31-07-2025
In Bihar's Politics, a Fair Place at the Table Continues to Elude Muslims
Politics
Despite Muslims constituting almost 17% of Bihar's population, their voices in legislatures remain disproportionately limited.
In Bihar, politics often comes down to numbers and for Muslim candidates, those numbers can be brutally defining.
Time and again, elections have shown a clear pattern: Muslim leaders are less likely to win from constituencies where their community doesn't form a significant chunk of the population. It often doesn't matter which party backs them or how experienced they are; if the local Muslim population is too small, their chances at the ballot box tend to drop.
Despite Muslims constituting nearly 17% of the state's population, Muslim voices in the legislature are disproportionately limited by geography and demographics. It's not merely about election arithmetic; it's a commentary on where identity and representation meet in Bihar's highly caste and community-oriented politics.
The data's message is stark: in Bihar, being a Muslim candidate means that your election may not hinge as much on what you believe in, but on who else around you looks like you do.
In this article, we take a closer look at six recent elections in Bihar, three parliamentary (2014, 2019 and 2024) and three assembly (2010, 2015 and 2020), to better understand how Muslim representation has played out at the ballot box.
By looking at these two sets of elections, this article aims to uncover patterns in candidate selection, constituency demographics and the win rates of Muslim candidates over the past decade and half.
From 2014 to 2024: a narrowing path to parliament for Muslims
The 2014 parliamentary election was a difficult terrain for Muslim candidates in Bihar. Most candidates that won had contested from constituencies with a large Muslim population.
The Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) fielded six Muslim candidates, three in constituencies with a 20% to 30% Muslim population and two in constituencies with a less than 20% Muslim population, but only one – the party's candidate for the Araria constituency – won; that seat has a Muslim population of over 40%.
The Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)) put up five Muslim candidates across different regions, none of whom managed to win. The Congress (INC) through Mohammad Asrarul Haque won one seat, Kishanganj, where Muslims make up around 68% of the population (and from where one of the JD(U)'s Muslim candidates lost).
Tariq Anwar of the Nationalist Congress Party won from Katihar, where Muslims make up 41% of the population, and Mehboob Ali Kaiser of the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) won in Khagaria (with a just ~11% Muslim population), a rare case where he was able get support from the Dalit community as well – a community that also supported the BJP as the LJP was in alliance with it.
The BJP's lone Muslim candidate Shahnawaz Hussain didn't manage to win from Bhagalpur, where Muslims form less than 20% of the seat's population.
Overall, the results suggested that Muslim candidates could only win in a constituency where Muslims make up a large share of voters (Table 1).
The 2019 election saw a decline in Muslim candidates winning seats.
The RJD fielded five Muslim candidates, including in Muslim-majority seats like Araria, and lost all.
The INC again held on to Kishanganj, with Mohammad Jawed winning from the same. However, their candidate in Katihar lost.
Once again, the LJP's candidate in Khagaria won from a constituency with a low Muslim population share, repeating the exception seen in 2014.
These results highlighted a deeper problem: Muslim candidates were not able to win in constituencies where they once had better chances. Without the support of other communities, especially Yadavs and Dalits, their chances had become even slimmer (Table 2).
By 2024, the space for Muslim candidates had shrunk further. Only five were fielded by major parties: two by the RJD, one by the JD(U) and two by the INC. The RJD's candidates both failed to win. The INC, however, won both its seats: Kishanganj and Katihar.
This underlined that it is still difficult for Muslims to achieve adequate representation. Their success now depends almost entirely on contesting from seats with large Muslim populations, and even then, only with backing from other communities like Yadavs and Dalits. Muslim representation remains limited to a few pockets where demographics and political alliances align just right.
Overall, if we observe the eight Muslim candidates who won across the three elections, six of them were elected from constituencies where the Muslim population was over 40%. This clearly shows a strong correlation between a high Muslim population and the winnability of Muslim candidates (Table 3).
2010 to 2020: a decade of fluctuating fortunes for Muslims in the Bihar assembly
In the last three assembly elections in Bihar, the success of Muslim candidates has dramatically fluctuated, depending on shifting alliances and party strategies, as well as the evolving political identity of Muslim voters.
In 2010, the RJD fielded the highest number of Muslim candidates at 30. Its win rate in this aspect stood at just 20%.
The INC performed even worse, with only three of its 49 Muslim candidates winning, thus clocking a dismal 6.12% win rate. The three seats the party won were Kishanganj, Kasba and Bahadurganj, all of which have a Muslim population of over 40%.
The JD(U) emerged as an exception in this election, with a strong 50% win rate, largely due to its ability to garner support from across communities, even in areas with a low Muslim population.
But the larger pattern in 2010 was clear: Muslim candidates were otherwise more likely to win from seats with high Muslim populations (Table 4).
The 2015 election, however, brought a major shift. The formation of the Mahagathbandhan between the RJD, JD(U) and INC changed the game for Muslim candidates, who won 24 seats.
The RJD's win rate surged to 75%, with 12 wins out of 16 constituencies, including many from seats where Muslims weren't even the predominant group. The JD(U) followed with a 71.42% win rate, while the INC also improved, winning six out of ten seats.
This success was not merely a result of demographics; it reflected the fact that people averse to the NDA may have felt like they didn't have a choice but to vote for a Mahagathbandhan candidate (as their number of choices would have gone down with alliance parties fielding one candidate per seat), whether they were Muslim or otherwise.
It also highlighted the fact that if Muslims receive support from other communities, they may make it to the assembly. The 2015 election proved that when social coalitions align, Muslim political representation can thrive, even in areas where they aren't numerically predominant (Table 5).
By 2020, that momentum had fractured. The Mahagathbandhan weakened, and the All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM)'s emergence in Seemanchal added a new layer of competition for Muslim votes.
Nineteen Muslims were able to win in this election. The RJD's performance slipped, with just eight of its 18 Muslim candidates winning – a 44.44% win rate. The INC's win rate declined drastically to 36.36% and the JD(U), once a model of cross-community support, failed to send a single Muslim candidate to the assembly, largely due to two factors: first, its being an ally of the BJP, and second, in the recent past the JD(U) didn't seem to stand up for the Muslim community on the national and state level.
The AIMIM secured five wins out of 15 in its debut assembly election in Bihar, but only in Muslim-majority constituencies, highlighting both its rise and its limits.
The 2020 results revealed a scattered field where Muslim votes were divided and Muslim candidates increasingly reliant on narrow, community-driven strategies rather than broad-based alliances (Table 6).
This pattern in which Muslim candidates often win from seats with a large Muslim population raises a troubling question. Why is it that Muslim voters often vote along ideological lines, but non-Muslim voters seem to prefer sticking to caste lines when the candidate is Muslim?
According to the CSDS-Lokniti post-poll survey of 2020, 76% of Muslims voted for the Mahagathbandhan, irrespective of caste and region. Yet when a Muslim candidate stands, many from the Mahagathbandhan's own base often keep their votes firmly within caste and religious borders.
Transferability, the supposed lifeblood of coalition politics, seems to get stuck in traffic whenever a Muslim candidate appears on the ballot. The irony is rich: the most ideologically loyal voters get the least electoral reward. Perhaps parties in Bihar should hold a crash course on coalition basics, or at least invest in stronger vote transfer engines. Because if secular parties don't seriously rethink Muslim representation soon, they may find their minority plank strong in theory, but minority MLAs missing from the seats that count.
For years, Muslims in Bihar have voted with hope in their hearts, not for their own caste or narrow interests. Muslims stood by the promises of secularism, cast their vote for alliances and not identity. But when it's time for tickets or seats, they're too often left behind, told quietly that the numbers don't favour them. Their loyalty is rarely doubted, yet they are rarely rewarded by secular parties.
Muslims aren't asking for privilege, they are asking just for a fair place at the table. And if their voice keeps getting ignored, the silence they leave behind may one day speak volumes.
Aamir Shakil is a political researcher based in Delhi.
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