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Business Wire
31-07-2025
- Business
- Business Wire
Oasis Announcement of the Agreement to Sell its Digital Garage, Inc. Shares to Resona Holdings, Inc.
HONG KONG--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Oasis Management Company Ltd. (together with private funds that it manages, 'Oasis' or 'we'), announces today that it has agreed to sell all the Digital Garage, Inc. ('DG') shares it owns to Resona Holdings, Inc. ('Resona HD', and the transaction, the 'Transaction'). Oasis has been an investor in DG since 2020, drawn to the Company's competitive advantages and growth potential in both the payment and investment businesses. As of today, Oasis holds 8,520,200 shares of DG, representing approximately 18.6% of DG's voting rights. During the investment period, Oasis has actively engaged with DG's management team with the goal of enhancing DG's corporate value. Recently, Oasis received a proposal from Resona HD to acquire Oasis's stake in DG, and Oasis has agreed to proceed with the Transaction. Resona HD is already in a capital and business alliance with DG, including joint initiatives to build a sales framework in the payment business. Through this additional acquisition of shares, Resona HD aims to deepen the existing partnership and further strengthen collaboration in the payment business as part of its broader efforts to enhance corporate value for both parties. Oasis has consistently advocated for enhancing DG's corporate value through growth of the payment business by strengthening sales and operational capabilities to capture the once-in-a-generation opportunity presented by the shift toward a cashless society. We hope this transaction will accelerate the growth of DG's core payment business and ultimately benefit all stakeholders of DG, including customers, employees, and shareholders. Oasis's engagement activities in Japan are characterized by a focus on enhancing long-term corporate value through dialogue with the management teams of investee companies, rather than pursuing short-term profits. Oasis has adopted the Japan FSA's 'Principles of Responsible Institutional Investors' (a/k/a the Japan Stewardship Code) and, in line with those principles, Oasis will continue to pursue investments, monitor and engage with its investee companies with the goal of benefiting all stakeholders involved. About Oasis Oasis Management Company Ltd. manages private investment funds focused on opportunities in a wide array of asset classes across countries and sectors. Oasis was founded in 2002 by Seth Fischer, who leads the firm as its Chief Investment Officer. More information about Oasis is available at Oasis has adopted the Japan FSA's 'Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors' (as amended from time to time) (a/k/a Japan Stewardship Code) and in line with those principles, Oasis monitors and engages with our investee companies. Disclaimer This press release is not intended to solicit or seek shareholders' agreements to jointly exercise voting rights with Oasis. Shareholders that have an agreement to jointly exercise their voting rights are regarded as Joint Holders under the Japanese large shareholding disclosure rules and they must file notification of their aggregate share ownership with the relevant Japanese authority for public disclosure under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act. Oasis does not intend to be subjected to such notification requirements. The press release exclusively represents the opinions, interpretations, and estimates of Oasis.
Yahoo
11-06-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Oasis Intends to Vote Against Kyocera's Top Management at the Upcoming AGM
*Kyocera has been facing chronic underperformance, with its stock price remaining depressed over the long-term and profitability continuing to deteriorate sharply *Although Kyocera has announced certain management reform initiatives, they fall far short of the necessary fundamental changes needed to transform the Company *On May 14, Oasis released a "Seven-Point Plan" calling for more substantive reforms at Kyocera, including the acceleration of non-core business divestitures and improvements to the Company's inefficient capital structure *However, Kyocera has so far failed to address the "Seven Point Plan" and has demonstrated little commitment to genuine transformation *In its latest results, Kyocera achieved an ROE of just 0.8% *Oasis will vote against the reappointment of Chairman Yamaguchi and President Tanimoto at the upcoming AGM, holding them accountable for the underperformance and poor capital allocation *Both ISS and Glass Lewis have recommended to vote against the reappointment of Kyocera Chairman Yamaguchi, and ISS additionally recommends voting against President Tanimoto More information available at HONG KONG, June 11, 2025--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Oasis Management Company Ltd. ("Oasis") is manager to funds that beneficially own shares in Kyocera Corporation (6971 JP) ("Kyocera" or the "Company"). Oasis has adopted the Japan FSA's "Principles of Responsible Institutional Investors" (a.k.a. the Japan Stewardship Code) and in line with those principles, Oasis monitors and engages with its investee companies. At its May 14, 2025 earnings call, Kyocera reported on the progress of its management reforms. The Company appeared to acknowledge its past mistakes and expressed an intention to take the first step toward change. Specifically, Kyocera recognized the inefficiencies caused by the dispersal of management resources due to diversification and announced its policy to restructure its business portfolio in order to focus on its core strengths. However, like many shareholders and market participants, Oasis remains highly skeptical of Kyocera's commitment and ability to execute meaningful change especially in light of its modest plans and continued commitment to manufacturing solar panels and telecommunication devices. Moreover, underperformance against its management targets has become the norm. Since the fiscal year ended March 2020, Kyocera has exceeded its operating profit targets only once. This track record raises serious concerns about the current management team's ability to formulate and execute plans, casting significant doubt on whether they can even implement the current, modest reform plan. The latest earnings briefing further highlighted weak progress. Although Kyocera announced plans to exit JPY200 billion worth of non-core businesses, only JPY7.3 billion has been announced so far. This year's forecast includes just a JPY10 billion revenue reduction from exits. Kyocera's capital policy also remains insufficient. Although the Company has announced "Future Reduction Plan" to lower cross-shareholdings to below 20% of net assets, it has yet to provide a clear timeline for achieving this goal. Shareholders' dissatisfaction is growing. Approval for the Company's president at the AGM has dropped from 96% in 2015 to just 65% in 2023. ISS and Glass Lewis have once again recommended voting against the reappointment of Kyocera's Chairman, Mr. Yamaguchi. ISS has also recommended voting against President, Mr. Tanimoto, citing continued underperformance in ROE and capital misallocation. Oasis also believes that the top management is responsible for Kyocera's weak performance and therefore intends to vote against the reappointment of both individuals. Amid growing pressure from shareholders, Kyocera announced plans to reduce the cap on board directors from 20 to 12. At the same time, the Company also plans to increase the number of internal directors -- a move that runs against the broader efforts by many Japanese companies to strengthen board independence thereby decreasing the percentage of independent directors. In order for Kyocera to achieve genuine transformation and resolve its excessive diversification and inefficient capital structure, Oasis urges the full implementation of the following Seven-Point Plan: Divest non-core businesses amounting to over JPY660 billion of revenue. Exit the Organic Packages to prevent further losses. Restructure its KAVX subsidiary to achieve higher margins in line with peers. Stop losses by halting investment into GaN and millimeter-wave technologies which have little potential to produce material returns. Focus on its core business such as ceramics to capture untapped opportunities. Commit to aggressive M&A to reinforce core businesses. Announce a buyback program of JPY1 trillion over the next four years, amounting to approximately 37% of the Company. By implementing this plan, we believe that the stock could see an upside of over +100% from current levels. Seth Fischer, Founder & Chief Investment Officer of Oasis, said: "Kyocera's excessive diversification has long prevented it from realizing its full potential. The Company continues to support underperforming businesses while failing to prioritize investment and growth opportunities within its best businesses such as ceramics packaging, and the automotive and semiconductor sectors. With cross-shareholdings still accounting for 53% of its net assets and an ROE of just 0.8%, the time for meaningful change is now. Management needs to address the twin problems of over-diversification and over-capitalization of its balance sheet by exiting underperforming businesses, leaning into its best growth opportunities, and taking a much more ambitious stance on unwinding cross-shareholdings to improve returns on capital. Kyocera needs brave, large steps forward to achieve these goals. The current half measures are not enough." Full details can be viewed at All stakeholders are encouraged to contact Oasis at info@ *** Oasis Management Company Ltd. manages private investment funds focused on opportunities in a wide array of asset classes across countries and sectors. Oasis was founded in 2002 by Seth H. Fischer, who leads the firm as its Chief Investment Officer. More information about Oasis is available at Oasis has adopted the Japan FSA's "Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors" (a.k.a. the Japan Stewardship Code) and, in line with those principles, Oasis monitors and engages with our investee companies. The information and opinions contained in this press release (referred to as the "Document") are provided by Oasis Management Company ("Oasis") for informational or reference purposes only. The Document is not intended to solicit or seek shareholders to, jointly with Oasis, acquire or transfer, or exercise any voting rights or other shareholder's rights with respect to any shares or other securities of a specific company which are subject to the disclosure requirements under the large shareholding disclosure rules under the Financial Instrument and Exchange Act. Shareholders that have an agreement to jointly exercise their voting rights are regarded as Joint Holders under the Japanese large shareholding disclosure rules and they must file notification of their aggregate shareholding with the relevant Japanese authority for public disclosure under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act. Except in the event that Oasis expressly enters into the agreement as a joint holder requiring such disclosure, Oasis does not intend to take any action triggering reporting obligations as a Joint Holder. The Document exclusively represents the opinions, interpretations, and estimates of Oasis. View source version on Contacts Media Contact For all inquiries, please contact:Taylor Hallmedia@
Business Wire
11-06-2025
- Business
- Business Wire
Oasis Intends to Vote Against Kyocera's Top Management at the Upcoming AGM
HONG KONG--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Oasis Management Company Ltd. ('Oasis') is manager to funds that beneficially own shares in Kyocera Corporation (6971 JP) ('Kyocera' or the 'Company'). Oasis has adopted the Japan FSA's 'Principles of Responsible Institutional Investors' (a.k.a. the Japan Stewardship Code) and in line with those principles, Oasis monitors and engages with its investee companies. At its May 14, 2025 earnings call, Kyocera reported on the progress of its management reforms. The Company appeared to acknowledge its past mistakes and expressed an intention to take the first step toward change. Specifically, Kyocera recognized the inefficiencies caused by the dispersal of management resources due to diversification and announced its policy to restructure its business portfolio in order to focus on its core strengths. However, like many shareholders and market participants, Oasis remains highly skeptical of Kyocera's commitment and ability to execute meaningful change especially in light of its modest plans and continued commitment to manufacturing solar panels and telecommunication devices. Moreover, underperformance against its management targets has become the norm. Since the fiscal year ended March 2020, Kyocera has exceeded its operating profit targets only once. This track record raises serious concerns about the current management team's ability to formulate and execute plans, casting significant doubt on whether they can even implement the current, modest reform plan. The latest earnings briefing further highlighted weak progress. Although Kyocera announced plans to exit JPY200 billion worth of non-core businesses, only JPY7.3 billion has been announced so far. This year's forecast includes just a JPY10 billion revenue reduction from exits. Kyocera's capital policy also remains insufficient. Although the Company has announced 'Future Reduction Plan' to lower cross-shareholdings to below 20% of net assets, it has yet to provide a clear timeline for achieving this goal. Shareholders' dissatisfaction is growing. Approval for the Company's president at the AGM has dropped from 96% in 2015 to just 65% in 2023. ISS and Glass Lewis have once again recommended voting against the reappointment of Kyocera's Chairman, Mr. Yamaguchi. ISS has also recommended voting against President, Mr. Tanimoto, citing continued underperformance in ROE and capital misallocation. Oasis also believes that the top management is responsible for Kyocera's weak performance and therefore intends to vote against the reappointment of both individuals. Amid growing pressure from shareholders, Kyocera announced plans to reduce the cap on board directors from 20 to 12. At the same time, the Company also plans to increase the number of internal directors -- a move that runs against the broader efforts by many Japanese companies to strengthen board independence thereby decreasing the percentage of independent directors. In order for Kyocera to achieve genuine transformation and resolve its excessive diversification and inefficient capital structure, Oasis urges the full implementation of the following Seven-Point Plan: Divest non-core businesses amounting to over JPY660 billion of revenue. Exit the Organic Packages to prevent further losses. Restructure its KAVX subsidiary to achieve higher margins in line with peers. Stop losses by halting investment into GaN and millimeter-wave technologies which have little potential to produce material returns. Focus on its core business such as ceramics to capture untapped opportunities. Commit to aggressive M&A to reinforce core businesses. Announce a buyback program of JPY1 trillion over the next four years, amounting to approximately 37% of the Company. By implementing this plan, we believe that the stock could see an upside of over +100% from current levels. Seth Fischer, Founder & Chief Investment Officer of Oasis, said: " Kyocera's excessive diversification has long prevented it from realizing its full potential. The Company continues to support underperforming businesses while failing to prioritize investment and growth opportunities within its best businesses such as ceramics packaging, and the automotive and semiconductor sectors. With cross-shareholdings still accounting for 53% of its net assets and an ROE of just 0.8%, the time for meaningful change is now. Management needs to address the twin problems of over-diversification and over-capitalization of its balance sheet by exiting underperforming businesses, leaning into its best growth opportunities, and taking a much more ambitious stance on unwinding cross-shareholdings to improve returns on capital. Kyocera needs brave, large steps forward to achieve these goals. The current half measures are not enough." Full details can be viewed at All stakeholders are encouraged to contact Oasis at info@ *** Oasis Management Company Ltd. manages private investment funds focused on opportunities in a wide array of asset classes across countries and sectors. Oasis was founded in 2002 by Seth H. Fischer, who leads the firm as its Chief Investment Officer. More information about Oasis is available at Oasis has adopted the Japan FSA's 'Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors' (a.k.a. the Japan Stewardship Code) and, in line with those principles, Oasis monitors and engages with our investee companies. The information and opinions contained in this press release (referred to as the "Document") are provided by Oasis Management Company ('Oasis') for informational or reference purposes only. The Document is not intended to solicit or seek shareholders to, jointly with Oasis, acquire or transfer, or exercise any voting rights or other shareholder's rights with respect to any shares or other securities of a specific company which are subject to the disclosure requirements under the large shareholding disclosure rules under the Financial Instrument and Exchange Act. Shareholders that have an agreement to jointly exercise their voting rights are regarded as Joint Holders under the Japanese large shareholding disclosure rules and they must file notification of their aggregate shareholding with the relevant Japanese authority for public disclosure under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act. Except in the event that Oasis expressly enters into the agreement as a joint holder requiring such disclosure, Oasis does not intend to take any action triggering reporting obligations as a Joint Holder. The Document exclusively represents the opinions, interpretations, and estimates of Oasis.
Business Wire
03-06-2025
- Business
- Business Wire
Ascender Capital Calls for Improved Capital Allocation Policy at Cresco Ltd (4674)
TOKYO--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Ascender Capital Limited ('Ascender Capital'), a Hong Kong-based investment firm focused on high-quality businesses across Asia, is a long-term investor in the Japanese software and system integration sector, where it has allocated over half of its assets in recent years. The firm actively follows more than 100 publicly listed companies in the space and has met with management teams at over 50 of them since 2015. Ascender Capital calls for improved capital allocation policy at Cresco Ltd Share Ascender Capital has a strong track record of constructive engagement with companies to enhance long-term corporate value. In line with the objectives of the Japan Stewardship Code and global best practices, we have been engaging with Cresco Ltd. ('Cresco' or 'the Company') management and Board since November 2023, urging improvements in capital allocation and corporate governance. Ascender Capital is a long-term shareholder of Cresco, currently holding approximately 2.2% of the shares. Strong Operations Undermined by Poor Capital Allocation Since 2015, Cresco's operating margin has increased from 8.0% to 10.2%, driving annual growth in operating income of 12%. Cumulative operating cash flow of ¥28 billion has largely accumulated on the balance sheet. FY3/2025 was another strong year: revenue rose by 11%, operating income increased by 17%, and FY3/2026 guidance targets a further 17% gain in operating profit. We commend management for these strong results, reflecting stable client relationships and operational excellence. However, shareholders have seen limited benefit. The ¥26 billion in cash flow generated over the last decade remains idle. Excluding excess capital (defined as anything beyond three months of SG&A), we estimate the Company's ROE could reach 50% — more than triple the current 15%. The announced increase in the dividend payout from 40% to 50% and the 2.5% share buyback disclosed on 9 May 2025 are welcome, but only partially address the issue. Valuation Disconnect Despite these strong fundamentals, Cresco trades at only 14x P/E — a 26% discount to the System Integrators (SI) sector average of 19x. On an ex-cash/LTI basis, the P/E drops to below 9x. This discount is not a reflection of business quality. It stems from ineffective capital allocation, overcapitalization, and a governance structure in need of reform. Shareholder Proposals Ahead of the upcoming June 2025 AGM, Ascender Capital has submitted the following proposals in the interest of all shareholders: Transfer authority to set dividends to the General Meeting of Shareholders — consistent with best practices across 90% of listed companies in Japan Increase dividends: a. Declare a special dividend of ¥46 per share to normalize the cash balance relative to operational needs b. Distribute a year-end dividend of ¥54 per share for FY3/2025 — resulting in a 75% payout ratio, a sustainable level for Cresco's asset-light model Expand share buybacks to 8.8 million shares (21% of shares outstanding), and immediately cancel all treasury shares Even after implementing these measures, Cresco would still hold over ¥6 billion in cash — well above operational requirements. Moreover, annual operating cash flows exceeding ¥5 billion will continue to replenish reserves and support strategic initiatives. Supporting Analysis Overcapitalization of the Balance Sheet As of March 2025, Cresco's net cash and long-term investments amount to over 4 years' worth of SG&A — far in excess of what is needed to run the business efficiently. This level of capital is excessive for a company with a 15-year track record of uninterrupted positive cash flow, including through the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Cresco has executed a highly successful M&A program over the last decade with just ¥3 billion. Future transactions of similar scale can be easily financed through operating cash flow or modest leverage. There is no financial justification for maintaining such an overcapitalized balance sheet. Risky Investment Management Cresco incurred derivative losses in FY3/2020 and FY3/2023 through active management of a ¥8 billion financial investment portfolio. This speculative activity is inappropriate for a system integrator and detracts from the Company's core focus in a rapidly consolidating IT services market. We call on the Company to immediately liquidate these investments and redeploy the capital toward shareholder returns. Improving Shareholder Engagement Cresco has no controlling shareholder and should therefore be fully accountable to its public investors. While management has been hospitable and courteous, engagement has lacked depth and substance. The Board's superficial rejection of our shareholder proposals — in its 9 May 2025 response — reflects either a fundamental misunderstanding of capital allocation or a disregard for fiduciary responsibility. Further Information More details are available in the News section of our website or through these direct links: - Shareholder proposals in English Shareholder Proposals – ENG - Shareholder proposals in Japanese Shareholder Proposals – JPN - Improvement Plan for Cresco – ENG This press release does not constitute an offer to purchase or sell shares in Cresco Ltd. About Ascender Capital Founded in December 2012, Ascender Capital is a Hong Kong-based value orientated investment firm concentrated on opportunities in Asia including Japan. The fund focuses on high-quality companies with a track record of profitability and earnings growth. DISCLAIMER Ascender Capital is the investment manager of private funds (the 'Ascender Capitals Funds') that own shares in Cresco. Ascender Capital has created this communication to enable fellow shareholders to carefully monitor how sincerely the board of directors and management of Cresco address our concerns, listen to shareholders' views and endeavor to increase the value of Cresco shares in the best interest of all shareholders. Ascender Capital is not and should not be regarded or deemed in any way whatsoever to be (i) soliciting or requesting other shareholders of Cresco to exercise their shareholders' rights (including, but not limited to, voting rights) jointly or together with Ascender Capital, (ii) making an offer, a solicitation of an offer, or any advice, invitation or inducement to enter into or conclude any transaction or (iii) any advice, invitation or inducement to take or refrain from taking any other course of action (whether on the terms shown therein or otherwise). Further, this communication and information to be found on its Website do not purport to recommend the purchase or sale of any security nor do they contain an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security. Nothing in this communication or on the Website is intended to be, nor should it be construed or used as, investment, tax or legal advice. This communication and the Website exclusively represent the opinions, interpretations, and estimates of Ascender Capital in relation to Cresco' business and governance structure. Ascender Capital is expressing such opinions solely in its capacity as an investment adviser of the Ascender Capital Funds.
Yahoo
03-06-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Ascender Capital Calls for Improved Capital Allocation Policy at Cresco Ltd (4674)
Cresco operates a superior, stable business but remains severely undervalued Ascender has filed shareholder proposals for the June 2025 AGM Ascender also calls for the divestment of the ¥8 billion actively managed investment portfolio TOKYO, June 03, 2025--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Ascender Capital Limited ("Ascender Capital"), a Hong Kong-based investment firm focused on high-quality businesses across Asia, is a long-term investor in the Japanese software and system integration sector, where it has allocated over half of its assets in recent years. The firm actively follows more than 100 publicly listed companies in the space and has met with management teams at over 50 of them since 2015. Ascender Capital has a strong track record of constructive engagement with companies to enhance long-term corporate value. In line with the objectives of the Japan Stewardship Code and global best practices, we have been engaging with Cresco Ltd. ("Cresco" or "the Company") management and Board since November 2023, urging improvements in capital allocation and corporate governance. Ascender Capital is a long-term shareholder of Cresco, currently holding approximately 2.2% of the shares. Strong Operations Undermined by Poor Capital Allocation Since 2015, Cresco's operating margin has increased from 8.0% to 10.2%, driving annual growth in operating income of 12%. Cumulative operating cash flow of ¥28 billion has largely accumulated on the balance sheet. FY3/2025 was another strong year: revenue rose by 11%, operating income increased by 17%, and FY3/2026 guidance targets a further 17% gain in operating profit. We commend management for these strong results, reflecting stable client relationships and operational excellence. However, shareholders have seen limited benefit. The ¥26 billion in cash flow generated over the last decade remains idle. Excluding excess capital (defined as anything beyond three months of SG&A), we estimate the Company's ROE could reach 50% — more than triple the current 15%. The announced increase in the dividend payout from 40% to 50% and the 2.5% share buyback disclosed on 9 May 2025 are welcome, but only partially address the issue. Valuation Disconnect Despite these strong fundamentals, Cresco trades at only 14x P/E — a 26% discount to the System Integrators (SI) sector average of 19x. On an ex-cash/LTI basis, the P/E drops to below 9x. This discount is not a reflection of business quality. It stems from ineffective capital allocation, overcapitalization, and a governance structure in need of reform. Shareholder Proposals Ahead of the upcoming June 2025 AGM, Ascender Capital has submitted the following proposals in the interest of all shareholders: Transfer authority to set dividends to the General Meeting of Shareholders — consistent with best practices across 90% of listed companies in Japan Increase dividends:a. Declare a special dividend of ¥46 per share to normalize the cash balance relative to operational needsb. Distribute a year-end dividend of ¥54 per share for FY3/2025 — resulting in a 75% payout ratio, a sustainable level for Cresco's asset-light model Expand share buybacks to 8.8 million shares (21% of shares outstanding), and immediately cancel all treasury shares Even after implementing these measures, Cresco would still hold over ¥6 billion in cash — well above operational requirements. Moreover, annual operating cash flows exceeding ¥5 billion will continue to replenish reserves and support strategic initiatives. Supporting Analysis Overcapitalization of the Balance Sheet As of March 2025, Cresco's net cash and long-term investments amount to over 4 years' worth of SG&A — far in excess of what is needed to run the business efficiently. This level of capital is excessive for a company with a 15-year track record of uninterrupted positive cash flow, including through the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Cresco has executed a highly successful M&A program over the last decade with just ¥3 billion. Future transactions of similar scale can be easily financed through operating cash flow or modest leverage. There is no financial justification for maintaining such an overcapitalized balance sheet. Risky Investment Management Cresco incurred derivative losses in FY3/2020 and FY3/2023 through active management of a ¥8 billion financial investment portfolio. This speculative activity is inappropriate for a system integrator and detracts from the Company's core focus in a rapidly consolidating IT services market. We call on the Company to immediately liquidate these investments and redeploy the capital toward shareholder returns. Improving Shareholder Engagement Cresco has no controlling shareholder and should therefore be fully accountable to its public investors. While management has been hospitable and courteous, engagement has lacked depth and substance. The Board's superficial rejection of our shareholder proposals — in its 9 May 2025 response — reflects either a fundamental misunderstanding of capital allocation or a disregard for fiduciary responsibility. Further Information More details are available in the News section of our website or through these direct links: - Shareholder proposals in English Shareholder Proposals – ENG - Shareholder proposals in Japanese Shareholder Proposals – JPN - Improvement Plan for Cresco – ENG This press release does not constitute an offer to purchase or sell shares in Cresco Ltd. About Ascender Capital Founded in December 2012, Ascender Capital is a Hong Kong-based value orientated investment firm concentrated on opportunities in Asia including Japan. The fund focuses on high-quality companies with a track record of profitability and earnings growth. DISCLAIMER Ascender Capital is the investment manager of private funds (the "Ascender Capitals Funds") that own shares in Cresco. Ascender Capital has created this communication to enable fellow shareholders to carefully monitor how sincerely the board of directors and management of Cresco address our concerns, listen to shareholders' views and endeavor to increase the value of Cresco shares in the best interest of all shareholders. Ascender Capital is not and should not be regarded or deemed in any way whatsoever to be (i) soliciting or requesting other shareholders of Cresco to exercise their shareholders' rights (including, but not limited to, voting rights) jointly or together with Ascender Capital, (ii) making an offer, a solicitation of an offer, or any advice, invitation or inducement to enter into or conclude any transaction or (iii) any advice, invitation or inducement to take or refrain from taking any other course of action (whether on the terms shown therein or otherwise). Further, this communication and information to be found on its Website do not purport to recommend the purchase or sale of any security nor do they contain an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security. Nothing in this communication or on the Website is intended to be, nor should it be construed or used as, investment, tax or legal advice. This communication and the Website exclusively represent the opinions, interpretations, and estimates of Ascender Capital in relation to Cresco' business and governance structure. Ascender Capital is expressing such opinions solely in its capacity as an investment adviser of the Ascender Capital Funds. View source version on Contacts For enquiries please contact:English release Jean-Charles TisserandEdouard Mercierinfo@ +852 3758 2608Japanese release Ashton ConsultingTokyoascender@ +81 3 5425 7220 Error in retrieving data Sign in to access your portfolio Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data Error in retrieving data
