, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.
![[Editorial] Build up strength](/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fall-logos-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fkoreaherald.com.png&w=48&q=75){kind=small}
Korea Herald
02-04-2025
- Politics
- Korea Herald
[Editorial] Build up strength
Concerns about possible US-NK talks and USFK role adjustment US President Donald Trump has hinted at the possibility of restarting talks with North Korea. Asked by a reporter at the White House on Monday about whether he plans to reach out to North Korea and its leader, Kim Jong-un, Trump said, 'Well, I do.' Trump said there is communication with North Korea. He called North Korea a 'big nuclear nation.' Though Trump did not elaborate on the communication, it is quite obvious that Washington will likely seek to reopen dialogue with Pyongyang. If US-North Korea contacts were actually happening, it is likely that they communicate through North Korean representative to the United Nations in New York. Some speculate that the US might utilize channels with Russia to communicate with North Korea. Trump is going to reach out to North Korea, but the way his administration treats US allies is not like that. In the recently distributed 'Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance,' the Pentagon reoriented the US military to prioritize deterring China's seizure of Taiwan, according to an article in the Washington Post. The Pentagon will 'assume risk in other theaters' and pressure allies in Europe, the Middle East and East Asia to take on the bulk of the deterrence role in deterring Russia, North Korea and Iran, according to the guidance. Under the guidance, Washington is likely to pressure Seoul to increase its defense budget to deter North Korea and demand a steep increase in its share of the expenses of stationing US Forces Korea. A possible change in the role of the US military in Korea is a grave issue to watch. The Pentagon indicated in the memo that US military deployments will be reassessed. If US forces in Korea are reduced or partly deployed to defend Taiwan, insecurity will grow in Northeast Asia, including the Korean Peninsula. North Korea, which is always on the lookout for security gaps on the Korean Peninsula, is likelier to try bolder provocations against South Korea in such a scenario. To make matters worse, military relations between Pyongyang and Moscow are expected to deepen further. North Korea recently disclosed photos of Kim Jong-un boarding a radar surveillance plane and inspecting the progress on the construction of a nuclear-powered submarine. Some experts suspect Russian technologies might have been introduced in that military equipment. With South-North relations having been strained in recent years, North Korea has become very hostile to South Korea. If the US and North Korea negotiate to restart their direct dialogue in such a precarious situation, one of the biggest concerns for South Koreans would be the possibility of South Korea being passed over. Trump and Kim held talks in 2018 and 2019, and at that time, South Korea was practically sidelined to the role of an onlooker. If the same pattern is repeated this time, Seoul could end up accepting the outcomes of Trump-Kim negotiations passively. More concerning is the possibility that the dialogue will develop toward a deal lacking denuclearization. Should North Korea get sanctions relief with its nuclear programs kept intact, South Korea would face a dangerous security situation. With the South Korean government leadership weakened due to the impeachment of President Yoon Suk Yeol over his martial law decree, it has been difficult for Seoul to respond preemptively to US government policies. The Constitutional Court is scheduled to issue a sentence in Yoon's impeachment trial Friday. Afterward, the South Korean government and politicians should work together to get South Korean positions reflected well in Trump's Korea policies. There is a very low chance of China invading Taiwan, but it is not zero. Nonetheless, should an emergency break out in the Taiwan Strait, part of the USFK resources will likely be deployed there. South Korea should brace for all possibilities. In an era when the international security order is being shaken, efforts to build strength are a must, not an option.
