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The Star
5 days ago
- Politics
- The Star
Editorial: Seoul's mixed messages on Pyongyang will only sow confusion
South Korean and North Korean guard posts are seen on either side of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Paju between the two counntries. — AFP THE notion of a country's main enemy – or ' jujeok ' in Korean – is not just symbolic rhetoric. It is the fulcrum around which national defence policy, military readiness and diplomatic posture revolve. Yet the Lee Jae Myung administration's incoming ministers are offering strikingly divergent views on North Korea's status. In a region where miscalculation can lead to catastrophe, the lack of clarity is not a luxury South Korea can afford. During confirmation hearings this week, the country's Unification Minister nominee Chung Dong-young described North Korea not as an enemy but as a 'threat.' Labour Minister nominee Kim Young-hoon echoed that assessment, distancing himself from the 'main enemy' label. By contrast, Defence Minister nominee Ahn Gyu-back offered a resolute view, stating that the North Korean regime and military are indeed South Korea's principal adversary. This inconsistency is not merely semantic. The designation of North Korea as South Korea's main enemy first appeared in the 1995 Defence White Paper under President Kim Young-sam, following the North's threats to turn Seoul into a 'sea of fire.' While subsequent governments shifted between hard-line and conciliatory stances, most notably under Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration reinstated the enemy designation in 2022. Now, Seoul risks retreating from this stance just as Pyongyang has explicitly emphasised its own hostility. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un last year formally declared the South a 'primary foe,' rejecting unification and dismantling the inter-Korean reconciliation framework. Since then, the North has accelerated weapons development, severed communication channels and deepened military ties with Russia. To overlook these developments or downplay their implications is to misread the strategic environment. Chung's statements suggest the new administration may be preparing a significant policy pivot. He proposed suspending joint military drills with the United States as a confidence-building measure, citing the 2018 model. He also raised the idea of renaming the Unification Ministry to the Ministry of the Korean Peninsula, a move he claims would signal flexibility. Yet such proposals, absent careful coordination or broad consensus, could project confusion rather than pragmatism. Strategic ambiguity has long characterised inter-Korean policy, but frequent shifts weaken credibility. South Korea's defence posture cannot oscillate with each political transition. Doing so emboldens adversaries and complicates coordination with allies, particularly Washington. North Korea has repeatedly exploited policy vacillations, alternating between provocation and dialogue to gain time for weapons advancement. Calls to revive the 2018 military accord – annulled by the North and later suspended by Seoul – underscore this risk. South Korea honoured the agreement despite repeated violations by the North, including missile launches, GPS jamming and trash balloon campaigns. Restoring such an accord without preconditions could repeat a pattern of unreciprocated concessions. What is missing from the current debate is a sober reflection on the record of past engagement. Chung attributes the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan in 2010 and Yeonpyeongdo shelling to the Lee Myung-bak administration's hawkish posture, yet similar provocations occurred under liberal governments. North Korea has pursued escalation to secure leverage regardless of the South's tone. This is not to dismiss the value of diplomacy. Efforts to reduce tensions must continue, but only with a clear-eyed understanding of the other side's intentions. Engagement should be mutual, measured and anchored in deterrence. One-sided overtures, whether symbolic or substantive, can be as risky as belligerence. If the Lee government intends to revise its stance toward Pyongyang, it must do so with unity, transparency and strategic rationale. Fragmented messaging – especially on foundational concepts like the main enemy – undermines trust both at home and among allies. In a geopolitical landscape marked by intensifying tensions, Seoul cannot afford ambiguity in its security doctrine. — The Korea Herald/Asia News Network
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Korea Herald
7 days ago
- Politics
- Korea Herald
[Editorial] Mixed messages
Seoul's fractured view on Pyongyang could sow strategic confusion amid rising tensions The notion of a country's main enemy — or 'jujeok' in Korean — is not just symbolic rhetoric. It is the fulcrum around which national defense policy, military readiness and diplomatic posture revolve. Yet the Lee Jae Myung administration's incoming ministers are offering strikingly divergent views on North Korea's status. In a region where miscalculation can lead to catastrophe, the lack of clarity is not a luxury South Korea can afford. During confirmation hearings this week, Unification Minister nominee Chung Dong-young described North Korea not as an enemy but as a 'threat.' Labor Minister nominee Kim Young-hoon echoed that assessment, distancing himself from the 'main enemy' label. By contrast, Defense Minister nominee Ahn Gyu-back offered a resolute view, stating that the North Korean regime and military are indeed South Korea's principal adversary. This inconsistency is not merely semantic. The designation of North Korea as South Korea's main enemy first appeared in the 1995 Defense White Paper under President Kim Young-sam, following the North's threats to turn Seoul into a 'sea of fire.' While subsequent governments shifted between hard-line and conciliatory stances, most notably under Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration reinstated the enemy designation in 2022. Now, Seoul risks retreating from this stance just as Pyongyang has explicitly emphasized its own hostility. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un last year formally declared the South a 'primary foe,' rejecting unification and dismantling the inter-Korean reconciliation framework. Since then, the North has accelerated weapons development, severed communication channels and deepened military ties with Russia. To overlook these developments or downplay their implications is to misread the strategic environment. Chung's statements suggest the new administration may be preparing a significant policy pivot. He proposed suspending joint military drills with the United States as a confidence-building measure, citing the 2018 model. He also raised the idea of renaming the Ministry of Unification to the Ministry of the Korean Peninsula, a move he claims would signal flexibility. Yet such proposals, absent careful coordination or broad consensus, could project confusion rather than pragmatism. Strategic ambiguity has long characterized inter-Korean policy, but frequent shifts weaken credibility. South Korea's defense posture cannot oscillate with each political transition. Doing so emboldens adversaries and complicates coordination with allies, particularly Washington. North Korea has repeatedly exploited policy vacillations, alternating between provocation and dialogue to gain time for weapons advancement. Calls to revive the 2018 military accord — annulled by the North and later suspended by Seoul — underscore this risk. South Korea honored the agreement despite repeated violations by the North, including missile launches, GPS jamming and trash balloon campaigns. Restoring such an accord without preconditions could repeat a pattern of unreciprocated concessions. What is missing from the current debate is a sober reflection on the record of past engagement. Chung attributes the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan in 2010 and Yeonpyeongdo shelling to the Lee Myung-bak administration's hawkish posture, yet similar provocations occurred under liberal governments. North Korea has pursued escalation to secure leverage regardless of the South's tone. This is not to dismiss the value of diplomacy. Efforts to reduce tensions must continue, but only with a clear-eyed understanding of the other side's intentions. Engagement should be mutual, measured and anchored in deterrence. One-sided overtures, whether symbolic or substantive, can be as risky as belligerence. If the Lee government intends to revise its stance toward Pyongyang, it must do so with unity, transparency and strategic rationale. Fragmented messaging — especially on foundational concepts like the main enemy — undermines trust both at home and among allies. In a geopolitical landscape marked by intensifying tensions, Seoul cannot afford ambiguity in its security doctrine.
Hans India
14-07-2025
- Politics
- Hans India
South Korea: Unification minister nominee says North Korea is 'threat'
Unification Minister nominee Chung Dong-young on Monday said he does not agree with the view that North Korea is South Korea's "main enemy," instead calling the North a "threat. Chung made the remarks during a parliamentary confirmation hearing as the former conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration defined the North Korean regime and military as the South's "enemy" in the 2022 defence white paper. "I don't agree," Chung said when asked by an opposition lawmaker if he concurs with the view that North Korea is the South's main enemy. "(The North) is a threat." South Korea defined North Korea as its main enemy for the first time in the 1995 defence white paper. In the 2004 version, the expression was replaced by a "direct military threat" amid a conciliatory mood between the two Koreas. The former Yoon government referred to North Korea as an "enemy" for the first time in six years in the 2022 defence white paper, after the liberal Moon Jae-in administration dropped the labelling in the 2018 and 2020 editions. In late 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un defined inter-Korean relations as those between "two states hostile to each other," vowing not to seek reconciliation and unification with South Korea. He also called the South his country's "primary foe." On a now-suspended inter-Korean military tension reduction pact, Chung said he thinks the government will be able to approve its restoration in a Cabinet meeting, reported Yonhap news agency. In June last year, the former Yoon government fully suspended the 2018 military agreement signed under the Moon administration in response to the North's repeated trash balloon campaigns and attempts to disrupt GPS signals near border islands. The military pact calls for halting all hostile acts against each other and setting up land and maritime buffer zones where artillery firing and drills are suspended. Chung said before approving the restoration of the deal, he believes South Korea could take "interim" steps by refraining from military measures at sea and on land that are banned under the agreement. Meanwhile, Chung raised the need to consider changing the name of the unification ministry, suggesting the Ministry of the Korean Peninsula could be one of the choices for the new name. A controversy has recently emerged over whether South Korea should change the name of the Ministry of Unification in charge of inter-Korean affairs by dropping the unification reference after the North's leader vowed not to seek unification with the South. "This would be a very important issue that needs to be discussed with the National Assembly," Chung said. Some liberal experts insist the name change would help dispel North Korea's doubts about South Korea's possible pursuit of absorption-based unification and set the stage for resuming inter-Korean dialogue. But conservatives and even some former liberal unification ministers are opposed to the name change, saying it could be misunderstood as South Korea not seeking unification. The Constitution stipulates South Korea will seek national unification in a peaceful manner. On North Korea's stance of "two hostile states," Chung said he thinks it was the North's response to the former South Korean government's hard-line stance against Pyongyang. Calling the way that East and West Germany unified a "pragmatic" approach, the nominee assessed that they pursued unification through exchanges and cooperation while effectively recognising them as two separate states. "What the Lee Jae Myung government needs to pursue is pragmatism," he said. Chung said former liberal President Moon Jae-in's proposal in 2017 to suspend a joint military exercise with the United States helped resume inter-Korean dialogue on the occasion of the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics. "This is an issue that needs to be discussed at meetings of the National Security Council," Chung said. Chung, a journalist-turned-lawmaker, was nominated last month as the first unification minister under the Lee Jae Myung administration. He previously served as unification minister in 2004-05 under former liberal President Roh Moo-hyun.
