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Yahoo
24-07-2025
- Sport
- Yahoo
Italian Football Strategy Over the Last 25 Years: A Look Back in Time
Clubs like AS Roma have played a key role in this evolution, bridging old-school structure with modern tactical innovation. From the creative peak of Francesco Totti to recent European campaigns under José Mourinho, Roma's journey mirrors Italy's broader transformation. This article will discuss key developments and the styles that made Italy win the 2006 World Cup and the 2020 Euros. Moving Away from Catenaccio In the 1990s, Italy was still tied to a style called catenaccio. This was a very defensive system. Teams stayed deep, focused on blocking opponents, and tried to score through quick counterattacks. A special defender called a libero helped clean up danger at the back. But this started to fade. The game was speeding up. Teams from other countries began to press more, pass quicker, and attack more freely. Italian clubs began to lose ground in European competitions. Coaches saw the need to change. By the 2000s, most teams dropped the sweeper and adopted zonal defending. This meant defenders covered space, not just specific opponents. Flat back-fours became common. Midfielders played a larger role in building attacks, not just defending. Focus on the Midfield From the mid-2000s to the early 2010s, strategy moved toward the midfield. Coaches wanted balance. They used three or four midfielders to stay compact, win the ball back, and build attacks. Marcello Lippi's 2006 World Cup team used this setup well. His midfield was organized, but also able to create chances. Antonio Conte later brought a more aggressive version of this at Juventus and with the national team. He used players who could press, pass, and cover lots of ground. The idea was simple: control the center of the pitch. If you win the midfield, you control the match. This is still true today. Roma, too, embraced midfield control, especially under Luciano Spalletti. His use of the 'false nine' system, with Totti dropping deep to link play, allowed midfielders like Daniele De Rossi and Simone Perrotta to shine and dominate possession zones in a modern way. Return of the Three Defenders Italy has a long history with three-at-the-back systems. In the 2010s, this setup returned, but in a new way. It was no longer just to defend. Now, it was used to attack as well. Conte's Juventus and Inter teams played this way. So did Gian Piero Gasperini's Atalanta. They used three defenders, two wide wingbacks, and midfielders who ran hard. Wingbacks stretched the field wide. The back three helped keep the ball and cover space. This allowed teams to press high and move the ball fast. When done right, it confused opponents. It also gave players more options during attacks. Roma joined this trend under Paulo Fonseca and José Mourinho, who both experimented with a back-three formation in various matches. Mourinho, especially in European knockout ties, balanced a solid defensive block with quick transitions through wingbacks like Leonardo Spinazzola and Zeki Çelik. Pressing and Quick Attacks By the late 2010s, pressing became more common in Italy. For years, Italian teams were cautious. They sat back and waited. But younger coaches brought in new ideas. They wanted to win the ball high up the pitch and attack fast. This approach is now seen in teams like Napoli, Roma, and Milan. They do not always press constantly. But when they lose the ball, they react quickly. This helps break the opponent's shape and create chances. The goal is not to keep the ball all the time. Instead, teams try to move it forward quickly and shoot before the defense can get ready. Adapting in Europe Italian clubs had to adjust their tactics for European games. These matches are faster and more physical. Teams from England, Germany, and Spain use higher pressing and an intense pace. To keep up, Italian teams had to change their training and strategy. Juventus used wide defenders and a solid midfield to stay balanced. Atalanta played man-to-man all over the pitch — a risky but bold choice. Milan used mixed pressing with strong defensive blocks. These changes helped clubs stay competitive outside Italy. It also helped Italian players learn new systems and grow tactically. Italy's National Team Today After winning the 2006 World Cup, Italy seemed to have run out of luck over the next decade. In 2018, Roberto Mancini took over, and Squadra Azzura started regaining momentum. In 2020, the long-awaited moment finally happened: Italy won the Euro. Mancini's squad showed unity, and that was the main difference. Final Thoughts Italian football no longer plays only to defend. The game has changed. Teams still value control and structure. But now, they press more, attack quicker, and adapt faster. AS Roma, with its mix of tradition and tactical evolution, is a perfect case study in this broader national transition: from rigid systems to modern flexibility. From Totti's genius to Mourinho's discipline, the Giallorossi have mirrored Italy's footballing journey. The strategy has shifted, not disappeared. It reflects the new demands of the modern game and shows how Italy, while staying true to its roots, can still grow and compete. Italian football is one of the world's most respected. Let's take a look at how things changed in the new millennium. What was once known mostly for defense has now grown into a mix of control, balance, and flexible tactics. Fans who want to see how their favorite teams perform nowadays can check public records from sportsbooks like Casumo. These records show match outcomes, trends, and team formations over time. Not intended for casual viewing, they can help with understanding how teams changed their styles. Clubs like AS Roma have played a key role in this evolution, bridging old-school structure with modern tactical innovation. From the creative peak of Francesco Totti to recent European campaigns under José Mourinho, Roma's journey mirrors Italy's broader transformation. This article will discuss key developments and the styles that made Italy win the 2006 World Cup and the 2020 Euros. Moving Away from Catenaccio In the 1990s, Italy was still tied to a style called catenaccio. This was a very defensive system. Teams stayed deep, focused on blocking opponents, and tried to score through quick counterattacks. A special defender called a libero helped clean up danger at the back. But this started to fade. The game was speeding up. Teams from other countries began to press more, pass quicker, and attack more freely. Italian clubs began to lose ground in European competitions. Coaches saw the need to change. By the 2000s, most teams dropped the sweeper and adopted zonal defending. This meant defenders covered space, not just specific opponents. Flat back-fours became common. Midfielders played a larger role in building attacks, not just defending. Focus on the Midfield From the mid-2000s to the early 2010s, strategy moved toward the midfield. Coaches wanted balance. They used three or four midfielders to stay compact, win the ball back, and build attacks. Marcello Lippi's 2006 World Cup team used this setup well. His midfield was organized, but also able to create chances. Antonio Conte later brought a more aggressive version of this at Juventus and with the national team. He used players who could press, pass, and cover lots of ground. The idea was simple: control the center of the pitch. If you win the midfield, you control the match. This is still true today. Roma, too, embraced midfield control, especially under Luciano Spalletti. His use of the 'false nine' system, with Totti dropping deep to link play, allowed midfielders like Daniele De Rossi and Simone Perrotta to shine and dominate possession zones in a modern way. Return of the Three Defenders Italy has a long history with three-at-the-back systems. In the 2010s, this setup returned, but in a new way. It was no longer just to defend. Now, it was used to attack as well. Conte's Juventus and Inter teams played this way. So did Gian Piero Gasperini's Atalanta. They used three defenders, two wide wingbacks, and midfielders who ran hard. Wingbacks stretched the field wide. The back three helped keep the ball and cover space. This allowed teams to press high and move the ball fast. When done right, it confused opponents. It also gave players more options during attacks. Roma joined this trend under Paulo Fonseca and José Mourinho, who both experimented with a back-three formation in various matches. Mourinho, especially in European knockout ties, balanced a solid defensive block with quick transitions through wingbacks like Leonardo Spinazzola and Zeki Çelik. Pressing and Quick Attacks By the late 2010s, pressing became more common in Italy. For years, Italian teams were cautious. They sat back and waited. But younger coaches brought in new ideas. They wanted to win the ball high up the pitch and attack fast. This approach is now seen in teams like Napoli, Roma, and Milan. They do not always press constantly. But when they lose the ball, they react quickly. This helps break the opponent's shape and create chances. The goal is not to keep the ball all the time. Instead, teams try to move it forward quickly and shoot before the defense can get ready. Adapting in Europe Italian clubs had to adjust their tactics for European games. These matches are faster and more physical. Teams from England, Germany, and Spain use higher pressing and an intense pace. To keep up, Italian teams had to change their training and strategy. Juventus used wide defenders and a solid midfield to stay balanced. Atalanta played man-to-man all over the pitch — a risky but bold choice. Milan used mixed pressing with strong defensive blocks. These changes helped clubs stay competitive outside Italy. It also helped Italian players learn new systems and grow tactically. Italy's National Team Today After winning the 2006 World Cup, Italy seemed to have run out of luck over the next decade. In 2018, Roberto Mancini took over, and Squadra Azzura started regaining momentum. In 2020, the long-awaited moment finally happened: Italy won the Euro. Mancini's squad showed unity, and that was the main difference. Final Thoughts Italian football no longer plays only to defend. The game has changed. Teams still value control and structure. But now, they press more, attack quicker, and adapt faster. AS Roma, with its mix of tradition and tactical evolution, is a perfect case study in this broader national transition: from rigid systems to modern flexibility. From Totti's genius to Mourinho's discipline, the Giallorossi have mirrored Italy's footballing journey. The strategy has shifted, not disappeared. It reflects the new demands of the modern game and shows how Italy, while staying true to its roots, can still grow and compete.
Yahoo
22-05-2025
- Sport
- Yahoo
How bad was Spurs v United in comparison to other European club finals?
The attacking talents on show for both Italian sides were frightening. Juventus partnered David Trezeguet in attack with Alessandro Del Piero, while Milan opted for Pippo Inzaghi and Andriy Shevchenko in front of the creativity of Andrea Pirlo, Clarence Seedorf and Rui Costa. Such was the embarrassment of riches available to manager Carlo Ancelotti, Rivaldo was an unused sub. Yet after 120 minutes, the final remained goalless. Marcello Lippi, who had succeeded Ancelotti as Juve manager in 2001, was particularly culpable, having brought on the defensively minded Antonio Conte as a makeshift No 10 at half-time. How they missed the suspended Pavel Nedved. Milan prevailed in the shootout, with Paolo Maldini lifting the trophy at Old Trafford, but the final did nothing to dispel the belief that Italian football is a defensive game. Related: Tottenham clinch Europa League glory on golden night to floor Manchester United A goal of exquisite beauty punctuated an otherwise drab affair as Radamel Falcao earned victory for André Villas Boas's side, a triumph that would contribute to the Portuguese manager moving to Chelsea later that summer. Falcao's looping header from a brilliant Fredy Guarín cross was the only highlight, with Braga looking only to frustrate their neighbours before conceding and unable to muster any sort of response once they fell behind. Even Villas Boas conceded afterwards his disappointment that the final had 'not been the spectacle' he had envisaged, while the Guardian's Paul Doyle, on liveblogging duties that night, was a little more forthright in his summary of the match: 'Well that was torpid. Nice enough goal to win it, though.' It is often the way that finals contested by teams from the same nation can be tight, cagey affairs – just look at this list – which is normally due to the finalists knowing each other well and often being concerned about losing to a long-established rival. In this case, it was much more to do with the fact that Spurs and Manchester United were lurching from dreadful domestic seasons, in which both sides lurked just above the Premier League relegation zone. The carrot of Champions League qualification and the stick of derision or potentially someone losing their job probably didn't help in opening up the contest, which was fittingly decided by a dismal Brennan Johnson deflection. Spurs fans won't care about that, or Ange Postecoglou's gameplan, which the Australian admitted afterwards was about 'minimising moments by having a strong foundation' – manager-speak for putting 10 men behind the ball for almost the entire second half. The fairytale of Nottingham Forest winning their first European Cup under Brian Clough often seems to omit how the final against the Swedish club was a drab affair. In an age where back passes to the keeper were common, especially in tight and important matches decided by the odd goal, it was a game heavy on offsides and stoppages. Forest had thrilled many en route to the final, including in a 4-1 win over Grasshoppers in the first leg of their quarter-final, and a 3-3 draw with Cologne in the first leg of their semi-final, but a tall, physical Malmö nullified Forest in the final, before Trevor Francis's headed winner, in his first European appearance for the club, mercifully prevented the final from going into extra time. As ever, though, it was Clough who had the last word: 'It wasn't a great game but they were a boring team, Malmö. In fact the Swedes are quite a boring nation. But we still won, so who cares?' 'Two teams with their minds more obviously on correcting the perceived injustices of the past than on winning a match through the sort of expressive football that earned the European Cup its reputation fought each other virtually to a standstill in Milan,' began Richard Williams' match report from San Siro. This was both a disappointing match – a penalty each for Bayern and Valencia sending the game towards, you guessed it, more penalties in a shootout – but also two disappointing performances, particularly for that Valencia side. The La Liga team were appearing in their second successive final, having been thrashed by Real Madrid in the 2000 showpiece a year earlier. Owen Hargreaves did such a good job of negating Pablo Aimar that the Valencia manager, Héctor Cúper, withdrew the Argentinian playmaker at half-time. Ultimately, the Spanish side could not conquer man-of-the-match Oliver Kahn. The goalkeeper saved Mauricio Pellegrino's spotkick in the shootout to give Bayern their fourth European crown.
