Latest news with #JointForces
New Straits Times
04-08-2025
- Politics
- New Straits Times
New sea base, tech upgrades for Sabah's Op Pasir
KUALA LUMPUR: AN operation on the eastern coast of Sabah is undergoing a major transformation by leveraging advanced surveillance technology, real-time intelligence systems and community-based reporting. Joint Forces Commander Lieutenant-General Datuk Zahani Zainal Abidin said Op Pasir had significantly expanded the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), coastal radar, and closed-circuit television systems to boost domain awareness and detection capabilities in the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESS Zone). "Enhancements to the Coastal Surveillance System would allow for earlier detection of suspicious vessel movements." These upgrades, he said, formed part of Op Pasir's evolution into a tech-driven, multi-agency defence operation supported by real-time coordination between the military, police and maritime enforcement. A cornerstone of this technological shift is the introduction of the Multi Purpose Command Platform (MPCP) — a mobile sea base that will replace the ageing Tun Sharifah Rodziah Sea Base. "The MPCP is a Mobile Forward Operating Base designed to replace the existing PL Tun Sharifah Rodziah. "This platform is capable of long-duration operations and can be rapidly deployed to hotspot areas," Zahani said. With capabilities to operate helicopters, interception boats, UAVs and unmanned surface vehicles, the MPCP will serve as a launch base for Quick Reaction Force teams — drastically cutting response time to smuggling attempts, incursions and maritime criminal activity. "With the deployment of this asset, Op Pasir is expected to be conducted more efficiently and effectively, enhancing operational readiness and territorial control," Zahani said. COLLABORATIVE EFFORT First launched 25 years ago, Op Pasir is today a full-spectrum joint operation led by the Joint Forces Headquarters and executed by Joint Forces Command 2. It involves a full-strength armed forces deployment across the ESS Zone districts of Kudat, Sandakan, Lahad Datu and Semporna. Troops maintain a round-the-clock presence on 21 islands and 19 land-based security posts, supported by maritime patrols, land-based security sweeps and aerial surveillance conducted by the Royal Malaysian Air Force. "Through this integrated deployment, Op Pasir has significantly enhanced domain awareness, response time and deterrence against threats such as piracy, smuggling, cross-border intrusions and maritime terrorism in one of Malaysia's most strategically-sensitive regions," Zahani said. Operational results last year and this year reflect the effectiveness of the approach, with 11 undocumented immigrants detained in Semporna waters and multiple seizures of controlled contraband, particularly petrol and diesel, that were handed over to police for further action. "These enforcement results highlight the effectiveness of Op Pasir's patrols, thus enhancing security and law enforcement in Malaysia's maritime domain," Zahani said. Beyond tactical upgrades, Op Pasir has undergone structural reforms to improve inter-agency cooperation and community engagement. "Op Pasir now operates with a more structured collaboration among the armed forces, police, Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency and the Eastern Sabah Security Command (Esscom)," Zahani said. "The establishment of joint operations centers and real-time intelligence sharing has enabled faster and more effective responses to threats." COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACH Meanwhile, public involvement has been strengthened through programmes like Community Policing and Rakan Maritim (Maritime Friends), empowering local residents to report suspicious activity. "A community-based approach has become a core element of Op Pasir. Safety education and cooperation with community leaders foster awareness of security risks and promote timely reporting of suspicious activities," Zahani said. However, he stressed that the operation's impact went well beyond security. "By maintaining continuous security control over Sabah's maritime and land borders, Op Pasir fosters a stable environment free from intrusions, piracy and cross-border crimes. "This stability is essential for encouraging both domestic and foreign investments, thereby supporting the sustained economic and social development of local communities." "The ESS Zone encompasses key economic areas including fisheries zones, commercial ports and strategic project sites. "Through integrated monitoring and patrols, Op Pasir safeguards these critical assets from sabotage or external threats, ensuring uninterrupted national supply chains and protecting economic interests." SENSE OF SECURITY Zahani said a visible and sustained security presence helped enhance public trust and support broader government initiatives. "The consistent presence of security personnel through Op Pasir demonstrates the government's commitment to the safety of its citizens. "This effort boosts the sense of security within local communities and reinforces trust in the armed forces and other security agencies." The broader outcome, he said, was a safer, more confident Sabah that could grow in tandem with Peninsular Malaysia. "By securing the environment as a prerequisite for development, Op Pasir enables the smooth execution of government projects such as road construction, and improvements in education and healthcare facilities in rural areas." "The improved security landscape resulting from Op Pasir not only benefits local communities and national development, but also enhances international confidence in East Malaysia. "This growing trust is reflected in the increased tourism activities across Sabah, with visitors feeling safer to explore the region. "Op Pasir is not merely a border security operation, but also a catalyst for continued stability and progress in East Malaysia.
IOL News
11-07-2025
- Politics
- IOL News
Sudan: Idris Government Faces Crisis Over Exclusion of Armed Movements
Sudan's Prime Minister Kamal Idris. Image: Ashraf Shazly / AFP Once again, Kamal Idris, the army-appointed Prime Minister of Sudan, seeks to bypass escalating political divisions over cabinet appointments by unilaterally naming three new ministers - for Health, Higher Education, and Agriculture - joining the already appointed Ministers of Defence and Interior. The current controversy revolves around the selection of 22 ministers whom Idris insists are technocrats. However, the Joint Forces - armed movements allied with the Sudanese army - view the appointments as an encroachment on the ministerial quota allocated to them under the Juba Peace Agreement. Late last Thursday night, Idris announced the appointment of al-Moiz Omar Bakhit as Minister of Health, Ismat Qureshi as Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation, and Ahmed Madawi as Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research. The announcement has only reignited tensions that never truly subsided. Public Disputes Recent reports indicate heightened verbal spats among the signatories of the Juba Peace Agreement regarding power-sharing ratios. Mohamed Bashir Abu Nama, chief negotiator of the Sudan Liberation Movement, asserted that factions incorporated into the peace agreement at a later stage are not entitled to a share of the 25% power allocation stipulated in the agreement. That quota, he insisted, is reserved solely for armed movements that originally signed the accord, not for groups from other tracks such as the North and Central regions, which were assigned separate shares in state-level governance. In a Facebook post quoted by Sudan Tribune, Abu Namu clarified that three groups - Mustafa Tambour's movement, Ali Shakoush's faction, and the Tammuz Movement - were added to the agreement at the initiative of South Sudanese mediators and the Sudanese government. These factions, he noted, were formed under specific circumstances and had no significant military activity at the time of the agreement's signing. Observers and media leaks suggest growing friction among Gabriel Ibrahim, head of the Justice and Equality Movement; Minni Arko Minnawi, Governor of Darfur; and Mustafa Tambour of the Sudan Liberation Movement. Meanwhile, Sudanese Army Chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan appears to be exploiting these divisions to fragment the Joint Forces. Reports indicate Minnawihas shown signs of cooperation, while Gabriel Ibrahim remains adamant about retaining control over the Ministries of Finance and Social Welfare. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Next Stay Close ✕ Ad loading Settling for Scraps In a lengthy Facebook post, Sudanese analyst Mujahid Bushra argued that ever since the Juba Peace Agreement granted the armed movements 25% representation in the transitional government, the army identified corruption and power lust among certain movement leaders. The military, he claimed, capitalized on this to orchestrate a coup against the civilian government, which had begun publicly advocating for the dismantling of the army's economic empire, an empire accounting for over 82% of Sudan's economy. Bushra added: 'But the army, directed by the Islamic Movement - Sudan's branch of the Muslim Brotherhood - knew what others didn't: that the 25% allocation was carved out of the mere 18% of resources not already under military control. The army manipulated the ignorance and greed of the movements, using them to oust the civilians via the '25% coup' in October 2021.' Today, despite the sacrifices made by the Joint Forces - men, arms, and lives - to protect the army and the kizan (a Sudanese term for the Muslim Brotherhood), the post-war reality has shifted. The military and the Brotherhood now seek even that 25%, needing all resources to finance the war and recoup losses from the collapse of their shadow economy. According to Bushra, the Joint Forces made a strategic blunder, not only in demanding their share of power and wealth but also in threatening rebellion or opening the door to rivals, despite knowing the regime's dependence on them. What they failed to foresee, he says, is that some within their own ranks might accept crumbs in exchange for turning against them. He cited a recent statement from a Darfur track leader urging 'political realism' - a remark interpreted by many as justification for accepting an unjust division of power. Secret meetings have reportedly taken place between members of the Sovereignty Council and certain movement leaders outside the formal Joint Forces channels, suggesting moves to isolate the current leadership. Bushra posed a question to the Joint Forces' leaders: 'Will you continue playing puppets on the Port Sudan stage while your cause is flayed, your fighters' sacrifices stolen, and the country's wealth distributed behind your backs? Do you really believe the army - which betrayed peaceful protesters, the Forces of Freedom and Change, the Rapid Support Forces, and now you - would hesitate for a moment to sell you out once you're no longer useful?' He warned that today, the Joint Forces are nothing more than the army and Brotherhood's last remaining 'legal cover' in their confrontation with civilians and the RSF. They're being held close, not out of loyalty, but out of fear. 'Will you keep sacrificing your sons' lives for a regime that denies you even the leftovers? Will you allow the Darfur track to be turned into fuel for a military that arms your rivals with 50,000 men to fight and replace you?' A Grim Fate Awaits Sudanese writer Mahmoud al-Duqm, in an op-ed for Al-Siha, painted a bleak picture for Joint Forces leaders in Port Sudan and River Nile State. After fulfilling their role - fighting the RSF in Khartoum's triangle and the surrounding deserts, burying their dead, and licking their wounds - they are now being driven out. Public insults, accusations of betrayal and heresy, and character assassination are becoming routine in Port Sudan. Their sacrifices in this 'war of regret' have earned them only ridicule and scorn. Al-Duqm expressed astonishment that the Muslim Brotherhood in Port Sudan have not chosen Gabriel Ibrahim, the dismissed Finance Minister and head of the Justice and Equality Movement, as Prime Minister, despite his Brotherhood affiliation and deep involvement in finance and real estate. But the military's entrenched power dynamic, rooted in decades of control since independence, has no room for leaders like Ibrahim, Minnawi, or Tambour. Their historical role, he argues, is to serve as cannon fodder—fighters and guards, not ministers or decision-makers. He reminded readers of Minnawi's personal losses - two brothers killed, thousands of fighters lost - yet all he has received is nothing. Even the Juba Peace Agreement's promises have been stripped away. Since Kamal Idris's appointment as Prime Minister, the Joint Forces have faced a barrage of accusations - fleeing the border triangle, retreating from El-Obeid, relocating to Jebel Kordofan - all allegedly in defiance of al-Burhan, who now leans more heavily on the Abu Aqla Kikel faction. Al-Duqm ended with a pointed message: 'The people of Darfur, and Sudan at large, now see that the Joint Forces' leaders are nothing but war profiteers with no regard for the interests of Darfur's people. They have become a disruptive force, a burden to the nation. And the countdown has begun: war between the army and the Joint Forces is no longer a question of if, but when.' Bayethe Msimang Amid escalating political divisions, Sudan's Prime Minister Kamal Idris unilaterally appoints new ministers, igniting controversy and raising questions about the future of the Juba Peace Agreement, writes Bayethe Msimang. Image: IOL * Bayethe Msimang is an independent writer, commentator and analyst. ** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.
IOL News
11-07-2025
- Politics
- IOL News
Sudan: Idris Government Faces Crisis Over Exclusion of Armed Movements
Sudan's Prime Minister Kamal Idris. Image: Ashraf Shazly / AFP Once again, Kamal Idris, the army-appointed Prime Minister of Sudan, seeks to bypass escalating political divisions over cabinet appointments by unilaterally naming three new ministers - for Health, Higher Education, and Agriculture - joining the already appointed Ministers of Defence and Interior. The current controversy revolves around the selection of 22 ministers whom Idris insists are technocrats. However, the Joint Forces - armed movements allied with the Sudanese army - view the appointments as an encroachment on the ministerial quota allocated to them under the Juba Peace Agreement. Late last Thursday night, Idris announced the appointment of al-Moiz Omar Bakhit as Minister of Health, Ismat Qureshi as Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation, and Ahmed Madawi as Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research. The announcement has only reignited tensions that never truly subsided. Public Disputes Recent reports indicate heightened verbal spats among the signatories of the Juba Peace Agreement regarding power-sharing ratios. Mohamed Bashir Abu Nama, chief negotiator of the Sudan Liberation Movement, asserted that factions incorporated into the peace agreement at a later stage are not entitled to a share of the 25% power allocation stipulated in the agreement. That quota, he insisted, is reserved solely for armed movements that originally signed the accord, not for groups from other tracks such as the North and Central regions, which were assigned separate shares in state-level governance. In a Facebook post quoted by Sudan Tribune, Abu Namu clarified that three groups - Mustafa Tambour's movement, Ali Shakoush's faction, and the Tammuz Movement - were added to the agreement at the initiative of South Sudanese mediators and the Sudanese government. These factions, he noted, were formed under specific circumstances and had no significant military activity at the time of the agreement's signing. Observers and media leaks suggest growing friction among Gabriel Ibrahim, head of the Justice and Equality Movement; Minni Arko Minnawi, Governor of Darfur; and Mustafa Tambour of the Sudan Liberation Movement. Meanwhile, Sudanese Army Chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan appears to be exploiting these divisions to fragment the Joint Forces. Reports indicate Minnawihas shown signs of cooperation, while Gabriel Ibrahim remains adamant about retaining control over the Ministries of Finance and Social Welfare. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Next Stay Close ✕ Ad loading Settling for Scraps In a lengthy Facebook post, Sudanese analyst Mujahid Bushra argued that ever since the Juba Peace Agreement granted the armed movements 25% representation in the transitional government, the army identified corruption and power lust among certain movement leaders. The military, he claimed, capitalized on this to orchestrate a coup against the civilian government, which had begun publicly advocating for the dismantling of the army's economic empire, an empire accounting for over 82% of Sudan's economy. Bushra added: 'But the army, directed by the Islamic Movement - Sudan's branch of the Muslim Brotherhood - knew what others didn't: that the 25% allocation was carved out of the mere 18% of resources not already under military control. The army manipulated the ignorance and greed of the movements, using them to oust the civilians via the '25% coup' in October 2021.' Today, despite the sacrifices made by the Joint Forces - men, arms, and lives - to protect the army and the kizan (a Sudanese term for the Muslim Brotherhood), the post-war reality has shifted. The military and the Brotherhood now seek even that 25%, needing all resources to finance the war and recoup losses from the collapse of their shadow economy. According to Bushra, the Joint Forces made a strategic blunder, not only in demanding their share of power and wealth but also in threatening rebellion or opening the door to rivals, despite knowing the regime's dependence on them. What they failed to foresee, he says, is that some within their own ranks might accept crumbs in exchange for turning against them. He cited a recent statement from a Darfur track leader urging 'political realism' - a remark interpreted by many as justification for accepting an unjust division of power. Secret meetings have reportedly taken place between members of the Sovereignty Council and certain movement leaders outside the formal Joint Forces channels, suggesting moves to isolate the current leadership. Bushra posed a question to the Joint Forces' leaders: 'Will you continue playing puppets on the Port Sudan stage while your cause is flayed, your fighters' sacrifices stolen, and the country's wealth distributed behind your backs? Do you really believe the army - which betrayed peaceful protesters, the Forces of Freedom and Change, the Rapid Support Forces, and now you - would hesitate for a moment to sell you out once you're no longer useful?' He warned that today, the Joint Forces are nothing more than the army and Brotherhood's last remaining 'legal cover' in their confrontation with civilians and the RSF. They're being held close, not out of loyalty, but out of fear. 'Will you keep sacrificing your sons' lives for a regime that denies you even the leftovers? Will you allow the Darfur track to be turned into fuel for a military that arms your rivals with 50,000 men to fight and replace you?' A Grim Fate Awaits Sudanese writer Mahmoud al-Duqm, in an op-ed for Al-Siha, painted a bleak picture for Joint Forces leaders in Port Sudan and River Nile State. After fulfilling their role - fighting the RSF in Khartoum's triangle and the surrounding deserts, burying their dead, and licking their wounds - they are now being driven out. Public insults, accusations of betrayal and heresy, and character assassination are becoming routine in Port Sudan. Their sacrifices in this 'war of regret' have earned them only ridicule and scorn. Al-Duqm expressed astonishment that the Muslim Brotherhood in Port Sudan have not chosen Gabriel Ibrahim, the dismissed Finance Minister and head of the Justice and Equality Movement, as Prime Minister, despite his Brotherhood affiliation and deep involvement in finance and real estate. But the military's entrenched power dynamic, rooted in decades of control since independence, has no room for leaders like Ibrahim, Minnawi, or Tambour. Their historical role, he argues, is to serve as cannon fodder—fighters and guards, not ministers or decision-makers. He reminded readers of Minnawi's personal losses - two brothers killed, thousands of fighters lost - yet all he has received is nothing. Even the Juba Peace Agreement's promises have been stripped away. Since Kamal Idris's appointment as Prime Minister, the Joint Forces have faced a barrage of accusations - fleeing the border triangle, retreating from El-Obeid, relocating to Jebel Kordofan - all allegedly in defiance of al-Burhan, who now leans more heavily on the Abu Aqla Kikel faction. Al-Duqm ended with a pointed message: 'The people of Darfur, and Sudan at large, now see that the Joint Forces' leaders are nothing but war profiteers with no regard for the interests of Darfur's people. They have become a disruptive force, a burden to the nation. And the countdown has begun: war between the army and the Joint Forces is no longer a question of if, but when.' Bayethe Msimang Amid escalating political divisions, Sudan's Prime Minister Kamal Idris unilaterally appoints new ministers, igniting controversy and raising questions about the future of the Juba Peace Agreement, writes Bayethe Msimang. Image: IOL * Bayethe Msimang is an independent writer, commentator and analyst. ** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.
Al-Ahram Weekly
19-06-2025
- Politics
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Sudan's clashes escalate - World - Al-Ahram Weekly
The Rapid Support Forces' takeover of the border triangle shared by Sudan, Egypt, and Libya threatens to expand the Sudan war into a regional conflict Compounding the conflict in Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) announced last week they had taken control of the border triangle shared by Egypt, Sudan, and Libya following the Sudanese Armed Forces' (SAF) withdrawal. The SAF accused the Libyan Army, under the command of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, of supporting the RSF, which has been at war with the SAF for more than two years now. The border triangle holds strategic significance due to its geographic location and abundant resources. While it could have served as a vital corridor for trade and cooperation among the three nations, it has become a zone of instability — now functioning as a conduit for the smuggling of people, weapons, and resources — and is at risk of turning into a haven for criminals, smugglers, armed groups, and terrorists. Known as the Gabal Al-Uwaynat Triangle, the area has long been neglected due to its harsh terrain and sparse population. However, in recent years its economic and security relevance has grown with the discovery of gold and other minerals as well as its emergence as a major transit point for smuggling. The SAF accused the RSF of taking control of the border triangle with the backing of Haftar's forces, describing it as part of a broader regional conspiracy against Sudan, following failed attempts by the RSF to defeat the SAF in other areas. The Sudanese army asserted its right to respond, condemning Haftar's involvement, and referring the matter to both the Arab League and the African Union. It added that the area was vacated as part of what it said were defensive measures aimed at repelling aggression. The Libyan army denied its involvement in Sudan's border affairs or internal conflict, stating that it has not interfered in Sudan's Civil War. It dismissed the Sudanese Army's claims of territorial seizure or alignment with one party to the conflict against the other as false, arguing that such accusations are an attempt to deflect attention from Sudan's internal crisis by fabricating an external threat. The RSF described its control of the border triangle as a qualitative victory that would open new fronts in the ongoing conflict. Meanwhile, the Joint Forces, comprising armed movements allied with the SAF, said that the RSF and their Libyan allies would not be able to maintain control over the border triangle for long, describing the move as an attempt to raise the morale of RSF members following a series of defeats. The Joint Forces added that the primary aim of the RSF's advance into the triangle was to obstruct military progress on the Kordofan fronts, which the allied forces aim to fully reclaim in the coming days. Undoubtedly, clashes in the border triangle, coupled with the exchange of accusations between the Sudanese and Libyan armies, are exacerbating tensions in Sudan and raising the spectre of wider regional conflict. The RSF's seizure of the triangle represents a major shift in its favour, strengthening its military position, securing its rear, and enabling access to Sudan's Northern State. RSF Commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (aka Hemedti) has previously threatened to launch attacks on the Northern State. Meanwhile, the Sudanese Army is unlikely to allow the RSF to consolidate control over the area, saying it will launch air strikes against RSF positions. The RSF's deployment of long-range drones will further fuel the conflict. The war in Sudan is now evolving into a regional conflict involving multiple regional and international parties, including Libya. Accusations of interference have previously been directed at Chad, Kenya, and other nations. Violence and retaliatory killings have intensified the crisis, especially after the Sudanese Army entered Al-Jazira State, leading to the death of several South Sudanese alleged to have collaborated with the RSF. This, in turn, provoked retaliation in South Sudan, where Sudanese nationals were reportedly killed. Expanding the scope of the war is drawing in more foreign parties, leading to the destabilisation of Sudan and threatening international interests in the region. At the same time, fights are intensifying between the SAF and RSF in Al-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur State. Situated near the border triangle, Al-Fasher remains the last stronghold in Darfur where the army and its allied armed movements maintain a presence. The RSF is attempting to seize control of the city through attacks and heavy artillery bombardment. Meanwhile, Sudan's internal political landscape is facing challenges. Prime Minister Kamil Idris is having a hard time forming his long-anticipated government amid political tensions, disputes, and negotiations. Armed movements and blocs insist on securing their share of power. Furthermore, the leadership of the Tasees coalition — comprising the RSF and its allies and advocating the formation of a parallel government — find themselves entangled in their own internal power struggles. This comes at a time when the Sudanese people are desperately awaiting a political breakthrough that might offer relief from the war's devastating impact. * A version of this article appears in print in the 19 June, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
Yahoo
11-06-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Drapatyi ends tenure as Ground Forces chief, says he leaves with 'clear conscience'
Mykhailo Drapatyi said on June 11 that he had concluded his six-month tenure as commander of Ukraine's Ground Forces, summarizing his accomplishments and stating that he is leaving with "a clear conscience." Drapatyi submitted his resignation on June 1, following a deadly Russian missile strike that killed at least 12 Ukrainian soldiers at a training camp in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, saying the victims were young recruits who "should have learned, lived, and fought — not died." President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed him as commander of the Joint Forces on June 3, two days after the incident. The Ground Forces said the same day that an investigation was underway and pledged accountability if negligence or misconduct is found. In his statement, Drapatyi described the state of the Ground Forces at the time of his appointment on Nov. 29, 2024 as mired in "managerial stagnation," defined by fear, lack of initiative, and detachment from frontline units. "Systemic abuse, personnel decisions based on connections, low internal organization," he wrote. "The command is gradually shifting from a culture of fear to a culture of responsibility." Drapatyi said he had replaced over half of the Ground Forces' leadership in key functions and had begun reforms aimed at decentralization, accountability, and professionalism. Under his leadership, the military launched a revamp of recruitment centers, aiming to eliminate corruption and increase transparency in mobilization. Drapatyi also oversaw a partial overhaul of the army's training and staffing systems. New leadership was introduced in the drone, cyber, and electronic warfare units amid a wave of broader reforms. "Decisions are made not on the basis of status or loyalty, but on the basis of analysis, results, and respect for subordinates," Drapatyi said. "Grassroots initiatives ceased to be a threat and began to become a resource." Zelensky said on June 3 that Drapatyi's new role would focus "exclusively on combat issues." Read also: Ukraine's SBU releases fresh video of Operation Spiderweb, teases 'new surprises' We've been working hard to bring you independent, locally-sourced news from Ukraine. Consider supporting the Kyiv Independent.
