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Forbes
4 days ago
- Business
- Forbes
Saudi Arabia, Turkey & Syrian Reconstruction
Profoundly relieved that Syria, after the Dec 2024 collapse of the Assad regime, broke free of Iran's orbit, Saudi Arabia is now trying to contain Turkey's influence in the Levantine nation. Turkey enjoys the advantages of geography and significant military strength but is hampered by serious economic challenges. Leveraging its position as the world's largest oil exporter, Riyadh seeks to exploit Ankara's financial constraints to establish itself as a major stakeholder in Syria—and, by extension, in the broader Middle East. Achieving a Saudi–Turkish modus vivendi will be critical to the Trump administration's objective of managing the Middle East while reducing U.S. exposure to regional instability." In an unprecedented move late last month, Saudi Arabia pledged $6.4 billion in public and private sector investments for Syria's reconstruction. Leading a delegation of roughly 120 government officials and business leaders, Investment Minister Khalid al-Falih traveled to Damascus to attend the inaugural Syrian–Saudi Investment Forum. The two-day event held July 23–24, yielded 47 agreements spanning energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, real estate, agriculture, and banking. Riyadh's decision to invest—at such scale and in what remains an active battlespace—came just three weeks after the United States lifted sanctions on Syria, a policy shift President Donald Trump announced during his mid-May visit to Saudi Arabia, his first major international trip of his second term. Saudi Arabia and Turkey form the two pillars of the Trump administration's strategy for managing the Middle East—an approach rooted in the president's broader geostrategic approach that allies and partners should take the lead in ensuring the security and prosperity of their respective regions. As the region's center of gravity, Syria is a country Washington seeks to steer toward stability. This priority was underscored by Trump's decision to meet with Syria's new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa—a man who, until 2017, led al-Qaeda in his country. The meeting, hosted by Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) and attended virtually by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, reflected the high stakes and regional coordination driving U.S. policy. Under Erdogan, Turkey has long supported different Islamist factions to further its strategic interests, especially the goal of countering Kurdish separatism on its southeastern periphery. Ankara has actually had close ties with Sharaa's ruling Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) since its inception in 2017. For Saudi Arabia, however, this marks the first time it has supported a government dominated by an Islamist movement. The magnitude of this policy shift is highlighted by the fact that Riyadh had fully restored diplomatic relations with the now-ousted Assad regime just three months before its overthrow by HTS. Several factors explain this dramatic shift. First, Riyadh had not anticipated the Assad regime's collapse as a byproduct of Iran's weakening in its conflict with Israel. In fact, even as Iran and its premier proxy, Hezbollah, were being eroded through much of 2024, the Saudis appointed their first ambassador to Damascus in 12 years—capping a year-long diplomatic process that included former President Bashar al-Assad's visit to Riyadh in May 2023. In a sense, by normalizing ties with Syria, the kingdom was fortuitously positioned to engage with the new HTS-led government. Second, and more strategically, the Saudis were keen not to miss the historic opportunity presented by regime change in Damascus, which effectively ended Iran's domination of Syria. Riyadh sought to capitalize on the moment and secure its northern flank, long overshadowed by Tehran's contiguous sphere of influence. Third, Turkey was far better positioned to benefit from Syria's detachment from Iran. Its extensive southern border provided Ankara with a significant advantage, allowing it to fill the vacuum left by Tehran's receding presence. With 20,000 troops and tens of thousands of allied militiamen, Turkey has controlled significant swathes of territory across five northern Syrian provinces since 2016. This forward deployment allowed Ankara to provide critical military and intelligence support that enabled HTS to overthrow the Assad regime. Today, Turkey is taking the lead in shaping the post-Assad Syrian state, particularly by directing the development of its armed forces. Nonetheless, Ankara's economic fragilities—soaring inflation, a volatile currency, mounting debt, and a weak financial sector—severely constrain its ability to contribute meaningfully to reconstruction in its war-torn southern neighbor. The Turks understand that for their Syrian allies to consolidate power in Damascus, they must demonstrate tangible progress in rebuilding Syria's infrastructure and restoring essential services. This is a Herculean task, given that international assessments estimate reconstruction costs in the hundreds of billions of dollars, leaving Ankara little choice but to seek Saudi assistance. From Riyadh's perspective, this presents a strategic opening to limit Turkey's influence over the emerging Syrian state. By leveraging Turkish dependence on the kingdom and other wealthy Gulf actors such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia can construct a bulwark against Ankara's ambitions to assert itself as the region's dominant power. This imperative is shaped by a long history dating back to the 18th century when the first Saudi state was established in the mid-18th century after MbS' ancestors rebelled against Erdogan's Ottoman forebearers. The Ottomans were able to dismantle the first and second Saudi states in 1824 and 1891 respectively but their own empire collapsed at the end of World War I by which time the Saudis were on their way to staging a comeback in the form of the current modern kingdom. By the late 20th century, Turkey had become a major military and industrial power, while Saudi Arabia leveraged vast oil reserves to emerge as a global financial heavyweight, setting the stage for both nations to assert themselves as major powers. The two nations, however, did not embark upon the path towards strategic competition until the Erdogan regime in the late 2000s began to reorient Turkey from the west and towards the Middle East. This shift was shaped by three decades of upheaval—the collapse of the Soviet Union, the September 11 attacks, and the Arab Spring. Iran's arc of influence extending westwards from the Zagros Mountains to the Eastern Mediterranean, however, continued to serve as a buffer between the Turks and the Saudis. Until last year, when the destruction of Hezbollah's offensive capabilities in Lebanon, which led to the ouster of the Assad regime, brought them face-to-face with one another in Syria. Despite their domestic constraints, both countries view Syria as a strategic priority. The Saudis lack the military and strategic capabilities to match Turkey, while Ankara does not possess the financial leverage Riyadh can wield. These complementary strengths compel the two to cooperate in pursuit of their objectives in Syria. They also share the goal of preventing an Iranian resurgence while ensuring that Israel's security concerns do not derail their mutual aim of stabilizing the country
The Independent
28-07-2025
- Politics
- The Independent
Trump's dramatic shift on Middle East policy is another diplomatic triumph for Starmer
The impromptu press call on the steps of Turnberry with Keir Starmer and Donald Trump provided an historic moment for UK, US and Middle East politics. Amid the rambling of the US president almost drowned out by the bagpipe music commissioned to welcome the prime minister and his wife Lady Victoria, there was a significant shift in policy. Trump essentially greenlighted Sir Keir recognising a Palestinian state and almost simultaneously rewrote US Republican party policy in regards to Israel and supporting Benjamin Netanyahu 's government. Trump publicly dismissed the Israeli prime minister's claim that 'nobody is starving in Gaza '. He said that 'you can't fake pictures' of starving children and, alongside Sir Keir, made ending the hunger his number one priority. The president then refused to praise the Israeli PM's tactics, saying that 'nobody is doing very well there' and calling the whole Gaza crisis 'a mess'. This is a significant departure from the absolute support he has given the Israeli government previously. Netanyahu has been a regular guest of his in Florida and a close political ally. But even more important was telling Starmer that he did not mind him 'taking a position' on a Palestinian state. The issue had been an incredibly vexatious one for Sir Keir. He had a divided cabinet arguing over it due to meet in an emergency session this week. Most of his party were demanding that it happens. More than 250 MPs from nine different political parties backed it. And worse still, Jeremy Corbyn was threatening him on the left on the issue with a new political party. One of the biggest problems with the UK following French President Emmanuel Macron's lead last week was US opposition - voiced just on Friday by secretary of state Marco Rubio. Now the US president, Rubio's boss, has told Starmer he can go ahead if he wants – it does not bother him. This takes a huge amount of heat off Sir Keir and means much of the political danger he faces from within his own party is reduced. Trump makes no bones about the fact he likes Sir Keir, even if they disagree politically on much. Now he is repaying Starmer's patience in press conferences and willingness to massage the president's ego on every occasion in full. And for those who watched the painful official press conference after their formal meeting, those remarks on the Turnberry steps were a pre-reward for Sir Keir's patience and forbearance. Underneath the prime minister must have been gritting his teeth as the US president toyed with him throughout. There was Labour London Mayor Sir Sadiq Khan being 'a nasty man'; there was the advice on how to beat Nigel Farage in an election (clue: it involved Starmer doing the opposite to what his government is doing now); there were the lectures on immigration and not putting inheritance tax on farmers. Throughout, Sir Keir sat with a smile on his face, not wavering in his warmth to Trump but occasionally standing up for himself on certain issues without directly criticising the president. The prime minister has learnt the hard way that insulting the world's most powerful politician is not the way to get what you want. He and many of his cabinet did that during the first Trump term. The truth is that the US president likes a mixture of sycophancy along with someone who is willing to defend themselves politely. Starmer is here for that, every so often pointing out his own policy successes or saying Sir Sadiq is his friend 'actually'. But the main aim is for the love shown to Trump to reduce tariffs for UK exports to the US and he can persuade a reluctant president to be more helpful on issues like Ukraine, and even more importantly, the Middle East. So successful has Starmer been that we are already seeing leaders like Germany's Friedrich Merz and Nato secretary general Marc Rutte follow his example. Starmer has proven time and again that he is a superb diplomat who has won the friendship and admiration over everyone from Ursula von der Leyen to Trump. Perhaps only he could have got the US president to shift so much on Middle Eastern policy.
Yahoo
02-07-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Israel calls on China to rein in Iran's military and nuclear ambitions
China and Russia stood by Iran in March after the US demanded nuclear talks with Tehran, with senior Chinese and Russian diplomats saying dialogue should only resume based on "mutual respect." Israel has called on China to use its economic and political influence to curb Iran's military and nuclear ambitions, Bloomberg reported on Tuesday. 'China is the only one capable of influencing Iran,' Consul-General in Shanghai Ravit Baer said. 'Iran would collapse if China didn't buy its oil,' she added. Both China and Russia stood by Iran in March after the US demanded nuclear talks with Tehran, with senior Chinese and Russian diplomats saying dialogue should only resume based on "mutual respect" and all sanctions ought to be lifted, The Jerusalem Post previously reported. 'They can pressure Iran. They have political power over Iran. They can help change its malign activities in the region,' she said. 'There are many things China can do.' However, despite the fact that both countries have close relations with the Islamic Republic, neither offered assistance in the 12-day war between Israel and Iran. 'I don't think China is interested in being a mediator' between Israel and Iran, Baer said. 'Being a mediator is a big responsibility, requires lots of money, and hard decisions.' According to Bloomberg, Baer added that Israel's relations with China, its second-largest trading partner after the US, haven't worsened much despite conflicts since 2023. 'We're still having good conversations,' she said. 'Even if we disagree politically, it doesn't mean you cannot cooperate.' This is a developing report.
The National
02-07-2025
- Politics
- The National
Israel's war may have weakened the hold of Iran-aligned groups on Iraqi politics
The Middle East has been in turmoil since October 2023. Missiles have flown in just about every direction, and there is significant concern about what the future might hold. One of the surprises, however, is that Iraq has managed to stay out of the conflict. For years, many analysts have argued that Iraq has fallen completely under Iran's shadow partially through control that proxy groups exercise in the country. And yet, these groups have been almost entirely inactive since October 2023, leading to questions as to where exactly the balance of powers lies in Iraq. The Popular Mobilisation Forces were established following ISIS's 2014 invasion and occupation of Iraq's north-west. After the terror group's defeat, the PMF and affiliated groups sought and obtained direct representation in Parliament and in government. Like all other parties, they used those positions to extract rents and to exercise influence over policy and financial matters. The difference, however, is that the PMF used its status as a paramilitary organisation to impose outcomes in ways that many other groups could not. Many factions within the PMF were also plainly anti-western in their rhetoric. On occasion, their leaders could be seen directing marches of (relatively small numbers of) followers and openly declaring that their ultimate source of authority was the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. However, since 2003, Iraq has lost its monolithic status and has become a more complicated society. The PMF may have been pushing a specific political line, but much of the state and society have had little to no interest in being involved in regional struggles of any kind. Formally, the Iraqi government's position has been to seek to de-escalate tensions in the region and internally. Politically, however, the government is made up of myriad forces, including groups affiliated to the PMF, each of which has its own set of interests and the means to act upon it. The quietist groups have long been at a disadvantage, however, given that they favour a moderate and dialogue-based approach that shies away from confrontation no matter the circumstances, which more aggressive groups have consistently used to push the limits on a range of issues. The contrast can most obviously be seen after arriving at Baghdad International Airport, the road to which has been co-opted by the PMF's efforts to construct a narrative of struggle and resistance. But visitors to Baghdad who drive along that road can look immediately to the left and see the enormous campus of the newly established American University of Baghdad and the thousands of students who now visit every day. English business schools and language academies can be found almost everywhere in the capital, including on streets that sometimes bear the names and faces of Iranian officers and their Iraqi allies who were killed in action by the American military. Recent developments will probably have an impact on that delicate balance. Iraqis and outside observers will all have noticed that the PMF did not get involved at all during the recent fighting between Iran and Israel. Analysts have offered different explanations for what was happening in the background. Some have said that Iran was opposed to any involvement by the PMF for fear that this could lead to greater escalation. Others have argued that Iran's main priority in Iraq is not to seek military support from the PMF but rather to keep the flow of dollars from Baghdad open. According to that narrative, any direct military involvement by the PMF could threaten that financial lifeline. Others still have noted that the Iraqi government – mainly Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani and the security forces – worked tirelessly behind the scenes to keep the country out of the conflict, which has been bearing fruit. Now that the conflict is over, however, a number of consequences will probably flow. Regardless of which narrative is the most accurate, the fact that the PMF did not take any action whatsoever will be interpreted by many as a sign of weakness and vulnerability. Political forces that have always been antagonistic to the PMF will seek at least partial realignment on a number of fronts, much of which the PMF will find hard to resist given that it will all be coming at the same time. Within the Iraqi government itself, and within governing coalitions – including but not limited to the Co-ordination Framework (of which the PMF is a part) – the quietist camp will necessarily feel emboldened. It could be that Iraqi politics will be entering a non-confrontation stage, in which armed skirmishes of any kind will be eschewed in favour of business as usual (including the continued and uninterrupted extraction of rents). Clearly, however, Iraq's relationship with Iran will not break entirely. All that is likely to happen is that Iraqi groups will feel less compelled to consult or to defer to Tehran in as many matters as before. Iraqi political groups' relentless rent-seeking for the past 20 years has always meant that they are economically independent, and many now will feel less politically tethered to Iran as well. If that does happen, it is altogether unclear whether this will translate into any concrete improvements for ordinary Iraqis. It will probably only mean that political power will gradually slip away from the confrontation camp – not with a bang, but with a whimper – with nothing much to replace it other than Iraq's decrepit political system. Iraqi politics is too fractious to coalesce around a concrete strategy, particularly in relation to foreign policy, given the country's limited regional influence. Thus, it is not that a new strategy is being developed. It is that the previous status quo will probably fray without collapsing altogether.
Al Jazeera
29-06-2025
- Politics
- Al Jazeera
Was the Iran war to establish Israel's control over the Middle East?
Political scientist Vali Nasr warns that the US 'doesn't have a regime change option' in Iran. Direct US involvement in Israel's unprovoked attack on Iran was a dangerous decision, argues Vali Nasr, professor of international affairs and Middle East history at Johns Hopkins University. Hours before a ceasefire between the US, Israel and Iran was announced, Nasr told host Steve Clemons that 'the US doesn't have a regime change option in Iran' and should be wary of humiliating Tehran, which would lead to long-term consequences. Nasr argues that the 12-Day War was meant to establish Israel's dominance as the premier Middle East power, backed by Washington, with no room for challengers.
