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The Hindu
a day ago
- Politics
- The Hindu
What is the significance of the Census?
The story so far: The Union Home Ministry has announced the next Census will be conducted in two phases and that the reference date for Census enumeration would be March 1, 2027. What is the history of Census? Census is the process of collecting, compiling and analysing the population of the country. Right from Kautilya's Arthashastra to the administrative report 'Ain-i-Akbari' during the reign of Mughal emperor Akbar, there have been references to population census. A synchronous census is where population data is collected simultaneously across the country. This kind of census was started in 1881 during the British period with W. C. Plowden being the first Census Commissioner of India. The details were collected in census schedules till Independence. The questions in the schedule underwent changes with each census but broadly contained questions relating to age, sex, mother tongue, literacy status, religion, caste etc. The last census where caste was enumerated for Hindus was in 1931. How is the Census conducted? The Census is a Union list subject while The Census Act, 1948 is the key legislation governing the Census process. It authorises the Central government to undertake Census operations and appoint a Census Commissioner to supervise the entire exercise. The Centre also appoints Directors of Census Operations to supervise the Census within several States, while the State governments may appoint Census officers. The staff for conducting the Census is provided by the local authorities of a State, which predominantly consists of teachers. Since 1971, Census operations have been carried out in two phases. The first phase is the 'house listing' phase that collects information on housing data. This usually spreads over a period of 5-6 months. In the last Census of 2011, the house listing schedule contained 35 questions that included details like type of house, main source of drinking water, type of latrine facility, availability of kitchen and fuel used for cooking, whether the house has a television/computer/telephone, type of vehicle available etc. The second phase is the 'population enumeration' phase that is usually conducted during the month of February of the Census year as the usual reference date for population count is fixed as March 1 of the Census year. This captures individual details like name, sex, age, religion, whether belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe (SC or ST), mother tongue, literacy status, educational qualification, occupation etc. These details are then compiled and provisional data from the Census is released. In 2011, this data was released by the end of March. The final report with a detailed analysis of the demographic, religious, linguistic profile etc. was released in April 2013. What is the significance? The decennial Census had happened from 1881 till 2011 without a break in India. However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2021 Census was postponed. While the exercise could have been conducted any time after 2022, it has been continuously postponed. The present Census can be considered the most significant in Independent Indian history due to three reasons. First, the Central government has decided to enumerate the caste details of all Hindus. All Censuses after Independence have captured only SC and ST details. The decision follows wide spread demand from Opposition parties and civil society groups to include caste details in the Census. One of the reasons for the postponement of the Census to 2027 is to undertake the preparatory work for caste enumeration. Second, since this Census would be the first one after 2026, it can be used for the delimitation exercise of determining the revised number of seats in Lok Sabha and State Assemblies. Third, this Census would also form the basis for reserving one-third of seats for women in Lok Sabha and State Assemblies. What should be the way forward? The enumeration of caste details needs to be done in a systematic and flawless manner. This data will have to be used for decisions on affirmative action with respect to backward classes. Hence, adequate time for its preparatory work is necessary. However, genuine apprehensions of southern States, some of the smaller States of north India and the northeast States, about losing political significance if the proposed delimitation and consequent revision of number of seats in Lok Sabha is carried out on the basis of population as per the 2027 Census, must be heeded. Many of these States have demanded a freeze on Lok Sabha seats at the existing level. There has to be a wide-spread consensus among all the States on the formula for proportionate increase in Lok Sabha seats. Hence, this exercise of delimitation should not be rushed through before the 2029 general elections. The one-third reservation of seats for women should be implemented based on this Census from the 2029 elections. Rangarajan. R is a former IAS officer and author of 'Courseware on Polity Simplified'. He currently trains at Officers IAS Academy. Views expressed are personal.


News18
28-05-2025
- Entertainment
- News18
From Digital India To Covid-19: NCERT Introduces 7 Teaching Module For Classes 1 To 12
Last Updated: The NCERT modules will cover various topics including digital technology, cleanliness, environment, sports, democracy and cultural heritage. The National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) has released seven new modules for students from class 1 to 12. These modules will cover various topics including digital technology, cleanliness, environment, sports, democracy and cultural heritage. They aim to make learning interesting and effective through stories, case studies, quizzes and interactive activities. Digital India: In the primary level module, children will be introduced to digital payments like UPI apps. While at the middle and higher level, students will be taught about digital platforms like DigiLocker, Aadhaar, Ayushman Bharat, Umang App. This module will also include a story about a jewelery artisan from Rajasthan showing how small businesses are also benefiting from government digital resources. Mental Health and Digital Helpline: This module will tell the story of a student named Rewa, who handles her emotions using the National Mental Health Helpline Tele Manas. The story is an attempt to explain the importance of mental health among children and youth. Democracy and Electoral traditions: Students will be informed about the evolution of India's democracy from its inception to modern electoral institutions. The focus will be on the idea of welfare state in Kautilya's Arthashastra. COVID-19: This module uses pictures, activities and science-based modelling to explain the symptoms of the pandemic and prevention methods to children. For higher secondary students, activities will include creating a 3D model of the virus and interacting with affected people. Heritage and Development: This module introduces children to the cultural heritage of India, such as Kashi Vishwanath Temple in Varanasi and Kamakhya Temple in Assam. It also encourages understanding of culture through stories related to monuments and multilingual vocabulary. These new modules aim to connect children with technology, as well as make them aware of their culture, health, environment and democracy. First Published: May 28, 2025, 14:37 IST


Asia Times
21-05-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
The US factor in India-Pakistan tensions: a Kautilyan perspective
This commentary first appeared on Pacific Forum and is republished with permission. Read the original here. Following the deadly terrorist attacks in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir on April 22, Delhi and Islamabad engaged in immediate diplomatic and security measures and countermeasures. This period of heightened tension culminated in a four-day military clash that ultimately concluded with an 'understanding' between the two nations. The international community's response to these events has varied, encompassing widespread condemnation and condolences, appeals for de-escalation and restraint, and expressions of enthusiastic or cautious support for India or Pakistan. These reactions, viewed through the lens of ancient Indian strategic thought, starkly highlight the enduring primacy of political interests in the global arena, echoing the rajamandala (circle of states) theory articulated by Kautilya. Within this framework, the response of the United States—arguably occupying the position of the udasina (neutral king) in India's rajamandala —warrants scrutiny. Kautilya's seminal Arthashastra conceptualizes the intricate web of interstate relations through the rajamandala , a construct comprising 12 distinct categories of states. The defining characteristics of each state within this system are determined by a confluence of three key factors: geographical proximity, the prevailing balance of power, and the state's intentions or disposition ( bhavin ). Applying this ancient wisdom to contemporary geopolitics, the United States arguably embodies the quintessential udasina —the neutral king—within India's rajamandala . 'One outside (the sphere of) the enemy, the conqueror and the middle king, stronger than (their) constituents, capable of helping the enemy, the conqueror and the middle king when they are united or disunited and of suppressing them when they are disunited, is the neutral king.' In the context of the post-Pahalgam scenario, India assumes the role of the vijigishu (the aspiring conqueror), Pakistan its immediate ari (enemy), and China potentially fits the description of the madhyama (middle king) or parshnigraha (rear enemy), given its geographical proximity and complex relationship with both India and Pakistan. The United States, geographically distant from this immediate sphere of interaction, possesses a comprehensive national power that surpasses that of India, Pakistan, and China. Historically, Washington has strategically navigated the dynamics between these actors, often shaping their interactions in pursuit of its own national objectives. India has cultivated a strategic partnership with the US, elevating it to the status of a mitra (ally) since the turn of the century, in line with Kautilya's framework that acknowledges the significance of external allies. His enumeration of the seven elements of state power uniquely includes mitra as the final component, a resource to be tapped when internal balancing proves ineffective to achieve foreign policy objectives. The US has reciprocated this alignment, driven by considerable strategic convergences, resulting in a demonstrably strengthening bilateral relationship over the past decade. From an Indian perspective, the United States is an important strategic partner with growing alignment of interests across several domains, notably in counter-terrorism. Washington, in turn, has witnessed a growing divergence, and even outright contestation, of its interests with Pakistan, primarily due to Islamabad's enduring 'iron brother' relationship with Beijing, America's principal strategic competitor. Against this backdrop, Delhi would have likely anticipated a more robust and unequivocal response from Washington following the Pahalgam attacks, moving beyond mere condemnation and calls for restraint to a more direct attribution of blame and support for India's security concerns. Despite Washington's affirmation of 'full support' to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on May 2, its reluctance to explicitly hold Pakistan accountable for its role in fostering terrorism has been conspicuous. This contrasts with the aftermath of the 2019 Pulwama attacks, where Washington adopted a significantly more assertive stance against Pakistan, both in terms of assigning blame and acknowledging India's right to self-defence. Some analysts attribute this shift in response to the absence of a 'formally claimed responsibility' by a specific Pakistan-based terrorist group for the Pahalgam attacks, unlike Jaish-e-Mohammed's claim for Pulwama. However, statements from US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Vice President J D Vance, hinting at US support for India's right to self-defence post-Pahalgam, suggest that a lack of definitive evidence was not the primary constraint. Notwithstanding recent vacillation and flip-flops of President Trump, a growing sentiment has emerged within Washington over the past few years, suggesting that its significant bet on India has not yielded the anticipated returns in countering the dual challenges posed by Russia and China. The proliferation of intense and protracted global flashpoints and the resulting alignment of major powers on opposing sides have severely tested India's delicate balancing act. Furthermore, Washington's apparent shift in strategic focus from the Indo-Pacific towards the conflicts in Russia and the Middle East has arguably diluted the strategic convergence that once defined the US-India partnership. The strategic value derived from the bilateral relationship is evident for both New Delhi and Washington, albeit tempered by an inherent power asymmetry that renders the relationship multifaceted and complex. India, as the relatively weaker partner, is naturally circumspect in its alliance with a stronger power to avoid potential manipulation. Conversely, the US delicately balances its approach towards its ally, based on the attitude it exhibits. For Kautilya: ' The ally is permanent because of (exclusive) feelings of friendship, fickle because of (his feelings) being common to the enemy, indifferent when not interested in either, with feelings for both when interested in the two .' From Washington's perspective, India remains a significant, albeit smaller, ally. Drawing upon Kautilya's wisdom, a stronger ally (the US) would be advised to bolster the power of an ally who aligns with the vijigishu (in this case, the US), manage the growth of an ally who shows potential to become too powerful, ensure that a weak ally remains neither excessively weak nor overly strong, prevent a fickle ally (one equally inclined towards the adversary) from defecting, support a weak ally seeking help from the conqueror and the enemy so that he doesn't turn to the enemy, and assist an ally in crisis to overcome their adversaries independently. Given Delhi's cautious approach to fully 'identifying' with US strategic objectives and its continued growth in power, Washington may be resorting to measures designed to keep India strategically tethered. Arguably, the recent strains in bilateral relations concerning the alleged plot to assassinate a US-based Sikh separatist, the evolving situation in Bangladesh, and the recent re-hyphenation of India and Pakistan with an offer to mediate on Kashmir, could be interpreted as strategic manoeuvres by the stronger ally to subtly influence a weaker ally perceived as unwilling to fully comply. While the convergence of interests between Washington and New Delhi is sufficient to sustain their partnership, it may not be comprehensive enough to entirely bridge the inherent power gap. India, committed to safeguarding its strategic autonomy, will likely continue to navigate its relationships with other major powers, including Russia, based on its own national interests. By the same logic, the US may see strategic value in maintaining a relationship with Pakistan. In the long term, India's demographic dividend, growing economic influence, advancing military capabilities, and expanding diplomatic footprint will likely serve as the enduring anchors that keep the US engaged—driven by both economic opportunities and geopolitical considerations. In conclusion, the path forward for the US-India relationship necessitates strategic maturity on both sides, particularly in appreciating the underlying principles guiding the other's strategic behavior. Washington's constructive involvement in India's domestic growth is not only beneficial for New Delhi but also serves America's broader strategic objectives in the subcontinent and the Indo-Pacific. The inherent differences in their approaches to partnerships—India's preference for strategic autonomy versus America's inclination towards alliances—will likely persist as a point of friction. However, viewed through a Kautilyan lens, this dynamic tension might be understood not as a flaw in the relationship but as a natural consequence of their respective strategic positions and objectives. Dr Kajari Kamal ( kajari@ ) is associate professor at The Takshashila Institution.


Indian Express
21-05-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
India's response to Pakistan was moral and ethically justifiable
Written by Shibashis Chatterjee War has shaped human history in both tragic and monumental ways. From ancient battlefields to modern drone warfare, its consequences are deeply etched into political, moral, and cultural life. Yet a core question endures: Can war ever be morally justified? The just war theory addresses this dilemma, aiming to establish moral limits on humanity's most destructive activity. Although rooted in Greco-Roman and Christian European thought, similar ideas about regulated violence appear in ancient Indian philosophy and German idealism, revealing both convergence and conflict. The classical framework and German Idealism Western 'just war theory' began with Cicero, who believed war was justified only for self-defence or protecting the innocent. In later days, theologians like Augustine and Thomas Aquinas gave it a structure. Aquinas emphasised three conditions for a just war: Legitimate authority, just cause, and righteous intent. These became the basis for jus ad bellum: Justice of engaging in war. Self-defence is just; conquest or revenge is not. Equally important is jus in bello, the ethical conduct of war, which demands differentiating between combatants and civilians, and proportionality in the use of force. Violating these principles erodes the moral legitimacy of war. International norms like the Geneva Conventions echo these principles, but modern warfare — deploying nuclear weapons, drones, and asymmetric threats — challenges classical just war theory. When technology diffuses accountability, can morality endure? Kant and Hegel complicate the landscape by shifting focus from external wars to internal violence, like punishment. Kant, a moral rationalist, saw punishment as retributive: Justice demands a proportionate response to wrongdoing. A murderer must not die as a consequence of revenge, but to uphold moral law. Hegel, writing in the wake of the French Revolution, took a historical view. He believed justice was embedded in 'Sittlichkeit' — the ethical life of a community. Punishment restores ethical balance, reaffirming the contract between citizens and the state. While Kant separates moral law from history, Hegel integrates them, but both agree: Legitimate violence must serve justice, not arbitrary power. Kautilya's realism: Order over idealism Kautilya's Arthashastra, a treatise on governance in ancient India, offers a pragmatic approach. War, for Kautilya, is a tool of policy, not a moral enterprise. He categorised warfare into open battle, covert operations, and silent war, deploying them based on necessity. Deception and subversion were not immoral but strategic. War was a last resort, justified only when diplomacy failed, and its conduct had to align with Rajdharma — the ruler's duty to preserve order. Punishment, too, was instrumental. Harsh measures like torture or execution were acceptable if used responsibly to preserve state stability. Kautilya avoided tyranny through proportionality: Justice meant balance, not vengeance. His view aligns with Kant's emphasis on moral accountability and Hegel's historical contextualism. Unlike them, however, Kautilya prioritised survival and governance over moral abstraction. Despite their differences, just war theory, German idealism, and Kautilyan realism converge on a common principle: Violence, if unavoidable, must be rationally and authoritatively regulated. From Aquinas to Kautilya, moral order distinguishes legitimate force from barbarism. Present context In light of these traditions, let us examine the India–Pakistan conflict. For decades, Pakistan has harboured terrorist networks that repeatedly attacked Indian civilians. Despite official denials, intelligence and satellite data trace these attacks to Pakistan-based groups, some allegedly supported by state actors. India, a democratic republic committed to peace, faced a moral dilemma: Whether to act or endure continued aggression. India launched a limited, targeted military operation after exhausting diplomatic options. Civilian casualties in Pakistan were minimal. Many reports have confirmed official Pakistani complicity in funding and organising attacks. While critics labelled India's action as hegemonic, others saw it as reluctant but necessary. India's ethical stance aligns with the spirit of jus ad bellum: It had a just cause, right intention, and pursued peaceful alternatives first. Military action wasn't about revenge but about deterrence, protection, and moral responsibility. As Pakistan weaponised terrorism, diplomacy lost relevance. Proportional force became not only a strategic necessity but a moral obligation. From a utilitarian view, limited action that prevents greater violence and saves lives is more ethical than inaction. Failing to respond would risk further destabilisation and violate the state's duty to protect its citizens. India's approach demonstrates a commitment to justice, avoiding excessive violence, upholding global norms, and reinforcing its role as a responsible state actor. War, when waged within strict moral and legal constraints, may at times be ethically justifiable. Whether framed through Christian doctrine, German philosophy, or Indian realism, the guiding principle is clear: Violence must serve justice, not vengeance. India's actions, rooted in restraint and purpose, reflect this enduring ideal. The writer teaches at Jadavpur University, Kolkata, and was the Eugenio Lopez Visiting Chair at the Department of International Studies and Political Science at Virginia Military Institute, US


India Gazette
08-05-2025
- Politics
- India Gazette
Our Prime Minister exemplified Kautilya's philosophy in action: Vice-President Dhankhar
New Delhi [India], May 8 (ANI): Vice-President Jagdeep Dhankhar on Thursday drew a striking parallel between Prime Minister Narendra Modi's leadership and the ancient wisdom of Kautilya (Chanakya), the legendary strategist and author of the Arthashastra, and said that Prime Minister Narendra Modi has exemplified Kautilya's philosophy in action. Speaking at a public forum, Dhankhar said, 'Our Prime Minister has exemplified in action Kautilya's philosophy. Kautilya's thought process is a treatise in governance, virtually encyclopedic for every facet of governance--statecraft, security, role of the king--now those elected. In our multipolar world of shifting alliances.' 'We had a concept--fly-by-night concept. Same can be seen with the alliances. Kautilya imagined then that this will be ever shifting. Let me quote Kautilya: 'A neighboring state is an enemy, and enemy's enemy is a friend.' Which country knows better than Bharat? We always believe in global peace, global fraternity, and global welfare,' he added. Interacting with the Kautilya fellows from the India Foundation in New Delhi, Dhankhar said, 'Our Prime Minister, a great visionary, believes in big scale. He believes in massive transformation. And after a decade of governance, the results are written on the wall. It is after a long gap of several decades, that we have a Prime Minister continually in the third term. And that is making all the difference.' Kautilya had one great emphasis, the Vice-President said, 'Democracy has to be participatory; development equally has to be participatory. He laid great emphasis on individuals contributing for national welfare. A nation is defined by decorum, discipline -- that is individualistic in nature. Similarly, I quote Kautilya: 'Just as one wheel alone does not move a cart'.....Administration cannot be accomplished single-handedly.' He highlighted how this ethos are reflected in contemporary governance, 'This nation has an administration which is innovative. In the country, we had some districts that were lagging behind. Bureaucrats did not venture into those areas. Prime Minister Modi created a nomenclature for those districts: 'Aspirational Districts'. And now, those 'Aspirational Districts' have turned out to be lead districts in development. Prime Minister Modi suddenly thought that people are going to metros. Tier 2, Tier 3 cities must also be hubs of economic activity. He devised a mechanism of smart cities. Smart cities were not in the context of infrastructure or beauty. It was in the context of facilities being available for entrepreneurs, for students.' Reflecting on the foundational principles of power and governance, the Vice-President said, 'Power is defined by limitations. Democracy is nurtured when we are ever mindful of the limitations of power. If you go deep into Kautilya's philosophy, you will find all this converges only to one essence, nectar of governance--welfare of the people.' Quoting Kautilya's Arthashastra, Dhankhar noted, 'Kautilya declared, 'The happiness of the king lies in the happiness of his people.' If you look at constitutions of any country that are democratic, you will find this philosophy is the underlying spirit and essence of democratic governance and democratic values.' Concluding with a reflection on India's civilizational ethos, the Vice-President remarked, 'Democracy is nurtured best when expression and dialogue complement each other. That distinguishes democracy from any other form of governance. And in India, democracy did not start with our Constitution coming into force or we getting independent from foreign rule. We have been a democratic nation in spirit for thousands of years. And this expression and dialogue, complementary mechanism--Abhivyakti, Vaad Vivaad--has been known in Vedic culture as Anant Vaad.' (ANI)