Latest news with #MadeinChina
Asia Times
5 days ago
- Business
- Asia Times
Red flags rising over China's trade surplus with Indonesia
Indonesia's widening trade deficit with China has evolved into more than an economic concern—it now poses the risk of becoming a destabilizing fissure within the country's social fabric and, by extension, ASEAN's regional stability. According to Indonesia's Central Statistics Agency (BPS), between January and April 2025, Chinese imports to Indonesia surged to US$25.8 billion, while Indonesian exports to China stagnated at $18.9 billion. The resulting $6.9 billion deficit, the highest recorded in recent history for such a short period, raises already rising concerns about asymmetry in the bilateral trade relationship. Although Indonesian authorities have attempted to downplay its significance by dismissing suggestions that this is due to the redirection of Chinese exports blocked by US and EU tariffs, the underlying realities paint a different picture. The sectors most affected by Chinese imports —namely, mechanical and electrical machinery, steel, automotive parts, and ceramics —are precisely those where China has long faced overcapacity. With Western markets erecting expanding barriers on Chinese goods in response to perceived unfair trade practices, Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, has become a convenient outlet for China's surplus industrial products. In effect, Chinese goods that cannot be sold in the US and EU are being channeled into the Indonesian market, either directly or via re-routing strategies through third countries. This dynamic mirrors the 2018–2020 period of the US-China trade war, when Southeast Asia similarly absorbed a disproportionate amount of redirected Chinese exports. Indonesia's manufacturing base has already begun to show signs of strain from the flood of cut-rate Chinese wares. The once-thriving textile sector, exemplified by the now-defunct Sritex conglomerate in Solo, has been unable to keep up with the price competition from cheap Chinese imports. Small and medium-sized manufacturers in ceramics and steel are also increasingly being squeezed by Made in China goods. Though the Indonesian government has responded by levying anti-dumping duties on select products, such as nylon film from China, Thailand and Taiwan, these actions have largely been reactive and insufficient to counteract the scale and pace of Chinese trade redirection. The longer this continues, the more it will undermine local industry, employment and economic self-sufficiency. The economic repercussions are only one layer of the problem. What makes this fissure particularly dangerous is its potential to metastasize into social tension. Indonesia's multi-ethnic composition includes a sizable Chinese-Indonesian minority that has historically been subject to scapegoating during economic downturns. The riots of May 1998, which led to the collapse of the Suharto regime, serve as a chilling reminder of how quickly economic grievances can morph into ethnic-based violence against ethnic Chinese. In the current climate of economic pressure and increasing unemployment—especially among urban manufacturing workers—there is a real risk that the narrative of Chinese imports 'destroying local industry' could morph into resentment directed at Chinese-Indonesian entrepreneurs, many of whom operate in retail, logistics and trade. In an age where social media can amplify divisive messaging in real-time, the potential for misinformation and targeted ethnic vilification should not be underestimated. At the regional level, Indonesia's predicament reflects a broader structural challenge in ASEAN. Countries like Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam have also experienced spikes in Chinese imports, particularly in sectors like automobiles and electronics. The nature of these imports—often heavily subsidized and arriving in large quantities at prices below prevailing market rates—suggests deliberate Chinese dumping. Yet ASEAN's current mechanisms are ill-equipped to deal with these surges in a coordinated manner. Each country acts on its own, imposing unilateral anti-dumping tariffs or seeking redress through domestic trade tribunals, thereby diminishing the strength of a collective ASEAN-wide economic position. What is needed is not isolationism but a recalibration of engagement. Indonesia and ASEAN must articulate clearer expectations in their trade relationships with China. Fairness, reciprocity and respect for domestic industries must be at the heart of any economic partnership. The notion that Southeast Asia should serve as China's release valve for overproduction is not only economically detrimental but geopolitically short-sighted. It risks turning ASEAN from a central strategic partner into a passive buffer zone—absorbing external shocks without the tools to respond effectively. Equally important is ASEAN's need to revive its own internal trade capacities. The ASEAN Economic Community was envisioned to deepen intra-regional trade and investment, yet the share of intra-ASEAN trade has remained stagnant at around 22–24% over the past decade. This is far below the intra-regional trade levels of the EU, which stands at around 60%. Reducing non-tariff barriers, streamlining customs procedures and improving regional logistics are all urgent if ASEAN is to build internal economic resilience. Greater economic interdependence within ASEAN would not only mitigate vulnerability to external dumping but also foster shared growth that benefits smaller economies equally. For Indonesia, the road ahead demands bold policy interventions. The country must begin by strengthening its industrial strategy—reinvesting in productivity, technological upgrading and workforce development—so that its manufacturing sectors are not merely shielded but revitalized. Trade defense instruments must be improved, not only in terms of speed and scope but also in coordination with ASEAN partners. The government should also launch public education campaigns that preempt the ethnicization of economic issues. The messaging must be clear: this is not a conflict between ethnic groups but a structural issue in global trade dynamics that requires unity, not division. China, for its part, must recognize that sustaining goodwill in Southeast Asia cannot rely solely on infrastructure investment or diplomatic fanfare. It must pay heed to the social consequences of its trade behaviors. Dumping excess production into Indonesia and other ASEAN markets may offer short-term economic relief for Chinese exporters, but it risks breeding long-term resentment, social instability and strategic blowback in a region vital to China's Belt and Road Initiative ambitions. The growing trade imbalance between Indonesia and China is not yet a fracture—but it is undeniably a fissure, one that reveals the fragile interconnections between economic policy, social harmony and geopolitical alignment. Whether this fissure is widened or closed depends on the wisdom and coordination of both Indonesia's domestic leadership and ASEAN's collective diplomacy. To ignore it would be to misread not only the fragility of Indonesia's pluralistic society but also the limits of ASEAN's absorptive capacity. By addressing this issue with fairness, clarity and resolve, Indonesia can lead the region in forging a more balanced relationship with China—one that respects economic sovereignty, sustains regional stability and ultimately preserves the dignity of Southeast Asia's diverse peoples. Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is professor of ASEAN Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia and senior visiting fellow at the University of Cambridge. Luthfy Hamzah is senior research fellow of ASEAN Studies at Strategic Pan Indo Pacific Arena.
Mint
6 days ago
- Business
- Mint
Rahul Jacob: Manufacturing is crying out for a reality check
In a world of wildly exaggerated claims for artificial intelligence (AI), the paradox is that the mythology which leads governments to favour manufacturing over services often seems like a global religion. US commerce secretary Howard Lutnick was quoted a few months ago fantasizing that 'the army of millions and millions of human beings screwing in little, little screws to make iPhones" would soon move back to the US. Hardly a fortnight goes by without New Delhi and indeed governments overseas announcing some new incentive for manufacturing. In India's case, this is usually via the production-linked incentive (PLI) scheme. Also Read: Think ahead: India's electronics manufacturing must go up the value curve China led the way a decade ago and provoked a similarly mercantilist pushback from the West. Kicking off its 'Made in China' scheme for the manufacturing domination of a swathe of high-tech sectors, Beijing declared 'the history of the rise and fall of nations has repeatedly proved that without a strong manufacturing industry, there will be no country and no nation." Beijing's melodramatic declaration underlined what is best described as manufacturing machismo, evident also in the Donald Trump administration's obsession with trade deficits faced by the US in manufactured goods. For all of China's success in electric batteries and vehicles, the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China last week pointed out that in electric vehicles, for instance, only three of 112 manufacturers are making a profit. Perhaps only communist accounting principles would allow such distortions. Also Read: Time to re-imagine Indian manufacturing from the ground up At a time when Beijing is seeking to boost its domestic economy because of uncertainty over trade with the US, the risk is that Beijing's issuances of new bonds will be used for servicing debt rather than boosting consumption or starting new production. Already, massive over-production means that China's deflation in producer prices has got entrenched. And its strategy of dumping goods in foreign markets is being ratcheted up to a new level. This week, BCA Economic Research in Jakarta observed of Indonesia's 22% increase in imports in April that this 'surge originated from Singapore (+48% year-on-year) and China (+54% year-on-year), indicating either potential trans-shipment activity or dumping of excess inventory." The supreme irony is that we live in an era in which manufacturing produces fewer and fewer jobs in factories because of the increasing use of robots. China has been among the world leaders in making robots and using them. Fifteen years ago, I used to joke that I was the 'factories correspondent' for the Financial Times because so much of my work in Guangdong involved visits to factories, which accounted for a dominant share of global production in industries such as light bulbs, knitwear and smartphone accessories. Even then, amid a push by the provincial government to raise factory wages by double-digit levels in Guangdong, I was surprised to see Hong Kong firms using robots in industries such as garment manufacturing. On a visit to a Ford plant in India at Sanand, Gujarat, a few years later, I saw far fewer workers on the factory floor than I expected and plenty of robots. Also Read: How a manufacturing boom could help India close the gender gap The most recent figures from the International Federation of Robotics released in November 2024 show that South Korea leads the way with 1,012 robots per 10,000 employees. China is third with 470 robots for every 10,000 workers. An obsession with manufacturing jobs is thus myopic because automation is a principal leitmotif of new factories. 'We are now in a tech race over the software and machines that will power manufacturing, more than the manufacturing itself," Joe Leahy, China bureau chief for the Financial Times and co-author of a recent article on 'Made in China,' told me. Electric vehicle plants, he observes, look like 'power stations" because there are so few humans on site. India does not figure in the world's top 20 nations for robot density. Yet, at the same time, as Raghuram Rajan has pointed out, we are a global player in making software for the design of semiconductor chips. A peculiarity of New Delhi's obsession with manufacturing over several decades is that it trumpets successes in capital intensive manufacturing while treating labour-intensive industries, such as garments and tourism that produce thousands of jobs, as stepchildren. Garments deserve priority in free trade agreements. So too does visa-free access to India for tourists from rich countries. Also Read: India can leap from cost competitiveness to innovation-led manufacturing Another oddity is that India's success in attracting global capability centres rarely dominates headlines or policy discussions. It routinely shows up in our export data: service exports jumped a staggering 45% year-on-year in the fourth quarter and boosted our GDP for that quarter, as announced last week. Also in the news is that our 'Make in India' scheme for solar modules is running well behind schedule. Moneycontrol reported that solar module capacities are running at a fifth of what the PLI scheme envisioned would be onstream by April 2026. Part of the problem is that visas for Chinese advisors and technicians have proved problematic. If Beijing is content to subsidize our solar panels, we should let it. We seem dependent on China in this industry in any case and our bilateral trade deficit is at record levels anyway. Even amid the fog of manufacturing myopia, it ought to be obvious that India has a comparative advantage in sunshine. The author is a Mint columnist and a former Financial Times foreign correspondent.
Economic Times
20-05-2025
- Business
- Economic Times
Doubts over US reliability grow in India after Trump's diplomatic cover to Pakistan
AP Doubts about America as a 'reliable partner' are once again on the Indian mind, thanks to Donald Trump's repeated John Boltons - war hawks - are roused. They are fuming at Trump for giving diplomatic cover to Pakistan despite its decades-long record of using terrorist proxies. They are also furious at India's leadership for not 'finishing' the job once and for all. How that might have played out in real life - military capabilities, loss of life, China opening another war front, and the impact on India's economy - is not explained. Realists understand that India's war against Pakistan-sponsored terrorism is largely a lonely one. The answer is self-reliance, continued economic progress and careful management of two difficult neighbours. Now, consider the ground situation:The US supported India's right to defend itself, and no one, including Trump and members of Congress, questioned that Pakistan's exaggerated claims and narrative dominance in the Western media, the bigger story was India's ability to pierce Pakistan's air defence systems and hit the most sensitive installations with precision. Pakistan army chief can't acknowledge that Made in China systems didn't work so well for obvious 'hyphenation' between India and Pakistan is temporary and will get a quiet burial in the coming months, but Indian diplomats will have to work officials understand India's anger, but no one can temper Trump. They insist the nuts and bolts of the relationship are fine. They are looking at dates for the next 2+2 dialogue and the first meeting of the technology for cooperation with India are too many to list and will not disappear. India is the world's fourth-largest economy, has a talent pool the West needs and a market it covets. Pakistan is an imploding economy in constant need of IMF bailouts, a society infected with jihadism and an army that won't allow normal politics to the past, India has compartmentalised the unsavoury (Washington's tendency to protect Pakistan's military-intelligence complex) and focused on the positive (tech and defence cooperation). It should continue to do is busy with the next big 'deal'. Last week, he was making a splash in the Arab world, receiving gifts, promising a nuclear deal to Iran and undermining Israel, America's staunchest ally. Lesson: Trump will risk any relationship if he thinks a country - in this case, Israel - is hampering his hunt to be a 'peace president'. His anti-war stance might be as real as his worship of that linger:Does India have a real contact in Trump's inner circle? Or the bureaucratic outreach is deemed sufficient? Why hasn't the Indian-American community been unleashed? Who is India's go-to person now that Mike Waltz is no longer in the White House? Washington requires constant networking and endless schmoozing, not standoffish after the April 22 terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Pakistan signed a crypto deal with World Liberty Financial, a cryptocurrency firm where majority stakes are owned by Trump's family. Company executives, including Zach Witkoff, the son of Trump's all-purpose envoy Steve Witkoff, met everyone from Shehbaz Sharif to Asim are the Indian billionaires in this game? It's fairly simple: money makes the Trump world go around. When Narendra Modi came in February, he should have come with India's top five industrialists with open purse about India's lobbyists? The latest addition is Jason Miller, a former Trump adviser whose firm last month got a one-year contract worth $1.8 mn. That kind of money should show real results in a crisis, not just getting members of Congress to churn out two lines of sympathy on social media. Pakistan has hired its set of new lobbyists - also former Trump people - in a back-to-DC signal.A multi-party parliamentary delegation headed by Shashi Tharoor is expected in Washington June 4-5 to meet US lawmakers and senior Trump officials. The idea is to clear misconceptions and counter the flood of disinformation from Pakistan/China. To do a serious job, they need to double their delegation will engage members of the House and Senate foreign affairs committees, India Caucus and possibly the Republican leadership. How about trying to meet members of the House Select Committee on China, which keeps an eye on Beijing's geopolitical ploys? Congressman Raja Krishnamoorthi, who has a keen understanding of China's game, is the top Democrat on the delegation should also meet members of the two armed services committees. They must understand Op Sindoor and the use of Chinese weapons by Pakistan. They must also get a timeline to establish Pakistan's escalatory moves after India hit terrorist infrastructure. There's a lot of confusion out there. (Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this column are that of the writer. The facts and opinions expressed here do not reflect the views of Elevate your knowledge and leadership skills at a cost cheaper than your daily tea. Protean eGov of PAN fame crashes 20% as govt turns down bid The BrahMos link that fired up this defence stock 45% in one month Explainer: Why RBI took a U-turn on banks and NBFCs investing in AIFs How Azerbaijan's support for Pak could put USD780 million trade at risk How to effectively navigate the volatile world of small-cap investment Why Azim Premji is getting into aviation, a sector Warren Buffett shunned for long Stock Radar: HAL breaks out from 8-month consolidation on daily charts; check target price & stop loss for long positions These large-caps have 'strong buy' & 'buy' recos and an upside potential of more than 30% Weekly Top Picks: These stocks scored 10 on 10 on Stock Reports Plus If PM Modi gives his time, it is worth noting: 6 stocks for investors with ability to take risk and have patience
Express Tribune
06-05-2025
- Business
- Express Tribune
Why is 'Make in India' struggling to make progress?
Dr Muhammad Asif Qureshi is an Associate Professor at Bahria University, Karachi; Dr Jawaid A Qureshi is serving as Professor at SZABIST University, Karachi Manufacturing industry has been taken as the real national muscle, particularly when the global trade war is likely around the corner. Whether 'Make in India' could replace 'Made in China' arouses the universal attention. However, the recent argument within India's domestic politics proves India still has a long way. The Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have engaged in heated debates over whether the 'Make in India' initiative has failed. Congress MP Rahul Gandhi pointed out that although Prime Minister Narendra Modi has sought to turn India into a factory for the world, the share of manufacturing in India's GDP has unexpectedly declined, dropping from 15.3 per cent in 2014 to 12.6 per cent today, the lowest in six decades. Congress President Mallikarjun Kharge was even more scathing in his criticism, stating that "Modinomics is a curse on India's economy". Given the current state of development, he argues, Modi's campaign promises to build India into a global production powerhouse has no chance of being fulfilled. Reacting to these sharp remarks, BJP's IT department head Amit Malviya insisted that the "Make in India" initiative has fueled sustained expansion in the country's manufacturing sector. While 29 million jobs had been created during the INC's tenure (2004-2014), the Modi administration (2014-2024) has added 179 million new jobs, potentially positioning India as a global manufacturing hub. The clashes between INC and BJP expose irreconcilable visions for India's industrial future. 'Make in India' is an ambitious top-down planning. Introduced as a core initiative during the early days of the Modi administration, 'Make in India' was designed to showcase reform credentials and rally public backing through industrial upgrading. However, its overly aggressive targets were severely misaligned with the actual industrial base and execution capabilities. Policy execution has proven to be inefficient. The sluggish bureaucratic system and cumbersome administrative procedures caused substantial delays in the implementation. Businesses often find themselves mired in red tape, even simple approvals taking months, substantially hampering the response capability. Incentive mechanisms have been poorly designed while the government's Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme for boosting manufacturing industry, its complex criteria, such as progressively increasing investment and output thresholds, misalign with actual needs. Many small and medium-sized enterprises are excluded due to stringent requirements, while large corporations remain hesitant due to policy uncertainty. Additionally, systemic inadequacies, such as fragmented land ownership and the absence of just compensation frameworks for land expropriation, have ensnared numerous manufacturing endeavours in the cycle of "land acquisition-public dissent-impasse". The stagnation of India's manufacturing sector is linked to its socio-cultural values, which hinders its labour market development. The traditional caste system ties individuals' career trajectories to their birth, thereby restricting the free movement of labour into the manufacturing domain. Lower-caste groups are systematically marginalised from technical positions, thus vocational training is woefully insufficient. Higher-caste individuals view manufacturing with contempt, preferring "respectable" professions like finance and software. Deep-seated cultural traditions persist in stifling female engagement in the workforce. According to World Bank labour force statistics, women account for only 31.2 per cent of India's workforce in 2023 and 32.8 per cent in 2024, and their representation in manufacturing is even more limited, mostly in low-wage industries such as textiles and tobacco. Despite India's abundant supply of young workforce, labour participation rates remain low, lagging not only behind China but even Bangladesh. The protectionist measures of Modi government have not only tarnished India's international business standing but impeded foreign investment. 'Make in India' couldn't offer a stable and transparent business climate. Government authorities often carry out unannounced inspections on the pretext of compliance audits or tax probes. The negative impact of the investment environment has been demonstrated by typical examples such as Xiaomi, Amazon and Samsung. It has eroded corporate confidence as well as investment reputation of India. The slowdown in foreign investment inflows has significantly diminished the upgrading capacity of domestic supply chains. This vicious cycle is likely to persist in the foreseeable future. Besides economic factors, India's failure to merge with the regional economy proved to be the proverbial last straw. India's withdrawal from RCEP made it miss a crucial opportunity to integrate into the Asia-Pacific value chains. Its hesitant attitude towards China's BRI and the CPTPP has largely constrained its ability to ride the tide of regional economic development. Such self-imposed foreign policies have plunged India's manufacturing sector into an increasingly "isolated" predicament. On the background of tariff war triggered by President Donald Trump, the chances for the Indian manufacturing industry to rise are slimmer than ever.
Time of India
01-05-2025
- Business
- Time of India
With the pvt sector indifferent to R&D, India risks missing the deep-tech bus, or getting locked out
In the 2000s, China recognised that technological dependence was a strategic liability because it relied on US chips, Western operating systems and telecom infra. This triggered a strategy rooted in constructive paranoia, and the launch of mission-driven policies: #Pahalgam Terrorist Attack Nuclear Power! How India and Pakistan's arsenals stack up Does America have a plan to capture Pakistan's nuclear weapons? Airspace blockade: India plots a flight path to skip Pakistan Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006-20): This aimed to make China an 'innovation-oriented nation'. Made in China 2025 : It targeted dominance in 10 hi-tech sectors. Thousand Talents Plan (2008): This programme was launched to reverse brain drain, and attract global researchers. It has received massive state support through guidance funds, industrial subsidies and tech-focused SOEs. China also doubled down on patenting, domestic standards and end-to-end industrial ecosystems, from semiconductors to green energy. R&D investment surged past 2.5% of GDP, with a rapidly rising share from the private sector. Today, China leads the world in AI patents, EV production, solar capacity and quantum publications. Live Events Meanwhile, India faces similar vulnerabilities China faced 25 years ago: imported chips, weak indigenous IP, low- tech exports and a fragmented research base. And the response has been uneven. GoI has launched Anusandhan National Research Foundation (ANRF), a ₹1 lakh cr R&D fund, expanded PLI schemes, and invested in semiconductors, space tech, clean energy and quantum. For the first time, the government is adopting a full-spectrum approach to funding research and innovation across all technology readiness levels (TRLs). While ANRF will focus on early-stage discovery (TRLs 1-3) and improve ease of doing science with DST, a soon-to-be-finalised ₹1 lakh cr R&D fund should drive private investment in mid-to-late-stage innovation (TRLs 4-9) through long-term, near-zero-interest loans. This fund shifts focus from grants to outcome-linked support for developing commercially viable tech. While the need for greater funding in basic research is acknowledged, GoI is laying the essential groundwork to build a self-sustaining R&D ecosystem. Yet, the private sector remains risk-averse, contributing barely a third of national R&D. India's R&D-to-GDP ratio remains stuck below 0.7%, with little traction in patenting or deep-tech commercialisation. The innovation pipeline is still thin. Ex-Intel CEO Andrew Grove made the line, 'Let's be paranoid' - with its philosophy of the importance of proactive preparedness for unexpected changes and strategic inflection points - famous. And, yet, even Intel wasn't paranoid enough. It missed the AI inflection point, and today Nvidia has overtaken it in valuation, strategic relevance and tech leadership. A similar inversion is unfolding between China and the US, driven by who innovates faster and scales deeper. Unfortunately, while GoI is paranoid, India's private sector isn't. In 2024, Foundation for Advancing Science & Technology (FAST) published a comparative study, 'State of Industry R&D in India', of 59 Indian and 60 global firms across six key sectors: pharma, software, defence, chemicals, automobiles, and energy. The study, conducted between FY16 and FY23, reveals a persistent input-output gap. Global firms, on average, reported 2.9x R&D intensity (spend as % of revenue), 3.7x share of PhD-qualified employees, and 2.9x R&D spending as share of profits than Indian firms. On output indicators, the disparity is starker. Global firms generated 13.1x patents and 1.3x scientific publications per billion dollars of revenue compared to their Indian counterparts. In software, global firms had 32x R&D intensity and 12.1x patents by revenue. In pharma, India's strongest sector, R&D intensity (5.8%) lagged far behind global peers (17.3%). The only parameter where Indian firms outperformed was in R&D disclosure, with an average disclosure score of 6.2 (out of 10) vs 3.7 for global firms. The European Commission recently released the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard 2024. It presents data on the top global 2,000 companies investing in R&D. They invested ₹1,257.7 bn in R&D in 2023. Indian firms accounted for ₹5.5 bn, or about 0.4%, of global industrial R&D investment, with only 15 companies featuring among the world's top 2,000 R&D spenders. This places India behind not only advanced economies like the US (₹531.8 bn, 681 firms) and China (₹215.8 bn, 524 firms), but also innovation-intensive small economies such as South Korea (₹42.5 bn, 40 firms), Taiwan (₹24.7 bn, 55 firms), and Ireland (₹10.4 bn, 24 firms). Sustained long-term economic growth is driven by investments in knowledge and innovation. India's failure to internalise this principle within its industrial ecosystem suggests presence of constraints: low absorptive capacity, weak industry-academia linkages, and limited interest from the private sector in high-risk R&D. Persistent underrepresentation of Indian firms in global innovation rankings reflects a missing industrial policy focus on Schumpeterian creative destruction, without which India risks being confined to low-value segments of GVCs. In Liu Cixin's 2008 science fiction novel, The Three-Body Problem, the world gets paralysed by the sudden collapse of scientific progress. Stagnation is the real nightmare. It's not fiction any more. For India, the risk isn't that we fail. It's that we're too comfortable even to try. Innovation can't be outsourced. If there's a gap between what scientists are doing and what businesses need, then companies must invest in R&D, collaborate with academia, and shape research. If the private sector stays disengaged, we'll keep watching others lead. We just aren't paranoid enough.
