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Arabian Post
02-07-2025
- Politics
- Arabian Post
Iran is not Syria, not even Saudi Arabia
By Manish Rai The question of regime change in Iran has recently resurfaced after the killing of Iran's top military commanders following the Israeli airstrikes. However, Israel's short-term goal was to damage Iran's nuclear facilities to severely diminish its weapons program. But the Israeli Prime Minister mentioned during his speeches that the war with Iran 'could certainly' lead to regime change in the Islamic Republic. It is not the first time that foreign powers have imagined Iran as a crumbling house, one that only needs a gentle push, or a series of airstrikes, before it falls into new hands. This was the fantasy in 1953, when the CIA and the British intelligence overthrew Mohammad Mossadegh, Iran's prime minister, who had nationalized the country's oil, and pushed Iran into Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's autocratic rule. And this was also the dream in the 1980s, when Saddam Hussein invaded Iran with military and economic support from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel, who believed the newly revolutionary Iran would collapse in months. Founded in 1979 after the Iranian Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has democratic, theocratic, and authoritarian elements in its governance system, which makes it a hybrid. The founding figure of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, envisioned a state run by Islamic clerics and jurists who ensured all policies adhered to Islamic law. ADVERTISEMENT As Iran was a constitutional monarchy before the revolution, theocratic elements were effectively grafted on top of the existing republican ones, such as the parliament, executive, and judiciary. Iran has a unicameral legislature (one house of parliament), called the Majles, and a president. There are regular elections for both. But, while there are democratic elements within this system, in practice, it is a 'closed loop' that keeps the clerical elite in power and prevents challenges to the supreme leader. There is a clear hierarchy, with the supreme leader at the top. This complex system of governance makes the Iranian regime a unique one in the Middle East. Iran is not Syria, Libya, or Iraq, where, in the recent past, regime change has been achieved. United States policy makers often underestimate the strength of the Iranian state, which is structured for survival. The following features and dynamics make the Iranian regime hard to replace. The Iranian military has a dual architecture designed to resist coups and invasions: Artesh, the regular armed forces of around 420,000 men across ground, naval, air, and air-defence troops, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an elite, ideologically driven military with roughly 190,000 personnel across ground, naval, and air branches. Beyond them is the Basij, a vast paramilitary network with hundreds of thousands of members embedded in every corner of Iranian society—in the streets, in neighbourhoods, in schools, and mosques. They aren't just loyalists of the Ayatollah but woven into a deeper idea of the state and committed to the core ideology of the Islamic Republic. Despite Israel's extensive and quite successful campaign of assassinations targeting senior IRGC commanders, the core of this group has not been hollowed out but hardened. A younger generation of more ideologically rigid commanders has emerged. This new generation of Iranian military commanders has also been battle-hardened in close-quarter conflict in Syria and understands how wars of state collapse can unfold. Bombing and Air campaigns could significantly destroy military and civilian infrastructure in Iran, but to replace the Iranian regime, President Trump must be prepared to fight not just a standing army but a system with decades of experience in asymmetric warfare. Iran is not governed by a single man or clique that can be decapitated. The Iranian state is a competitive authoritarian system with institutions that have evolved over a century. Even amid a crisis, the system generates new leaders, factions, and power centres. Even the deaths of some influential figures would not bring the system down; it would renew it. Iran is not merely a conventional state; it is built upon a revolutionary, theocratic ideology. The current structure is more than a government; it is part of an ideological movement rooted in the principles of revolution and resistance. It is naive to think that any external military attack or intervention could destroy this structure. Historically, when Iran faces external threats, its citizens unite under nationalist sentiment, thereby strengthening the ruling regime. More than 46 years after the Iranian Revolution, there is still talk among Iranians, both those living in the country and among the diaspora, that the end of the regime is nearing. Unless and until large factions of the regime's military, police, and intelligence forces begin defecting, it will be hard for the people of Iran to overthrow the regime. And unfortunately, in every protest movement in Iran since the 1979 revolution, that hasn't happened. The protesters haven't convinced significant individuals within the regime to step away and join them. Yes, there is discontent among the Iranian people, especially regarding women's rights, economic crises, and political freedoms. However, this dissatisfaction has not yet transformed into a well-organized movement. A significant number of Iranian citizens are voicing their dissatisfaction with the Iranian regime over issues of human rights abuses, the absolute authority of the Supreme Leader, the declining economy of the country, and the lack of freedoms of speech, assembly, and thought. From the 2009 Green Movement to the 2017-2019 economic protests and the 2022 'Women, Life, Freedom' uprising, Iranians have demonstrated extraordinary courage in confronting state violence. But these uprisings have not translated into regime collapse. Iranian opposition groups may be getting western media attention, but the hard reality is that they have no ground presence inside Iran. The monarchists and the former Mojahedin (Presently NCRI) are positively despised by much of the Iranian diaspora, but unfortunately have no grassroots support. On top of this, there is no unity among Iranian opposition groups. Even there is no consensus on the basic norms of democratic governance. The opposition remains paralysed and ill-prepared to step in if the regime collapses and poses no major threat to the current regime. ADVERTISEMENT Also published on Medium. Notice an issue? Arabian Post strives to deliver the most accurate and reliable information to its readers. If you believe you have identified an error or inconsistency in this article, please don't hesitate to contact our editorial team at editor[at]thearabianpost[dot]com. We are committed to promptly addressing any concerns and ensuring the highest level of journalistic integrity.
News18
24-06-2025
- Politics
- News18
Protests, CIA's Coup & $5 Million: How US Changed Regime In Iran In 1953 Explained
Last Updated: The 1953 Iran coup: Years after Iranian PM Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown, a declassified CIA document revealed how the agency was involved in it In the Israel-Iran conflict, US President Donald Trump has joined hands with Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He has been repeatedly exerting pressure on Iran, even mentioning the possibility of ouster of Tehran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Iranians, however, are not new to the United States (US) enforcing a regime change in their country. In 1953, the US helped stage a coup to overthrow Iran's democratically elected prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh. Why? Mossadegh wanted to nationalise the country's oil fields, which would hit the US and Great Britain, which were dependent on oil from the Middle East. The move gained popularity in Iran and was seen as victory for the then-USSR. The coup was meant to support Iran's monarch Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to rule as Shah of Iran, and appoint a new prime minister – General Fazlollah Zahedi. The independent National Security Archive research institute had published the document. The the declassification marked the CIA's first formal acknowledgment of its involvement. The documents were declassified in 2011 and given to George Washington University research group under the Freedom of Information Act. WHAT THE DOCUMENTS SHOWED According to a CNN report, the documents showed that the CIA, along with the British Secret Intelligence Service, organised large protests against Mossadegh in 1953, which the Army eventually joined. To offer some stability to Zahedi, the CIA made $5,000,000 available within two days of him taking power. The Shah was an ally of the US. However, unhappy with the interference, the anti-American sentiment kept growing in the country. In the late 1970s, millions of Iranians took to the streets against his regime, which they viewed as corrupt and illegitimate. The Shah was toppled in the 1979 Islamic revolution, which ended the country's western-backed monarchy and ushered in the start of the Islamic Republic and clerical rule. Thus began the rule of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a Shia cleric, as the Supreme Leader, the highest authority in the new system based on Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist). After Khomeini's death, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei became the Supreme Leader of Iran on June 4, 1989. 2025: US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL Israel wants the US to join the conflict and use its unique military edge and weaponry, such as the GBU-57 bunker-busting bomb, to destroy the Iranian nuclear complex at Fordow, which is buried deep underground. The general opinion is that Israel can delay the programme, but only the US can destroy it. The US has bolstered its military presence in the Middle East, deploying over 31 refueling aircraft to Europe and redirecting the USS Nimitz aircraft carrier to the region. The move is to enhance air power and ensure protection of American assets amid the intensifying conflict. Trump has warned Tehran's residents to ' evacuate", signaling a readiness for more direct involvement if necessary. On Monday evening, the president wrote on Truth Social that 'IRAN CAN NOT HAVE A NUCLEAR WEAPON". He has also clearly said that 'Iran cannot win this war". Trump refused to sign a draft joint statement prepared by G7 leaders calling for a de-escalation of the conflict between Israel and Iran. The US President, however, vetoed an Israeli plan to assassinate Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. top videos View all Meanwhile, in a sign that Iran did not want US involvement, it has not directly targeted US bases or personnel, nor has it widened the conflict, by going after shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. With CNN Inputs First Published: News explainers Protests, CIA's Coup & $5 Million: How US Changed Regime In Iran In 1953 Explained
Time of India
18-06-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Why blocking Hormuz is a losing strategy for Iran
In the early hours of June 13, Israel unleashed a series of pre-emptive strikes on Iran's nuclear development, its missile production sites and attacks on strategic personalities, including nuclear scientists and Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders. The attacks on Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow inflicted severe structural damage and claimed the lives of at least fourteen nuclear scientists in coordinated assassinations. Tel Aviv justified these raids by pointing to Iran's uranium enrichment levels, which had already reached 60 per cent purity – alarming close to the 90 per cent threshold for weapons-grade material. Iran responded with a wave of missile and drone barrages against Israeli cities – Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, Bnei Brak, Petah Tikva, and Rehovot – prompting air-raid sirens and Iron Dome interceptions. Yet Tehran's retaliation extended beyond Israel's borders, striking the US military installations in the region and daring to challenge America's naval supremacy in the Gulf. As tensions soared, three commercial vessels in the Gulf of Oman caught fire in incidents widely attributed to Iranian sabotage. Additionally, Tehran publicly threatened to seal off the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow maritime chokepoint through which nearly one-fifth of the world's oil supply flows. The spectre of a Hormuz blockade is not new in Tehran's strategic lexicon. The first recorded Iranian threat to close the strait dates back to 1951, when the then Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh hinted that nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian oil company could lead to Western embargoes and blockade of the waterway. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, particularly between 1987 and 1988 in the so-called Tanker War, Iran deployed fast attack boats and mines, warning that any assault on its oil exports would close Hormuz to all shipping. In 2008, after British forces seized Iranian naval vessels in the Gulf, Tehran again menaced the strait. More recently, it has issued similar warnings in 2011-12 when it threatened to block the strait in retaliation for US and European sanctions and after the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, as well as following the 2020 assassinations of General Qassem Soleimani and nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh. Yet a full closure of the strait would do far greater harm to Iran than to its adversaries. A SWOT analysis makes this clear, particularly in the realm of diplomatic isolation. Strengths of a coalition condemning Iran would include unified political will among the United States, European Union, Japan, and other major consumers, backed by legal frameworks for sanctions and vast diplomatic networks. Weaknesses in their stance lie in competing energy needs. While Europe seeks to diversify away from Russian gas, Asian giants like China and India depend heavily on Gulf oil, which could complicate unanimous action. Opportunities for these countries include reinforcing international norms of freedom of navigation and deterring future coercive measures. Yet threats remain. If the coalition applies too harsh a diplomatic squeeze, it risks driving Iran closer to alternative partners like Russia and China, and could trigger regional destabilisation that boomerangs in higher energy prices and security costs. Within this context, India faces a delicate strategic dilemma. Historically, New Delhi has maintained cordial ties with Tehran, importing nearly 600,000 barrels per day from Iran before 2019. However, after Washington's 'maximum pressure' campaign, India reduced these imports, pivoting toward the United States and Gulf producers. If Iran moves to choke Hormuz, India would find itself confronted with converging imperatives: supporting broader international action to keep maritime lanes open, while safeguarding its own energy security and investments in Iranian infrastructure such as the Chabahar Port. New Delhi's likelihood of diplomatically isolating Iran hinges on balancing these interests. It could, for instance, vote in favour of UN resolutions condemning the blockade, while quietly affirming its need to maintain minimal oil flows. Ultimately, India's principle of strategic autonomy suggests it would join consensus measures that protect global commerce without entirely severing ties with Tehran. Roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption, around 20 million barrels per day, passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making it the most crucial chokepoint in global energy logistics. The strait, barely 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point, is the gateway through which the oil-rich Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran itself send crude oil to global markets. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, about 76 per cent of the oil that transits Hormuz heads to Asia, powering the economies of China, India, Japan, and South Korea. In addition, liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments from Qatar, which alone accounts for 20 percent of global LNG exports, also pass through this strategic corridor. Even a temporary closure or disruption in the Strait could send oil prices soaring above US$150 per barrel, aggravating global inflation, destabilising developing economies, and threatening already fragile post-pandemic economic recoveries. The Brent crude benchmark has already crossed US$102 per barrel in the aftermath of the Israeli strikes. Any military move to seal off Hormuz would send shockwaves through every major energy-importing economy. Notably, blocking Hormuz will prove to be a losing strategy for Iran itself. First, Iran's economic fragility would be laid bare. Under the US sanctions, oil exports have plummeted from over 2.5 million barrels per day in 2017 to roughly 1.2 million barrels per day today, cutting national revenues by two-thirds. With oil accounting for nearly 80 per cent of Iran's foreign exchange receipts, a blockade that chokes off exports could erase upwards of US$40 billion in annual income, triggering a double-digit GDP contraction and reversing a decade of modest growth. Skyrocketing inflation already exceeding 45 per cent and youth unemployment above 27 per cent would turn economic hardship into social unrest, jeopardising the regime's domestic stability. Second, global military escalation would become almost inevitable. The US Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, maintains a constant presence precisely to guarantee freedom of navigation. Any attempt to blockade Hormuz would invite direct naval confrontation, potentially involving mine-clearing vessels, destroyers, and airstrikes on Iranian naval assets. Such clashes risk expanding the conflict well beyond Iranian proxies and could draw in allied forces from Europe, Australia, and even China, whose energy supply lines would be under threat. Third, diplomatic isolation would deepen. Major consumers such as China, India, Japan, and European states would expedite the diversification of their energy imports, renegotiate existing contracts, and support secondary sanctions. Even long-standing partners like Russia would hesitate to side with Iran at the expense of their own oil revenues. Unlike the targeted suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, which impacted only Pakistan and maintained dispute-resolution channels, a Hormuz blockade would unite a broad coalition against Iran's action. Fourth, there is a significant risk of financial contagion and insurance upheaval. Closing Hormuz would send tanker insurance premiums to unprecedented levels, potentially tripling current rates and causing shipping firms to reroute through longer, costlier passages around the Cape of Good Hope. This would not only cripple Iran's capacity to export oil but also undermine its plans for alternative overland pipelines through Oman and Iraq by making them economically unviable. Fifth, the environmental and strategic fallout could be disastrous. Mine warfare or missile strikes on civilian shipping lanes would risk oil spills in the ecologically fragile Gulf, devastating fisheries and coastal economies in Iran and neighbouring states alike. Furthermore, Iran's own critical infrastructure, such as ports, pipelines, and refinerie,s would become legitimate military targets, compounding the costs of reconstruction already estimated to exceed US$10 billion. In essence, a Hormuz blockade would play into Iran's perceived strength, its geostrategic leverage over an essential trade artery, but would magnify its vulnerabilities. Economic self-harm, military escalation, diplomatic isolation, financial chaos, and environmental destruction combine to make such a move profoundly counterproductive. Instead, Iran's optimal course lies in diplomacy and economic diversification. A ceasefire agreement paired with renewed nuclear negotiations – whether under a revamped JCPOA or a fresh multilateral framework – could secure limited sanctions relief. Mediators like Switzerland, Oman, and Qatar have the credibility to facilitate backchannel talks and rebuild trust. Tehran's strategic calculus at this critical juncture will not be assessed by the potency of its rhetoric, but by the prudence of its actions. A closure of the Strait of Hormuz may offer short-term leverage, but it neither redresses the damage inflicted by Israel's pre-emptive strikes nor constrains the formidable maritime presence of the United States and its allies. On the contrary, such a move would deepen Iran's diplomatic isolation, exacerbate its economic vulnerabilities, and risk transforming a regional crisis into a multi-actor conflagration with global repercussions. In an interconnected world order, where geoeconomic stability often supersedes geopolitical defiance, the imperative for dialogue and calibrated diplomacy has never been more urgent. The pathway to regional security and global credibility lies not in coercive disruptions but in constructive engagement, de-escalation, and a forward-looking economic vision grounded in resilience and cooperation. 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