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Indian Express
08-07-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
As Israel strikes Yemen, it will need to look back at its security architecture after conflict with Iran
Israel's ongoing air strikes targeting the Houthis in Yemen, the ports of Hodeidah, Ras Isa and Salif, and the Ras Khatib power station, could be construed as its commitment to consistently degrade the operational capabilities of any adversaries it perceives as major security threats. While most Iranian-supported proxies lie low for the moment, the Houthi militias appear intent on enhancing their reputation as a threat which Israel cannot afford to ignore. For decades, the rivalry between Israel and Iran has been characterised by proxy conflicts and rhetorical antagonism, yet direct military confrontation remained largely theoretical. The recent escalation in hostilities between these two regional powers has fundamentally altered this dynamic. The ideological and political divergences between Israel and Iran crystallised following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which established a theocratic governance structure under clerical authority headed by the Supreme Leader. Iran's nuclear programme, particularly its uranium enrichment activities, has emerged as a central flashpoint in this arch rivalry, which intensified following the mid-2002 revelation of Tehran's nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz. The policy trajectory has remained consistent across successive US administrations, culminating in direct military strikes against three important nuclear facilities inside Iran on June 22, 2025. These actions, however, followed Israel's pre-emptive strikes against Iran on June 13 and subsequent Iranian retaliation. While the military exchanges between Israel and Iran in 2024 resulted in limited material damage to both parties, it appeared that the former's leadership had grown complacent due to the measured Iranian responses during these earlier strikes. Tel Aviv was operating under the assumption that future threats could be effectively mitigated through existing air defence systems, a miscalculation that proved costly. Critical infrastructure in Israel, including a Haifa oil refinery, a Beersheba hospital, and residential complexes in populated areas suffered substantial harm. On the other hand, the conflict's aftermath presents significant challenges for Iran's domestic stability. The current regime confronts the imperative of securing substantial public support for its continued legitimacy while simultaneously implementing more stringent governance measures to prevent the fragmentation of public opinion. This represents a particularly delicate balancing act, given recent episodes of civil unrest (for instance, Mahsa Amini) stemming from Iran's human rights records, restrictions on female political participation, and persistent socio-economic grievances. In the post-conflict environment, the theocratic regime is likely to respond to any manifestation of dissent with increased authoritarian measures. This 'wounded' regime — even the IRGC has suffered severe operational degradation following the elimination of several senior military commanders — is likely going to be a dangerous one. The conflict has also fundamentally challenged Iran's regional ambitions, especially its project of establishing a Shiite crescent across the Levant. The assassination of former Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut in September 2024, to an extent, undermined operation effectiveness of the Axis of Resistance, calling into question the viability of Iran's regional proxy network. The fall of former Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad to rebel forces in December 2024 constituted a major setback for Iranian leadership, representing the loss of a crucial ally who had been instrumental in sustaining and advancing the so-called resistance framework. And beyond the Houthis' initial missile attack against Israel, other Iranian proxies had shown limited engagement during the conflict. This was mostly evident among Iranian-aligned groups operating out of Lebanon and Iraq which could be construed as potential weaknesses in Iran's proxy coordination and commitment mechanisms. However, it remains premature to anticipate the complete cessation of proxy activities; these groups will likely adopt a more cautious operational posture to avoid retaliatory measures for a while. While Iran's setbacks during the June conflict were discernible, Israel also confronted significant security challenges. Despite deploying advanced anti-missile defence systems, including variants of Arrow, David's Sling, Iron Dome, and US-manufactured Patriot systems, which intercepted numerous long-range ballistic missiles, the defensive network proved insufficient against the sustained missile assault carried out by Iran. For a geographically constrained state like Israel, prolonged exposure to such intensive attacks from regional adversaries presents unsustainable strategic risks, given its limited defensive resources and the escalating financial cost of continuous retaliation. Questions also remain regarding the sustainability of Israel's dependence on American security assurances, particularly given the Trump administration's disinterest to engage in protracted Middle Eastern military entanglements. This dilemma between immediate security guarantees and long-term strategic autonomy presents a critical consideration for Israeli defence planning moving forward. The damage inflicted upon Iran's nuclear infrastructure will likely require several years of reconstruction efforts, though whether Tehran will resume uranium enrichment activities remains an open question. Simultaneously, there are growing concerns that Iran may retreat into unprecedented levels of operational secrecy, potentially complicating international monitoring efforts and obscuring the regime's actual capabilities and intentions from the global community. Given Israel's consistent capacity for strategic adaptation following military engagements throughout its history, it will likely conduct a comprehensive assessment of the operational deficiencies and strategic vulnerabilities exposed during the recent confrontation. The 12-day confrontation, nevertheless, marks a watershed moment, testing Israel and Iran's deterrence frameworks and strategic resilience, fundamentally altering the parameters of their longstanding rivalry and establishing new precedents for regional security dynamics. The writer is Deputy Director & Assistant Professor, Symbiosis School of International Studies, Pune
Daily Maverick
10-06-2025
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
Deepening ties between Houthis and Somali terror groups raise alarm over lethal drone threat
The sharing of lethal drone technology with al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Somalia could recast the conflict in the Horn and beyond. Yemen's Ansar Allah – commonly known as the Houthis – and Somalia's two proscribed terrorist organisations, al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Somalia (IS Somalia), are reportedly deepening ties. How could this impact the tools of war, especially lethal drone technology, which is increasingly a hallmark of Ansar Allah's operations backed by its powerful ally, Iran? Will the relationship with the United Nations (UN)-sanctioned group influence how Somalia's violent extremist groups fight or are perceived regionally? Technology transfer between armed groups is better understood since the proliferation of improvised explosive devices following conflicts in Iraq (2002) and Afghanistan (2001-2021). Migration of foreign fighters and access to 3D printing have ramped up these groups' ability to exploit arms trafficking channels, share knowledge, access components or inspire others. The proliferation of military-grade drones in Africa makes this an even more crowded space. Al-Shabaab has to date used drones largely for propaganda, intelligence and surveillance rather than attacks. UN monitors describe its relationship with Ansar Allah as 'transactional or opportunistic' – the pair having shared interests in smuggling routes and access to revenue streams. However, there is evidence that al-Shabaab may seek a more lethal use of drones. The UN monitors note that in meetings between the two groups in 2024, al-Shabaab's leadership requested 'advanced weapons and training' from Ansar Allah. Ansar Allah has demonstrated a penchant for using drones, seen during attacks on commercial ships during the Red Sea crisis that began in 2023. Some of the group's equipment and components were traced directly to Iran, 'and were likely mostly domestically assembled Sammad-series [unmanned aerial vehicles]', Conflict Armament Research's head of Gulf operations, Taimur Khan, told ISS Today. 'The Houthis procure the internal dual-use components themselves and make the airframes domestically.' They also used commercial, off-the-shelf drones. Al-Shabaab, IS Somalia and Ansar Allah mutually benefit from working together. A Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report, which includes interviews with coastguards, claims that 'Somalia's porous coastlines have become critical to ensuring that the group has access to Iranian supplies of Chinese equipment necessary for the growth of its Iranian-supported drone and missile programme'. And Somalia's armed groups allegedly benefit from training and more sophisticated drones. IS Somalia is also experimenting with drones. In Puntland, where it has a foothold, the group's first recorded drone strikes – on the Puntland Security Force – were in January. In the six months before, security officials seized five suicide drones 'dispatched by Ansar Allah… and arrested seven individuals' linked to Somalia's two main extremist groups. Furthermore, the UN monitors said that in May 2024 '[IS Somalia] employed unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance and limited explosive deployment… It is assessed that the programme was aimed at building suicide unmanned aerial vehicles.' This either suggests cooperation between Yemen and Somalia's armed groups or that they draw inspiration from each other. Owning drones is important for armed groups' power projection. Media focus on suicide or first-person-view drones used for short-range missions. These enable operators to receive real-time information, and are 'one of the deadliest threats to civilians in frontline areas', say UN human rights monitors in Ukraine. They are regarded as a game-changer in asymmetric warfare and seem highly coveted by armed groups, including Ansar Allah. But how likely are these weapons to be routinely used in Somalia? 'There have been… seizures of FPV [drone] components being smuggled into Yemen, but Conflict Armament Research has not seen FPV drones being used by [al-Shabaab], although it does not mean it has never happened,' Khan says. Assault rifles are still the main weapon smuggled into the region, but experts say greater drone proliferation seems almost inevitable. 'Once this technology is adopted [by] a particular terrorist group, the ideas will proliferate in the region and be picked up by other armed groups, even if there are no direct links between those groups,' Khan says. Existing supply routes for other forms of contraband can easily be repurposed. The relationship between Ansar Allah and al-Shabaab provides greater access for al-Shabaab to more sophisticated arms, and smuggling routes and financial opportunities for Ansar Allah. Closer ties with extremist groups in Somalia also mean that Ansar Allah – and more so Iran, which provides it with military, financial and logistical support – gains 'strategic depth', the Carnegie Endowment says. Via its Yemeni proxy, Iran can help 'shape the maritime security architecture of the Gulf of Aden and Bab-al-Mandab Strait', the site of many commercial shipping attacks. It also potentially increases threat perceptions in the region, especially in Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Kenya. This will force militaries to allocate more resources to air defences, says Institute for Security Studies (ISS) maritime senior researcher Timothy Walker. There is also a psychological and diplomatic effect of more lethal technology transfer, says ISS senior researcher Moses Okello. He suggests that the mere threat of owning lethal drones or having access to components and supply routes, may impact diplomacy such that 'insurgents may be less willing to take part in political discussions'. For the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia, the prospect of lethal drones in the hands of al-Shabaab is alarming, Okello adds. 'Offensive drones have not yet taken root, but al-Shabaab is said to be adapting commercial drones, adding payloads to them.' Insurgents need only one successful drone strike to impact the conflict's direction. Peacekeepers know that for now, assault rifles are still the weapon of choice in Somalia. But sharing technology and expertise with a key player in Yemen's complex proxy war could recast the conflict in the Horn of Africa and beyond. DM
Time of India
28-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
'Destroyed last aircraft': Israel strikes Yemen's Sanaa airport after intercepting Houthi missile
Israel's defence minister Israel Katz, on Wednesday, announced that their fighter jets conducted strikes on Houthi targets at Sanaa airport in Yemen, following the group's launch of two projectiles towards Israel the previous day. Tired of too many ads? go ad free now "Air Force jets have just struck terror targets of the Houthi terrorist organisation at the airport in Sanaa and destroyed the last aircraft remaining," Katz said in a statement. "This is a clear message and a continuation of our policy: whoever fires at the State of Israel will pay a heavy price," he added. Houthi media subsequently confirmed the Israeli strikes on the airport. The military action followed Israel's interception of a missile and another projectile launched from Yemen by the Iranian-supported group. The Houthis, who govern substantial areas of Yemen, subsequently acknowledged launching two "ballistic missiles" towards Israel. Since October 2023, following Hamas's attack on Israel and the ensuing Gaza conflict, the Houthis have consistently launched missiles and drones at Israel. The Yemeni forces, acting in support of Palestinians, suspended their operations during a two-month Gaza ceasefire until March, resuming afterwards when Israel recommenced its military operations in the region. Despite most projectiles being intercepted, a missile in early May reached the vicinity of Ben Gurion international airport near Tel Aviv, resulting in numerous international flight cancellations to Israel. Israel has conducted various retaliatory strikes in Yemen, targeting ports and Sanaa airport. The Israeli military confirmed Wednesday's strikes destroyed aircraft belonging to the group. "The aircraft struck were used by the Houthi terrorist organisation for the transfer of terrorists who advanced terrorist attacks against the state of Israel," according to the army's statement. "Similarly to the Hodeida and Salif ports that were struck last week, the main airport of Sanaa is continuously operated by the Houthi regime and is used by them for terror purposes," the army added.
