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Express Tribune
04-04-2025
- Politics
- Express Tribune
Repatriation and implications
Listen to article The deportation of nearly 880,000 Afghan Citizen Card (ACC) holders, along with all foreigners illegally residing in Pakistan, is underway following the expiration of the official March 31 deadline, which mandated the return of these individuals to leave the country voluntarily. The move has caused considerable "mayhem" — both in Afghanistan and elsewhere — with calls for compassion and refrain from forced repatriation. But quite interestingly, Iran has expelled over 1.5 million Afghans in the last two years but hardly has it been subjected to the kind of scrutiny that Pakistan is currently facing. One wonders why Pakistan is singled out for a drive that in essence is centred in the need for documentation of every foreigner that enters, resides or leaves the country. The Interior Ministry defends the crackdown, arguing "sufficient time has already been granted for their dignified return", emphasising that no one will be maltreated during the repatriation process, that began as the Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Program in November 2023. It forced around 850,000 undocumented refugees to return to Afghanistan in the first phase. They largely included hundreds of thousands of Afghans who fled their country in the wake of its takeover by Taliban in August 2021. The ongoing second phase is primarily targeting individuals who possess the ACC. The temporary identification document was issued to undocumented Afghans, mostly economic migrants, by the Pakistani government under a programme implemented in 2017 with the support of the International Organization of Migration (IOM) to address their vulnerabilities and facilitate access to services. Pakistan also hosts nearly 1.4 million legal Afghan refugees with the Proof of Registration (PoR) cards issued by the UNHCR. The PoR cards remain valid until June 30, 2025. Notably, over 60% of these refugees were born and raised in Pakistan. However, several questions arise based on my extensive experience and observations over the past three decades in and around Afghanistan. Does the phased expulsion of Afghans address Pakistan's security concerns? While officials have publicly argued that the presence of Afghans, both through PoR and ACC, poses a threat, it is unclear whether this expulsion will effectively address the security crisis. Secondly, what tangible benefits will be gained by forcibly repatriating Afghans who were born, raised and educated in Pakistan? For many of these young people, Afghanistan is an unfamiliar country. Additionally, despite the PTI provincial government's policy gaps and execution shortcomings, its standoff with the Centre and security establishment since 2013 has only exacerbated the province's economic woes and deepened the governance crisis, particularly in the six border districts that were merged in May 2018. The province continues to bear the brunt of TTP-led violence that originates from across the border. It is also important to note that the apex committee comprising the civilian government and the 11th Corps has continued to function effectively, largely due to the military's consistent leadership in addressing issues related to Afghanistan, borders and terrorism. Thirdly, the air is already toxic, replete with numerous anti-Pakistan narratives, predominantly emanating from Afghans who suffer under the oppressive rule of greedy police or border officials. These officials merely amplify and exacerbate the sentiment against Pakistan. Do they consider the consequences of their decisions, which grant the police unchecked authority to extort Afghans from all corners of the country? In numerous cases, even those with valid documentation, businesses and relationships have fallen victim to the unbridled and high-handedness of these officials, often driven by a voracious desire for money. Lastly, and more alarmingly, what mindset is currently prevailing in Pakistan? Do officials genuinely seek to protect Pakistan or merely the capital territory of Islamabad? Internally, the stated intention was to force Afghans out of Islamabad and Rawalpindi and relocate them to other areas. We would be delighted if most Afghans could leave the capital territory and Rawalpindi, as officials in Islamabad reportedly whispered into each other's ears. The most apparent implied intention, it appears, was to push Afghans from the twin cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi into the already struggling Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The province continues to grapple with the repercussions of the two Afghan wars, one against the Soviet Union and the other against Al-Qaeda, commonly referred to as the war on terror. In both instances, KP served as the launching pad, leading to a dilution of the rule of law. This erosion of law and order facilitated the involvement of both local and foreign state and non-state actors, resulting in countless compromises, relaxations of regulations, interference in the civilian security sector and circumvention of societal norms. The consequences are evident in the decaying governance structures, characterised by bureaucratic lethargy, political expediency and professional incompetence. The movers and shakers of power need to tread the path carefully to avoid the perception that they only care about Rawalpindi and Islamabad and that they treat KP and Balochistan as useless backyards, where socio-political tensions and economic adversity doesn't seem to bother those who matter.
Rudaw Net
27-01-2025
- Climate
- Rudaw Net
Iraq records lower rainfall in January
Also in Iraq Gunmen shoot Kurdish man, destroy property in Kirkuk Iraq says to recruit more Christian police officers in Nineveh Iraq's poverty, unemployment rates dropped in 2023: Official PM Sudani, US-led coalition commander discuss joint cooperation A+ A- ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - The Iraqi ministry of agriculture said on Monday most of Iraq's central and southern areas are suffering from drought and the whole country has seen less rainfall in January compared to the same period last year. "So far, the amount of rainfall in all central and southern Iraqi provinces is lower than the same period last year, especially in the southern provinces, where some areas received less than 30 millimeters," agriculture ministry spokesman Mohammed Khuzai told Rudaw, adding that as a result, there will be less wheat this year, compared to 2024. The provinces of Maysan, Dhi Qar, Basra, and Nasiriyah have seen the least amount of rainfall so far, said Amer Jabri, spokesman for the Iraqi meteorological and seismological agency. According to Jabri, plenty of rain is expected in February but it is not clear whether it will affect the agriculture sector. He also predicts that in any case, there will not be a general drought in the country this year. 'Drought is a natural phenomenon and it will be dealt with in accordance to its amount. In the Kurdistan Region so far, we have not declared drought in any area because this requires the coordination and opinion of all departments," Hiwa Ali, spokesperson for Kurdistan Region's ministry of agriculture and water resources told Rudaw. Besides Sulaimani - which had one millimeter of rainfall more than last year - all other three Kurdish provinces have seen less rain than the previous year, according to information obtained by Rudaw. Iraq is one of the world's most oil-rich countries that's grappling with climate effects which have impacted all aspects of life in the country. While climate change is a global problem, Iraq in particular is more vulnerable to its effects, as it was ranked fifth among countries most vulnerable to climate breakdown in a 2022 report by the International Organization of Migration (IOM). Additionally, it is ranked 61st out of 163 countries on UNICEF's Children's Climate Risk Index. By 2050, water availability is expected to drop by 20 percent, which could lead to the loss of nearly one-third of Iraq's irrigated land.
