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Shafaq News
28-07-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Three years on, Is PM Al-Sudani responsible for Iraq's failing services?
Shafaq News – Baghdad When Mohammed Shia al-Sudani assumed the premiership in 2022, he declared a clear priority: building a 'services government.' From electricity and water to healthcare and education, his cabinet pledged to reverse Iraq's chronic infrastructure failures. But nearly three years into his term, many Iraqis see little improvement, raising a pressing question: how much of the country's persistent service failure falls on al-Sudani himself? From Promise to Disappointment Al-Sudani's government identified key priorities: fighting corruption, improving public services, stimulating the economy, enhancing national security, and resolving federal disputes with the Kurdistan Region. On paper, the focus was comprehensive and ambitious. In practice, however, delivery has lagged far behind public expectations. The Prime Minister has repeatedly emphasized anti-corruption efforts, infrastructure development, and economic diversification. Still, Iraqis continue to suffer from recurring power outages, water scarcity, and poor health and education services. The symbolic slogan of a 'government of services' now risks eroding public trust as the realities on the ground diverge sharply from official rhetoric. Mounting Frustrations and Heatwaves The current summer has seen electricity failures spike dramatically amid soaring temperatures above 50°C, forcing many provinces to suspend work and schools. Political analyst Abbas al-Jubouri told Shafaq News that 'there is clear negligence across all services, particularly electricity,' noting that drought-induced water shortages, stalled projects, and the delayed disbursement of the federal budget have all worsened the service crisis. 'The government made promises, but the situation in Baghdad and other provinces is visibly deteriorating,' al-Jubouri added, arguing that basic infrastructure projects like roads and bridges—now hailed as achievements—should have been the norm, not exceptions. Political Structure or Executive Failure? Critics are divided on where ultimate responsibility lies. Political analyst Mujashaa al-Tamimi argued that while al-Sudani's administration carries part of the blame, Iraq's systemic flaws run deeper. 'Service deterioration did not start with this government,' al-Tamimi said, noting that since 2003, successive cabinets have promised reforms that largely remained 'ink on paper.' He pointed to Iraq's entrenched ethno-sectarian power-sharing system, or Muhasasa, as a major obstacle: it prevents the appointment of qualified officials, empowers party loyalties over state performance, and shields corruption. Al-Tamimi also emphasized the absence of effective oversight mechanisms and political stability, which he believes have rendered the legislative branch incapable of imposing executive accountability. Despite what he described as 'some visible achievements' by al-Sudani's government in limited sectors, political interference and appointments based on loyalty have curtailed the Prime Minister's ability to lead sweeping reforms. Civil Society Response and a Warning from October Civil society voices echo a growing sense of frustration. Activist Noor Salem told Shafaq News that the political class, especially ruling parties, bear primary responsibility for the deterioration of services. He argued that the lessons of the 2019 October protests—which triggered government resignations and political reckoning—were not absorbed by the ruling elite. 'The system has regressed,' he said. 'What we're seeing now—sectarian quotas, project mismanagement, and administrative chaos—is worse than what triggered the October Uprising,' Salem warned of rising public anger and hinted at renewed protest movements if the situation remains unchanged. His warning is underpinned by a financial reality: despite massive spending over recent years, infrastructure and service outputs remain modest. Delays in passing the 2025 budget tables are adding fuel to popular dissatisfaction. Budget Paralysis and Institutional Decay Parliamentary voices, such as that of Mahdiya al-Lami from the Services and Reconstruction Committee, offer a mixed diagnosis. Al-Lami acknowledged that protests are constitutionally protected and a legitimate response to poor services. She attributed the crisis partly to chronic underfunding and, at times, the complete absence of financial allocations. 'Despite passing the tripartite budget law, budget schedules haven't yet reached Parliament,' she explained, describing widespread institutional paralysis across ministries and departments. She also blamed delayed projects, rampant corruption, and the lack of administrative and technical capacity. More significantly, al-Lami pointed to a broader decay in national responsibility and vision. 'There is no genuine political will to reform or deliver,' she said bluntly. Accountability in a Captive System While al-Sudani's term has not been devoid of progress, especially in launching select infrastructure and employment initiatives, the failure to deliver comprehensive service improvements is increasingly viewed as a leadership shortfall. However, as analysts and lawmakers agree, he operates within a dysfunctional structure that limits reform. With time running out and popular discontent deepening, al-Sudani faces a critical test: either break the political mold or become yet another prime minister who promised services and delivered frustration. Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.
Shafaq News
05-07-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Elections stir ghosts of Iraq's sectarian past
Shafaq News Sectarian rhetoric is re-emerging in Iraq's political discourse ahead of the legislative elections scheduled for November 11, 2025. Once synonymous with civil strife and foreign interference, its renewed intensity has alarmed officials, lawmakers, and religious leaders. Many now warn that its return threatens Iraq's already fragile social cohesion, prompting urgent calls for swift legal reforms and firm institutional action before deeper divisions take hold. The resurgence is not viewed as coincidental. Analysts and observers draw a direct line between the rise in sectarian discourse and the looming elections, accusing certain political factions of deliberately weaponizing identity politics to galvanize fractured constituencies. Critics argue this approach revives the wounds of Iraq's darkest periods and threatens renewed fragmentation. As MP Thaer al-Jubouri told Shafaq News, 'Politicians without achievements resort to inflaming sectarian divisions to stay in power. They appeal to those who lack national and religious understanding—using sectarianism as a tool of power, not unity.' Al-Jubouri urged the Council of Representatives to pass legislation criminalizing sectarian incitement and pressed the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to disqualify candidates who engage in such rhetoric. 'Sectarianism is something we only overcame with great difficulty,' he remarked, 'and it remains a tool of occupation to divide the country.' Broader Electoral Context and Democratic Implications Iraq's post-2003 political structure has operated under an informal ethno-sectarian power-sharing system known as Muhasasa. This arrangement typically assigns the Prime Minister's post to a Shia, the Parliament Speaker to a Sunni, and the Presidency to a Kurd. Political parties are generally organized along sectarian and ethnic lines. Shia factions such as the Sadrist Movement (now the Patriotic Shiite Movement) and Fatah Alliance participated primarily within Shia constituencies. Sunni parties like Taqaddum and Azm competed in Sunni-majority areas. Kurdish representation was led by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Demographic Tensions and Political Calculations Iraq's population, which now exceeds 46 million according to the Ministry of Planning, is ethnically and religiously diverse. Based on estimates from the US Department of State's 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom, the majority of Iraq's Muslim population is Shia, comprising 55 to 60%, while Sunnis represent about 40%—roughly 24 % Arab, 15 % Kurdish, and 1 % Turkmen. Minority communities include Christians—Chaldeans, Assyrians, Syriacs, and Armenians—whose numbers have dropped to fewer than 150,000 from around 1.5 million before 2003, largely due to conflict and displacement. Other religious minorities include Yazidis and Sabean-Mandaeans. Ethnically, the population is primarily Arab, followed by Kurds in the north, with smaller communities such as Turkmen, Assyrians, Shabaks, and Armenians. Historical grievances and longstanding power imbalances between these groups have often been exploited by political actors. This divisive legacy continues to provide fertile ground for sectarian rhetoric, particularly during moments of electoral vulnerability. A Painful History Rekindled After the 2003 invasion, Iraq descended into years of bloodshed between Sunni and Shia communities, marked by bombings, assassinations, and ethnic cleansing. Baghdad and other mixed cities were flashpoints, while extremist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq—and later ISIS—exploited these fractures for recruitment and domination. The civil war of 2006–2007 represents a tragic peak, with tens of thousands killed and millions displaced. While estimates vary, it is believed that hundreds of thousands of civilians lost their lives during this period. UNAMI (United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq) reported civilian casualty rates in the thousands per month at the time. This violence left deep scars and entrenched distrust, making today's revival of sectarian narratives especially dangerous. State Measures and Legal Ambiguity The Iraqi government has recently taken visible, though arguably overdue, steps to confront sectarian incitement. The Ministry of Interior 's Offensive Content Committee announced 'firm and decisive' action against instigators of division, and on June 30, launched proceedings against mosque preacher Uday al-Ghariri and poet Abdul Hussein Hayal al-Hatimi for promoting hateful content online. Earlier this year, journalist Salam Adel was also prosecuted for allegedly insulting the Sunni community. Momentum is also building for legislative reform. On June 28, MP Hamid al-Shiblawi initiated a signature campaign to draft a law explicitly criminalizing sectarianism. This echoes a March proposal by Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, who advocated for legislation and called for the removal of online content promoting division. In a public statement, al-Mashhadani warned of the dangerous intersection between electoral campaigns and the mobilization of sectarian sentiment amid broader regional volatility. While legislative efforts are advancing, Iraq's existing legal framework already addresses sectarian incitement. Article 200 of the amended Penal Code criminalizes sectarian or ethnic hate speech as a threat to state security, with penalties of up to seven years in prison. Article 372 allows for imprisonment or fines for insulting religious beliefs or symbols. However, legal experts argue that implementation remains flawed. Mohammed Jumaa, a legal analyst speaking to Shafaq News, criticized the misuse of Article 372 for sectarian cases. 'These are not misdemeanors,' he contended. 'They should be prosecuted under Article 200 as felonies. Iraq needs deterrent action against anyone who incites sectarianism.' Inconsistent application, he warned, fuels impunity and undermines state efforts to contain the phenomenon. Religious Authorities Push Back Prominent religious leaders have added their voices to the campaign against sectarianism. Sheikh Muhammad Khalil Ibrahim, representing the religious establishment in Baghdad, emphasized to Shafaq News that sectarianism remains a tool of foreign domination. Stressing Islamic principles, he underscored the obligation to protect any person who proclaims the shahada (the Islamic declaration of faith) and urged unity across the Muslim world. Meanwhile, Sheikh Mustafa al-Bayati, head of the Association of Imams and Preachers of Al-Adhamiya, underlined that Islamic ethics demand respect—even for non-believers—and condemned sectarianism as both 'religiously forbidden and nationally harmful.' He implored the state and judiciary to take firm action against offenders, reaffirming the role of religious institutions in promoting unity.
