Latest news with #Knesset
Middle East Eye
3 hours ago
- Politics
- Middle East Eye
Netanyahu left in precarious position as two ultra-Orthodox parties withdraw from his coalition
A second ultra-Orthodox group has withdrawn from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's ruling coalition this week, leaving him holding on to power with the minimum number of seats required, multiple news outlets reported on Tuesday. The Agudat Yisrael faction withdrew on Tuesday, leaving Netanyahu's coalition with 61 seats in the Knesset out of a total of 120 seats, while the Degel HaTorah faction withdrew on Monday. Both groups withdrew in protest against a bill not being drafted to exempt ultra-Orthodox Jews from military service. The Shas party - also an ultra-Orthodox party - is threatening to withdraw on Thursday. If this happens, it would lead to the collapse of the Netanyahu government and trigger elections.
Yahoo
6 hours ago
- Politics
- Yahoo
Saudi normalization possible without commitment to Palestinian state, Deputy FM tells 'Post'
Asked whether normalization was possible without Israel having to commit to Palestinian statehood, Haskel answered that she 'believed so.' Normalization between Israel andSaudi Arabia is possible without Israel having to commit to a pathway to Palestinian statehood, Deputy Foreign Minister Sharren Haskel said in an interview in the Jerusalem Post Studio on Monday. The full interview will be published on Friday. With aFrench-Saudi summit geared towards Palestinian statehood approaching, Haskel said that the gulf monarchy needed to 'make a decision' on whether to support Palestinian statehood or normalize relations with Israel. 'The offer for a Palestinian state was there on the table for years, multiple times. They refused. They didn't want it. Why? Because a bigger goal was not a Palestinian state. It was to obliterate the state of Israel, killing all the Jews in Israel and out [of it],' Haskel said. 'It's a religious cause. It's not a territorial aspiration in the sense of a state, but for the entire land. And I think that the Saudis need to make that choice as well, like Egypt did, like Jordan did, like the Emiratis, Bahrainis did,' the deputy foreign minister said. Asked whether normalization was possible without Israel having to commit to Palestinian statehood, Haskel answered that she 'believed so.' The French-Saudi summit was 'just another attempt to gain public international attention,' Haskel said, arguing that it would 'not change reality.' Haskel cited a vote in the Knesset in which 98 MKs supported a declaratory measure against a unilateral formation of a Palestinian state. By holding the summit, French President Emmanuel Macron was'rewarding' the October 7 Hamas massacre, Haskel said. The summit, while declaratory, could also give Hamas a 'breadth of fresh air' and 'takes us further from a ceasefire,' since Hamas will 'continue to say no' because by 'holding on a little further,' they will be rewarded, Haskel said. 'If the initiative would have been taken down a long time ago … I think a month and a half ago Hamas would have agreed to a ceasefire,' but such declarations gave Hamas 'more oxygen,' Haskel said.
The Diplomat
8 hours ago
- Politics
- The Diplomat
China's Taiwan Message to Israel and the Limits of Pragmatism
Earlier this week, the Chinese Embassy in Israel issued a sharply worded statement condemning what it called 'erroneous words and acts' by a member of the Israeli Knesset following a visit to Taiwan. The rebuke was directed at Member of the Knesset (MK) Boaz Toporovsky, a senior member of the centrist Yesh Atid party, and the chairman of the Israel-Taiwan Friendship Group, who headed a parliamentary delegation to Taipei in late April. In its statement, the embassy accused Toporovsky of 'violating the One China principle,' suggested he 'take some time to study Chinese history,' and offered to have him visit China and see for himself 'that people on both sides of the strait are family bound by blood ties, and that Taiwan belongs to the over 1.4 billion Chinese people, including the 23 million Taiwan compatriots.' Following a post in X by the Chinese ambassador to Israel, Xiao Junzheng, who repeated the statement, Toporosvsky responded that he would be honored to visit China, but 'no one from China found time to talk to me.' He added that he 'always remember who stands with Israel and who support[s] our enemies.' To add insult to injury, Taiwan's Secretary-General of the National Security Council (and former foreign minister) Joseph Wu trolled Xiao on X, writing: 'Hey dude, you talk way too much on @X. Let me sum it up for you: 'I don't respect your freedom & sovereignty. I support terrorism & stand with #Israel's enemies. BTW, the universe belongs to #China.'' For longtime observers of China-Israel-Taiwan triangular relations, this incident is rather common. Indeed, China has long objected to Israeli parliamentary delegations visiting Taiwan, and similar condemnations have been issued in the past. Already in 2006, during the first parliamentary visit since the establishment of the friendship group, the Chinese ambassador condemned the visit and threatened that 'if the event happens again, that matter will be viewed as critical.' In fact, it is not even the first time that Taiwan's Wu has something to say in the context of China-Israel relations. In a 2022 interview with Israel's biggest English-language media outlet, The Jerusalem Post, Wu remarked: 'So don't worry about China getting upset at you. When they get upset at you, that means you are doing something right.' What makes the latest incident puzzling, however, is the timing. Toporovsky's visit to Taiwan occurred in April, yet Beijing's reaction came only now in July. Even more striking is that this rhetoric came on the heels of what appeared to be a Chinese charm offensive in Israel. Since the appointment of Xiao Junzheng as ambassador in late 2024, it seems that the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Xiao have taken some steps to improve Beijing's image in Israel. These include softer public messaging over the Gaza war, increased outreach to Israeli think tanks and journalists, and a more balanced approach to the Palestinian conflict, as well as the Israel-Iran war, in Chinese state media. The goal seemed to be to stabilize ties after a period of deterioration that had begun even before the October 7 Hamas attack, arguably dating back to Trump's first term and his administration's efforts to pressure Israel to reduce Chinese access to sensitive technologies and infrastructure. This makes the delayed condemnation appear out of step with Beijing's recent approach. If China is trying to build goodwill, why would it publicly revive an issue from over two months ago? Several explanations may help make sense of this sudden diplomatic shift. First, Beijing may be sending a calibrated warning to Israel not to deepen its ties with Taiwan, even symbolically. Toporovsky himself praised Taiwan's democracy, spoke of the importance of strengthening bilateral ties, and in a recent tweet expressed concern over reports about Chinese surveillance on Taiwan's then-vice president-elect Hsiao Bi-khim during her trip to Prague. The embassy's message served to reiterate that this type of engagement will not go unnoticed. At the same time, the statement targeted Taipei as well. As President Lai Ching-te seeks to expand Taiwan's international space, China is actively working to limit it. Condemning Israeli MKs acts as a signal to other countries: even informal parliamentary exchanges will draw pushback. Second, the timing may be tied to China's strategic deepening of ties with Iran. Recently, media reports have surfaced indicating that Beijing may supply Tehran with HQ-9B air defense systems and J-10C fighter jets, two advanced systems that could significantly improve Iran's military capabilities. If these transfers proceed, they would mark a notable escalation in China's role in regional military affairs and a direct challenge to Israeli (as well as U.S.) security interests. By reviving the Taiwan issue, Beijing may be seeking to preempt Israeli criticism or shift the diplomatic narrative, portraying Israel as the actor causing friction. In this view, the Taiwan condemnation becomes a form of strategic hedging: asserting pressure on one front while deflecting attention from another. Third, the statement could also reflect growing Chinese frustration over Israel's shifting China policy. Israel has come under increasing U.S. pressure to reduce its economic and technological exposure to China. This includes growing scrutiny over Chinese investments, especially in critical infrastructure, and more recently, over the supply and use of Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) in the Israeli market and within the Israeli Defense Forces. Indeed, Israeli policymakers have begun signaling a shift, driven in part by national security considerations and closer alignment with U.S. regulatory trends. From Beijing's perspective, this could be seen as part of a broader pattern of Israeli drift toward the U.S.-led containment posture. The embassy's statement, then, may serve as a proxy for expressing broader dissatisfaction with the trajectory of the bilateral relationship. A fourth possibility related to Israel's expanding ties with India and its potential participation in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a U.S-backed infrastructure initiative. IMEC aims to link India to Europe via the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel, creating a strategic land-and-sea route that rivals China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China is deeply wary of IMEC, which it sees as part of a broader Western effort to dilute its influence across Eurasia. Israel's role in this corridor, alongside its growing interest in strengthening ties with India, could be viewed in Beijing as further evidence of Israel distancing itself from Chinese strategic frameworks. The Taiwan rebuke may thus reflect a broader geoeconomic concern: that Israel is helping build the very alternatives that China seeks to blunt. Yet, notwithstanding all the aforementioned possibilities, perhaps we are overcomplicating things. Maybe there is no deep geopolitical rationale behind Beijing's recent move, no clear linkage to Iran, India, or economic pressure. Perhaps the statement was simply the result of bureaucratic inertia, or a routine effort to enforce the One China principle without much strategic thought. Maybe, there is nothing behind it at all. And that, in itself, is telling. Beijing is juggling a fragile diplomatic posture in the Middle East: courting Iran militarily, losing influence in Israel, competing with India, and watching the United States regain its foothold in the region. For years, Chinese foreign policy was portrayed as calculated and pragmatic, a reliable contrast to the erratic turns of U.S. diplomacy under President Donald Trump. One could argue that Trump simply does what is good for him at any given moment, guided more by instinct and domestic political calculus than strategic consistency. By contrast, Beijing cultivated an image of being deliberate, long-term in outlook, and strategically composed. Yet episodes like this one suggest something else: not pragmatism, but indecision. As the Middle East slides back into open conflict, U.S. regional dominance reasserts itself, and economic incentives lose their leverage, China appears increasingly unsure of how to position itself. Symbolic rebukes, charm offensives, and military hedging may buy time, but they do not add up to a coherent regional strategy. In this context, deciphering Beijing's intentions has become more difficult than ever – not because its strategy is subtle or sophisticated, but because it increasingly lacks the consistency and clarity it once projected.
The National
8 hours ago
- Politics
- The National
Blow for Benjamin Netanyahu as ultra-Orthodox party quits coalition
An ultra-Orthodox party has quit Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 's coalition in a long-running dispute over mandatory military service, leaving his government with a razor-thin majority amid public protests over the Gaza war. The departure of United Torah Judaism leaves Mr Netanyahu with 61 seats in the 120-seat Knesset. If ultra-Orthodox party Shas also quits over the issue, as Israeli media reports suggest they will this week, the government will be left with only 50 seats. The two parties have not said whether they will join the opposition to try to dissolve parliament, which would trigger elections. Their departures will only come into effect after 48 hours, giving Mr Netanyahu a window to salvage the situation. United Torah Judaism's move is the latest in wrangles over whether Israel's growing ultra-Orthodox population should serve in the military, as all other Jewish Israelis are obliged to do. The issue has been a political lightning rod for years, but is drawing particular anger during the Gaza war as Israel's military says it is facing a shortage of personnel. Many Israelis are saying the ultra-Orthodox community is shirking its responsibility. It is also a divisive issue within Mr Netanyahu's far-right coalition, which contains ultra-nationalist Zionist parties whose supporters are disproportionately represented in military units fighting on the frontlines. A spokesman for one of the factions that makes up UTJ said the party was making the decision after the government repeatedly failed 'to fulfil their obligations to regulate the legal status of the dear yeshiva students', referring to ultra-Orthodox Jewish religious schools that focus on the study of Torah and rabbinic traditions. Currently, men enrolled in these schools are exempt from military service. But a court ruled in June last year that this exemption was no longer legal. In response, the community wants the government to legislate on a permanent exemption, but that process has been stalled. Mr Netanyahu has reportedly directly intervened in the drafting of the long-debated bill, which faces stiff resistance from influential politician Yuli Edelstein, of Mr Netanyahu's Likud party. A wave of departures from the coalition was prevented last month after Mr Edelstein agreed to limit some sanctions against draft dodgers listed in an earlier version of the bill. The ultra-Orthodox community also receives significant subsidies to continue its secluded way of life, which many Israelis criticise as an unfair financial burden that encourages its members not to integrate. While some ultra-Orthodox Jews do serve in specialised branches of the armed forces, they represent a tiny proportion of the fast-growing community, whose leaders overwhelmingly encourage men to pursue full-time religious study. Community leaders fear that military life draws men away from the isolated group – significant swathes of which are non-Zionist – and its strict, insular interpretation of Judaism. The Israeli opposition has made military exemption a central issue in its strategy to attack the government. 'We will not forget: while Netanyahu fought yesterday to promote draft evasion, he knew about the three fatalities and the soldier who took his own life,' wrote opposition leader Yair Lapid in a post on X on Tuesday, following news of Israeli soldiers dying in Gaza. Former prime minister Naftali Bennett, a favourite in polls for future elections, said on Monday that as soldiers were dying, 'in the corridors of the Knesset, coalition members are moving heaven and Earth to create a draft-dodging law'. 'This gap is unbearable. We are at war. Our sons are there. In Gaza, in the north, wherever they are needed,' he added. 'This is a disgraceful government, unworthy of our good people.'
NDTV
12 hours ago
- Politics
- NDTV
Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Party Quits Netanyahu's Government. Whats At Stake
Jerusalem: One of Israel's ultra-Orthodox Jewish parties has quit Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's coalition in a long-running dispute over a new military conscription bill. The move by the six United Torah Judaism (UTJ) party members leaves Netanyahu's nationalist-religious government extremely vulnerable with just a one-seat majority in the Knesset. Has Netanyahu's government collapsed? No. But it might. UTJ is allied with another ultra-Orthodox coalition member called Shas, which has traditionally kept in lockstep with UTJ. If Shas quits, Netanyahu will lose his majority in parliament and his government will find it hard to function. However, UTJ's withdrawal from the coalition will only go into effect 48 hours after submission of its ministers' resignation letters, which gives the prime minister some time to seek a compromise. Even if that fails, parliament goes on summer break at the end of July, giving Netanyahu around three months to try and resolve the crisis. A lot can happen in that time and Netanyahu has shown extraordinary political survival skills over the years. How do Israeli governments work? Governments rarely complete a full four-year term in Israel. No single party has ever won an outright majority in an election, so governments are formed by a coalition of parties. Prime ministers have often had to contend with sectarian demands and ideological clashes within their coalitions. When divisions emerge, coalitions can quickly unravel and governments fall. Will there be an early election? Possibly. But not for several months. There are a few political paths that would lead to the ballot being brought forward. They include parliament voting to dissolve itself and the government failing to pass an annual budget. In no scenario would an election be immediate. Some political analysts have predicted that a ballot will likely be brought forward from the end of 2026 to early next year. How do elections work? Israel's elections are parliamentary. The 120 Knesset seats are allocated by proportional representation to national party lists, which may secure seats after passing a threshold of 3.25% of the vote. Since 2019, Israel has held five national elections. The last one, which gave Netanyahu a decisive victory, was in November 2022. Successive polls of voter intentions have shown his coalition would lose an election, were it to be held today. Coalition shape? Although Netanyahu's coalition has fluctuated over the past 2-1/2 years, with political shifts, finding replacements for UTJ to join the ranks of his government, which is made up of right-wing and religious Jewish parties, would be extremely difficult. The opposition includes centrist, left-wing, right-wing, liberal and conservative factions. Coalition composition Total Knesset seats: 120 Number of factions: 13 Total coalition seats: 61 Seats held by Netanyahu's Likud party: 32 Seats held by ultra-Orthodox party Shas: 11 Seats held by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich's Religious Zionism party: 7 Seats held by National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir's Jewish Power party: 6 Seats held by National Right party: 4 Seats held by Noam party: 1 Will political turmoil affect war in Gaza? This is still unclear. US-backed ceasefire talks are underway in Qatar. Israelis have become increasingly weary of the war against Hamas in Gaza and surveys show popular support for ending it with a deal that will bring back remaining hostages held by the Palestinian militant group. Netanyahu still has enough support within his government to secure a ceasefire. However, the two far-right parties in Netanyahu's coalition - Jewish Power and Religious Zionism - are unlikely to back ending the war entirely anytime soon.
