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'I want to be an independent senior': Xiang Yun on ageing positively and not relying on children, Entertainment News
'I want to be an independent senior': Xiang Yun on ageing positively and not relying on children, Entertainment News

AsiaOne

time5 hours ago

  • Entertainment
  • AsiaOne

'I want to be an independent senior': Xiang Yun on ageing positively and not relying on children, Entertainment News

In an ideal world, Xiang Yun wishes to live with her children and grandchildren in her twilight years, but she also knows not to force it. Speaking to AsiaOne on Monday (July 21) while promoting her new drama Where the Heart Belongs, the 64-year-old local veteran actress said: "I told myself that when I am older, I want to be an independent senior and not trouble my children. So, I don't mind living alone." Xiang Yun, who has been married to former actor Edmund Chen since 1989, shares two children, Chen Xi, 34, and 25-year-old Chen Yixin, with him. Chen Xi, who graduated with a master's degree in arts and cultural management from King's College London this January, recently tied the knot with his non-celebrity Japanese girlfriend, nicknamed Mimi. She added she understands that while "kinship brings warmth", everyone is ultimately alone in the end. Planning ahead to age healthily and happy For Xiang Yun, she believes in planning ahead and ageing positively. She revealed she had written her will in her 50s when she followed her mother — who died in 2023 — to do so. "Especially after my parents died, I feel that life in your senior years is not just about living one day at a time till the final day. There is a need to plan ahead, so that we can age healthily and happily. There is a need to get everything ready," she said. She also told us that while she has not put afterlife planning into action, she had briefly spoken to her family about her wishes. Xiang Yun shared: "I told them that I don't prefer prayers after my death. They can just scatter my ashes at sea and probably find a song to remember me by. That's my wish. When they hear this song in the future and think about me, they could tell someone that this song is a memory of me. That's already fulfilling enough. "I feel that everyone is busy with their own life, so a ritual to remember ancestors doesn't need to be elaborate. As long as there is remembrance, I think that's enough. So, I told them not to make it complicated, I just want to keep it simple." In Where the Heart Belongs, Xiang Yun plays Liu Zhen Wanyu, a senior citizen who lives in the fictional I'Deal City where an ageing population and declining marriage and birth rates resulted in the government implementing policies where the younger population could adopt senior citizens as parents. Wanyu, who is a hot-tempered and strong masseur, and Zhong Yilian (Kym Ng) are both adopted by Situ Ziyang (Romeo Tan), a consultant in the Housing and Senior Affairs Board. Both urge Ziyang to adopt another senior, so that they can complete their mahjong team, which leads him to adopting Li Xunkai (Yao Wenlong) eventually. Despite having no blood relations, they discover a sense of harmony in their found family. However, Xunkai later reports Ziyang for adopting seniors for insurance payouts, prompting a police investigation to uncover whether Ziyang's actions are acts of compassion or a calculated facade. Slowing down to experience life Xiang Yun also told us that remaining active is part of her plans to age healthily. She shared: "I feel that it's not healthy to live a lifestyle where you stop doing everything, especially in senior years. For me, I would plan my time to work, for leisure, hobbies and exercising. I also wish to fulfil my goals of doing social work in the future. I am constantly on the lookout for suitable things for me to do next." She had faced a few minor health scares in the past few years, including osteoporosis where she broke her teeth and sprained her back frequently as well as issues with her lymph nodes. These made her more conscious about her health, including watching her diet, exercising for bone health and studying about nutrition. She added that filming this drama has also led her to start going to the gym to work out. She has also slowed down her pace of life, finding opportunities to relax and spend time with family. She told us: "Over the years, I was constantly busy and anxious about work from the beginning till end of the year. But for the past two years, I have been slowing down and going on trips with Edmund to spend time with our son more frequently. "In recent years, I have spent more time on longer trips and taken the time to experience it fully. Unlike in the past where I would frequently feel anxious about going on overseas trips and returning to work quickly, which tired me out." Letting go of presumptions about being a senior Xiang Yun also believes in having a positive mindset and letting go of presumptions about being a senior. "I told myself that I wouldn't want to give others too much trouble in the future. Because seniors now are different from the past. We are exposed to different things, so I feel that we should be more cheerful and happier. "Times are different now... The younger generation view things differently and we may even have to learn from them sometimes. We should let go of beliefs about seniority, so that it's easier to get along with the younger generation." She also believed that it is important for senior citizens not to wallow in self-pity, but to remain positive and find friends to spend time with: "Everyone must face life and death, but we have a choice to decide on how we want to live." Where the Heart Belongs will be available on demand for free on Mewatch from July 28 and premieres on Channel 8 on July 31, airing on weekdays at 9pm. [[nid:720527]] No part of this article can be reproduced without permission from AsiaOne.

As Gaza hunger crisis deepens, where do truce talks stand?
As Gaza hunger crisis deepens, where do truce talks stand?

New Straits Times

time7 hours ago

  • Politics
  • New Straits Times

As Gaza hunger crisis deepens, where do truce talks stand?

DOHA: Mediators have been shuttling between Israeli and Hamas negotiators since July 6 as they scramble to end nearly two years of war in Gaza where fears of mass starvation are growing. Through 21 months of fighting both sides have clung to long-held positions preventing two short-lived truces being converted into a lasting ceasefire. The stakes are higher now with growing numbers of malnutrition deaths in the Palestinian territory casting a spotlight Israel's refusal to allow in more aid. With pressure for a breakthrough mounting, Washington said top envoy Steve Witkoff will travel to Europe this week for talks on a Gaza ceasefire and aid corridor. US officials said he might head on to the Middle East. As the humanitarian situation in Gaza deteriorates drastically, are the two sides closer to reaching an agreement? After more than two weeks of back and forth, efforts by mediators Qatar, Egypt and the United States are at a standstill. The proposal on the table involves a 60-day ceasefire and the release of 10 living hostages in exchange for hundreds of Palestinian prisoners. Hamas insists any agreement must include guarantees for a lasting end to the war. Israel rejects any such guarantees, insisting that Hamas must give up its capacity to fight or govern as a prerequisite for peace. "The cold hard truth is that for domestic political considerations neither (Israeli Prime Minister) Benjamin Netanyahu nor Hamas leaders in Gaza have an interest in seeing a swift outcome and a comprehensive ceasefire," said Karim Bitar, a lecturer in Middle Eastern studies at Paris's Sciences Po university. "Both would have to answer serious questions from their own constituencies," he added. While Israeli officials have said they are open to compromise, troops have expanded their operations this week into areas of Gaza that had largely been spared any ground offensives since the war began in October 2023. Israeli media have reported that Hamas negotiators in Doha have been unable to communicate directly with the military leadership in Gaza to approve Israeli pullback maps. Logistical issues compound existing rifts within the militant group. There are "technical aspects which are quite difficult to overcome because there is a growing disconnect between Hamas leadership in Gaza and the negotiators in Doha," Bitar said. For Andreas Krieg, a Middle East analyst at King's College London, "the talks are technically progressing, but in practical terms, they are approaching a stalemate." "What is on the table now is effectively just another prisoner swap deal, not a real ceasefire deal," he said. Hamas faces a dilemma: it is under pressure to secure some Israeli concessions but "on the other hand, it faces an increasingly desperate humanitarian situation." "The leadership may be debating how far it can compromise without appearing to surrender politically," he said. More than two million people in Gaza are facing severe food shortages, with more than 100 NGOs warning of "mass starvation." On Tuesday, the head of Gaza's largest hospital said 21 children died of malnutrition and starvation in three days. "Humanitarian pressure is mounting fast," Krieg said, with Hamas facing "rising desperation among the population, which could force it to accept an interim deal to alleviate suffering." But even if Hamas makes concessions, Israel has the upper hand and there can be no lasting ceasefire unless it wants one. "Unless the United States and Qatar... increase significantly their pressure on Israel, I am afraid that this round of negotiations will fail like the previous rounds," Bitar said.

My Perfect Weekend with actor and artist Chen Xi
My Perfect Weekend with actor and artist Chen Xi

Straits Times

timea day ago

  • Entertainment
  • Straits Times

My Perfect Weekend with actor and artist Chen Xi

Chen Xi makes time to reflect after reading and enjoys sketching in his free time over the weekends. Who: Singaporean actor and artist Chen Xi, 34, is the son of celebrity acting couple Edmund Chen, 64, and Xiang Yun, 63. He has a younger sister, 25-year-old actress Chen Yixin. Chen Xi's acting credits include Mediacorp series like Fix My Life (2023), Soul Doctor (2022) and Nightwatchers (2021). He was also nominated in the Top 10 Most Popular Male Artistes category at the 2021 and 2023 Star Awards. He took a break from acting when he pursued a year-long arts and cultural management masters course at King's College London, which saw him graduating in January 2025, before returning to Singapore for good. On July 14, Chen married his 33-year-old Japanese girlfriend, who is known only as Mami. The couple will also be holding a traditional Japanese wedding ceremony in her home town of Kyushu. He is currently partnering local energy company Geneco on its Lost To Be Found mental health and wellness initiative, through six black-and-white illustrations and an infinite-loop video journey. The exhibition, at wellness centre Grovve in youth space *Scape, runs till Sept 30. Chen Xi currently partners local energy company Geneco on its Lost To Be Found mental health and wellness initiative. PHOTO: GENECO 'A perfect weekend for me is about balance. I see it in three parts: time with family, time for self-interest, and time for introspection. I usually begin or end the day sharing a meal with my family, either breakfast or dinner, where we will catch up on the week. My comfort meal is simple: two soft-boiled eggs and kopi. I missed it terribly while I was in the UK, so now it feels extra special, especially when I share it with my dad. Around 1pm, I like to make myself a decaf oat latte, a skill I picked up while working in cafes in the UK. On weekends, I often teach urban sketching and watercolour at Nanyang Academy of Fine Arts, usually in the morning or early afternoon before it gets too hot. After class, I spend time creating content or sketching, often blending the two so it is both fun and efficient. I also try to sketch for myself, just something personal, to keep my creative fuel alive. Chen Xi enjoys sketching in his free time over the weekends. PHOTO: COURTESY OF CHEN XI Later in the day, I hang out with my wife or family, and if time allows, I squeeze in a quick workout. Evenings are for winding down, either with a book, some light gaming, or simply resting. Lately, I have also been catching up with my online friends. We have been trying to play badminton together, though I have discovered that booking a court in Singapore is a sport in itself. One of the most memorable weekends I had was a glamping trip with my wife in the outskirts of London. It was quiet, rural and simple, the kind of city detox I did not know I needed. Making a fire as the day turned to golden hour is one of those snapshots I will always carry with me.'

Studies show Vitamin D levels influence COVID-19 severity for a particular ethnic group
Studies show Vitamin D levels influence COVID-19 severity for a particular ethnic group

West Australian

time4 days ago

  • Health
  • West Australian

Studies show Vitamin D levels influence COVID-19 severity for a particular ethnic group

Having low levels of vitamin D may increase the risk of hospitalisation with COVID-19, Australian and UK scientists have reported. The findings followed an observational study of the health records for 151,543 people in the UK. Sunlight is the primary natural source of Vitamin D for humans. Whist low vitamin D increased the risk of hospitalisation among white patients, it didn't so among Black or Asian patients. The study authors, from the University of South Australia and King's College London, said Vitamin D plays an important role in immune modulation and deficiency is associated with increased susceptibility to acute respiratory syndrome as observed in COVID-19. They reported that black and Asian populations with low vitamin D levels were at a higher risk of catching COVID-19, but this did not translate to increased hospitalisation. Vitamin D and ethnicity may independently influence COVID-19 outcomes, rather than interacting to affect risks, the authors concluded.

TERMS OF TRADE: The political economy of welfare in India
TERMS OF TRADE: The political economy of welfare in India

Hindustan Times

time5 days ago

  • Politics
  • Hindustan Times

TERMS OF TRADE: The political economy of welfare in India

Everybody, from fund managers in Wall Street to RWA WhatsApp groups, has an opinion on welfare in India. Many of them see this as an agent of economic doom which will destroy not just the fisc but also (poor) people's willingness to work. Then there are those who see this as the litmus test for a civilized society. Listening to the (often-wrong) psephologists on TV channels, one could very well come to believe that welfare is something which has come into existence, and, more importantly, political salience, only in the recent past in India. The story of welfare in India, however, goes long back in time, is significantly more complicated, and has been constantly evolving over the last century. Making India Work: The Development of Welfare in a Multi-Level Democracy, the latest book by Louise Tillin, a political scientist at King's College London, finally does justice to the task of putting together the longue durée narrative of welfare in India. It is a must read for anybody who wants to have an informed opinion, rather than just an opinion about welfare in India. India, among the many interesting things Tillin's book teaches us, was a founding member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1919. It was the first colony to be made a permanent member of its governing body in 1922. Even the US, a much older democracy than India, became an ILO member only in 1934. India's ILO membership spurred not just the formation of its first trade union (All-India Trade Union Congress) but also its first industry lobby (Federation of Indian Chambers and Commerce). Even domestic capital was keen to have a voice of its own rather than outsource it to our imperial masters. The national movement was actively engaged with both of these camps. The book also tells us how a planned visit and study by the economist William Beveridge, considered the architect of the modern welfare state, to India fell through because, B R Ambedkar, minister for labour on the Viceroy's Executive Council in 1942 refused to allow Beveridge to focus beyond the realm of industrial labour. Beveridge wanted to look at and study everything including the rural. The book also tells us how capital in Bombay was pleading with the colonial government to dilute social security obligations because it was facing competition from capital elsewhere where such regulations did not apply. It also tells us how the roots of political weaponisation and straight-jacketing of welfare go back to the first (and not the more recent) instance of Caesarism – rise of a charismatic leader – in Indian politics and how the political competition around it actually created a fiscal crisis in for the Indian state even in the 1980s. These are just some tidbits from the story which Tillin's comprehensive and much needed book tells us. To be sure, the book, which is a result of decades of research ranging from field visits in India to archives going back to the pre-independence era, is not just a mere reiteration of facts on the state and evolution of welfare in India. It also builds a nuanced argument about the mechanics and ongoing dialectics of the shaping of welfare in India and questions a lot of perceived wisdom around it. This edition of the column is inspired by a reading of Tillin's book – this author was invited to a discussion on the book – but also tries to critically place the debate around welfare in a larger political economy framework. Why is welfare important in a democracy? A liberal democracy has two mutually conflicting classes, labour and capital, trying to get the better out of each other. In the crudest form, the argument boils down to capital employing labour to generate surplus value. The former's returns (profits) can only be maximised if the latter's reward (wages) is kept as low as possible. The conflict between labour and capital sharpened significantly after the communist revolution in Russia in 1917. The working class started militantly demanding a bigger share in the value of production. This militancy triggered a huge backlash in large parts of western Europe which began with austerity and culminated in fascism in places like Germany and Italy. For those who are interested in a detailed story, there is excellent academic work to be read on the topic such as The Capital Order: How Economists Invented Austerity and Paved the Way to Fascism by Clara E. Mattei and The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of Nazi Economy by Adam Tooze. For readers interested in a fictionalised take on the topic, a recently published blockbuster Italian novel (now translated) M: Son of the Century by Antonio Scurati gives a gripping account of the rise of Mussolini in Italy. Capital completely dominating labour is just one extreme of the tension between capital and labour in modern history. The other extreme, where labour triumphed over capital also did not lead to amicable outcomes. The Soviet Union, which abolished private property, ultimately became a victim of the economic contradictions of its own making. Chris Miller's book Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR and The Triumph of Broken Promises: The End of the Cold War and the Rise of Neoliberalism by Frirtz Bartel go into the detail of how the socialist camp could not preserve the advances made by its working class because of a failure to get its macroeconomics right and ultimately collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions. That the Chinese success story has been built on the basis of a very different kind of 'socialism' than what existed in the likes of the Soviet Union only underlines this point. The rise of fascism as a reaction to communist militancy and collapse of the socialist block are, of course, extreme examples in the history of capitalism and democracy. Most major countries in the world managed to find a middle path by placating both labour and capital in a democratic framework and minimising conflict. These bargains are best understood by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci's concept of the passive revolution which argued that the bourgeoisie often tries to minimise conflict by offering concessions to its adversaries including the underclass to maintain stability. The equally important question to ask, however, is not whether such a bargain between capital and labour has managed to preserve stability but also about the relative well-being of each class as a result of the prevailing bargain. It is on this question that political scientist Sudipta Kaviraj's critique of the passive revolution in India – first published in an essay by the same name in 1987 – offers a persuasive and still relevant take on the bargain between the capital and labour in Indian democracy. 'The tragic thing is that the crisis of ruling-class politics plunges not only the ruling bloc, which has ruptured its protocol, into serious disorder, but the whole country. An exhaustion of the politics of the ruling bloc does not automatically prefigure a radical alternative. It is a particularly sad chapter of a story which had begun with the promise of something like an 'Indian revolution', an understandably unpractical and sentimental beginning which promised to 'wipe every tear from every eye'. Even if we consider only the socially relevant tears, the promise is as distant today as at the romantic time when it was made,' Kaviraj writes. His critique, in a way, is very similar to the larger criticism of India failing to evolve as a 'rights-based' welfare regime where workers and citizens are conferred constitutionally guaranteed entitlements to provide a minimum standard of living. What went wrong with welfare in India? Answering this question, first and foremost, requires admitting that class conflict in India never took the form it had in advanced capitalist countries. An overwhelming majority of the working class in India has never been employed by the typical capitalist. Despite being at the cusp of becoming the third largest economy in the world, the average Indian firm still employs less than three people. The conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in India has therefore taken two primary forms: a struggle for terms of trade between the farm and the non-farm sector and demand for more welfare from the state rather than capital. With the evolution of the Indian economy, there have been two key developments which have minimised the importance of the conflict between the agrarian and the non-agrarian sector and increased the importance of the conflict around greater demand for welfare from the state. The first is the self-sufficiency of the country in food production from days of infamous 'ship-to-mouth' existence thanks to the green revolution. It has been accompanied not just by a rise in per capita production and availability of food grains but also the per capita procurement and distribution of food grains. There was a time when the state wanted to procure as much food as possible and farmers were unwilling to sell to the state because they could get better returns in the open market. Now it is the farmers who are demanding that the state buy their food at minimum support prices because the markets are not so rewarding. The second has been the falling importance of agriculture as a source of livelihood in India. While agriculture's headline employment share is still more than 40%, government's own data from sources such as the Situation Assessment Survey shows that the share of workers who are exclusively dependent on cultivation incomes has fallen drastically. As this share comes down further, the militant farmer is increasingly become a thing of the past in India and being replaced by the vulnerable migrant worker who can be employed in a construction site or delivering food in cities. The rise of welfare expectations vis-à-vis the state in India goes back to the Indira Gandhi years. In the middle of an inner-party struggle and a serious macroeconomic crisis, both Gandhi and the deep state realised that the planning experiment was struggling to deliver politically and economically. From the Garibi Hatao campaign of Indira Gandhi, which won her a landslide victory in 1971 to the 'capitalism with a human face' phase of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government to the welfare heavy rhetoric of the Narendra Modi government in the past eleven years, the nature of conflict in expanding the ambit of welfare to generate political capital has largely been the same: balancing political popularity with larger macroeconomic stability. As is obvious, there is a fundamental contradiction in this dialectic. The expectation for welfare is the highest at a time when the economy is in distress. But it is precisely at that moment when the fiscal ability to provide or expand welfare is also the lowest. What further complicates this contradiction in India is the fact that almost every political party faces a fundamental asymmetry in India. Its political legitimacy in a universal franchise-based democracy depends on support from the underclass. But for political finance it must draw on the support of capital which has much more stake in macroeconomic stability than the poor. As elections have become more and more expensive in India, this fault line has only worsened. The other fact which has worsened the pursuit of this balance is the fact that widespread economic precarity persists in India despite a phase of high growth in the past two decades. The choice, as far as the underclass is concerned in India is between chronic distress (in agriculture) and a consistent precarity while being a part of the informal economy across sectors. Minus the welfare cushion of the state, hundreds of millions of Indians can slip into acute distress as was seen during the pandemic in the country. The failure and success of reforms vis-à-vis India's welfare regime The fact that precarity still exists after three and a half decades of economic reforms and India is the biggest indictment of the core promise of reforms. The proponents of reforms, after all, argued that the shackles of license raj were holding back a successful economic transformation of India. To be sure, reforms have not been a complete failure when it comes to expanding the welfare net in India. This is what the left leaning critiques of economic reforms in India often get wrong. While India has not managed to expand things such as manufacturing and still faces large-scale precarity, reforms have helped the case of welfare on one crucial front, namely, enhancing the fiscal capacity of the Indian state to provide welfare to its people. This is best seen in the rise in per capita tax revenue of the state in the last four and a half decades. While the rise in revenue receipts of the Centre and the states between this period is relatively modest – it has increased from 17% to 21% or so – inflation adjusted per capita tax revenue has increased almost four-fold during this time. Economic puritans might scoff at this somewhat unconventional measure of per capita real revenue. But even they would agree that this number matters while designing welfare schemes for a large population. It is precisely because of the revenue generation fruits of growth – not matter how unequal in nature – that welfare schemes have proliferated in India in the past couple of decades. Also read: Terms of Trade: The great Indian political economy drama in six acts While reforms have expanded the welfare providing abilities of the Indian state, things are far from comfortable on the fiscal front. As expectations of greater welfare increase among the underclass and every election victory is increasingly being associated with a new cash transfer scheme in addition to what already exists, fiscal balance is being tested, both at the level of the Centre and the states. This often manifests itself as a zero-sum policy choice between preserving political capital or macroeconomic stability. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) learned this the hard way when it went to the 2024 elections with a fiscally prudent budget and ended up losing its parliamentary majority. The UPA, despite delivering India's best ever growth performance under its watch, completely lost the confidence of capital because of its inability to manage the economy's deficits as well as inflation while trying (unsuccessfully) to buttress its welfare credentials for political gains. To be sure, this is not to say there are no differences between the welfare or larger political economy approach of the UPA and the Modi government. The latter, unlike the former, has mostly pursued asset enhancing welfare schemes which are not (seen as) inflationary via the wage price spiral route. Under Modi, there has also been a greater focus on attribution of welfare to the head of the executive. However, as has been discussed earlier, this is also a reflection of the resurrection of political Caesarism after 2014 rather than just economics. Another important differential of the Modi government, especially in the recent years, has been its strategy to sharply reduce the revenue deficit (revenue expenditure minus revenue receipts) despite the fiscal deficit continuing to be higher than what the FRBM target entails. Most welfare spending happens on the revenue expenditure head. The reduction in revenue deficit at a time when capital spending share has been increasing underlines a new fiscal contract by the current government. It is not just supporting the budget constraint of the poor via welfare but also spending money to ease India's supply side infrastructure deficiency which can potentially boost growth and (private) profits. Also read: The limits of welfarism The reason this approach has failed to boost growth, at least until now, is that external demand has turned bleak with the protectionist turn in advanced economies and domestic demand has lost some of its pent-up component after the pandemic. A vast majority in the country is barely managing to survive and anyway cannot be expected to drive growth. Unless external or domestic demand picks up, growth and therefore revenue cannot grow at higher levels. This also means that welfare levels cannot be enhanced further without jeopardising macroeconomic stability. A lot of commentators, including Tillin are optimistic about the role of federalism in carving out a new future for welfare in India. However, a retrograde rather than progressive turns await the welfare and larger political economy discourse on this route in this author's opinion. While state governments and politicians are feeling more tempted to offer greater welfare benefits, fiscal capacity of states to fund these schemes varies drastically in India. Bihar's per capita revenue, for example, is almost half compared to richer states in the south. What makes this tension worse is even the well-off states are now realising that their unequal growth trajectories have generated a very skewed upward mobility leading to an appetite for welfare spending which is not very different from poor states. This is exactly what is feeding the growing discontent with the in-built equity principle in India's fiscal federalism architecture where central taxes raised in richer states are shared with the not-so-rich ones. A move away from this principle will be a big setback to the fight for equality in India. So, what is to be done? It is common to hear two conflicting views about India's economic regime. The first is critical of it for doing very little on the welfare front and the other laments the failure to usher in radical reforms to boost growth. These binaries should be seen as the competition between labour and capital to further their interests in the democratic arbitration of class conflict. Does the fact that India has managed to preserve its democratic framework mean that the debate can be completely ignored? Such a take is not just cynical but also counter productive in the long run. Unless India manages to boost its current rate of growth, it would find it difficult to manage social security and macroeconomic stability in the not-so-distant future once our demographic dividend starts reversing. How does one resolve this contradiction then? It is useful to remember what India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru told his party in the 1955 Avadi session of the Congress. 'We cannot have a welfare state in India with all the socialism or even communism in the world unless our national income goes up greatly. Socialism or communism might help you to divide your existing wealth, if you like, but in India there is no existing wealth for you to divide; there is only poverty to divide. It is not a question of distributing the wealth of the few rich men here and there. That is not going to make any difference to our national income,' Nehru said. Also Read: Politics, economics, social contracts: Why rerun of anger of '75 is unlikely The point of quoting Nehru seven decades later is not to mechanically reiterate his emphasis on growth rather than redistribution but to ask a different question. Why is it the case that capital in India has failed to kickstart the kind of value creation which countries such as China could achieve? A lot of the GDP divergence between China and India took place after economic reforms began in India. Nehru's question is best followed up by a question India's commerce minister Piyush Goyal posed to India's new age venture capitalists recently when he blamed them for just building trading platforms and selling ice-cream while Chinese companies are making advances in cutting edge manufacturing. The failure of India's capitalists is not just a result of reforms or lack of it. It is also a deeper, structural problem about the incentives India's political economy has generated for them. The question of welfare in India cannot be addressed without engaging with the larger processes of value creation and vice versa. It is here that our biggest success in the political managing this tension between capital and labour has also been our biggest failure. Both sides, especially their advocates, continue to think in silos blaming the other and its political benefactors for not doing what is needed. This has become a convenient but self-defeating alibi for not having a holistic critique of India's growth process in the post-reform period. Unless this changes, India will never be able to deliver on its true potential for either capital or labour. Roshan Kishore, HT's Data and Political Economy Editor, writes a weekly column on the state of the country's economy and its political fall out, and vice-versa

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