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Korea Herald
12 hours ago
- Politics
- Korea Herald
Trump struck Iran — but North Korea is a different story
Iran strike hardens Kim Jong-un's nuclear resolve, pushes Pyongyang deeper into China-Russia orbit, say experts US President Donald Trump's decision to authorize airstrikes on three Iranian nuclear facilities has been widely seen as reinforcing North Korea's long-held belief: that nuclear weapons are essential for regime survival. The strike would further dim the already unfavorable prospects for nuclear dialogue with Washington and accelerate Pyongyang's push for deeper military cooperation with Russia. Still, analysts in Seoul stressed that North Korea's case is fundamentally different from Iran's. Not only does Pyongyang already possess nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems, it also maintains a distinct rationale and motivation for nuclear armament — unlike Tehran, whose program is framed around deterrence and national pride, Pyongyang's is centered on the survival of the Kim regime. One of the most significant differences, observers noted, is that the likelihood of Trump ordering a similar strike on North Korean nuclear facilities is considered extremely low. A key reason lies in North Korea's counterstrike capabilities: intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the US mainland and massed artillery aimed at densely populated areas of Seoul. Joung Kyeong-woon, a senior research fellow at the Seoul Defense Forum, pointed out that densely populated areas — including the Seoul metropolitan area and the city of Goyang — are well within range of North Korean artillery. 'The primary reason North Korea cannot be attacked lies in the fact that we are essentially held hostage by its artillery — far more easily usable than nuclear weapons,' Joung told The Korea Herald. "This reality was confirmed when South Korea opposed, and then-US President Clinton ultimately abandoned, the idea of a surgical strike." Then-President Kim Young-sam opposed the US proposal to strike the Yongbyon nuclear facility during the 1994 nuclear crisis under the Clinton administration. North Korea can launch immediate strikes on the densely populated South Korean capital and its vicinity using artillery systems such as 170mm self-propelled guns and 240mm multiple rocket launchers, in addition to missiles targeting South Korea, including nuclear-capable solid-fuel short-range missiles like the KN-23. 'Since then, North Korea has secured layered deterrence through its possession of various medium- and long-range ballistic missiles, in addition to nuclear weapons,' Joung said. Joung further explained that North Korea's deeply fortified underground nuclear facilities are nearly impossible to neutralize. 'North Korea's key nuclear and missile facilities are located hundreds of meters underground, beneath solid bedrock in the mountainous regions of the country's northwest," Joung said. 'There are no existing weapons capable of directly destroying them — not even tactical nuclear weapons.' Lim Eul-chul, a professor at Kyungnam University's Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul, pointed out, 'North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons and second-strike capabilities are the biggest constraints on a US airstrike" against nuclear facilities in North Korea. In April 2025, Gen. Xavier Bruson, the commander of US Forces Korea, testified before the House Armed Services Committee that the 'DPRK's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs and formidable missile force (ballistic and cruise) pose a threat to the US homeland, US forces in the Indo-Pacific, and allied nations." Pyongyang has formalized a preemptive, or first-use nuclear policy in accordance with the law on North Korea's policy on nuclear forces, promulgated in September 2022. 'This marks a shift from its previous stance of using nuclear weapons solely for defensive purposes, allowing their use also for repelling or retaliating against an enemy's invasion or signs of an impending attack,' Lim said. The roles of Russia and China also set North Korea apart from Iran. 'Unlike the case of Iran, Russia is obligated to intervene automatically under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between North Korea and Russia," Lim said. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, which stipulates a mutual defense obligation, in June 2024, during Putin's visit to Pyongyang. 'China is likely to view a US airstrike on North Korea's nuclear facilities as a direct threat to stability on the Korean Peninsula and to security along the China–North Korea border," Lim added. Leif-Eric Easley, professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, pointed out that 'China and Russia are better positioned to help Pyongyang than Tehran.' 'The North Korean case is very different," Easley said. More importantly, experts in Seoul underscored that the US strike on Iran's nuclear facilities is likely to have far-reaching implications for North Korea — reinforcing Pyongyang's nuclear posture, deepening its distrust of Washington, and reshaping its approach to diplomacy and military cooperation. Kim Dong-yub, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies in Seoul, pointed out that what matters to South Korea is 'the impact on the Korean Peninsula and how North Korea perceives the situation." 'North Korea is likely thinking that its choice was the right one following the US bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities. It will further solidify its belief that 'possessing nuclear weapons is the only means of survival' and will continue to maximize the legitimacy of its nuclear possession,' Kim said. 'Beyond the economic shock, this crisis is highly likely to trigger widespread security instability on the Korean Peninsula and lead to a fundamental shift in the strategic environment,' Kim added. Lim said Trump's decision to strike Iranian nuclear facilities 'has a significant impact on North Korea's foreign policy.' 'North Korea will reinforce the legitimacy of its existing policy that prioritizes regime survival and nuclear weapons development, and expand military cooperation rooted in anti-Western solidarity — particularly with Russia and China,' Lim said. 'It will also shift further toward deepening skepticism of inter-Korean dialogue and negotiations with the United States.' The US military strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities will further deepen North Korea's distrust of the US — already hardened by Washington's withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, or JCPOA, in 2018 and the breakdown of the 2019 North Korea–US summit in Hanoi during the first Trump administration.
South China Morning Post
15 hours ago
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
South Korea's Nato no-show: pragmatism or diplomatic shift?
With the Middle East in turmoil and his own government barely weeks old, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung has opted to forgo this week's Nato summit in the Netherlands – a move that analysts say shows the shifting sands of regional diplomacy. Unlike his conservative predecessor, Yoon Suk-yeol , who attended the transatlantic security alliance's summits three times in as many years, Lee's expected Nato absence has prompted speculation over Seoul's diplomatic intentions. Observers warn against reading too much into the move, however. 'President Lee would have attended the Nato summit but for the US bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities,' Lim Eul-chul, an international relations specialist and professor at Kyungnam University's Institute for Far Eastern Studies think tank, told This Week in Asia on Monday. 'It would be reading too much into it to see this decision as a signal to China or a shift in South Korea's diplomatic calculus under the new government,' Lim added, noting that the Lee administration was still formulating its regional and global strategies. But other observers cautioned that optics matter when it comes to geopolitics. Anti-Nato protesters rally in The Hague on Sunday before this week's summit. Photo: Xinhua Lee might have been concerned 'that a strongly worded joint statement could offend China', suggested Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.
Japan Times
31-03-2025
- Politics
- Japan Times
Trump prompts U.S. allies to reopen nuclear weapons debate
Donald Trump's attacks on NATO and the established world order are undermining the confidence of its allies under the U.S. security umbrella, fueling fears of an eventual proliferation of nuclear weapons, experts have said. Since his return to power in January, the U.S. president has criticized the trans-Atlantic alliance, reopened direct dialogue with Russia and flattered North Korea's Kim Jong Un with warm words. Trump's "provocative and inconsistent rhetoric," said Byong-Chul Lee, from the Institute of Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University, Seoul, has left allies' trust in the U.S. deterrence "deeply shaken." In recent times, the risk of nuclear proliferation has come from states such as North Korea or Iran but non-nuclear armed allies of Washington seem to want to now reopen the debate. "We're seeing more and more friendly proliferator" speeches in Europe and Asia, even if they seem primarily aimed at putting pressure on Washington, said Heloise Fayet, a proliferation specialist at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI). Artur Kacprzyk, an analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, agreed. "Policies of the new U.S. administration increase the risk of nuclear proliferation by allies, although it is not a foregone conclusion, yet," he said. The lack of confidence could not have come at a worse time, said Syed Ali Zia Jaffery, from the Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research at the University of Lahore in Pakistan. "The overall international security environment is deteriorating. We see raging conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. We also see a crisis-prone environment in South Asia," he added. "And there are no reliable mechanisms in place to resolve those conflicts." Other than the fear of being left high and dry in the event of attack, Washington's allies are concerned about Trump wanting to revive talks on arms control with Moscow and Beijing. "The butt of the joke of an eventual agreement will very likely be Europeans and the United States' allies in Asia," said Fayet. Jaffery said a lack of assurances from the United States makes it more likely that its allies could start looking at other options, including nuclear weapons. "Countries that are likely to face territorial aggression from nuclear-armed states would mull over having their own nuclear deterrents," he said. Currently, only the U.S., Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea are nuclear-armed powers. Lee said that South Korea was arguably the "most likely" U.S. ally to consider acquiring nuclear weapons given its proximity to North Korea. "Public support for nuclearization has remained consistently strong," he pointed out. "However, South Korean elites remain wary of the strategic instability, diplomatic backlash and potential international sanctions that would follow a nuclear breakout." In Europe, French President Emmanuel Macron has recommended discussion about extending France's deterrence to other European nations. Poland is on the front line, although Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has not announced a national nuclear military program. But Kacprzyk said: "He has not, nonetheless, excluded pursuing nuclear weapons in the future while noting it would be a long and challenging process." Proliferation is unlikely to come overnight, the analysts said. U.S. allies are linked by the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — the cornerstone of the global nuclear architecture. It is possible to withdraw from it, although only North Korea has done so. But Fayet said there are "regulatory, financial and technical constraints," and non-nuclear European countries are less advanced than South Korea or Japan. Any military nuclear programs could see rival nations attempt to hobble development. In Europe, said Kacprzyk, "there's also the risk that Russia would try to derail such programs, even by striking nuclear facilities," as Israel did against the Osirak reactor in Iraq in the 1980s. Despite the obstacles, Jaffery said that "most of these countries have nuclear latency and when you have the capability and strategic need to develop a nuclear program, you're more likely to succeed." "Pakistan has demonstrated it's hard to impede a country committed to building nuclear weapons." Another uncertainty is how the Trump administration would react to an about-face from its allies. "In practice, South Korea would not be able to go nuclear without at least tacit approval from Washington," said Lee. "In the past, the U.S. dealt with the risk of nuclear proliferation among allies by both exercising pressure and offering additional reassurance," said Kacprzyk. "For example, it halted plans to cut its conventional troops in South Korea in the 1970s." The War on the Rocks defense site said nonproliferation to both friendly and hostile nations has been a "core bipartisan pillar" of U.S. foreign policy for decades. But if that changes, "nuclear proliferation will haunt 'America First,'" researchers Ankit Panda, Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi warned.
