How the Iran-Contra Scandal Impacts American Politics Today

Time​ Magazine

14-05-2025

President Donald Trump's actions, including denying election results, ignoring court decisions, and attacking civic institutions, have left many concerned that American democracy is imperiled. Historians have chronicled how precedents from the past have helped make these dangerous behaviors possible. They've cited the long history of conservative backlash against liberal reforms since the 1960s, the coarsening of political discourse in the 1990s, and the denial of voting rights and election results in the 21st century, for instance.
But this narrative of democratic decline leaves out a pivotal episode: the Iran-Contra scandal of the 1980s. This opaque foreign policy mess has receded from history, a minor speedbump at the triumphant end of the Cold War. In a 2023 episode of Only Murders in the Building, Steve Martin's character explains to a bored millennial that Iran-Contra was 'worse than Watergate, just not as interesting.' Yet, understanding Iran-Contra's assault on democracy makes it interesting—and relevant—once more.
The Iran-Contra scandal highlights how little respect Reagan Administration officials harbored for the guardrails of democracy yet suffered few penalties for their misdeeds. The rule-breaking and impunity during Iran-Contra may have set the stage for Trump.
Americans have a muddled memory of Iran-Contra, in part because of its complexity. The scandal had two separate branches, each stemming from an attempt to achieve one of President Ronald Reagan's foreign policy goals.
The first part transpired between 1984 and 1986, as Reagan's administration worked to free hostages held by allies of Ruhollah Khomeini's anti-American Iranian government. Believing that the Iranians could secure the release of the hostages, Reagan's aides sold them thousands of missiles to use in their war against Iraq. Doing so violated American law, and it broke Reagan's own promise never to negotiate with terrorists. These efforts proved, at best, ineffective and, at worst, counterproductive: they freed three hostages but got three more taken, and they failed to moderate the regime in Tehran. In late 1986, word of the secret sales leaked.
Simultaneously, the other part of the scandal—the 'Contra' component—was taking place in a very different region of the world. In late 1984, Congress banned any U.S. intelligence organization from giving military funds or advice to the Contra rebels fighting Nicaragua's socialist government. Despite the clear ban, however, Reagan ordered subordinates to keep the Contras alive ' body and soul.' Trying to satisfy this directive, the CIA handed its mission to the National Security Council (NSC).
More specifically, the mission fell to the NSC's deputy director of political-military affairs, Lt. Col. Oliver North. He took over a secret—and again, illegal—war with the help of private Americans and foreign governments. When a so-called private plane came crashing down in Nicaragua just weeks before news of the arms sales to Iran broke, the U.S. government's stealth effort in Central America emerged in broad daylight.
The two were tied together because North diverted millions in unexpected profits from the arm sales to the Contras. While many in the government participated in at least one of two separate schemes, for instance by helping the Contras or shipping arms, only a scant few knew of this connection. Like the other elements of the scandal, it, too, was illegal, as the funds from the weapons sale should have gone to the U.S. Treasury by law.
When the scandal engulfed the administration, Reagan did transfer North back to the Marine Corps and fired his national security advisor, John Poindexter. But, incredibly, he at first denied that he had sold weapons to Iran. His subordinates lied to congressional committees. And his attorney general, Ed Meese, ran a 'fact-finding' operation so careless that it seemed meant to protect the President while allowing North and his secretary to shred documents. This was not the behavior of an administration accepting responsibility or displaying transparency. In fact, in an interview with TIME, Reagan blamed the press for his troubles, and Republicans blamed Congress. Even when Reagan finally fessed up to having falsely denied an obvious arms for hostages operation, he told the American people, 'My heart and best intentions still tell me that's true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not.'
The revelation of the intertwined scandals captivated Americans. Between the fall of 1986 and the fall of 1987, more than seven out of 10 Americans watched some of the televised congressional hearings about Iran-Contra. But once it became clear that Democrats would not impeach Reagan, public interest waned. Unlike Watergate, when a smoking gun tape implicated President Richard Nixon, to many, the 1980s scandal seemed a blur of byzantine Cold War diplomacy, opaque Swiss bank accounts, and a large cast of forgettable middlemen. The country boxed up the ugly affair and stored it in the attic of its memory.
It did so even as the scandal persisted and investigators indicted dozens of administration officials. In 1988, Reagan's vice president, George H.W. Bush, won the presidency, and throughout his entire administration, those responsible for Iran-Contra dodged the political and legal consequences of their actions. Defendants in Iran-Contra cases benefited from a Bush Administration that refused to make many documents available to the courts, thus forcing prosecutors to pare back their charges. This allowed most to escape justice in criminal court.
On, Christmas Eve 1992, after Bush had lost his reelection race, the lame duck president pardoned all of those still facing legal jeopardy from Iran-Contra.
That conclusion—as well as the Reagan administration's lack of concern with legality—confirmed the erosion of core democratic norms, including separation of powers, rule of law, judicial independence, consent of the governed, and trust. In its final report, the Democratic-led congressional investigation committee sounded the alarm about the impact of Reagan officials' widespread disdain for democracy: 'Constitutional process is the essence of our democracy and our democratic form of Government is the basis of our strength.' A privatized war was 'a prescription for anarchy in a democratic society' they argued and the diversion of funds was 'the path to dictatorship.'
But, crucially, unlike during Watergate, these conclusions weren't bipartisan. In fact, Republicans dismissed them. One conservative lawyer cynically called the criminal charges against North—lying to Congress, obstructing inquiries, and accepting an illegal gratuity—'nothing you couldn't charge a hundred other people with in this town.'
Some congressional Republicans came away from the hearings convinced that their own institution should further encourage a 'unitary executive' that bullied not only Congress but also all executive departments. 'There was no constitutional crisis, no systematic disrespect for 'the rule of law,' no grand conspiracy, and no Administration-wide dishonesty or coverup,' concluded Republican Congressmen and Senators in the now-famed "Minority Report." Instead, many Republicans in Congress were frustrated by their own institution's legal right to restrain the power of the executive.
They could freely dismiss the scandal in part because the GOP paid little political price for it. Voters elected Bush in 1988. In 1994, North came within a hair of winning a Senate race in Virginia.
That same year, reflecting how Iran-Contra became a partisan Rorschach test more so than a badge of shame, the New York Times reported that, among those charged, convicted, or pardoned, 'almost all are unrepentant.' Poindexter reflected, 'If I had it to do over again, I would probably do things just about exactly the same way I did then.'
The GOP's dismissal of the scandal has shaped politics in the decades since Iran-Contra. Dick Cheney, who served on the House Iran-Contra committee in 1987, later became vice president and recalled his and his colleagues' ' robust view of the president's prerogatives.' Elliott Abrams, Bill Barr, and John Bolton, who all figured in the scandal, served in the first Trump Administration.
Additionally, echoes of Iran-Contra can be seen today. From the Trump Administration's refusal to obey congressional subpoenas to the mishandling of classified documents officials have ignored democratic norms and practices.
Trump has also tried to shutter government agencies without congressional approval, refused to spend congressionally appropriated funds, and chipped away at the trust that cements relationships in a democracy. These behaviors represent the full flowering of the " unitary executive concept,"—an attitude that first reared its head during Iran-Contra.
Alan McPherson is professor of history at Temple University and the author of The Breach: Iran-Contra and the Assault on American Democracy.