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First Post
25-04-2025
- Politics
- First Post
South Korea debates nuclear weapon option as Trump retreats from Ukraine
US allies were alarmed when Trump, following a heated argument with Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House, withdrew military and intelligence support to Kyiv read more Donald Trump's return to the power in the United States has left Washington's allies scratching their heads on the issue of security. US allies were alarmed when Trump, following a heated argument with Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House, withdrew military and intelligence support to Kyiv. In South Korea, this made people realise the US security umbrella may no longer be reliable in an increasingly uncertain geopolitical landscape. South Koreans were also left anxious when Trump, just hours after taking office in January, described Pyongyang as a 'nuclear power.' Some drew conclusions whether the US would treat North Korea as an establish nuclear state with no ambition of denuclearisation on the peninsula. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Debate over nuclear arms intensifies in South Korea Amid all these developments, South Koreans are now increasingly calling for developing a nuclear arsenal of their own, which would not just help Seoul wean itself off overreliance on US but also ward off threats from the North. 'We can't always rely on the U.S. They're looking after themselves first now,' Kim Min-ho, a 29-year-old IT worker in Seoul, was quoted as saying by Nikkei Asia. 'If Trump is going to charge us for protection, maybe it's time we protect ourselves. Why should North Korea have nuclear weapons but not us?' A Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) survey last year revealed that 45 per cent of South Koreans now preferred having nukes of their own, against 40 per cent who still preferred reliance on US security umbrella. It was for the first time that more people favoured nuclear option against US reliance. Overall, some 60 to 70 per cent people in South Korea remain in favour of developing nuclear weapons but the support falls to just 30 to 40 per cent when they are informed about associated costs, including potential sanctions from the global community and collapse of alliances. 'What looks like overwhelming support becomes far more cautious when costs are factored in,' said Lee Sang-sin, a senior researcher at KINU, speaking at a policy forum in March. The North Korea threat South Korea's relationship with nuclear weapons dates back to the 1970s when Seoul briefly pursued a covert nuclear programme. However, in recent years, as North Korea's nuclear arsenal expands, the idea of South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons has gained more attention. North Korea is estimated to have at least 50 nuclear warheads, and this number could increase significantly in the coming years. North Korea's growing ties with Russia have further complicated the security situation. Since late last year, North Korean troops have been confirmed to be on the ground in Ukraine, supporting Russia's invasion. Analysts say North Korea is using the war to gain battlefield experience and test weapons that could be used in future conflicts in Northeast Asia. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Will US allow South Korea's nuclearisation? The Trump administration has not signalled any change in US policy but the Pentagon now includes officials who have supported Seoul's nuclear ambitions in the past. Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby, for instance, has supported the idea of Seoul having nuclear weapons. Before taking office, even Trump himself said he wanted both South Korea and Japan to pursue nuclear weapons. Interestingly, even North Korea may also support the South's nuclear move as it could provide legitimacy to their own nuclear arsenal, forcing the world to completely abandon the denuclearisation of Korean Peninsula. The regional implications of South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons would be significant, experts warn. Such a move could prompt Japan to pursue its own nuclear arsenal, which would likely trigger a regional arms race in East Asia. China, which reacted strongly by imposing sanctions on South Korea when it deployed US missile defence systems in 2017—costing South Korea's economy about $7.5 billion—would likely respond even more harshly to any nuclear weapons development in the region.
Asia Times
11-03-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
N Korea's nuclear sub engulfed in a sea of doubt
North Korea's unveiling of its first nuclear-powered submarine marks a bold leap in its military ambitions, but skepticism but its actual capabilities is already floating to the surface. This month, multiple media sources reported that North Korea has unveiled its first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), signaling a significant advancement in its military capabilities amid speculation of Russian assistance. State media released images of North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un inspecting the vessel, which experts estimate to be between 6,000 and 8,000 tons and capable of carrying up to 10 nuclear-loaded missiles. If operational, the nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) would enhance North Korea's second-strike capability, allowing it to launch missiles from undetectable underwater positions. While North Korea has tested submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) since 2016, these were previously launched from a single-tube, 2,000-ton test submarine. The new vessel could alter the strategic balance, particularly if North Korea perfects nuclear propulsion technology. However, full operational capability may take years, with a possible test launch within two years. The disclosure follows North Korea's intensified rhetoric against US-South Korea military drills and aligns with Kim's long-standing goal to modernize North Korea's naval forces. The US remains committed to North Korea's denuclearization, while South Korea monitors potential Russian technological transfers that could accelerate North Korea's nuclear submarine ambitions. As with many of North Korea's military advancements, these claims should be taken with a grain of salt, given the paucity of information about its military and Pyongyang's tendency to exaggerate its capabilities for propaganda purposes. In a September 2023 article for the Korean Institute for National Reunification (KINU), Hong Min says North Korea may pursue a dual track in building its sea-based nuclear deterrent. According to the writer, North Korea's first line of effort is the construction of nuclear-armed submarines, while its second is building nuclear-powered submarines. In line with its first line of effort, North Korea unveiled the Hero Kim Kun Ok 'tactical nuclear submarine' in September 2023. According to Beyond Parallel, it is a refurbished Soviet Romeo-class conventional ballistic missile submarine (SSB). Beyond Parallel says the submarine's unveiling aligns with North Korea's SLBM program, with its newer Pukguksong-3, Pukguksong-4, Pukguksong-5 and an unnamed SLBM unveiled in April 2022 too big to fit its current Gorae-class SSB. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), as of August 2024, North Korea had one Gorae-class SSB. NTI notes that the submarine is limited by its reliance on diesel engines and lack of air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems. Its range is capped at 2,778 kilometers—sufficient to hold targets in South Korea and Japan at risk but insufficient to threaten the US mainland. However, Min says that remodeling Soviet-era submarines, as in the Hero Kim Kun Ok and Gorae-class SSBs' case, could introduce structural and engineering problems, which could take significant time and resources to correct, rendering these efforts impractical for North Korea. Further, in a 2017 article in the Strategy journal, Oh Soon-Kun mentions that North Korea's Gorae SSBs will face significant command and control challenges and combat service support as they operate further from their home bases. Oh also says that the Gorae SSB, a variant of the Soviet Golf-class SSB, has high noise levels, making it vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations. Given those limitations, Oh says North Korea could limit its SSBs to operations close to its shore bases, following a Soviet-style bastion strategy. However, he mentions that the approach limits their deterrent value by precluding forward operations. Alternatively, he states that North Korea could attempt to infiltrate its SSBs into the Sea of Japan, risking detection and destruction by South Korea, the US, and Japan's ASW capabilities. As for North Korea's second line of effort, Thomas Newdick mentions in an October 2024 article for The War Zone (TWZ) that nuclear propulsion would give North Korea a credible second-strike capability, ensuring unlimited underwater endurance and possibly reduced acoustic signature. However, Newdick points out that North Korea's ability to build a nuclear-powered submarine is questionable. He notes that building submarine reactors is challenging to master, given their demanding integration and power generation requirements. Despite those challenges, in an October 2024 Heritage Foundation report, Robert Peters mentions that North Korea has been seeking nuclear submarine propulsion technology for over a decade, with US officials speculating that Russia may have provided North Korea with such in exchange for supporting its Ukraine war effort with soldiers and materiel. While Alex Luck notes in TWZ that a North Korean nuclear-powered submarine is not an unexpected development, the technical challenges of building such a submarine are daunting. Luck says North Korea hasn't developed a suitable reactor design, but it may focus on building 'hybrid' submarines, combining nuclear and conventional propulsion, as seen in the sole 1980s Project 651E Juliett-class cruise missile submarine (SSG). Including a small auxiliary nuclear reactor in its Romeo and Golf-class retrofits could help North Korea simultaneously achieve its two lines of effort in building an underwater nuclear deterrent. A small auxiliary nuclear reactor could offset the range limitations of North Korea's Hero Kim Kun Ok and Gorae-class SSBs and increase their submerged endurance. However, taking Project 651E as a precedent, this approach was less than successful, achieving only a sustained speed of six knots underwater for 11,200 kilometers. This poor performance made chemical-based AIP technology, such as fuel cells and lithium-ion batteries, more practical. The Project 651E reactor was disposed of in 2005. Sukjoon Yoon mentions in an October 2023 article for the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore that North Korea's submarine force will likely depend on quantity over quality to match US and South Korean forces. According to the US Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) 2021 North Korea Military Power report, North Korea has about 70 conventional submarines, but they are of older design and limited endurance. Yoon argues that since North Korea's nuclear submarine projects seem half-baked, the best response for South Korea is to put diplomatic pressure on the former and Russia. However, he says that South Korea's popular media prefers a military response, noting that the country has already built the sophisticated KSS-III SSB, which could have nuclear propulsion. Yoon mentions that South Korea's KSS-III submarines could perform an 'anti-exit' strategy against North Korea's SSBs, preventing them from leaving their bases and going out to sea. However, he says that South Korea constructing a nuclear-powered submarine is still a big request for the US. Cautioning about North Korea's submarine developments, Yoon says that while the country's efforts may be odd and flawed, the Kim regime's determination to acquire weapons that can threaten South Korea, Japan and the US should not be underestimated and should be addressed urgently.
Korea Herald
05-02-2025
- Politics
- Korea Herald
‘Three bullets, moldy rice': N. Korean soldiers endure dire conditions
North Korean conscripted soldiers endure brutal conditions, grappling with severe shortages of essentials — from bullets for training to food — and at times survive on corn powder or even moldy rice, according to a report by a South Korean state-run research institute. The Korea Institute for National Unification on Monday released a report titled "Military Life of North Korean People," detailing the harsh realities faced by North Korean conscripts under the Kim Jong-un regime. The findings are based on extensive research, including in-depth interviews in 2024 with 27 male and female defectors who served in the North Korean military. Except for two individuals who fled to South Korea in 2009 and 2010, the defectors left the North under Kim Jong-un's rule, mostly between 2015 and 2020. The report stated that testimonies from the defectors, all of whom remained anonymous, indicated that the North Korean authorities failed to provide soldiers with sufficient "expendable materials," including bullets for rifle training and other drills. A defector who served in the North Korean army from 2011 to 2015 before fleeing to South Korea in 2018 said soldiers were given just three bullets each during the rare shooting drills that took place. 'You can't really call that sufficient. We were given just three rounds — how is that enough? You need to fire at least a full magazine to say you've had proper training,' the defector said. 'Three shots — bang, bang, bang — and that was it.' The defector said their guard post, which housed two squads, had to share just 50 rounds — leaving each soldier with only about three bullets. A second anonymous defector, who served in the army from 2004 to 2013 before fleeing to South Korea in 2019, recalled, "If we hit all our targets with the three rounds, we were given one extra bullet." But live ammunition was rarely used in training. Instead, soldiers practiced aiming with a small, needle-like device — about half the size of a cigarette — inserted in place of a bullet. 'We didn't wear steel helmets there. As for clothing, we were issued a single uniform before deployment and had only two or three undershirts,' recalled a third anonymous defector, who served in the Army from 2008 to 2012 before fleeing to South Korea that same year. However, the report clarified that North Korean defectors generally agreed that while non-consumable supplies and equipment provided to soldiers — excluding items like ammunition — were not abundant, they were not so scarce as to be considered severely lacking. KINU analyzed that despite the Kim Jong-un regime's rhetoric about improving civilian living standards, it continues to prioritize resource allocation to the military. More notably, there was no disagreement about food shortages in the military. The report found that nearly all interviewees, particularly male defectors, consistently described military meals as "both poor in quality and severely insufficient in quantity." A fourth anonymous defector, who served in the navy from 2010 to 2017 before fleeing to South Korea in 2019, said food was scarce on their first assignment — an anti-aircraft artillery unit located far from the navy headquarters where they later served. 'The conditions there were extremely poor,' the defector said. 'Even the corn we received wasn't whole kernels -- it was just corn powder. Due to poor storage, I sometimes had to eat rice covered in blue-green mold." The defector added that on good days, soldiers had soybean paste soup. 'Otherwise, it was nothing more than saltwater or watered-down soy sauce,' the defector recounted. 'As for side dishes, it was the 'salted trio' — salted napa cabbage and salted radish,' the defector said, noting that even these were in short supply. In the spring, soldiers received only three small pieces of bread made from barley or whole wheat. A fifth defector, who served in the Army from 2015 to 2019 before fleeing to South Korea, testified that soldiers relied heavily on corn as their staple food. 'Sometimes we got rice, sometimes we didn't — it was inconsistent,' the defector said. 'Flour was hardly common.' KINU pointed out that "a considerable number of defectors either used money sent by their parents to ease their hunger when given the chance to leave their bases or directly witnessed such occurrences." The report also noted that North Korean soldiers were mobilized for farming to secure their own food, despite the military being given priority in food allocation. A sixth defector, who served in the army from 2006 to 2013 before defecting to South Korea in 2015, stated that soldiers 'usually woke up at 4 a.m. for farming, or at 5 a.m. when it rained.' "Upon waking up, if the day's task was assigned as 'weeding,' then we would spend the entire day just weeding."
