Latest news with #Iran-Contra
Yahoo
14-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
How the Iran-Contra Scandal Impacts American Politics Today
Patrons at a pub watching TV to see Lt. Col. Oliver L. North's testimony before the joint Congressional hearing into Iran-Contra affair. Credit - Steve Liss—Getty Images President Donald Trump's actions, including denying election results, ignoring court decisions, and attacking civic institutions, have left many concerned that American democracy is imperiled. Historians have chronicled how precedents from the past have helped make these dangerous behaviors possible. They've cited the long history of conservative backlash against liberal reforms since the 1960s, the coarsening of political discourse in the 1990s, and the denial of voting rights and election results in the 21st century, for instance. But this narrative of democratic decline leaves out a pivotal episode: the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s. This opaque foreign policy mess has receded from history, a minor speedbump at the triumphant end of the Cold War. In a 2023 episode of Only Murders in the Building, Steve Martin's character explains to a bored millennial that Iran-Contra was 'worse than Watergate, just not as interesting.' Yet, understanding Iran-Contra's assault on democracy makes it interesting—and relevant—once more. The Iran-Contra scandal highlights how little respect Reagan Administration officials harbored for the guardrails of democracy yet suffered few penalties for their misdeeds. The rule-breaking and impunity during Iran-Contra may have set the stage for Trump. Americans have a muddled memory of Iran-Contra, in part because of its complexity. The scandal had two separate branches, each stemming from an attempt to achieve one of President Ronald Reagan's foreign policy goals. The first part transpired between 1984 and 1986, as Reagan's administration worked to free hostages held by allies of Ruhollah Khomeini's anti-American Iranian government. Believing that the Iranians could secure the release of the hostages, Reagan's aides sold them thousands of missiles to use in their war against Iraq. Doing so violated American law, and it broke Reagan's own promise never to negotiate with terrorists. These efforts proved, at best, ineffective and, at worst, counterproductive: they freed three hostages but got three more taken, and they failed to moderate the regime in Tehran. In late 1986, word of the secret sales leaked. Trump Calls for Judge in Deportations Case to Be Impeached, Drawing Rare Rebuke From Roberts Simultaneously, the other part of the scandal—the 'Contra' component—was taking place in a very different region of the world. In late 1984, Congress banned any U.S. intelligence organization from giving military funds or advice to the Contra rebels fighting Nicaragua's socialist government. Despite the clear ban, however, Reagan ordered subordinates to keep the Contras alive 'body and soul.' Trying to satisfy this directive, the CIA handed its mission to the National Security Council (NSC). More specifically, the mission fell to the NSC's deputy director of political-military affairs, Lt. Col. Oliver North. He took over a secret—and again, illegal—war with the help of private Americans and foreign governments. When a so-called private plane came crashing down in Nicaragua just weeks before news of the arms sales to Iran broke, the U.S. government's stealth effort in Central America emerged in broad daylight. The two were tied together because North diverted millions in unexpected profits from the arm sales to the Contras. While many in the government participated in at least one of two separate schemes, for instance by helping the Contras or shipping arms, only a scant few knew of this connection. Like the other elements of the scandal, it, too, was illegal, as the funds from the weapons sale should have gone to the U.S. Treasury by law. When the scandal engulfed the administration, Reagan did transfer North back to the Marine Corps and fired his national security advisor, John Poindexter. But, incredibly, he at first denied that he had sold weapons to Iran. His subordinates lied to congressional committees. And his attorney general, Ed Meese, ran a 'fact-finding' operation so careless that it seemed meant to protect the President while allowing North and his secretary to shred documents. This was not the behavior of an administration accepting responsibility or displaying transparency. In fact, in an interview with TIME, Reagan blamed the press for his troubles, and Republicans blamed Congress. Even when Reagan finally fessed up to having falsely denied an obvious arms for hostages operation, he told the American people, 'My heart and best intentions still tell me that's true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not.' The revelation of the intertwined scandals captivated Americans. Between the fall of 1986 and the fall of 1987, more than seven out of 10 Americans watched some of the televised congressional hearings about Iran-Contra. But once it became clear that Democrats would not impeach Reagan, public interest waned. Unlike Watergate, when a smoking gun tape implicated President Richard Nixon, to many, the 1980s scandal seemed a blur of byzantine Cold War diplomacy, opaque Swiss bank accounts, and a large cast of forgettable middlemen. The country boxed up the ugly affair and stored it in the attic of its memory. It did so even as the scandal persisted and investigators indicted dozens of administration officials. In 1988, Reagan's vice president, George H.W. Bush, won the presidency, and throughout his entire administration, those responsible for Iran-Contra dodged the political and legal consequences of their actions. Defendants in Iran-Contra cases benefited from a Bush Administration that refused to make many documents available to the courts, thus forcing prosecutors to pare back their charges. This allowed most to escape justice in criminal court. On, Christmas Eve 1992, after Bush had lost his reelection race, the lame duck president pardoned all of those still facing legal jeopardy from Iran-Contra. That conclusion—as well as the Reagan administration's lack of concern with legality—confirmed the erosion of core democratic norms, including separation of powers, rule of law, judicial independence, consent of the governed, and trust. In its final report, the Democratic-led congressional investigation committee sounded the alarm about the impact of Reagan officials' widespread disdain for democracy: 'Constitutional process is the essence of our democracy and our democratic form of Government is the basis of our strength.' A privatized war was 'a prescription for anarchy in a democratic society' they argued and the diversion of funds was 'the path to dictatorship.' But, crucially, unlike during Watergate, these conclusions weren't bipartisan. In fact, Republicans dismissed them. One conservative lawyer cynically called the criminal charges against North—lying to Congress, obstructing inquiries, and accepting an illegal gratuity—'nothing you couldn't charge a hundred other people with in this town.' Some congressional Republicans came away from the hearings convinced that their own institution should further encourage a 'unitary executive' that bullied not only Congress but also all executive departments. 'There was no constitutional crisis, no systematic disrespect for 'the rule of law,' no grand conspiracy, and no Administration-wide dishonesty or coverup,' concluded Republican Congressmen and Senators in the now-famed "Minority Report." Instead, many Republicans in Congress were frustrated by their own institution's legal right to restrain the power of the executive. Read More: What to Know About Trump's Order on Birthright Citizenship and the Legal Battle Around It They could freely dismiss the scandal in part because the GOP paid little political price for it. Voters elected Bush in 1988. In 1994, North came within a hair of winning a Senate race in Virginia. That same year, reflecting how Iran-Contra became a partisan Rorschach test more so than a badge of shame, the New York Times reported that, among those charged, convicted, or pardoned, 'almost all are unrepentant.' Poindexter reflected, 'If I had it to do over again, I would probably do things just about exactly the same way I did then.' The GOP's dismissal of the scandal has shaped politics in the decades since Iran-Contra. Dick Cheney, who served on the House Iran-Contra committee in 1987, later became vice president and recalled his and his colleagues' 'robust view of the president's prerogatives.' Elliott Abrams, Bill Barr, and John Bolton, who all figured in the scandal, served in the first Trump Administration. Additionally, echoes of Iran-Contra can be seen today. From the Trump Administration's refusal to obey congressional subpoenas to the mishandling of classified documents officials have ignored democratic norms and practices. Trump has also tried to shutter government agencies without congressional approval, refused to spend congressionally appropriated funds, and chipped away at the trust that cements relationships in a democracy. These behaviors represent the full flowering of the "unitary executive concept,"—an attitude that first reared its head during Iran-Contra. Alan McPherson is professor of history at Temple University and the author of The Breach: Iran-Contra and the Assault on American Democracy. Made by History takes readers beyond the headlines with articles written and edited by professional historians. Learn more about Made by History at TIME here. Opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of TIME editors. Write to Made by History at madebyhistory@
Time Magazine
14-05-2025
- Politics
- Time Magazine
How the Iran-Contra Scandal Impacts American Politics Today
President Donald Trump's actions, including denying election results, ignoring court decisions, and attacking civic institutions, have left many concerned that American democracy is imperiled. Historians have chronicled how precedents from the past have helped make these dangerous behaviors possible. They've cited the long history of conservative backlash against liberal reforms since the 1960s, the coarsening of political discourse in the 1990s, and the denial of voting rights and election results in the 21st century, for instance. But this narrative of democratic decline leaves out a pivotal episode: the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s. This opaque foreign policy mess has receded from history, a minor speedbump at the triumphant end of the Cold War. In a 2023 episode of Only Murders in the Building, Steve Martin's character explains to a bored millennial that Iran-Contra was 'worse than Watergate, just not as interesting.' Yet, understanding Iran-Contra's assault on democracy makes it interesting—and relevant—once more. The Iran-Contra scandal highlights how little respect Reagan Administration officials harbored for the guardrails of democracy yet suffered few penalties for their misdeeds. The rule-breaking and impunity during Iran-Contra may have set the stage for Trump. Americans have a muddled memory of Iran-Contra, in part because of its complexity. The scandal had two separate branches, each stemming from an attempt to achieve one of President Ronald Reagan's foreign policy goals. The first part transpired between 1984 and 1986, as Reagan's administration worked to free hostages held by allies of Ruhollah Khomeini's anti-American Iranian government. Believing that the Iranians could secure the release of the hostages, Reagan's aides sold them thousands of missiles to use in their war against Iraq. Doing so violated American law, and it broke Reagan's own promise never to negotiate with terrorists. These efforts proved, at best, ineffective and, at worst, counterproductive: they freed three hostages but got three more taken, and they failed to moderate the regime in Tehran. In late 1986, word of the secret sales leaked. Simultaneously, the other part of the scandal—the 'Contra' component—was taking place in a very different region of the world. In late 1984, Congress banned any U.S. intelligence organization from giving military funds or advice to the Contra rebels fighting Nicaragua's socialist government. Despite the clear ban, however, Reagan ordered subordinates to keep the Contras alive ' body and soul.' Trying to satisfy this directive, the CIA handed its mission to the National Security Council (NSC). More specifically, the mission fell to the NSC's deputy director of political-military affairs, Lt. Col. Oliver North. He took over a secret—and again, illegal—war with the help of private Americans and foreign governments. When a so-called private plane came crashing down in Nicaragua just weeks before news of the arms sales to Iran broke, the U.S. government's stealth effort in Central America emerged in broad daylight. The two were tied together because North diverted millions in unexpected profits from the arm sales to the Contras. While many in the government participated in at least one of two separate schemes, for instance by helping the Contras or shipping arms, only a scant few knew of this connection. Like the other elements of the scandal, it, too, was illegal, as the funds from the weapons sale should have gone to the U.S. Treasury by law. When the scandal engulfed the administration, Reagan did transfer North back to the Marine Corps and fired his national security advisor, John Poindexter. But, incredibly, he at first denied that he had sold weapons to Iran. His subordinates lied to congressional committees. And his attorney general, Ed Meese, ran a 'fact-finding' operation so careless that it seemed meant to protect the President while allowing North and his secretary to shred documents. This was not the behavior of an administration accepting responsibility or displaying transparency. In fact, in an interview with TIME, Reagan blamed the press for his troubles, and Republicans blamed Congress. Even when Reagan finally fessed up to having falsely denied an obvious arms for hostages operation, he told the American people, 'My heart and best intentions still tell me that's true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not.' The revelation of the intertwined scandals captivated Americans. Between the fall of 1986 and the fall of 1987, more than seven out of 10 Americans watched some of the televised congressional hearings about Iran-Contra. But once it became clear that Democrats would not impeach Reagan, public interest waned. Unlike Watergate, when a smoking gun tape implicated President Richard Nixon, to many, the 1980s scandal seemed a blur of byzantine Cold War diplomacy, opaque Swiss bank accounts, and a large cast of forgettable middlemen. The country boxed up the ugly affair and stored it in the attic of its memory. It did so even as the scandal persisted and investigators indicted dozens of administration officials. In 1988, Reagan's vice president, George H.W. Bush, won the presidency, and throughout his entire administration, those responsible for Iran-Contra dodged the political and legal consequences of their actions. Defendants in Iran-Contra cases benefited from a Bush Administration that refused to make many documents available to the courts, thus forcing prosecutors to pare back their charges. This allowed most to escape justice in criminal court. On, Christmas Eve 1992, after Bush had lost his reelection race, the lame duck president pardoned all of those still facing legal jeopardy from Iran-Contra. That conclusion—as well as the Reagan administration's lack of concern with legality—confirmed the erosion of core democratic norms, including separation of powers, rule of law, judicial independence, consent of the governed, and trust. In its final report, the Democratic-led congressional investigation committee sounded the alarm about the impact of Reagan officials' widespread disdain for democracy: 'Constitutional process is the essence of our democracy and our democratic form of Government is the basis of our strength.' A privatized war was 'a prescription for anarchy in a democratic society' they argued and the diversion of funds was 'the path to dictatorship.' But, crucially, unlike during Watergate, these conclusions weren't bipartisan. In fact, Republicans dismissed them. One conservative lawyer cynically called the criminal charges against North—lying to Congress, obstructing inquiries, and accepting an illegal gratuity—'nothing you couldn't charge a hundred other people with in this town.' Some congressional Republicans came away from the hearings convinced that their own institution should further encourage a 'unitary executive' that bullied not only Congress but also all executive departments. 'There was no constitutional crisis, no systematic disrespect for 'the rule of law,' no grand conspiracy, and no Administration-wide dishonesty or coverup,' concluded Republican Congressmen and Senators in the now-famed "Minority Report." Instead, many Republicans in Congress were frustrated by their own institution's legal right to restrain the power of the executive. They could freely dismiss the scandal in part because the GOP paid little political price for it. Voters elected Bush in 1988. In 1994, North came within a hair of winning a Senate race in Virginia. That same year, reflecting how Iran-Contra became a partisan Rorschach test more so than a badge of shame, the New York Times reported that, among those charged, convicted, or pardoned, 'almost all are unrepentant.' Poindexter reflected, 'If I had it to do over again, I would probably do things just about exactly the same way I did then.' The GOP's dismissal of the scandal has shaped politics in the decades since Iran-Contra. Dick Cheney, who served on the House Iran-Contra committee in 1987, later became vice president and recalled his and his colleagues' ' robust view of the president's prerogatives.' Elliott Abrams, Bill Barr, and John Bolton, who all figured in the scandal, served in the first Trump Administration. Additionally, echoes of Iran-Contra can be seen today. From the Trump Administration's refusal to obey congressional subpoenas to the mishandling of classified documents officials have ignored democratic norms and practices. Trump has also tried to shutter government agencies without congressional approval, refused to spend congressionally appropriated funds, and chipped away at the trust that cements relationships in a democracy. These behaviors represent the full flowering of the " unitary executive concept,"—an attitude that first reared its head during Iran-Contra. Alan McPherson is professor of history at Temple University and the author of The Breach: Iran-Contra and the Assault on American Democracy.
Chicago Tribune
23-04-2025
- Politics
- Chicago Tribune
Column: President Donald Trump should be wary of history of second terms
The 2024 election victory of President Donald Trump by a majority of the Electoral College votes and a narrow plurality of votes cast at the polls understandably has been a source of great political satisfaction for his partisan base, and his now captive Republican Party. The committed core of the president's fervent support has experienced nothing short of jubilation, given the highly confrontational and contentious approach of this leader, especially on social and affirmative action, and immigration issues. The fiscal restraint of traditional Republicanism is another matter, given the spending and deficit escalations that are now characteristic of Trump. In this atmosphere, Americans generally, and especially Trump supporters, should reflect thoughtfully on our history, and specifically on the very serious problems that have afflicted nearly all presidents fortunate enough to have a second term in the White House. President Barack Obama was vexed by the IRS targeting of conservative groups, President George W. Bush by the Iraq insurgency, President Bill Clinton by impeachment, President Ronald Reagan by the Iran-Contra scandal, and President Lyndon Johnson and President Harry Truman by wars – in Vietnam and Korea – that forced early retirement of the former. President Richard Nixon was driven from office. Even President Franklin D. Roosevelt suffered major difficulties. He is viewed as a great president and great politician, given his unique accomplishment of successive elections to the White House four times. Yet FDR in his second term was frustrated by Supreme Court vetoes of New Deal reforms, and attempted to expand or 'pack' the nation's highest judicial body. Dominant Democrats in Congress were more sensitive to the constitutional bulwark of the separation of powers than to even a very powerful chief executive of their own party, and Roosevelt rightly was rebuffed. His vainglorious effort to change our institutional balance in such a fundamental manner stands as a major mistake of his tenure. The single exception among relatively recent presidents to second-term setbacks is President Dwight D. Eisenhower, whose historical reputation has steadily risen since he left office in 1961. Professor Fred Greenstein of Princeton University, an influential and unusually perceptive political scientist among the Eisenhower revisionists, argues that this 'hidden-hand' president exercised deft executive leadership while largely avoiding direct confrontations. The sunny good humor Ike almost invariably displayed in public masked an extremely disciplined, thorough style of administrative work. Those who worked for him express respect and admiration, but also almost uniformly testify to his exceptionally disciplined, demanding, and at times cold-blooded style of work. You absolutely had to be well-informed and effective in your own job, or you would soon be sidelined or gone. Eisenhower's executive skills were honed through long years of difficult staff work, including service for the generally impossible Gen. Douglas MacArthur, and the extraordinary challenges of leading the Allied military coalition in the European theatre in World War II. Even very successful American politicians are often surprisingly lacking in true executive experience, discipline and skill. Ike the exception was ever mindful of unanticipated developments and consequences. After his inauguration, he promptly ended the Korean War, maneuvered through crises over Taiwan as well as Berlin that were loaded with nuclear danger, and ruthlessly executed covert operations in Nicaragua and elsewhere that were important to keeping the peace of that high-risk Cold War era. He purchased credit with the public through federal spending restraint. Having achieved our highest military rank and our highest political office, he scrupulously avoided swagger, chose his public words very carefully and always wore civilian clothes.
Arab News
19-04-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
1986 - The Iran-Contra affair
RIYADH: The 1986 Iran-Contra affair remains one of the most controversial episodes in modern US history, revealing a complex web of clandestine operations, legal violations and political intrigue. The scandal, which unfolded during Ronald Reagan's presidency, revolved around covert sales of arms to Iran and the illegal diversion of the profits to fund right-wing Contra rebels in Nicaragua. It challenged the very principles of transparency, accountability and the rule of law in democratic governance. The backdrop to the events was shaped by Cold War tensions and volatile Middle Eastern geopolitics. On May 17, 1985, Graham Fuller, the CIA's national intelligence officer for the Near East and South Asia, wrote a memorandum to CIA Director William Casey on the options for US policy toward Iran. 'Events are moving largely against our interests, and we have few palatable alternatives. The US has almost no cards to play; the USSR has many,' Fuller wrote. To provide the US with 'some leverage in the race for influence in Tehran,' Fuller suggested Washington should 'remove all restrictions on sales — including military — to Iran.' In Nicaragua, meanwhile, the Sandinista government, which in 1979 overthrew a US-backed political system, aligned itself with socialist policies and the Soviet Union. This development alarmed the Reagan administration, which supported the Contra rebels, a group accused of widespread human rights abuses. Simultaneously, the US faced complex challenges in the Middle East. Iran was engaged in a protracted war with Iraq (1980-1988), and Washington sought to limit Soviet influence in the region while securing the release of US hostages held by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon. Despite its public stance of refusal to negotiate with terrorists, and its own arms embargo on Tehran, the Reagan administration saw an opportunity to leverage arms sales as a means of influence. It wanted to secure the release of US hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon, and attempt to open a channel for dialogue with more-moderate elements in Iran. The Iran-Contra scandal involved two distinct yet interconnected operations. Firstly, senior US officials facilitated the secret sale of arms to Iran, ostensibly as a gesture of goodwill to moderate factions within the Iranian government and to secure the release of US hostages. This violated an arms embargo imposed by Washington on Iran, and contradicted Reagan's public statements condemning terrorism. Secondly, profits from these arms sales were diverted to fund the Contras in Nicaragua. This contravened the Boland Amendment, a series of laws passed by Congress between 1982 and 1984 that explicitly prohibited US military assistance for the group. US and Israeli intelligence organizations collude in Operation Tipped Kettle, which involves the transfer to Contra rebels in Nicaragua of weapons seized from the PLO. With US agreement, Israel sends first of several shipments of American-made armaments to Iran in a bid to secure release of US hostages in Lebanon. Lt. Col. Oliver North of the US National Security Council proposes direct sale of armaments to Iran, with the profits to go to the Contras in Nicaragua. Lebanese weekly Ash-Shiraa exposes the illegal Iran arms deal. North convicted on three charges relating to the Iran-Contra affair. In September 1991, all charges are dismissed on appeal. President George H.W. Bush pardons the former secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, and five other defendants facing trial over the Iran-Contra affair, saying it is 'time for the country to move on.' The plan was orchestrated by a small group of officials within the National Security Council, including Lt. Col. Oliver North, with the knowledge and support of senior figures such as National Security Advisor John Poindexter. At the same time, the CIA and the Department of Defense conducted Operation Tipped Kettle, which involved secret negotiations with Israel on the transfer of armaments captured from the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon to the CIA and, ultimately, to the Contras. In May 1983, Israel duly handed over several hundred tonnes of weapons, valued at $10 million. This was repeated in 1984. In 1985, Israel began shipping US weapons to Iran, in an attempt to curry favor with Tehran and pave the way for the release of American hostages, with the approval of Poindexter's predecessor as Reagan's national security adviser, Robert McFarlane. On Nov. 2, 1986, within days of the delivery of 500 antitank missiles to Iran, US hostage David Jacobsen was released by his captors in Beirut. North anticipated the release of other hostages would follow but this did not happen. In response to media inquiries, White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan publicly acknowledged, for the first time, the ongoing negotiations with Iran. The Iran-Contra affair fully came to light in late 1986, after Lebanese publication Ash-Shiraa revealed details of the arms deals with Iran. On Nov. 3, 1986, it published an account of a secret visit to Tehran by McFarlane in May 1986. Subsequent investigations by journalists and Congressional committees uncovered the broader plan, which raised serious questions about executive overreach, the subversion of Congressional authority, and the ethical conduct of government officials. It sparked outrage among lawmakers and the public. Televised hearings in 1987 captivated the country, with key figures, including North, testifying about the operation. While some viewed North as a patriot simply following orders, others considered him emblematic of an administration willing to circumvent the law to achieve its goals. The hearings also revealed a culture of secrecy and deception within the Reagan administration, damaging the president's credibility and eroding public trust in state institutions. The fallout from the Iran-Contra scandal included several criminal prosecutions. North, Poindexter and other officials were charged with crimes such as obstruction of justice, conspiracy and lying to Congress. The affair was also a major blow to the Reagan administration's credibility. It raised questions about the extent of presidential knowledge and oversight, as Reagan maintained he was unaware of the transfer of funds to the Contras. Politically, the scandal tarnished his legacy, though his approval ratings remained high until the end of his presidency in 1989. The affair remains a cautionary tale about the dangers of unchecked executive power and the ethical dilemmas inherent in foreign policy. While it did not lead to lasting reforms in intelligence oversight, it did underscore the need for greater vigilance to prevent abuses of power, and serves as a case study in how the pursuit even of well-meaning objectives can result in unintended consequences if legal and ethical boundaries are crossed.
Yahoo
14-04-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Trump rushes headstrong into the dreaded ‘fifth-year curse'
Five years ago, the University of Virginia's Miller Center and the Center for Presidential Transition published a memorable report on 'the fifth-year curse,' which took note of a curious historical phenomenon. 'While the president's fifth year should be a symbolic and substantive fresh start, it is often marred by political infighting, major crises, and failed legislative agendas,' the report explained. Way back in 2013, Politico had a related report on the trend. [T]here's just something about Year Five itself — some immutable law of the American political calendar that condemns our presidents to a miserable time after their second inaugural. Maybe it's about presidents and their re-election hangovers, or their opponents' renewed determination to thwart the White House agenda, or perhaps it's simply the problem of the public's inevitable fatigue. While there's no reason to take seriously the idea of an actual 'curse,' there's no denying the fact that a great many presidents have struggled in their fifth year in the White House. In 1937, for example, in Franklin Delano Roosevelt's fifth year, the legendary Democratic president backed off New Deal spending, which reversed economic progress, and tried to pack the U.S. Supreme Court. But that's just the start. The Watergate scandal broke during Richard Nixon's fifth year. The Iran-Contra scandal broke during Ronald Reagan's fifth year. Bill Clinton's relationship with Monica Lewinsky began during his fifth year. George W. Bush tried to privatize Social Security in his fifth year, helping set the stage for Democrats to take back Congress a year later. Though it pales in comparison to dramatic scandals such as Watergate and Iran-Contra, one of the most notable setbacks of Barack Obama's presidency — the launch of the Affordable Care Act's website, which initially did not work — also came during his fifth year in office. There are plenty of competing theories to explain why 'the fifth-year curse' endures. Some have attributed this to staffing changes; others have pointed to the hubris that comes with leaders knowing they'll never again have to face the electorate again. But while Donald Trump's fifth year is just getting started — believe it or not, he's not yet three months into his second term — it's hard not to notice that he doesn't appear to be making much of an effort to avoid the so-called 'curse.' On the contrary, the incumbent Republican appears to be rushing headstrong into it. Twelve weeks after his second inaugural, Trump is increasingly unpopular, burdened by scandal, generally seen as an international pariah by the United States' traditional allies, confronting a series of controversies generated by rampant White House incompetence, suffering a series of setbacks in the courts, pursuing a foolhardy imperialistic agenda, undermining democracy and democratic institutions, and undermining global economic stability for reasons he's struggled to explain. No one should call a game after the first quarter, but Trump is already on pace to have the worst fifth year in American history — a history that is filled with some catastrophically bad fifth years. Perhaps he's unconcerned about accountability because a truly pitiful Republican majority exists in both chambers, and it remains wholly indifferent to Congress' oversight responsibilities. Maybe this has something to do with the fact that Republican-appointed Supreme Court justices ruled that presidents can break laws with impunity. It's also very easy to believe that while Trump had some officials in his first term who told him inconvenient truths, in his second term, he's taken steps to ensure that he's surrounded exclusively with sycophants who tell him his every whim is worthy of praise and celebration. Whatever the explanation, those who study the 'fifth-year curse' should prepare for a dramatic new chapter to their work. This article was originally published on
