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The Star
18-05-2025
- Politics
- The Star
How the US gave India and Pakistan an excuse to stand down
WHEN US President Donald Trump announced on May 10 that India and Pakistan had agreed to a ceasefire, it surprised most on the subcontinent. The military exchanges that followed a terrorist attack on tourists in Kashmir had only intensified in the days prior. And few outsiders seemed interested in the conflict between the two nuclear-armed nations – vice president JD Vance had even said that the brewing war was 'fundamentally none of our business.' So how was the Trump administration, unable to arrange for a ceasefire in Ukraine, so successful in South Asia? Even an unenthusiastic attempt at mediation proved remarkably effective. Is the United States still the global policeman that it was a couple of decades ago? Not quite. In this case, America was not a figure of authority – merely a good excuse. Neither India nor Pakistan really wanted a full-out war, but the spiral of attack and retaliation might have led them there. They needed a plausible reason to pull back from the brink, and Washington's efforts qualified. All three countries were acting on muscle memory. The US has intervened often when India and Pakistan have fought. In another Kashmir-centric skirmish in 1999, Bill Clinton pushed then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif into retreating after a stormy July 4 meeting in the Oval Office. Clinton's advisers told him that would be the most consequential meeting of his presidency; Trump's advisors may not have been so pressing. But they didn't need to be. India and Pakistan didn't have any other path to de-escalation, so they simply seized on the one that had worked before. Pakistan was particularly grateful for the out, judging by its reaction. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif thanked the president for his 'pathbreaking leadership and commitment to global peace.' India was less willing to name the US. New Delhi didn't even call it a ceasefire, clumsily describing it as 'an understanding on stoppage of firing and military action.' They insisted, in addition, that this was negotiated not at the political level but through talks between the uniformed officers in charge of military operations at the front. India might have been worried that Trump went too far when he offered to work with the two countries to reach a solution to the Kashmir dispute. New Delhi has never discussed that issue with anyone other than Pakistan, and isn't likely to start now. People on this side of the border seem more disappointed than the Pakistanis – egged on, perhaps, by a remarkably irresponsible media. India's news anchors have predicted total military victory while standing in front of AI-generated images of Pakistani cities on fire, as ersatz air raid sirens shrill in the background. This bellicosity seemed so universal in the public sphere that you might not have noticed how it contrasted with New Delhi's official tone. The foreign ministry and the military consistently insisted there would be no escalation. Those who did notice the difference were not pleased. India's top diplomat, whose frequent press conferences made him the face of this official moderation, had to protect his X account when he and his family began to receive threats. But Prime Minister Narendra Modi, unlike his Pakistani counterpart, chose to avoid discussing the strikes and counter-strikes at all. This is where even the appearance of US involvement helps: It allows decision-makers at the top to do the right thing while giving them some cover against their own hyper-nationalist followers. People on either side of the border are now free to wonder if somehow their leaders secretly got something in return for giving in to US suggestions that they climb down. Trump gave that speculation some wings when he talked about 'increasing trade' following the ceasefire. Others have wondered about arms deals. No such secret clauses to the agreement may ever materialise, but imagining their existence is nevertheless useful. Too few facts have been established for either side to credibly claim victory. Eventually, we will know if and how many Indian aircraft were shot down, and how much India damaged Pakistani air bases. The Pakistani air force can say it demonstrated parity in the sky. India can claim to have shown that Pakistani airfields are vulnerable and will be held hostage to terrorist attacks. It's all too opaque for any decision-maker to feel confident. Did Pakistan's Chinese-made missiles really outfox India's European planes and weaponry? How has the use of drones changed the escalation ladder between two nuclear adversaries, and has it made us less or more secure? Who in the Pakistani establishment aided the terrorist attack on Kashmir, and will they ever be brought to account? The point of US intervention is to render these questions less urgent. Nobody has to save face by giving in to the other; they each give in to the US – even if America has changed dramatically from the country that could and would enforce its decrees on the rest of the world. If that US didn't exist, we would have to invent it. These days, we will instead pretend it does. — Bloomberg Opinion/Tribune News Service Mihir Sharma is a senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, he is author of Restart: The Last Chance for the Indian Economy.
Hindustan Times
12-05-2025
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Pakistan's politico-military tango: Relationship fractured by deep State
The idea of Pakistan as an Islamic democracy that offered space for other religions and cultures to coexist within an Islamic State vanished with the death of its founder and first Governor General, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. What has emerged since is a State that has demonstrated a fractured and unstable politico-military relationship that has seriously impeded Pakistan's evolution from a colony to a modern State. There are three main themes that highlight the politico-military dynamics that exist in Pakistan. The first is an absence of consistent political acumen and the widespread corruption within Pakistan's political parties since its creation, which has offered space for the military to step in and offer notions of stability and power to its people. Pakistan's political instability relative to India is exemplified by the fact that it has had 24 prime ministers compared to India's 14. The second theme that merits attention is the political rise of the Pakistan army and its gradual domination of the violent political landscape. From Prime Minister (PM) Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination at a political rally in 1951, to the recent attempt to assassinate Imran Khan in November 2022, the Pakistan army has — in one or the other form — been linked to these attempts as part of a continuous struggle for supremacy over the political and civilian establishment. The methodology followed by the Pakistan army over the years to dominate the political landscape has followed two models. The first model is the military dictator model in which the Pakistan army chiefs have brazenly seized political power and proclaimed themselves as president to seemingly infuse stability in the country after engineered political crises. Generals Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, and Pervez Musharraf are examples of this model. In their regime, dummy PMs were installed, and these dictators ruled the country with an iron hand. An interesting trivia that indicates the longevity and domination of the Pakistan army is that since the creation of Pakistan, its army has just had 15 army chiefs with tenures ranging from two years to as long as 12 years (Zia). India, on the other hand, has had 31 army chiefs who have consistently stuck to the two-year/retirement at 62 years template that is mandated as per law. The dominance of the Pakistan army has been periodically challenged by powerful politicians like Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, Benazir Bhutto, and Imran Khan, all of whom came to power on a consistent anti-India and Kashmir-centric plank. When coupled with the global pressure that linked the continuation of aid to the return of democratic processes, these politicians came to power with the backing of specific factions within the Pakistan army. However, what emerged that whenever these politicians attempted to flex political power and marginalise the military, they were removed from power — Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was hanged, Benazir was assassinated, Nawaz Sharif was exiled, and Imran Khan was imprisoned, all at the behest of powerful army chiefs. The last theme that is not often discussed in India relates to the continuous tinkering with the Constitution that changes Pakistan's politico-military equations. Rubber stamp presidents have often been used by the Pakistan army to dissolve the National Assembly and conduct fresh elections, usually to install an elected government favourable to the army. In 1987, President Zia-Ul-Haq engineered the 8th Amendment which gave the president (himself) sweeping powers to dismiss the National Assembly. In 1997, the 13th Amendment was passed during a decade-long period of strong civilian rule, under PMs Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. The Amendment nullified the 8th Amendment and clipped the wings of the President. The following decade saw a period of dominance of the Pakistan army with Musharraf proclaiming himself president in 2001 after three years as the army chief, a move that saw him undermine the Constitution to stay in office till 2008 when he resigned to avoid impeachment. Soon after Musharraf's downfall, the 18th Amendment was put in place in 2010 to further limit presidential powers and improve federalism, a move that has not paid much dividend as far as limiting the powers of the army, though there have been previous army chiefs in the recent past such as General Qamar Bajwa who have attempted a more sophisticated way of retaining power in Pakistan — through a masquerade of submitting to civilian authority. Bajwa's successor, General Asim Munir is a radicalised general in the Zia mould who has plunged the politico-military dynamics in Pakistan to a new low. After the current crisis, only time will tell whether this relationship will see a change. Arjun Subramaniam is a military historian and a strategic commentator. The views expressed are personal Get 360° coverage—from daily headlines to 100 year archives.
News18
02-05-2025
- Politics
- News18
Same Target, Different Tactics: How Commanders Of Jaish And Lashkar Operate
Last Updated: While Rauf Azhar of JeM believes in high-intensity attacks, Sajid Jatt of LeT prefers sustained insurgency with help from ISI, posing a long-term threat to regional stability. Two deadly terror organisations, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), are led by deadlier commanders with distinct tactics and two different ideologies. While Rauf Azhar of JeM believes in high-intensity attacks, Sajid Jatt of LeT prefers sustained insurgency under the guidance of the ISI, posing a long-term threat to regional stability. Rauf Azhar is the mastermind behind some of the deadliest attacks in India, including the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2016 Pathankot airbase assault, and the 2019 Pulwama bombing that resulted in the death of 40 CRPF personnel. He also orchestrated the 1999 Kandahar hijacking, which led to the release of Masood Azhar. Rauf Azhar embodies JeM's sectarian radicalism and high-risk operations. On the other hand, Sajid Jatt represents LeT's insurgency, closely aligned with the ISI. While Rauf's attacks have immediate devastating impacts, Jatt's adaptive insurgency presents a prolonged challenge to regional peace. CNN-News18 delves into the operational methods of both terrorists. The commanders of Jaish and Lashkar share similar goals but differ in ideologies and tactics. Rauf Azhar, from the Deobandi sect, emphasises strict Sunni orthodoxy and violence against Shias and other minorities. His leadership has led to internal splits within JeM, with members rebelling against Masood Azhar for prioritising Kashmir over global jihad. Historically, Rauf Azhar's faction has targeted Pakistani Christians and state symbols, including assassination attempts on Pervez Musharraf. Sajid Jatt, influenced by the Ahl-e-Hadith sect followed by LeT, aligns with Salafism and focuses on Kashmir-centric jihad while avoiding direct confrontation with the Pakistani state. Unlike JeM, LeT maintains close ties with the ISI. Post-2019, TRF, a proxy of LeT, was created to portray terrorism as a local Kashmiri movement, thereby avoiding international scrutiny. Rauf Azhar masterminded major attacks like the 2001 Parliament strike, the 2016 Pathankot assault, and the 2019 Pulwama bombing, escalating tensions between India and Pakistan. He relies on encrypted devices and public rallies in Pakistan to incite violence, as seen in his 2017 speech threatening an attack bigger than Pathankot. Sajid Jatt manages TRF operations under a domestic front disguise, using drones for weapon drops and encrypted apps like Telegram and WhatsApp for recruitment and propaganda. Recent attacks, such as the 2025 Pahalgam massacre, involved checking victims' IDs to target Hindus and spare Muslims, aiming to incite communal tensions. JeM has splintered into factions like Jamaat-ul-Furqan (JuF) due to internal dissent against Masood Azhar's loyalty to Pakistan. Rauf Azhar's leadership is marked by alliances with Al-Qaeda and internal conflicts. Jaish operates like a family enterprise, with Rauf Azhar and his brother Masood Azhar centralizing control, resulting in operational rigidity. LeT maintains a structured hierarchy under Hafiz Saeed, with TRF acting as a deniable proxy. Sajid Jatt coordinates with senior LeT leaders and ISI handlers. LeT fighters are trained in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and associated with Al-Qaeda. They are suspected of procuring encrypted technology through ISI-China networks. LeT, co-founded by Osama bin Laden, prioritises Kashmir over global jihad to retain ISI support. The organisation receives funding and political cover from Pakistan, with leaders like Hafiz Saeed operating openly. JeM aims to provoke military retaliation from India to internationalise the Kashmir issue, as seen after Pulwama. Jaish also targets Shias and Christians within Pakistan, complicating its relationship with ISI. Lashkar focuses on sustained warfare in Kashmir, using TRF to maintain a low-intensity conflict while avoiding Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklisting. LeT exploits social media to glorify militancy and recruit youth, presenting TRF as a resistance movement. Get breaking news, in-depth analysis, and expert perspectives on everything from geopolitics to diplomacy and global trends. Stay informed with the latest world news only on News18. Download the News18 App to stay updated! First Published: May 02, 2025, 12:58 IST
