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Titan Sub implosion was ‘preventable', Coast Guard report cites flawed design, negligence, and ignorance
Titan Sub implosion was ‘preventable', Coast Guard report cites flawed design, negligence, and ignorance

Time of India

time4 days ago

  • Time of India

Titan Sub implosion was ‘preventable', Coast Guard report cites flawed design, negligence, and ignorance

A US Coast Guard report reveals the Titan submersible tragedy was preventable. OceanGate ignored safety warnings and lacked proper oversight. The company used experimental materials and suppressed internal safety concerns. The submersible imploded during a dive to the Titanic. All five people on board died. The report recommends stricter regulations for submersible operations. Tired of too many ads? Remove Ads Tired of too many ads? Remove Ads The Titan was constructed using experimental materials, including a carbon fiber hull, without undergoing third-party certification required by international maritime standards. The company lacked a comprehensive inspection and maintenance program, and investigators revealed that the sub had been left exposed to extreme elements in winter months prior to its 2023 dive. OceanGate failed to address internal safety complaints from employees, some of whom were either ignored or allegedly forced out of the company after raising alarms. The board also found that the company had actively discouraged transparency, operating under a philosophy that 'innovation and regulation were incompatible.' Stockton Rush, 61 – CEO of OceanGate and pilot of the submersible Hamish Harding, 58 – British explorer and billionaire Paul-Henri Nargeolet, 77 – renowned French Titanic expert Shahzada Dawood, 48 – Pakistani businessman Suleman Dawood, 19 – his son, a student Regulatory loopholes and warnings ignored Tired of too many ads? Remove Ads A newly released final report from the US Coast Guard has concluded that the catastrophic implosion of the Titan submersible in June 2023, which killed all five people on board during a dive to the Titanic wreck site, was a 'preventable' disaster caused by systemic safety failures and negligence by its operator, OceanGate long-awaited 300-page report from the Marine Board of Investigation, released Tuesday (August 7) morning, paints a damning portrait of OceanGate's design, certification, and maintenance practices. Investigators found that the company operated outside accepted industry standards, ignored multiple warnings, and cultivated a toxic internal culture that suppressed safety concerns.'This marine casualty and the loss of five lives was preventable,' said Jason Neubauer, chair of the Marine Board of Investigation. 'OceanGate's critically flawed safety procedures and lack of regulatory oversight directly contributed to the tragedy.'The Titan submersible lost contact with its support vessel on June 18, 2023, approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes into its descent to the Titanic wreckage, 12,500 feet beneath the surface of the North Atlantic. What followed was a frantic multi-national search operation that spanned four days and captured global Coast Guard report outlines a host of violations and lapses that point to gross negligence on OceanGate's part:According to the report, had Stockton Rush survived the implosion, the board would have recommended charging him with investigation also delved into the internal workings of OceanGate, revealing a toxic culture that discouraged dissent. Engineers and technicians who raised red flags about the sub's integrity were marginalized or ignored. The company reportedly lacked standard safety reporting channels and had no independent review process for mission-critical operated vehicles located debris from the submersible on the seafloor, confirming what experts feared, a catastrophic implosion had occurred, killing all five individuals on board the deceased were:OceanGate's operations exploited regulatory grey areas by conducting dives in international waters, which allowed them to bypass stricter oversight by maritime agencies such as the American Bureau of Shipping or experts, including those in the marine engineering community, had warned OceanGate publicly and privately about the potential risks of its carbon-fiber hull design, concerns that were dismissed by Rush and company had marketed its deep-sea tours as cutting-edge exploration, charging up to $250,000 per Coast Guard report includes 30 safety recommendations aimed at improving oversight of submersible operations, including mandatory third-party certification, safety culture assessments, and stricter inspection OceanGate ceased operations in the weeks following the disaster, legal experts suggest civil lawsuits or posthumous accountability may still be pursued, especially given the board's strong language and conclusion that criminal charges would have been warranted.

Series of mistakes caused Titan sub disaster, US Coast Guard says
Series of mistakes caused Titan sub disaster, US Coast Guard says

The Star

time4 days ago

  • General
  • The Star

Series of mistakes caused Titan sub disaster, US Coast Guard says

The Coast Guard's final report on the submersible that imploded during a dive to the Titanic concluded that the fatal disaster resulted from a series of safety and design failures. 'This marine casualty and the loss of five lives was preventable,' said Jason Neubauer, who led the two-year inquiry for the Marine Board of Investigation, which issued a more than 300-page report on Aug 5. The submersible, known as the Titan and operated by a company called OceanGate, disappeared in June 2023 on a trip to view the wreck of the Titanic ocean liner. It lost contact an hour and a half into the dive, and prompted a sprawling search effort in the dark depths of the Atlantic Ocean. The craft's remains were discovered on the fourth day by a remotely operated vehicle. The submersible's operator and four passengers were killed. Numerous investigations, hearings and news reports have documented failures in the submersible's construction and operation, which were echoed by the Coast Guard report. 'The board determined the primary contributing factors were OceanGate's inadequate design, certification, maintenance and inspection process for the Titan,' the investigative board said in a news release. The five people killed in the implosion were the operator, Stockton Rush, as well as explorers Hamish Harding and Paul-Henri Nargeolet and two members of a wealthy Pakistani family, Shahzada Dawood and Suleman Dawood. Here are takeaways from the report. The Titan's final moments seemed normal. The Titan's final voyage on June 18, 2023, proceeded largely without incident until the submersible nearly reached the ocean floor, the report found. At 10.47am, as the submersible was approaching the seabed, the report said it 'followed standard procedure by releasing ballast weights to slow its descent'. Seconds later, at a depth of 10,978 feet, the Titan transmitted its location for the final time. Within moments, the submersible's carbon fiber hull gave way, catastrophically imploding under the immense pressure, the report found. The board's report said the passengers 'were exposed to approximately 4,930 pounds per square inch of water pressure' when the vessel imploded, 'resulting in the instantaneous death of all five occupants.' The implosion was heard at the surface. Seconds after the submersible imploded, OceanGate employees aboard the submersible's support ship, the Polar Prince, heard a 'bang' from the ocean's surface, the board found. After hearing the noise, the leader of the submersible's communications and tracking team turned to another OceanGate employee and asked, 'What was that bang?' according to the report. Subsequent messages to the Titan's crew went unreturned. 'With the benefit of hindsight, I now believe I felt the Polar Prince shudder at around the time communications were reportedly lost, but at the time we thought nothing of it,' the master of the Polar Prince later wrote to the board. He added that the disturbance 'was slight'. OceanGate pilots lacked adequate training. The report found that OceanGate lacked adequate protocols to ensure its submersible pilots, including Rush, were sufficiently trained to lead undersea expeditions. OceanGate's former director of operations told the board that there was 'no official documentation' required for OceanGate's submersible pilots, and that the company didn't have a dedicated manual for pilots operating the Titan submersible, the report said. Additionally, the board found no evidence showing that Rush had completed any training programme specific to the submersible that would have met the company's standards for its highest pilot training certification. OceanGate gave false information to the Coast Guard. At the time of the Titan's final dive, Rush possessed a credential issued by the US Coast Guard that permitted him to operate vessels of a certain volume on inland waters. That credential was based on falsified information, the report said: In 2020, OceanGate exaggerated the volume of the Titan in a letter to the National Maritime Center so that it would appear as if Rush had the requisite time at sea needed to earn the credential. The Titan was damaged in previous dives. On multiple occasions, OceanGate failed to adequately investigate damage suffered by the Titan during previous dives, the report found, including one that resulted in the vessel becoming entangled with the wreckage of the Titanic. During a dive in July 2022, the Titan entered the Titanic's wreckage and became briefly caught in debris near the ship's main stairwell, a mission specialist told the board. During the submersible's ascent, crew members reported hearing a loud noise they feared indicated damage to the hull. A contractor told the board that Rush later brushed aside those concerns. It wasn't the first time an OceanGate submersible became entangled in a shipwreck, according to the report. In an interview with the board, the OceanGate director of operations described a dive in which an earlier OceanGate submersible, the Cyclops 1, became stuck beneath the bow of the Andrea Doria shipwreck near Nantucket, Massachusetts, with Rush at the controls. In response, Rush had a 'meltdown,' the director of operations said, adding that when he asked Rush to relinquish the controls Rush threw the controller at him. – ©2025 The New York Times Company This article originally appeared in The New York Times.

OceanGate boss ignored safety checks sub tragedy probe finds
OceanGate boss ignored safety checks sub tragedy probe finds

Irish Independent

time4 days ago

  • General
  • Irish Independent

OceanGate boss ignored safety checks sub tragedy probe finds

Rush and four passengers were killed in June 2023 when Titan suffered a catastrophic implosion as it descended to the wreck of the Titanic, sparking a days-long search in the North Atlantic off Canada that grabbed international headlines. The Coast Guard convened its highest level of investigation in the aftermath, and the disaster has led to lawsuits and calls for tighter regulation of the developing private deep sea expedition industry. The Titan was operated by OceanGate, a private company based in Washington state. The Coast Guard found the company's safety procedures were 'critically flawed' and cited 'glaring disparities' between safety protocols and actual practices. Jason Neubauer, with the Marine Board of Investigation, said that the findings will help prevent future ­tragedies. 'There is a need for stronger oversight and clear options for operators who are exploring new concepts outside of the existing regulatory framework,' he said in a statement. OceanGate suspended operations in July 2023. A spokesperson for OceanGate, Christian Hammond, said the company has been wound down. Investigators repeatedly pointed to OceanGate's culture of downplaying, ignoring and even falsifying key safety information to improve its reputation and evade scrutiny from regulators. OceanGate ignored 'red flags' and had a 'toxic workplace culture'. 'By strategically creating and exploiting regulatory confusion and oversight challenges, OceanGate was ultimately able to operate Titan completely outside of the established deep-sea protocols,' the report found. Numerous OceanGate employees have come forward since the implosion to support those claims. The report says firings of senior staff members and the looming threat of being fired were used to dissuade employees and contractors from expressing safety concerns. The Marine Board concluded that Rush 'exhibited negligence' which contributed to the deaths of four people. ADVERTISEMENT Learn more The company reclassified submersible passengers as 'mission specialists' to bypass regulations on small passenger vessels and designate its subs as oceanic research vessels. Former mission specialists and OceanGate employees said their participation was 'purely for a ride in the submersible, not for scientific research', the report states. To obtain his credentials, Rush submitted a fraudulent sea service letter signed by OceanGate's chief operations officer to the Coast Guard's National Maritime Centre, the report said. In the letter, Rush claimed past service as a crew member on Titan and misrepresented the size of the vessel. An experienced submersible pilot described serious safety concerns within OceanGate's leadership over a decade before the disaster, when Rush insisted on solo piloting his 'rich friends' on a dive using a company vessel that was only licensed for scientific research. The trip in 2010 caused over $10,000 in damage after a critical battery component was removed without proper documentation, reinforcing the pilot's belief that safety was not a priority at the company, according to the report. Investigators found the submersible's design, certification, maintenance and inspection process were all inadequate. The vessel's carbon fibre hull design and construction introduced flaws that 'weakened the overall structural integrity' of its hull, the report stated. Mounting financial pressures in 2023 led to a decision by OceanGate to store the Titan submersible outdoors over the Canadian winter, where its hull was exposed to temperature fluctuations that compromised the integrity of the vessel, the report said. In addition to Rush, the implosion killed French explorer Paul-Henri Nargeolet, British adventurer Hamish Harding and two members of a prominent Pakistani family, Shahzada Dawood and his son Suleman Dawood. The family of Nargeolet, a veteran French undersea explorer known as 'Mr Titanic', filed a more than $50m (€43m) lawsuit last year that said the crew experienced 'terror and mental anguish' before the disaster. Titan's final dive came on June 18, 2023, a Sunday morning when the submersible would lose contact with its support vessel about two hours later. The Coast Guard-led team operated under the possibility there could be survivors for several days. Wreckage would subsequently be found on the ocean floor about 300 meters off the bow of the Titanic.

Titan submersible report says implosion was preventable and CEO ignored safety risks
Titan submersible report says implosion was preventable and CEO ignored safety risks

Boston Globe

time5 days ago

  • Boston Globe

Titan submersible report says implosion was preventable and CEO ignored safety risks

Advertisement Jason Neubauer with the Marine Board of Investigation said the findings will help avoid future tragedies. 'There is a need for stronger oversight and clear options for operators who are exploring new concepts outside of the existing regulatory framework,' he said in a statement. Get Starting Point A guide through the most important stories of the morning, delivered Monday through Friday. Enter Email Sign Up OceanGate suspended operations in July 2023. A spokesperson for OceanGate, Christian Hammond, said the company has been wound down and was fully cooperating with the investigation, and offered condolences to the families of those who died and everyone affected. Investigators pointed to OceanGate's culture of downplaying, ignoring, and even falsifying key safety information to improve its reputation and evade scrutiny from regulators. The company ignored 'red flags' and had a 'toxic workplace culture,' where firings of senior staff and the looming threat of being fired were used to dissuade employees and contractors from expressing safety concerns. Advertisement Rush, a former flight test engineer for fighter jets, founded the company in 2009 after years of experience in aerospace and aviation. The Marine Board concluded that Rush had an 'escalating disregard for established safety protocols,' which contributed to the deaths of four people. If Rush were alive, the board would have passed the case to the US Department of Justice and he may have faced criminal charges, the board said. The company reclassified submersible passengers as 'mission specialists' to bypass regulations on small passenger vessels and claim its subs were oceanic research vessels. Former mission specialists and OceanGate employees said their participation was 'purely for a ride in the submersible, not for scientific research,' the report said. Rush and OceanGate received numerous warnings about Titan's fraudulent classifications. In 2017, Rush was told by a Coast Guard Reserve officer hired by OceanGate that his planned Titanic dive would be illegal. Rush said 'he would buy a congressman' if ever confronted by regulators, the officer testified. Over the years, the company resorted to increasingly deceptive strategies, the report said. By 2021, an OceanGate attorney falsely informed a federal court in Virginia — which was presiding over The Titan's authorization to conduct dives — that the vessel was registered in the Bahamas, even though it wasn't. To obtain his credentials, Rush submitted a fraudulent sea service letter signed by OceanGate's chief operations officer to the Coast Guard's National Maritime Center, the report said. In the letter, Rush claimed past service as a crew member on Titan and misrepresented the size of the vessel, when in fact it had never been registered or admeasured. Advertisement Investigators found the submersible's design, certification, maintenance, and inspection process were all inadequate. The vessel's carbon fiber hull design and construction introduced flaws that 'weakened the overall structural integrity' of its hull, the report stated. Mounting financial pressures in 2023 led to a decision by OceanGate to store the Titan submersible outdoors over the Canadian winter, where its hull was exposed to temperature fluctuations that compromised the integrity of the vessel, the report said. The implosion also killed French underwater explorer Paul-Henri Nargeolet, known as 'Mr. Titanic,' British adventurer Hamish Harding, and two members of a prominent Pakistani family, Shahzada Dawood and his son Suleman Dawood. Nargeolet's family filed a $50 million lawsuit last year that said the crew experienced 'terror and mental anguish' before the disaster. The lawsuit accused OceanGate of gross negligence. Titan had been making voyages to the Titanic site since 2021. The Titan's final dive came on the morning of June 18, 2023. The submersible lost contact with its support vessel about two hours later, and was reported overdue that afternoon. Ships, planes and equipment were rushed to the scene about 435 miles south of St. John's, Newfoundland. The Coast Guard-led team operated under the possibility there could be survivors for several days. Wreckage would subsequently be found on the ocean floor about 330 yards off the bow of the Titanic.

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