Latest news with #KD-21
AllAfrica
04-04-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
China's KD-21 missile puts US carriers and bases at range
China's KD-21 air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) has quietly entered service, adding a potent new threat to US aircraft carriers, air bases and exposed parked aircraft across the Western Pacific. Recent images obtained by The War Zone (TWZ) show frontline People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) H-6K bombers armed with KD-21 missiles, confirming the weapon's operational status. First revealed during Airshow China 2022 in Zhuhai, the KD-21 represents a significant step in China's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy to counter US power projection across the Indo-Pacific. Analysts immediately recognized the missile's strategic potential, with many likening it to Russia's Kinzhal ALBM. While its precise role—whether tailored more for anti-ship or land-attack missions—remains ambiguous, the KD-21's similarity to the CM-401 anti-ship ballistic missile suggests it may be capable of both. Observers noted that the missile was carried by a bomber from the PLAAF's 10th Bomber Division based in Anqing, Anhui Province, under the Eastern Theater Command, suggesting its potential employment in operations targeting Taiwan, Japan and beyond. The KD-21's reported hypersonic speed and maneuverability make it particularly challenging for US air defense systems. Its pairing with the H-6K, a modernized variant of China's Cold War-era bomber, offers China significantly extended reach. Equipped with more efficient turbofan engines and capable of in-flight refueling, the H-6K allows the KD-21 to threaten targets well beyond the First Island Chain, possibly reaching as far as Guam, where the US maintains significant military assets. By integrating the KD-21 with an expanding arsenal of traditional ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and unmanned aerial systems, China aims to challenge and defeat US and allied defenses. The operational deployment of ALBMs, such as the KD-21, underscores China's efforts to diversify its missile force and enhance its strike capabilities against key assets throughout the Western Pacific. ALBMs offer several advantages over cruise missiles. A 2019 Federation of American Scientists (FAS) report by Eugene Saad and Adam Mount explains that with their higher speeds, ALBMs enable rapid strikes, thereby compressing the time available for enemy forces to react. Moreover, their deployment from mobile aerial platforms allows them to launch from unpredictable vectors, thereby bypassing air defense systems that are optimized for traditional ground-based threats. Saad and Mount also emphasize that ALBMs enhance the survivability of delivery platforms. Unlike fixed missile sites, bomber aircraft can disperse, remain airborne or operate from concealed positions, reducing their vulnerability to preemptive strikes. However, these advantages are tempered by operational risks. A 2018 RAND report by Derek Grossman and colleagues highlights the persistent vulnerabilities of the H-6K bomber, particularly during overwater missions near contested airspaces, such as those surrounding Taiwan and the Japanese archipelago. While the KD-21 may extend the bomber's standoff range, allowing it to fire from safer distances, the H-6K remains susceptible to interception by US and allied air combat patrols equipped with advanced fighters and air defense networks. These risks could complicate Chinese strike operations in an actual conflict. Still, the PLAAF has steadily modernized its bomber force and doctrine. A 2022 report by the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) describes the H-6K as the backbone of China's long-range conventional strike capabilities. The bomber's upgraded engines allow it to project power deep into the Western Pacific, and its integration within the PLAAF's preserved division-regiment structure provides the organizational resilience for sustained operations. CASI notes that regiment-level training and modernization efforts have ensured the H-6K's relevance in China's evolving regional deterrence posture. Meanwhile, the KD-21's speed, maneuverability, and precision make it particularly suited for disabling critical US military infrastructure. In a 2019 National Defense Magazine article, Jon Harper and Tom Callender discuss how bomber-launched hypersonic missiles, such as the KD-21, could exceed Mach 5 and maneuver unpredictably during terminal phases to evade US defenses. Callender notes that such missiles can exploit gaps in high- and low-altitude coverage, posing a threat to carriers even at long ranges. While John Richardson has downplayed the vulnerability of US carriers, citing a combination of operational concepts and defensive systems offsetting the threat, others, including Michael Griffin and Samuel Greaves, stress the urgency of developing countermeasures. Their recommendations include novel interceptors, space-based sensors for continuous tracking and advanced technologies such as railgun projectiles to improve missile defense capabilities. Beyond carriers, US airbases in the Western Pacific face acute risks from China's expanding missile arsenal. A 2024 Stimson Center report by Kelly Grieco and others outlines how China could cripple US airpower projection by targeting runways with ballistic and cruise missiles carrying runway-penetrating submunitions. Grieco and others estimate that such attacks could render fighter runways in Japan unusable for up to 12 days and Guam's for at least two, severely disrupting the tempo of US military operations in a conflict scenario. Moreover, tanker operations—vital for sustaining airpower over vast distances—could be denied for weeks, particularly in Japan, exacerbating the challenge of generating sorties during the critical opening phase of a conflict. These vulnerabilities have been compounded by relative underinvestment in the hardening of US base and other facilities. A 2025 Hudson Institute report by Thomas Shugart III and Timothy Walton reveals that, despite recognizing the missile threat for over a decade, the US has constructed only two hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) and 41 non-hardened shelters at airfields within 1,000 nautical miles of Taiwan. In stark contrast, China has built more than 3,000 hardened shelters. The report further notes that key US bases in Guam and the Philippines have no HAS at all, leaving aircraft, fuel stores and maintenance facilities exposed to even small-scale missile salvos. Shugart and Walton conclude that these shortfalls leave US air assets vulnerable to initial strikes, limiting their capacity to sustain operations during a significant contingency with China. The KD-21's introduction into China's operational missile inventory signals more than just the fielding of another precision strike weapon—it underscores China's commitment to recalibrating the military balance of power in the Western Pacific in its favor. As China refines its ability to penetrate US defenses from the flight deck to the flight line, the risks for US and allied forces will only grow more acute over time.
Yahoo
01-04-2025
- General
- Yahoo
China's KD-21 Air-Launched Ballistic Missile Appears To Be Operational
China's KD-21 air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM), a shadowy weapon that is widely seen as part of the country's rapidly developing anti-shipping armory, appears to now be in operational service. The missile, carried by the H-6K bomber, first appeared when it made an official public debut at Airshow China in Zhuhai in November 2022. Until now, however, it had not been confirmed as being carried by aircraft assigned to a frontline unit. Imagery has emerged showing an H-6K aircraft assigned to the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) 10th Bomber Division, carrying a pair of KD-21 missiles under its center-wing pylons. The images, which appear to have been taken during a recent military drill, were brought to our attention by Andreas Rupprecht, a long-term observer of Chinese military aviation and a TWZ contributor. The 10th Bomber Division's 29th Air Regiment, part of the strategically highly important Eastern Theater Command, flies the H-6K from Anqing, in Anhui province. The aircraft wear codes in the 20x1x sequence, matching those in the images. Turning to the KD-21, when this was first identified at Airshow China in 2022, the missile had '2PZD-21' stenciled on the side. You can read more about its surprise debut here. 杰哥很狗仔 Video of the H-6K carrying an air launched ballistic missile, arrives at the Zhuhai airshowPossibly capable of targeting moving ships — Zhao DaShuai 东北进修 (@zhao_dashuai) November 3, 2022 Overall, the ALBM concept is far from new, with designs dating back to the Cold War, although they are currently seeing something of a renaissance, with multiple nations around the globe now pursuing their capabilities. At one point, it was suggested that the designation YJ-21 was applied to the missile, but it now appears to be known as the KD-21. Intriguingly, the KD-series designation refers to a land-attack missile, rather than an anti-ship missile (YJ-series). The missile appeared again in a video published in May of 2024, showing an apparent test launch from an H-6K. 5月1日メーデー特番内に登場したH-6K爆撃機。2PZD-21 ALBMの実弾発射シーンがあります。 — お砂糖wsnbn (@sugar_wsnbn) May 1, 2024 — Húrin (@Hurin92) May 1, 2024 The KD-21 is, however, only the latest in a series of Chinese ALBMs. These have tended to be considered primarily as anti-ship weapons — often referred to as 'carrier-killers' based on their likely high-priority targets, but they can be used against many ship types. Pursuing various ALBMs optimized for the anti-shipping role also fits with their use as part of China's fast-evolving anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. The KD-21 designation, combined with the fact that the missile is being issued, at first to the PLAAF, suggests that it might be primarily intended for land attack, rather than anti-shipping. As such, the KD-21 might be closer in concept to the Russian Kinzhal (known in the West as the AS-24 Killjoy). This is a weapon that is launched from adapted MiG-31 Foxhound interceptors of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Kinzhal, which has been described, somewhat misleadingly, as a hypersonic missile, has been used by Russia in Ukraine, although it seems to have only achieved mixed success. There have been reports that Kinzhal can also be used as an anti-ship weapon, although this remains unconfirmed. Another potential parallel with Kinzhal is the KD-21's possible origins in a surface-launched weapon. While the Russian ALBM is an air-launched development of the Iskander short-range ballistic missile, the KD-21 looks like it might be an adaptation of the CM-401 anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), otherwise launched from a truck or ship. The CM-401 can also strike static land targets and reportedly has a terminal speed of between Mach 4 and 6. As we have discussed before, whether the air-launched KD-21 is intended primarily to strike land or maritime targets — or both — the fact that it now seems to be in operational service is significant. Whatever the target set, ALBMs are notably difficult to defend against. Like many ballistic missiles, ALBMs arrive at their target with a hypersonic or near-hypersonic terminal velocity and a steep angle of descent. While this is hard enough to intercept, an added problem comes when the missile also maneuvers dynamically during the terminal attack phase. The lessons of the Ukraine war suggest that ALBMs like Kinzhal are not immune to interception by high-end air defense systems. However, in the context of a future confrontation with China in the Indo-Pacific region, the KD-21 would be just one element with a layered and complex A2/AD strategy. Not only would ALBMs arrive in considerable numbers, but they could also be accompanied by other types of missiles, ballistic and cruise, as well as drone strikes. Already, China can call upon a huge arsenal of ground-launched ballistic missiles, but having ALBMs delivered by H-6 provides a much greater reach and the possibility of more dynamic, less predictable targeting. In its surface-launched form, the CM-401 has a reported range of a little over 180 miles, which will be extended when launched from the air. Meanwhile, the H-6K is understood to have a range of 3,700 miles. Certain examples are also equipped with probes so they can be refueled in flight, allowing them to range as far as the coast of Alaska, for example. There are meanwhile suggestions that the basic CM-401 might be able to hit targets at much greater ranges, by using a 'porpoising' or 'skip-glide' trajectory. This involves the warhead pulling up into a steep climb at least once as it begins the terminal stage of its flight. In the case of the CM-401, this could potentially boost its range to around 600 miles. This kind of trajectory also makes it even trickier to intercept. Clearly, a missile like this, whether being used against targets on land or at sea, could play a significant role in scenarios involving Taiwan. Even when launched from over the coast of the Chinese mainland, the KD-21 would be able to threaten targets on Taiwan's eastern coast. By firing these missiles from other vectors, Taiwan's problem of defending air bases, command centers, and other key military targets would be exacerbated. Elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific theater, the KD-21 could be used to strike critical enemy installations along the First Island Chain and further out into the Pacific. An official video from China's People's Liberation Army Air Force showing H-6 bombers taking part in a simulated attack on Andersen Air Force Base on Guam: Overall, having H-6s equipped to deliver smaller, more numerous ALBMs — potentially against ships — makes them a very unpredictable threat to any potential adversaries. In particular, the H-6K/KD-21 provides an alternative where otherwise a longer-range ground-launched ballistic missile would be needed. Meanwhile, the KD-21 is not the only ASBM available to the H-6. There is at least one larger and longer-range weapon known by the Western codename CH-AS-X-13, which may carry the Chinese designation KF-21. You can read more about it here. Due to its size, the missile is carried semi-recessed on the centerline of the fuselage of the H-6N variant. According to a Pentagon assessment, this weapon is likely available in nuclear-capable and conventionally armed versions. Potentially, there exist two further variants of the missile, one with a warhead similar to the land-based DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, and another that may be topped with a hypersonic glide vehicle upper stage similar to that on the DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile. An embedded Tweet with one of the best videos we have seen so far of the much larger CH-AS-X-13 ALBM: Other sources indicate at least two sub-variants of the same weapon, differing in their warhead types. The first variant is thought to feature a 'double-cone' type tip, similar to that found on the land-based DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, while the second variant may feature a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) upper stage similar to that on the DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile. 空军轰6N挂载空射弹道导弹视频 — lqy (@lqy99021608) April 19, 2022 For now, the apparent operational fielding of the KD-21 further underscores the continued importance of more modern versions of the H-6, the original design of which dates back to the 1950s. At the same time, the weapon reflects China's continued effort to expand and increasingly diversify its already potent missile armory, with a notable focus on ALBMs. Contact the author: thomas@
