logo
#

Latest news with #MichaelLangley

‘Shooting themselves in the foot': Pentagon officials outraged by DOD think tank ban
‘Shooting themselves in the foot': Pentagon officials outraged by DOD think tank ban

Politico

time2 days ago

  • Business
  • Politico

‘Shooting themselves in the foot': Pentagon officials outraged by DOD think tank ban

She added that 'the only thing that suffers in this process are ticket sales for organizations that are largely America Last.' While Aspen and other conferences outside the capital are ticketed, think tank events in Washington are often free and open to the public. The new policy is already leading to bureaucratic kerfluffles. A select group of top Washington think tankers got a routine invitation last Tuesday: How would they like to join a video call with the outgoing top U.S. general in Africa? Just 48 hours later, they received a note that Africa Command chief Gen. Michael Langley had canceled with no explanation. A defense official said it was halted so as to not appear out of step with the new rules. The idea for the halt, according to one of the defense officials, was sped along by the Pentagon's realization that multiple employees, including Navy Secretary John Phelan, were heading to the Aspen summit. The organization and the other forum attendees were not ideologically aligned with the president's American First agenda, they felt, so the Pentagon pulled its participation. 'It is absolutely to control who says what, where, and when,' said the official. Defense Department officials have historically attended roundtables to explain emerging defense policies. Foreign allies worry about losing that big-picture view, especially as the Pentagon makes decisions that catch them off guard — such as pausing military aid to Ukraine and conducting a review of a major submarine deal with Australia and the U.K. 'Meetings with the Pentagon are difficult to book, so losing public events where we can glean some details about military policy will have a big effect on us,' a NATO diplomat said. The ban will also limit the ability of tech start-ups to understand the Pentagon's priorities and build the weapons of the future, a defense industry executive said. Many of these companies struggle to get access to DOD officials. Pentagon speaking requests also now have to be approved by the building's general counsel, the policy team, and Hegseth's press shop. Previously, only the individual command needed to approve the request. The new rules have already led the Navy to bar the service's top official for research, development, and acquisition, Jason Potter, from participating in a conservative-leaning Hudson Institute event on shipbuilding, according to two people familiar with the matter. There wasn't enough time to go through the new approvals process. The Pentagon used to pay member fees for the Council on Foreign Relations and slotted military fellows at think tanks such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies. But that would appear to clash with the new rules. Some employees wondered whether the Pentagon would still pay for their advanced degrees at universities considered more liberal, such as the Harvard Kennedy School or Princeton's School of Public and International Affairs. The Halifax International Security Forum, one of the events explicitly targeted by the ban, hoped the Pentagon would change course. 'Halifax International Security Forum has provided a non-partisan venue to strengthen cooperation between the U.S. and its democratic allies,' said Peter Van Praagh, the founder and president of the forum. 'When these alliances are nourished, America is stronger and Americans are safer. When these alliances are not nourished, Americans at home and American troops abroad are less safe.' Nick Taylor-Vaisey contributed to this report.

The US needs a foothold in the Sahel, and Togo is here to help
The US needs a foothold in the Sahel, and Togo is here to help

The Hill

time21-07-2025

  • Politics
  • The Hill

The US needs a foothold in the Sahel, and Togo is here to help

As Congress prepares to mark up the fiscal 2026 National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. has a critical opportunity to strengthen its strategic partnerships in Africa — partnerships that will shape regional stability for years to come. Nowhere is this more urgent than in West Africa. Earlier this year, General Michael Langley, Commander of AFRICOM, warned that terrorist groups are actively seeking access to the West African coastline — an objective that 'puts not just African nations at risk, but also increases the chance of threats reaching the U.S. shores.' Terrorist attacks in northern Togo, once unthinkable, are now tragically real. To counter extremism and support governance in vulnerable states, the U.S. must act with urgency and with trusted partners. It must act with Togo. Togo is the United States' most engaged and capable defense partner in coastal West Africa. Over the past decade, Togo and the United States have built a strong foundation of security cooperation — from joint military training and intelligence sharing to maritime patrols and regional counterterrorism efforts. Our armed forces regularly participate in U.S.-led exercises like Flintlock, which strengthens special operations and counterterror capabilities across the Sahel, and Obangame Express, which enhances maritime security coordination in the Gulf of Guinea. These efforts do more than build capacity and interoperability — they forge real operational trust. At home, Togo has prioritized national security by increasing its defense budget from 8.7 percent of total government spending in 2017 to 17.5 percent in 2022 — an investment aimed at modernizing our military and enhancing readiness. These efforts have made our relationship a model of partnership and a cornerstone of regional stability. As U.S. Air Force Major General Kenneth Ekman, Director of the AFRICOM Coordination Element, emphasized in November 2024, 'The partnership between AFRICOM and the Togolese military is essential in promoting peace and security across the West African region. By strengthening this relationship, we not only enhance Togo's defense capabilities but also ensure a united and effective approach to addressing the complex security challenges we face together.' This partnership aligns with the Trump administration's strategic shift toward a leaner U.S. defense footprint in Africa, built around empowering reliable regional partners to take the lead in addressing transnational threats. Togo has embraced this approach — stepping up its operational capabilities and committing to greater regional responsibility. As General Langley noted in front of the House Armed Services Committee, 'Strengthening the capacity of African partners to address security challenges and enhance regional stability reduces the long-term need for U.S. security assistance.' Togo is demonstrating exactly that model of sustainable, partner-led security cooperation. While U.S. law restricts certain forms of direct assistance to Sahelian countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, information sharing remains both legal and vital. Section 7008 of annual appropriations legislation bars most security assistance, but these restrictions do not apply to partners like Togo. Nor do they prevent the U.S. from sharing actionable intelligence with Togo, which can in turn serve as a critical conduit for relaying threat information to frontline states across the Sahel. With the right mechanisms in place, Togo can act as a trusted channel for coordination, helping to ensure that U.S. intelligence reaches those best positioned to act on it — even in countries where direct U.S. engagement is limited by law. The threat posed by terrorist networks in the Sahel cannot be overstated. According to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index, the region now accounts for over half of all terrorism-related deaths worldwide. Lethal and organized groups such as al-Qaeda affiliate Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara continue to exploit porous borders, local grievances, and weak governance to expand their reach. These extremist networks are no longer confined to the Sahel's core — they are steadily advancing southward into Togo, Ghana, Benin, and Côte d'Ivoire, where they are actively seeking access to ports and transit corridors to support smuggling, arms trafficking, and illicit finance. The implications for regional security — and for international partners with strategic interests in West Africa — are profound. Regional security is a prerequisite for economic growth and trade across Africa. The Gulf of Guinea, including Togo's Port of Lomé — the deepest-water port on the West African coast — is a lifeline for inland economies and a vital logistics hub for landlocked countries in the Sahel, a corridor that would be threatened with heightened terrorist activity. The U.S. cannot afford to retreat from the Sahel. Nor should it allow extremist groups to expand their influence unchecked. By strengthening cooperation with capable, willing partners like Togo, and by leveraging Togo as a hub for regional intelligence coordination, the U.S. can regain strategic momentum and help stem the tide of extremist and criminal networks. The road ahead will be difficult. But with the right tools, partners, and political will, we can contain this crisis before it escalates further. The rise of terrorism in the Sahel is not just a regional issue — it is a direct threat to global stability and U.S. national security. Unchecked, these networks will expand, radicalize, and export violence far beyond Africa's borders. Togo stands ready to confront this threat alongside the U.S. — not only to defend peace, but to secure prosperity across the continent.

The Americans are leaving — and the post-colonial world is fine with that
The Americans are leaving — and the post-colonial world is fine with that

Russia Today

time12-07-2025

  • Politics
  • Russia Today

The Americans are leaving — and the post-colonial world is fine with that

A shift appears to be underway in US-Africa relations, judging by the remarks of Vice President J.D. Vance and AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley. Speaking to new US naval graduates on May 23, Vance talked about re-evaluating the American military role around the world and declared that 'The era of uncontested US dominance is over" and that open-ended military engagements 'belong to the past.' Four days later General Langley, while attending an African defense chiefs' meeting in Gaborone, Botswana, suggested that the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) might be integrated into Central Command (CENTCOM). 'If we're [AFRICOM] that important to (you), you need to communicate that and we'll see,' Langley said, adding that the US is 'reassessing' its military role in the continent. This sends a clear signal that Washington may dismantle or repurpose AFRICOM as part of broader cuts to US global military posture. The statements, in line with President Donald Trump's 'America first' mantra, reflect Washington's growing impatience with costly foreign entanglements, while hinting at a fundamental transformation of how the US engages with Africa's complex security landscape. Since its creation in 2008, AFRICOM has served as the centrepiece of US military strategy on the continent. Over nearly two decades, the command has expanded its reach and budget significantly, shaping security partnerships and playing a pivotal role in regional conflicts. Yet today, AFRICOM's future is uncertain, caught at the crossroads of shifting US priorities, rising African assertiveness, and intensifying competition from rival powers such as Russia and China. Africa has long figured into the broader framework of US global military and political strategy. During the continent's era of anti-colonial struggle and liberation movements, Washington, obsessed with countering Soviet influence, viewed nearly every liberation movement through the narrow lens of Cold War anti-communism. AFRICOM was established by President George W. Bush, who emphasized its importance by stating that it would 'strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners.' AFRICOM was intended to centralize US military operations on the continent, replacing the fragmented structure inherited from the Cold War era, when Africa was divided among three different US military commands. Then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described the move as a long-overdue correction to an 'outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War.' Between 2008 and 2025, the cost of sustaining AFRICOM and financing its activities is estimated to have risen from around $50 million to between $275 million and $300 million. It is not a huge amount because the command borrows personnel and equipment from other US military commands, meaning the cost is accounted for anyway. This is likely to draw scrutiny from President Trump, who has made slashing federal spending a key priority. His administration has launched a dedicated initiative within the Office of Management and Budget – dubbed DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) – to identify and eliminate what it considers excessive international and domestic expenditures. Trump's return to office in 2025 marked a clear strategic pivot: a retreat from costly overseas commitments in favor of a narrow, transactional approach to foreign policy. The Sahel region illustrates the consequences of America's retrenchment in Africa. Once a central focus of US counterterrorism efforts, countries such as Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have witnessed the gradual reduction of American military presence amid growing local resistance. Coupled with political upheavals and anti-French sentiment, US forces have faced mounting pressure to leave or scale back operations. The withdrawal has left a security vacuum that regional powers and international actors struggle to fill, fueling instability and humanitarian crises. This retreat highlights the limits of America's influence and the complexities of African geopolitics in an era of shifting alliances. A stark example of the US pullback is Niger, where the military coup in 2023 prompted the expulsion of American forces and the shutdown of a $100-million drone base critical to regional surveillance and counterterrorism. The abrupt exit underscored the fragility of US military footholds amid shifting political dynamics. Meanwhile, Russia has swiftly moved to fill this security vacuum, leveraging military cooperation, renewed political ties with the region and arms deals to become a preferred partner for several African states. Moscow's approach – often perceived as less conditional and more respectful of sovereignty – has resonated with governments disillusioned by Western interference and demands, accelerating realignment in Africa's security landscape. African nations approach foreign military partnerships with a mix of pragmatism, skepticism, and growing assertiveness. Many governments are wary of traditional Western powers, associating them with a legacy of colonialism, exploitative aid, and conditional alliances that undermine sovereignty. In contrast, Russia's more transactional and less intrusive engagement style appeals to some leaders seeking security support without political strings attached. However, this trust is far from uniform – some African civil society groups and international observers often warn against swapping one form of dependency for another, emphasizing the need for genuine partnerships that respect African agency and prioritize long-term stability over geopolitical rivalry. African countries' relative trust in Russia compared to the US or former European colonial powers stems from historical and ideological factors. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union supported numerous African liberation movements, often standing in opposition to Western-backed regimes and colonial interests. Unlike Western powers, Russia's approach has often emphasized non-intervention in internal politics, focusing primarily on military cooperation and economic deals without pressing for political reforms. This contrasts sharply with Western demands for governance changes as a precondition for aid or security support. As Malian analyst Amina Traore noted, 'Russia does not come with lectures or conditions; it offers partnership based on mutual respect and shared interests.' Similarly, Senegalese former defense official Cheikh Diop remarked, 'African countries want security partners who respect their sovereignty and do not drag them into endless conflicts or political battles.' These sentiments underscore why Russia has gained ground as a preferred security ally, even as questions linger about the long-term implications of this pivot. The possible disappearance or transformation of AFRICOM signals a shift in US military engagement across Africa. Whether integrated into other commands or scaled back significantly, this change reflects Washington's recalibration of its global military priorities amid domestic pressures and evolving international dynamics. For Africa, the retreat of a long-standing security partner opens a strategic vacuum – one increasingly filled by Russia and other global actors eager to expand their influence. The shift challenges US policymakers to rethink their approach beyond military presence, emphasizing genuine partnerships based on respect, shared interests, and support for African-led security solutions. Ultimately, the future of US-Africa relations will depend on Washington's ability to adapt to a multipolar world where influence is no longer guaranteed by military might alone, but by diplomacy, economic engagement, and mutual respect.

Not wanted here: Why Africa is turning away from US military might
Not wanted here: Why Africa is turning away from US military might

Russia Today

time11-07-2025

  • Politics
  • Russia Today

Not wanted here: Why Africa is turning away from US military might

A shift appears to be underway in US-Africa relations, judging by the remarks of Vice President J.D. Vance and AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley. Speaking to new US naval graduates on May 23, Vance talked about re-evaluating the American military role around the world and declared that 'The era of uncontested US dominance is over" and that open-ended military engagements 'belong to the past.' Four days later General Langley, while attending an African defense chiefs' meeting in Gaborone, Botswana, suggested that the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) might be integrated into Central Command (CENTCOM). 'If we're [AFRICOM] that important to (you), you need to communicate that and we'll see,' Langley said, adding that the US is 'reassessing' its military role in the continent. This sends a clear signal that Washington may dismantle or repurpose AFRICOM as part of broader cuts to US global military posture. The statements, in line with President Donald Trump's 'America first' mantra, reflect Washington's growing impatience with costly foreign entanglements, while hinting at a fundamental transformation of how the US engages with Africa's complex security landscape. Since its creation in 2008, AFRICOM has served as the centrepiece of US military strategy on the continent. Over nearly two decades, the command has expanded its reach and budget significantly, shaping security partnerships and playing a pivotal role in regional conflicts. Yet today, AFRICOM's future is uncertain, caught at the crossroads of shifting US priorities, rising African assertiveness, and intensifying competition from rival powers such as Russia and China. Africa has long figured into the broader framework of US global military and political strategy. During the continent's era of anti-colonial struggle and liberation movements, Washington, obsessed with countering Soviet influence, viewed nearly every liberation movement through the narrow lens of Cold War anti-communism. AFRICOM was established by President George W. Bush, who emphasized its importance by stating that it would 'strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners.' AFRICOM was intended to centralize US military operations on the continent, replacing the fragmented structure inherited from the Cold War era, when Africa was divided among three different US military commands. Then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described the move as a long-overdue correction to an 'outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War.' Between 2008 and 2025, the cost of sustaining AFRICOM and financing its activities is estimated to have risen from around $50 million to between $275 million and $300 million. It is not a huge amount because the command borrows personnel and equipment from other US military commands, meaning the cost is accounted for anyway. This is likely to draw scrutiny from President Trump, who has made slashing federal spending a key priority. His administration has launched a dedicated initiative within the Office of Management and Budget – dubbed DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) – to identify and eliminate what it considers excessive international and domestic expenditures. Trump's return to office in 2025 marked a clear strategic pivot: a retreat from costly overseas commitments in favor of a narrow, transactional approach to foreign policy. The Sahel region illustrates the consequences of America's retrenchment in Africa. Once a central focus of US counterterrorism efforts, countries such as Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have witnessed the gradual reduction of American military presence amid growing local resistance. Coupled with political upheavals and anti-French sentiment, US forces have faced mounting pressure to leave or scale back operations. The withdrawal has left a security vacuum that regional powers and international actors struggle to fill, fueling instability and humanitarian crises. This retreat highlights the limits of America's influence and the complexities of African geopolitics in an era of shifting alliances. A stark example of the US pullback is Niger, where the military coup in 2023 prompted the expulsion of American forces and the shutdown of a $100-million drone base critical to regional surveillance and counterterrorism. The abrupt exit underscored the fragility of US military footholds amid shifting political dynamics. Meanwhile, Russia has swiftly moved to fill this security vacuum, leveraging military cooperation, renewed political ties with the region and arms deals to become a preferred partner for several African states. Moscow's approach – often perceived as less conditional and more respectful of sovereignty – has resonated with governments disillusioned by Western interference and demands, accelerating realignment in Africa's security landscape. African nations approach foreign military partnerships with a mix of pragmatism, skepticism, and growing assertiveness. Many governments are wary of traditional Western powers, associating them with a legacy of colonialism, exploitative aid, and conditional alliances that undermine sovereignty. In contrast, Russia's more transactional and less intrusive engagement style appeals to some leaders seeking security support without political strings attached. However, this trust is far from uniform – some African civil society groups and international observers often warn against swapping one form of dependency for another, emphasizing the need for genuine partnerships that respect African agency and prioritize long-term stability over geopolitical rivalry. African countries' relative trust in Russia compared to the US or former European colonial powers stems from historical and ideological factors. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union supported numerous African liberation movements, often standing in opposition to Western-backed regimes and colonial interests. Unlike Western powers, Russia's approach has often emphasized non-intervention in internal politics, focusing primarily on military cooperation and economic deals without pressing for political reforms. This contrasts sharply with Western demands for governance changes as a precondition for aid or security support. As Malian analyst Amina Traore noted, 'Russia does not come with lectures or conditions; it offers partnership based on mutual respect and shared interests.' Similarly, Senegalese former defense official Cheikh Diop remarked, 'African countries want security partners who respect their sovereignty and do not drag them into endless conflicts or political battles.' These sentiments underscore why Russia has gained ground as a preferred security ally, even as questions linger about the long-term implications of this pivot. The possible disappearance or transformation of AFRICOM signals a shift in US military engagement across Africa. Whether integrated into other commands or scaled back significantly, this change reflects Washington's recalibration of its global military priorities amid domestic pressures and evolving international dynamics. For Africa, the retreat of a long-standing security partner opens a strategic vacuum – one increasingly filled by Russia and other global actors eager to expand their influence. The shift challenges US policymakers to rethink their approach beyond military presence, emphasizing genuine partnerships based on respect, shared interests, and support for African-led security solutions. Ultimately, the future of US-Africa relations will depend on Washington's ability to adapt to a multipolar world where influence is no longer guaranteed by military might alone, but by diplomacy, economic engagement, and mutual respect.

Mali kills 80 militants after al-Qaeda-linked raids escalate
Mali kills 80 militants after al-Qaeda-linked raids escalate

The South African

time02-07-2025

  • Politics
  • The South African

Mali kills 80 militants after al-Qaeda-linked raids escalate

The Malian Armed Forces (FA Ma) responded to coordinated attacks on military targets in seven cities on 1 July 2025. The targeted areas were Nioro du Sahel, Diboli, Kayes, Sandere, Gogoui, Molodo, and Niono. As a result, the attack affected Nioro, Kayes, Sandere and Gogui, deeply alarming residents and local officials. Near the governor's residence, Kayes residents reported heavy gunfire and smoke. The attacks occurred near the borders with Mauritania and Senegal, raising concerns about regional security. The al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) claimed responsibility for the attacks. Moreover, JNIM declared that it had acquired numerous army installations, including three barracks. According to reports from Al Jazeera, quoting JNIM statements, the group described the operation as 'coordinated and high-quality.' The assault marks the third major JNIM attack in the past month. In addition, the militants had earlier killed 30 troops in central Mali and attacked the airport in Timbuktu. Mali's army declared the death of 80 rebels during counteroffensive operations. Insurgents suffered casualties in every combat zone, according to Army spokeswoman Souleymane Dembele. Weapons, motorcycles, and vehicles used in the attacks were among the confiscated items. Images of dead insurgents were broadcast on national television by the military. Official figures for the number of Malian soldiers' fatalities remained unreleased as of 2 July. For over ten years, Mali has struggled with Islamist insurgencies, including branches of ISIL and al-Qaeda. The country's continued military rule following the 2020 coup hinders international cooperation. In May 2025, the US Africa Command issued a warning about the growth of militants along West Africa's coastline. Furthermore, General Michael Langley emphasised the increasing risks of weapon trafficking and smuggling in the Sahel region. As a result, the attacks highlight growing insecurity in Mali and its neighbouring countries. Let us know by leaving a comment below, or send a WhatsApp to 060 011 021 11. Subscribe to The South African website's newsletters and follow us on WhatsApp, Facebook, X and Bluesky for the latest news.

DOWNLOAD THE APP

Get Started Now: Download the App

Ready to dive into a world of global content with local flavor? Download Daily8 app today from your preferred app store and start exploring.
app-storeplay-store