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Daily Record
3 days ago
- General
- Daily Record
Japan Airlines plane crash pilot's 'harrowing' last words before 520 people died
"The pilots were talking to each other in a state of deep distress because they didn't know what was going on and what they could do." The single deadliest air crash happened 40 years ago in Japan. The most shocking of recent times is the London bound Air India plane crash shortly after take-off in the western Indian city of Ahmedabad on June 12 of this year, killing 241 of the 242 people on board and 19 others on the ground. The largest number of deaths in an aviation incident was on March 27, 1977, when two 747s collided on a foggy runway on Tenerife North, formerly Los Rodeos Airport. 583 people were killed. In Scotland, Pan Am Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie, killing all 259 people on board on December 21, 1988. However, the crash in mountainous terrain north west of Tokyo - in Ueno, Gunma, Japan, exactly 40 years ago today remains the deadliest involving a single aircraft, reports the Mirror. Amid the remains of the Japan Airlines plane and the souls that perished on board, investigators recovered the black box containing the cockpit voice recording which captured the terror of the pilots. Aviation journalist David Learmount, who has investigated and reported on air incidents for almost five decades, recalls how reading the CVR transcript was so harrowing that he was reduced to tears. Speaking on the 40th anniversary of the crash, David, a consulting editor on Flightglobal magazine said: "I've lost count of the number of CVRS I've listened to and transcripts I've read from accidents - and the Japan Airlines 123 remains the only one that ever made me cry. "The transcript was so harrowing I could not listen to the CVR. "The pilots were talking to each other in a state of deep distress because they didn't know what was going on and what they could do. "It wasn't just fear. They wanted to save their airplane, to save their own lives and the lives of everybody on board, and they didn't know what to do. You've never heard that kind of distress." On the anniversary, we remember the lives lost on the doomed flight. What happened? On Monday August 12 1985 Tokyo's Haneda Airport was crowded with thousands of people trying to get home. It was the eve of Obon - a Japanese Buddhist custom when most of the country traditionally honour their ancestors, often returning to their place of birth for family reunions. At 6.12pm, Japan Airlines 123 took off heading to Osaka, 400 kilometres to the west. The flight was filled almost to capacity. 509 passengers and a crew of 15. The flight time was 52 minutes. The most senior pilot on board was Captain Masami Takahama, 49. Takahama was was one of the airlines' senior training captains, and was supporting the First Officer Yutaka Saski, 39, who was captaining the flight. Also on board was Hiroshi Fukuda, a veteran flight engineer. For the first few minutes after take off, all seemed to be fine. As the plane climbed, the air pressure difference between the air inside the cabin and the air outside the cabin grew greater and greater. Approximately 12 minutes after takeoff, the aircraft experienced a loud explosion. Oxygen masks dropped down in front of hysterical passengers. The cabin altitude alarm was blaring, alerting the pilots that the air inside the plane was now too thin to breathe. The piloting crew radioed an emergency to air traffic control. Captain Masami Takahama requested a turn back to Haneda- now 70 miles behind them. He was unaware that the bang that was heard in the cockpit was due to a hole at the rear of the plane and this wave of pressure had blasted off a huge section of the aircraft's tail, including the rudder, the auxiliary power unit, and several other critical control systems. The captain instructed his first officer to turn to the right to head back to Haneda but he started banking too steeply. But no matter what the first officer did, he couldn't turn the plane back to wings level. Horrified Hiroshi Fukuda, the flight engineer could now see that hydraulic pressure has dropped. The plane had a complete hydraulics failure and there was no checklist to deal with this nightmare scenario. Flight 123 began to swing from side to side like a falling leaf - a nauseating movement for passengers. Without hydraulic power, the pilots could no longer control the pitch of the aircraft. It began plunging up and down hundreds of metres at a time in a terrifying rollercoaster cycle. Passengers began scribbling farewell notes to loved ones, which were later found in the wreckage. Using the engine power, they were able to slow down the erratic moments and even turn the plane momentarily. "By increasing engine power on the left side, the plane would turn to the right. Increasing power on the right side, the airplane would turn to the left. So that helped. However, they still thought they could attempt to control the plane manually, which they couldn't,' said David. And their altitude pilots were now dulled by hypoxia - having been too distracted to put on their oxygen mask. In the cabin, passengers were running out of oxygen. Their best hope was a controlled crash landing at Haneda, but the plane needed to lose altitude. The flight engineer suggested they could lower the landing gear without hydraulic power. For the first time since leaving Tokyo, the plane had now dipped below 20,000 feet. A lower altitude now brought a new danger. Straight ahead of the plane loomed a towering mountain range. The aircraft began diving at more than 18,000 feet per minute, 10 times the normal rate of descent. "Raise nose, raise nose.... power' were the captain's last words as the ground proximity alarm buzzed around him before the CVR cut out on impact. The pilots fought a losing battle for almost 30 minutes before the plane hit the Mount Takamagahara area, close to Mount Fuji. The right wing tip and its outermost engine hit the mountain ridge and was ripped off. The plane spun onto its back and careened into the mountainside at hundreds of kilometres per hour, igniting into an enormous fireball. Four miracle survivors - including a 12-year-old girl whose parents and sister were killed in the crash - were all seated at the back of the plane, where impact forces were not as great as at the front, and sheer luck protected them from flying debris. The investigation into the crash concluded that a faulty repair on the aircraft seven years earlier had ultimately caused the fatal malfunction. During a landing in Osaka in 1978, the pilot had pitched the plane's nose too high and slammed the tail into the runway. The rear pressure bulkhead, a critical structural component in aircraft, specifically designed to maintain cabin pressure, was severely damaged. Join the Daily Record WhatsApp community! Get the latest news sent straight to your messages by joining our WhatsApp community today. You'll receive daily updates on breaking news as well as the top headlines across Scotland. No one will be able to see who is signed up and no one can send messages except the Daily Record team. All you have to do is click here if you're on mobile, select 'Join Community' and you're in! If you're on a desktop, simply scan the QR code above with your phone and click 'Join Community'. We also treat our community members to special offers, promotions, and adverts from us and our partners. If you don't like our community, you can check out any time you like. To leave our community click on the name at the top of your screen and choose 'exit group'. If you're curious, you can read our Privacy Notice. Boeing engineers performed the botched repair - which led to a ever weakening structure. It wasn't a question of if it would fail, it was when. David said: "It was a patch-up job, not a repair. They took a shortcut trying to fix it and put the plane back in action.' Over time, repeated pressurisation while in the air put stress on the incorrectly repaired section. The cracks led to metal fatigue and ultimately, the separation of the aircraft's tail. By August 12, 1985, the plane had flown more than 12,000 times since the shoddy repair. But on that final fateful flight, the damaged bulkhead reached breaking point. The rapid decompression also ruptured hydraulic systems, rendering the aircraft uncontrollable, although the pilots tried desperately to prevent the inevitable. Boeing redesigned the tail of the 747, so that rapid pressure spikes in the tail plane would no longer cause the kind of structural failure which occurred on flight 123, and also redesigned the plane's hydraulic systems, so that the loss of the aircraft's tail would not result in the total depletion of all hydraulic systems. Japan Airlines also modified its maintenance procedures, putting in place stricter supervision of important repair work and making regular inspections more thorough. Although the crash was Boeing's fault, the airline bore the brunt of national fury. After the crash, Japan Airlines paid 780million yen ($7.6million) to the victims' families - not as compensation, but as 'condolence money'. The company decided against taking criminal action against Boeing. Japan Airlines president Yasumoto Takagi resigned from his post. The company's maintenance manager, Hiroo Tominaga, died by suicide. Susuma Tajima, the engineer who checked and cleared the 747SR for takeoff before its final flight, also took his own life after the crash. "Careless Boeing engineers were to blame, ' said David. 'But this was the company culture. The culture is set by the people at the top. It always does. It happens in every organisation. And they made such shortcuts and shoddiness permissible." In recent years, Boeing has been at the centre of several controversies regarding the safety of of its planes after two fatal crashes. And history appeared to eerily repeat itself after had a mid-flight blowout of a door plug, due to poor safety checks. It was a miracle no one was killed. The incident, which occurred shortly after takeoff from Portland, Oregon, resulted in a gaping hole in the fuselage. The NTSB, investigating the incident and has pointed to systemic failures within Boeing. The company said they are working on strengthening safety and quality across their operations.
Daily Mirror
3 days ago
- General
- Daily Mirror
Japan Airlines plane crash kills 520 as pilot's 'harrowing' final words still sparks tears
The pilots had no idea their flight was doomed from the very beginning - resulting in the death of 520 people when a Boeing Jetliner slammed into a mountain near Tokyo 40 years ago today Every week it seems we hear about a new aviation accident. The most shocking of recent times is the London bound Air India plane crash shortly after take-off in the western Indian city of Ahmedabad on June 12, killing 241 of the 242 people on board and 19 others on the ground. The largest number of deaths in an aviation incident was on March 27, 1977, when two 747s collided on a foggy runway on Tenerife North, formerly Los Rodeos Airport. 583 people were killed. The single deadliest air crash in aviation history, however, took place 40 years today when a Boeing 747 jetliner slammed into a mountainous terrain north west of Tokyo - in Ueno, Gunma, Japan. The 40th anniversary of this Boeing disaster comes after a passenger was injured when door blew off mid-flight on Boeing 737 MAX 9 aircraft Amid the remains of the Japan Airlines plane and the souls that perished on board, investigators recovered the black box containing the cockpit voice recording. Aviation journalist David Learmount, who has investigated and reported on air incidents for almost five decades, recalls how reading the CVR transcript was so harrowing that it left him in tears. Speaking to the Mirror, on the 40th anniversary of the crash, David, a consulting editor on Flightglobal magazine said: "I've lost count of the number of CVRS I've listened to and transcripts I've read from accidents - and the Japan Airlines 123 remains the only one that ever made me cry. "The transcript was so harrowing I could not listen to the CVR. "The pilots were talking to each other in a state of deep distress because they didn't know what was going on and what they could do. "It wasn't just fear. They wanted to save their airplane, to save their own lives and the lives of everybody on board, and they didn't know what to do. You've never heard that kind of distress. " What happened? On Monday August 12 1985 Tokyo's Haneda Airport was crowded with thousands trying to get home. It was the eve of Obon - a Japanese Buddhist custom when most of the country traditionally honour their ancestors, often returning to their place of birth for family reunions. At 6.12pm, Japan Airlines 123 took off heading to Osaka, 400 kilometres to the west. It was filled almost to capacity. 509 passengers and a crew of 15. The flight time was 52 minutes. The most senior pilot on board was Captain Masami Takahama, 49. Takahama was was one of the airlines' senior training captains. He was supporting the First Officer Yutaka Saski, 39, who was captaining the flight. Also on board was Hiroshi Fukuda, a veteran flight engineer. For the first few minutes after take off, all was fine. As the plane climbed, the air pressure difference between the air inside the cabin and the air outside the cabin grew greater and greater. Approximately 12 minutes after takeoff, the aircraft experienced a loud explosion. Oxygen masks dropped down in front of hysterical passengers. The cabin altitude alarm was blaring, alerting the pilots that the air inside the plane was now too thin to breathe. The piloting crew radioed an emergency to air traffic control. Captain Masami Takahama requested a turn back to Haneda- now 70 miles behind them. He was unaware that the bang that was heard in the cockpit was due to a hole at the rear of the plane and this wave of pressure had blasted off a huge section of the aircraft's tail, including the rudder, the auxiliary power unit, and several other critical control systems. The captain instructed his first officer to turn to the right to head back to Haneda but he started banking too steeply. But no matter what the first officer did, he couldn't turn the plane back to wings level. Horrified Hiroshi Fukuda, the flight engineer could now see that hydraulic pressure has dropped. The plane had a complete hydraulics failure and there was no checklist to deal with this nightmare scenario. Flight 123 began to swing from side to side like a falling leaf - a nauseating movement for passengers. Without hydraulic power, the pilots could no longer control the pitch of the aircraft. It began plunging up and down hundreds of metres at a time in a terrifying rollercoaster cycle. Passengers began scribbling farewell notes to loved ones, which were later found in the wreckage. Using the engine power, they were able to slow down the erratic moments and even turn the plane momentarily. "By increasing engine power on the left side, the plane would turn to the right. Increasing power on the right side, the airplane would turn to the left. So that helped. However, they still thought they could attempt to control the plane manually, which they couldn't,' said David. And their altitude pilots were now dulled by hypoxia - having been too distracted to put on their oxygen mask. In the cabin, passengers were running out of oxygen. Their best hope was a controlled crash landing at Haneda, but the plane needed to lose altitude. The flight engineer suggested they could lower the landing gear without hydraulic power. For the first time since leaving Tokyo, the plane had now dipped below 20,000 feet. A lower altitude now brought a new danger. Straight ahead of the plane loomed a towering mountain range. The aircraft began diving at more than 18,000 feet per minute, 10 times the normal rate of descent. "Raise nose, raise nose.... power' were the captain's last words as the ground proximity alarm buzzed around him before the CVR cut out on impact. The pilots fought a losing battle for almost 30 minutes before the plane hit the Mount Takamagahara area, close to Mount Fuji. The right wing tip and its outermost engine hit the mountain ridge and was ripped off. The plane spun onto its back and careened into the mountainside at hundreds of kilometres per hour, igniting into an enormous fireball. Four miracle survivors - including a 12-year-old girl whose parents and sister were killed in the crash - were all seated at the back of the plane, where impact forces were not as great as at the front, and sheer luck protected them from flying debris. The investigation into the crash concluded that a faulty repair on the aircraft seven years earlier had ultimately caused the fatal malfunction. During a landing in Osaka in 1978, the pilot had pitched the plane's nose too high and slammed the tail into the runway. The rear pressure bulkhead, a critical structural component in aircraft, specifically designed to maintain cabin pressure, was severely damaged. Boeing engineers performed the botched repair - which led to a ever weakening structure. It wasn't a question of if it would fail, it was when. David said: "It was a patch-up job, not a repair. They took a shortcut trying to fix it and put the plane back in action.' Over time, repeated pressurisation while in the air put stress on the incorrectly repaired section. The cracks led to metal fatigue and ultimately, the separation of the aircraft's tail. By August 12, 1985, the plane had flown more than 12,000 times since the shoddy repair. But on that final fateful flight, the damaged bulkhead reached breaking point. The rapid decompression also ruptured hydraulic systems, rendering the aircraft uncontrollable, although the pilots tried desperately to prevent the inevitable. Boeing redesigned the tail of the 747, so that rapid pressure spikes in the tail plane would no longer cause the kind of structural failure which occurred on flight 123, and also redesigned the plane's hydraulic systems, so that the loss of the aircraft's tail would not result in the total depletion of all hydraulic systems. Japan Airlines also modified its maintenance procedures, putting in place stricter supervision of important repair work and making regular inspections more thorough. Although the crash was Boeing's fault, the airline bore the brunt of national fury. After the crash, Japan Airlines paid 780million yen ($7.6million) to the victims' families - not as compensation, but as 'condolence money'. The company decided against taking criminal action against Boeing. Japan Airlines president Yasumoto Takagi resigned from his post. The company's maintenance manager, Hiroo Tominaga, died by suicide. Susuma Tajima, the engineer who checked and cleared the 747SR for takeoff before its final flight, also took his own life after the crash. "Careless Boeing engineers were to blame, ' said David. 'But this was the company culture. The culture is set by the people at the top. It always does. It happens in every organisation. And they made such shortcuts and shoddiness permissible." In recent years, Boeing has been at the centre of several controversies regarding the safety of of its planes after two fatal crashes. And history appeared to eerily repeat itself after Alaska Airlines Boeing 737 MAX 9 had a mid-flight blowout of a door plug, due to poor safety checks. It was a miracle no one was killed. The incident, which occurred shortly after takeoff from Portland, Oregon, resulted in a gaping hole in the fuselage. The NTSB, investigating the incident and has pointed to systemic failures within Boeing stated they are working on strengthening safety and quality across their operations. no one For emotional support you can call the Samaritans 24-hour helpline on 116 123, email jo@ visit a Samaritans branch in person or go to the Samaritans website.
Daily Mirror
26-06-2025
- Daily Mirror
Pilot's final words as jet with 146 holidaymakers crashed into Tenerife mountain
Dan-Air's Flight 1008 was carrying 146 passengers from Manchester to Tenerife, in the Canary Islands, when it crashed into a mountain after a tragic communication error Tenerife is a top holiday destination for Brits seeking sun, sea and sand. However, on 22nd March 1977, a horrific tragedy occurred when a passenger flight heading to Tenerife North airport, then known as Los Rodeos Airport, crashed, resulting in the death of all 583 people on board. Tenerife has two airports, but Tenerife North is notoriously challenging for pilots due to its altitude of 2,000ft. This, coupled with weather conditions such as cloud cover, can make visibility particularly difficult. Tragedy struck again just three years after the 1977 disaster. At 9.20am on 25th April 1980, Dan-Air's Flight 1008 left Manchester Airport bound for Tenerife. The plane was mainly filled with British holidaymakers eager to enjoy the sunny beaches and beautiful landscapes of the Canary Islands, reports the Daily Record. The flight crew included three seasoned pilots - Captain Arthur Whelan, 50, co-pilot First Officer Michael Firth, 33, and flight engineer Raymond Carey, 33. Along with them were five flight attendants, making the total number of passengers and crew on board 146. For three hours, the flight went smoothly until the crew began their descent at 1pm local time. Gale-force winds from an unexpected quarter meant flights were rerouted to Runway 12, causing a headache for air traffic controller Justo Camin, 34. With another aircraft already homing in on the same strip, the risk of a mid-air collision loomed large. Lacking radar support, Camin had to fall back on old-school tactics, directing each flight along a set path. At 1:18 pm, he realised the Dan Air crew needed to circle to give the preceding plane space to touch down safely on Runway 12. But with no standard holding pattern for that runway, Camin had to think on his feet. He told Flight 1008 to maintain a left-hand circuit, looping until the coast was clear. Camin radioed First Officer Firth, "Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly." Captain Whelan's response was a terse "Roger", neglecting to echo Camin's directive—a move that might have prevented the looming tragedy. Yet when Camin said "turn to the left," he meant to signal continuous left turns, not a single leftward manoeuvre. This critical miscommunication led the crew to make a fatal error in judgement. Camin, who had originally cleared the flight for an altitude of 5,000 feet, made a seemingly minor but critical error. Captain Whelan, baffled by the unexpected directive to maintain a holding pattern absent from his charts, instinctively made a left-hand turn to a heading of 150 degrees, believing that this was what the controller intended. Flying over mountainous regions where the minimum safe altitude was pegged at 14,500 feet posed a grave risk for their safety. Barely a minute and six seconds prior to the tragedy, one pilot remarked, "bloody strange hold, isn't it?" and noted that it didn't align with the runway in any way. The cockpit voice recorder captured the crew's escalating concern, but no one challenged the instructions from control. Believing the aircraft to be safely over water following his impromptu holding pattern, Controller Camin approved a further descent of 1,000 feet, unbeknownst to him that the plane was dangerously nestled among the peaks. In the face of uncertain orders from Camin, Captain Whelan admitted to his co-pilot, "I don't like that." His co-pilot queried, moving deeper into confusion, "they want us to keep going more round, don't they?". It was then that the automated ground proximity warning system blared within the cockpit, spurring them with the command to "pull up, pull up!". In a last-ditch effort to avoid disaster, Captain Whelan interrupted his current manoeuvre, sharply veering right instead of continuing leftward, under the impression that it would enable them to skirt the imminent threat. Upon the alarm sounding, the usual procedure would be to "pull up" to gain enough height to avoid any terrain. Co-pilot Firth, after examining the chart, realised the captain's choice was misguided and suggested they consider other options. Flight Engineer Carey's urgent words, "let's get out of here," were captured on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). Despite Carey's warning, Captain Whelan continued with the sharp right manoeuvre, leading to a drop of 300 feet. Spanish investigators concluded in their report that this very action sealed the fate of the aircraft, eliminating any chance of escaping the calamity. The final chilling words from Flight Engineer Carey, "bank angle, bank angle!" were recorded before the CVR fell silent. Dan-Air Flight 1008 met its catastrophic fate as it collided with La Esperanza at an altitude of 5,450 feet, just 92 feet (28 metres) below the summit. The impact obliterated most of the plane instantly, with wreckage strewn down the mountainside. The tail section was flung hundreds of metres further, finally coming to rest in a ravine where it broke apart. Small fires broke out amidst the scattered debris, and Tenerife North Airport was jolted by the crash alarm for the second time in just over three years. Rescue teams arrived at the mountain within hours, but it was immediately apparent that none of the 146 passengers on board had survived the crash. The scene was so horrific not a single intact human body could be found, and many victims couldn't be definitively identified. While acknowledging the air traffic controller's error, Spanish investigators placed all the blame on the Dan Air crew. However, British investigators argued the controller should have recognised earlier that the closeness of the two planes would cause a problem, allowing him to implement a standard holding pattern and avoid any confusion among the crew. They further contended the controller shouldn't have issued an untried and non-standard holding pattern, but they admitted the Dan Air crew didn't question the controller's instructions or ask for clarification. The British team also criticised Camin's decision to allow flight 1008 to descend to 5,000 feet. If the holding pattern had been designed according to official regulations, the minimum altitude should have been set at 7,000 feet. Receiving a ground proximity warning, the captain, who was unable to see due to dense fog and cloud, decided to turn right. However, this decision led to the plane crashing directly into the mountain. In this critical moment, the standard procedure for pilots would have been to climb to a higher altitude. A single missing letter in one word ultimately led to the chain of events culminating in the tragic crash. Crucially, the controller's use of "turn" instead of "turns" was pivotal in causing the tragic crash. Following the accident, the investigation brought to light the critical need for explicit and standardised communication across all aspects of flight. This included procedures for holding patterns. The incident demonstrated the importance of precise communication between pilots and air traffic controllers. To prevent misunderstandings, pilots needed to reiterate the instructions provided by air traffic controllers. Despite the catastrophe, the airline, Dan Air, was able to bounce back, continuing to operate until its eventual acquisition by British Airways in 1992. Sadly, although this incident claimed the most lives in the history of a British aircraft, the memory of the tragic loss of 146 lives on Dan Air Flight 1008 seems to have faded away over the past four and a half decades.
Daily Record
26-06-2025
- Daily Record
Pilot's horrifying final words before deadly crash on flight from UK to Tenerife
The chilling final words of those in the cockpit of a doomed flight demonstrate the panic that took place in the last moments before the British plane crashed into a Tenerife mountain — killing all on board Tenerife is one of the most popular holiday hot spots for Brits hoping for sun, sea and sand. However, on March 22, 1977, tragedy struck when a passenger flight heading towards Tenerife North airport, then Los Rodeos Airport, plummeted from the sky, killing all 583 people on board. The island of Tenerife has two airports but Tenerife North can be notoriously difficult for pilots to navigate. It sits at an altitude of 2,000ft, which can make it a notably difficult airport for pilots to navigate, especially when weather conditions include cloud cover, making visibility trickier than normal. Just three years after the 1977 disaster, tragedy struck for a second time. At 9.20am on 25th April 1980, Dan-Air's Flight 1008 departed Manchester Airport bound for Tenerife. The flight was primarily filled with British holidaymakers seeking the sunny beaches and stunning landscapes of the Canary Islands. The flight crew consisted of three experienced pilots - Captain Arthur Whelan, 50, co-pilot First Officer Michael Firth, 33, and flight engineer Raymond Carey, 33. Alongside them were five flight attendants, bringing the total number of passengers and crew on board to 146. For three hours, the flight proceeded without incident until the crew began their descent at 1pm local time. The winds were blowing in from an unusual direction, meaning air traffic was being diverted to Runway 12 instead of the usual landing strip. However, this created a problem for air traffic controller Justo Camin, 34, as there was already another plane heading towards the same runway, putting the two aircraft at risk of a mid-air collision. Without the aid of radar, Camin was forced to rely on procedural methods to manage air traffic and he instructed each plane to follow a predetermined route. At 1:18 pm, Camin realised he needed to put the Dan Air crew into a holding pattern to allow the plane ahead to land safely on Runway 12. However, there was no established holding pattern for this runway, so Camin had to improvise. He instructed Flight 1008 to enter a left-hand holding pattern, making turns until the other flight was clear. In response to First Officer Firth's position report, Camin said, "Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly." Captain Whelan replied with a simple "Roger", failing to repeat back Camin's instructions. If he had done so, the impending disaster could have been averted. However, when Camin instructed them to "turn to the left," he intended to say "turns to the left," indicating the direction the crew should take while navigating the holding pattern. But without the crucial 's', the crew interpreted this as "turn to the left." Camin, who had also cleared the flight for an altitude of 5,000 feet, made a minor yet critical mistake. Captain Whelan, perplexed by the sudden instruction to enter a holding pattern not displayed on any of his charts, made a single turn to the left, aligning with a heading of 150 degrees, convinced this was the controller's intention. They were now flying over mountainous terrain, where the minimum safe altitude was 14,500 feet. Just one minute and six seconds before the crash, one of the pilots remarked, "bloody strange hold, isn't it?" adding, " It doesn't parallel with the runway or anything." The cockpit voice recording clearly showed the crew's growing unease, yet no one questioned the controller's instructions. Controller Camin, assuming the plane was over the sea in his improvised holding pattern, allowed the aircraft to descend another 1,000 feet, oblivious to the fact that it was actually in the midst of the mountains. Captain Whelan expressed his concerns about Camin's instruction to his co-pilot in the cockpit, saying, "I don't like that." His co-pilot responded, "they want us to keep going more round, don't they?" At this point, the automatic ground alarm sounded in the cockpit, warning them to "pull up, pull up!" In an desperate bid to evade the looming mountainous terrain, Captain Whelan abruptly aborted his left turn for a drastic right turn. He had the impression this manoeuvre would allow them to bypass the impending obstacle. Ordinarily, upon hearing the alarm, the appropriate reaction would be to "pull up" in an attempt to gain as much altitude as necessary to clear any nearby landforms. Co-pilot Firth, upon scrutinising the chart, realised the captain's decision was ill-judged and proposed alternative actions. The words "let's get out of here," voiced by Flight Engineer Carey, resonated through the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). Despite the engineer's advice, Captain Whelan persisted with the sharp right direction, which resulted in a descent of 300 feet. Spanish investigators stated unequivocally in their findings that this very movement eradicated any hope for averting disaster. Warnings from Flight Engineer Carey, "bank angle, bank angle!" echo as the last recorded words before the CVR goes silent. Dan-Air Flight 1008 met its tragic end as it crashed into La Esperanza at an elevation of 5,450 feet, a mere 92 feet (28 metres) shy of the peak. The collision decimated the majority of the aircraft instantaneously, scattering debris along the side of the mountain. The rear section of the plane hurtled several hundred metres, eventually crashing to earth, plummeting into a ravine, and disintegrating. Scattered small fires ignited amongst the dispersed wreckage and Tenerife North Airport was jarred by the crash alarm for the second time in just over three years. Rescue teams reached the mountain within hours but it was immediately clear that none of the 146 passengers on board had survived the crash. The scene was so devastating not a single intact human body could be found and many of the victims could not be definitively identified. While acknowledging the air traffic controller's mistake — Spanish investigators placed the entirety of the blame on the Dan Air crew. However, British investigators contended the controller should have recognised sooner the proximity between the two planes would pose an issue, allowing him to implement a standard holding pattern and prevent any confusion amongst the crew. They further argued the controller should not have issued an untested and non-standard holding pattern, but conceded the Dan Air crew did not question the controller's instructions or seek clarification. The decision by Camin to allow flight 1008 to descend to 5,000 feet also drew criticism from the British team. Had the holding pattern been designed in accordance with official regulations, the minimum altitude should have been set at 7,000 feet. Upon receiving a ground proximity warning, the captain - unable to see due to fog and cloud - opted to make a right turn, which tragically led them directly into the mountain. Typically, crews are expected to ascend as high as possible in response to such an alarm. What remains undisputed, however, is the omission of a single letter in a word triggered the series of events that ultimately resulted in the crash. Had the controller used "turns" instead of "turn", the tragic crash could have been averted. The investigation into the crash led to an increased emphasis on clear, standardised procedures across all flight operations, including holding patterns. The incident underscored the importance of unambiguous communication between air traffic controllers and pilots, with a particular focus on pilots repeating instructions from Air Traffic Control to eliminate any potential misunderstandings. Despite the tragedy, Dan Air managed to bounce back and continued operations until 1992 when it was acquired by British Airways. Even though it marked the largest loss of life on a British aircraft, the memory of Dan Air Flight 1008 and the 146 lives tragically lost that day seems to have faded over the last 45 years.
Irish Daily Mirror
30-04-2025
- Irish Daily Mirror
Pilot's eerie warning moments before Spain plane crash that killed 146 people
Tenerife North, formerly Los Rodeos Airport, is one of the island's two international airports and is located at an elevation of 2,000 ft making it a particularly challenging airport to fly in and out from. The weather is often cloudy - sometimes creating poor visibility caused by the winds blowing up off the sea. The deadliest example of how conditions can be catastrophic for pilots is the on-ground collision of two planes on March 27, 1977, partly due to poor visibility. The infamous airport disaster still retains the title of being the worst crash in aviation history - costing 583 people's lives. But another tragedy befell the island, just three years later. In the 1970s and 1980s British airline Dan-Air rose to become the largest independent airline in the United Kingdom. At 9.20am on April 25 1980, the popular airline's Flight 1008 departed Manchester Airport for Tenerife. It was mostly filled with holidaymakers looking to escape for the sunny beaches and dramatic landscapes of the Canary Islands. There were three experienced pilots on board - Captain Arthur Whelan, 50, co-pilot, First Officer Michael Firth,33 and flight engineer 33 year old Raymond Carey. There were also five flight attendants on board, bringing the total number of occupants on board to 146. For three hours, all was well until the crew began their descent at 1pm local time. The winds usually came from across the Atlantic to the west, but on this day they were coming from the opposite direction, meaning that the opposite runway was in use - Runway 12. The controller Justo Camin, 34, could not give the go ahead to the usual descent procedure as there was an aircraft in front also heading to Runway 12 - and the two planes were getting dangerously close to colliding mid-air. Due to the non-availability of radar at the airfield, Camin managed traffic movements procedurally - instructing each aircraft in turn to fly along a predetermined route. Just after 1.18pm Camin realised he needed to put the Dan Air crew in a holding pattern while the plane ahead could land safely on Runway 12. But there was a problem - there was no holding pattern for that runway - so Camin improvised. He wanted Flight 1008 to enter a left-hand holding pattern and remain in this holding pattern - making turns - until the other flight was out of the way. In response to First Officer Firth's position report, Camin said, 'Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly.' After receiving the message, the captain replied, "Roger" without repeating what Camin had told them to do. If Whelan had done this, the impending catastrophe may have been avoided. When Camin told them: 'turn to the left,' he actually meant to say 'turns to the left,' describing the direction in which the crew were to fly around the holding pattern. But without the 's,' this transmission sounded to the crew 'turn to the left.' Camin who also cleared the flight to an assigned altitude of 5,000 feet, had made a small but significant error. Captain Whelan, confused by the latest unexpected instruction to go into a holding pattern which didn't appear on any of his charts - made only one turn to the left onto a heading of 150 degrees, believing that's what the controller told him to do. They were now in a mountainous area where the minimum safe height is 14,500ft. At one minute and six seconds before the crash, one of the pilots is heard saying, " Bloody strange hold, isn't it?" adding, " It doesn't parallel with the runway or anything." It was clear from the cockpit voice recording, the crew was getting uneasy but nobody queried the instructions with the controller. The controller Camin, believing the plane to be out over the sea on his improvised holding pattern, had allowed the aircraft to descend another thousand feet. He had no idea the plane was in the middle of the mountains. Captain Whelan queried Camin's instruction with his co pilot in the cockpit. "I don't like that." "They want us to keep going more round, don't they?" said his co-pilot. At this point, the automatic ground alarm was heard on the cockpit "pull up, pull up!" In a desperate attempt to avoid the mountain, Captain Whelan flipped out of his left turn into a steep right turn. The captain believed that he could avoid the terrain by turning right. However the usual response to the alarm would be to "pull up" and go as high as possible to clear surrounding terrain. Co-pilot Firth, looking at the chart realised, it was the wrong course of action and made other suggestions to the captain. "Let's get out of here," Flight Engineer Carey is heard saying on the CVR. Captain Whelan continued to steer the plane steeply to the right, losing 300 feet of altitude in the process. The Spanish investigators later said that this one manoeuvre destroyed any chance of escape. Flight Engineer Carey was heard warning: 'Bank angle, bank angle!' And then the CVR cut out. Dan-Air flight 1008 slammed headlong into the side of La Esperanza at an altitude of 5,450 feet, just 92 feet (28 meters) below the summit. The impact obliterated most of the plane instantaneously, sending shattered debris across the mountainside. The tail section continued onward for several hundred meters before it slammed against the ground, plummeted into a ravine, and broke apart. Tiny fires erupted from the pulverized wreckage and for the second time in just over three years, the dreaded crash alarm sounded at Tenerife North Airport. Within hours, rescuers made the trek up the mountain, but it was immediately obvious that none of the 146 people on board had survived the crash. Not one single complete human body could be found and the remains of many of the people on board could not be conclusively identified. Although admitting the controller's error, Spanish investigators lay all the blame on the Dan Air crew. The British investigators argued that the controller should have realised earlier that the separation between the two planes would be a problem, so that he could have utilised a published holding pattern - preventing the crew from getting confused. British investigators added he should not have issued an unpublished and untried holding pattern but they accepted that the Dan Air crew did not query the controller's instructions or request clarification. They also criticided Camin's decision to clear flight 1008 to descend to 5,000 feet. Had the holding pattern been designed according to official regulations, the minimum altitude should have been 7,000 feet. After receiving a ground proximity warning, the captain - who could not see in the fog and cloud - decided to conduct a turn to the right, which actually took them straight into the side of the mountain. Usually crew are expected to pull up and go as high as possible -as the alarm demands What is not in dispute, however is that the omission of a single letter in a word set off the chain of events that ultimately led to the crash. If the controller had said "turns" and not "turn" the crash may never have happened. The crash findings prompted a renewed focus on clear, standardised procedures for all flight operations, including holding patterns. It also highlighted the need for clear communication between air traffic controllers and pilots - and ensuring pilots repeat Air Traffic Control instructions so there is no room for misunderstandings. Dan Air was able to recover from the accident and continued flying until 1992 when it was taken over by British Airways. Despite being the largest loss of life on a British airliner, 45 years on, Dan Air Flight 1008 is not as well remembered as it should be - and the 146 people who lost their lives that fateful day.
