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Time of India
2 days ago
- Business
- Time of India
View: Apple's India plans have two new threats: Trump and China's Xi
By Mihir Sharma Apple Inc. and its main manufacturing contractor Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. are still betting on India. When Hon Hai — better known as Foxconn — revealed through an exchange filing last week that it was putting another $1.5 billion into its operations there, it will have calmed a few nerves in New Delhi. Worries about the future of Apple in the country had been set off by President Donald Trump , who said last month that he had told the company's Chief Executive Officer Tim Cook that 'I don't want you building in India.' This seemed to contradict hopes, shared by both Cupertino and New Delhi, that most iPhones for the US market would come from India by the end of 2026. But on the ground, Apple's turn to the South Asian nation seems well-entrenched. Reports have emerged of a new Foxconn campus meant to house 30,000 employees — the largest such effort in India's recent history — and that another contract manufacturer, Tata Electronics , is now assembling the iPhone 16 in its South Indian plant. Yet CEOs and politicians may have begun to realize that the difficulties involved in shifting — or duplicating — an entire manufacturing ecosystem extend beyond placating Trump. This is a complex environment, and there are severe obstacles to moving it out of China. US politics is only one, though perhaps the loudest. Admittedly, Apple has had a lot of success in India already. That's why even Trump's talking about it. In just the last year, the value of its products manufactured there has jumped 60%, to $22 billion. Over $17 billion is exported; thanks to Apple, India's $38 billion of electronics exports now earn more than even its world-famous pharmaceutical sector. No other investment has produced anything near this scale of return. In fact, it may be the only success of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's pivot to industrial policy in the middle of his decade in power. This rare win happened because Apple and its suppliers were committed to moving production into India, and because both federal and state governments rewrote regulations and permissions to help them make the move. Politicians kept up this support, even when there might be a price to pay. After a border clash between China and India in 2020 that killed 20 of its soldiers, Indian officials restricted investment from Beijing. Those restrictions have slowly softened since then, primarily to ensure that Apple's contractors didn't get caught up in red tape. That experience should have served as a reminder to New Delhi that attracting an entire ecosystem needs three sets of players to cooperate: the companies, the destination market for their products, and the source geography. Apple and Foxconn might be on board; Trump and his tariffs might be managed — but what of China? A recent book by the former Financial Times journalist Patrick McGee argues that Apple in China, and Foxconn in particular, grew because American investors and engineers helped. That's no surprise. Any industrial power trains its competitors and successors. That's what Great Britain did for America centuries ago. The financiers, engineers and suppliers that make up an existing manufacturing ecosystem need to be willing and able to cooperate in creating a new one. They are generally well rewarded for it. Apple's contract manufacturers and component suppliers, large and small, in China might be willing to set up shop in India — after all, profits are profits wherever they are earned. Some of their engineers might be happy to move to supervise new shop floors. But, it turns out, Beijing might not permit that to happen. Many crucial, experienced employees have found themselves forbidden to travel to India and Southeast Asia. Apple and New Delhi have both tried to woo Trump, and make him accept the possibility that iPhones destined for the US will be made in India. But it appears that they may need to woo President Xi Jinping as well. Objectively, India's Apple-led mobile phone ecosystem is nowhere near challenging China's manufacturing dominance. China is, after all, the indispensable country not just for Apple, but for multiple companies struggling to shift production to India, Vietnam and elsewhere. But Beijing now appears to view Apple's India project as a risk — dangerous enough that a few barriers should be erected in its path. Trump, Apple, New Delhi, and Beijing appear agreed on Indian manufacturing's potential over the next few years, whatever the rest of us might think.
CNA
23-04-2025
- Business
- CNA
Commentary: Would Asia welcome trade deals that exclude China?
Commentary Disrupting Beijing's dominance would suit the US and its partners in the region, says Mihir Sharma for Bloomberg Opinion. Workers pack furniture for shipping to the US at a factory on the outskirts of Muar, Malaysia, Apr 11, 2025. (AP Photo/Vincent Thian) New: You can now listen to articles. This audio is generated by an AI tool. NEW DELHI: In any conflict, you have to recruit allies. Unfortunately for Donald Trump, that's also true of his trade war. Some of his advisors understand this: US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent intends to use the '90-day pause' he won from the president to round up old friends and encircle China. Given that Washington is trusted far less in Asia these days, that might be a big ask for Bessent and his colleagues. But we shouldn't dismiss the effort out of hand, either. Many countries would be happy to see the current structure of Trump's tariffs – disproportionately targeted at China – continue indefinitely. Beijing knows this, and that's why it has begun its own ally-recruiting effort. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Vietnam, Cambodia and Malaysia last week, and his hosts went out of their way to give him an enthusiastic welcome. Yet the fact is that resentment of China's dominance of goods trade and manufacturing supply chains is as potent in much of Asia as it is in the US. Perhaps more potent, since job losses caused by Chinese dumping are an ongoing and severe problem. Indonesia may have lost as many as 80,000 jobs in just the textile sector last year, with more to come. The real cost to developing countries of China's trade practices goes even deeper, although it is less visible. It's possible to count jobs that are being lost, but much harder to count the jobs that aren't created. After years of trying to pry value chains away from Beijing's firm grip, policymakers in emerging Asia are worried and angry. They fear the old tools of development – lower wages and industrial incentives – can't work against a trade superpower determined to pour its resources into maintaining investment-led growth. Some economies, such as Vietnam, have certainly prospered by integrating more closely with China. But their leaders know that comes at a cost. Nobody views it as the sort of benign relationship that could instead be built with US companies, investors, and markets. It's entirely possible to corral such countries into a coalition meant to disrupt a China-centric trade paradigm. And, yes, differential tariffs – which penalise China more – could well be a part of that effort. But a few other things will need to be put in place. A big lesson of the past few years is that attitudes to decoupling from China in Asia vary widely. Some countries, India, especially, are eager to isolate Beijing as far as possible, and have gone further than most in the West to control Chinese investment and cut trade links. Others, such as Indonesia, might be willing to join in any effort to reshape supply chains that gives them a shot at industrialisation, but will need an incentive that outweighs the promises and threats that Beijing could deploy. And there are yet others, such as Cambodia, that are perhaps too closely integrated with China now to be reliable partners for the US. Everyone in Asia already wanted to reduce China's footprint in the manufacturing sector. Now, as markets in the West close themselves to Chinese goods, producers and policymakers here are terrified that Chinese overcapacity will flood their home markets with cheap imports. These nations' incentives aren't perfectly aligned, however. They are in competition with each other to replace Chinese producers in specific sectors, for example. And some would also want to be the ones who 'cheat' any final deal by trans-shipping Chinese goods as much as they can, or through the low-value assembly of goods prepared in factories on the mainland. Something else will be needed as a glue to hold these diverse interests together. If aid and trade are both off the table, it's unclear what the US has to offer. Trump thinks access to US consumers is enough of a carrot, but for countries locked in competition with each other and with Beijing, the gains from that trade might appear too uncertain. After all, if they are asked to cut China out of their supply chains, it could raise their costs, perhaps by too much to break into the US market. A coalition on fairer trade will need boutique strategies designed for each of these countries. Even if Bessent can somehow figure that out, he needs his boss to play along. Any partnership will require Trump's willingness to haggle on the details, and respects these countries' autonomy. Trump has promised to negotiate with 'more than 75' countries he says reached out to the US. Any such negotiation will need him to acknowledge that most of his Asian partners aren't out to defraud the US. Such a change of heart seems unlikely: After Xi's visit to Vietnam, the president said the meeting's purpose was 'trying to figure out, how do we screw the United States of America?' America will only benefit from a trade coalition that excludes China, ensures the US' domestic regulations and higher standards don't render its producers uncompetitive, and creates new supply chains that include US workers. What Trump actually needs to achieve his ends is an inclusive, equitable, high-quality partnership with allies across the Pacific Ocean. A trans-Pacific partnership, if you will. Trump Tariffs trade China
