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Mint
08-05-2025
- Politics
- Mint
The seven books to read about Myanmar
It has become steadily more difficult to find reasons to be hopeful about Myanmar. Elections in 2015 had seemed to usher in a new era of democracy, after years of authoritarian rule. Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the opposition National League of Democracy (NLD), became the de facto leader of the country formerly known as Burma. Yet attacks by the army on the Muslim Rohingya people, many of whom were killed or forced into exile, exposed the deadly intolerance of those in power. A military coup in February 2021 made things worse, provoking widespread violence. The economy looks wrecked; by World Bank estimates it is about 30% smaller than it might have been in the absence of covid-19 and the army's takeover. How to make sense of it all? These seven books go some way towards explaining a land of lamentations. Picking Off New Shoots Will Not Stop the Spring. Edited by Ko Ko Thett and Brian Haman. Balestier Press; 264 pages; £11.99 It is too soon to expect any coherent account of the coup of February 1st 2021, and the awful events since. Ko Ko Thett, a Myanmar poet, and Brian Haman, an academic, have produced the next best thing, a volume of what they call 'witness poems and essays". These are first-hand, often visceral, accounts of the many anti-coup demonstrations that rocked the country last year, and the consequent military repression; the shootings, beatings, arrests and torture. 'The landscape is bloody-fucked," writes one contributor. The last works of two poets who lost their lives in the anti-coup protests are recorded here. The Lady and the Generals: Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma's struggle for freedom. By Peter Popham. Rider; 496 pages; £14.99 The slight, elegant figure of Aung San Suu Kyi has dominated the politics of Myanmar for more than three decades, even though she has been locked up by military governments for much of that time. The most readable biography of her is by Peter Popham, a British journalist. His first edition, 'The Lady and the Peacock", chronicled her life up to her release from house arrest in 2010; this second edition takes the story up to her landslide election victory in 2015, after which the NLD formed a government. 'The Lady and the Generals" captures the spirit of optimism that prevailed until the 2015 elections; long-lasting sanctions were lifted, Western aid poured into Myanmar and Ms Suu Kyi toured the world in triumph. We reviewed this book in 2016. Myanmar's Rohingya Genocide: Identity, History and Hate Speech. By Ronan Lee. I.B. Taurus; 288 pages; £19.99 For all her heroic defiance of Myanmar's generals for much of her life, Ms Suu Kyi's international reputation was badly tarnished by her attitude toward the Rohingyas. The army largely forced this Muslim minority out from the country, in 2017. That amounted to a genocide. She has not spoken out for the Rohingyas; perhaps she even shares the prejudice felt towards them by many of her fellow ethnic-Burmans, that they are not a genuine 'minority" at all, but merely illegal Bengali migrants. As de facto leader of the country, she even appeared at the International Court of Justice to defend the behaviour of the troops. Ronan Lee has written the most reliable and up-to-date account of the cruelty and discrimination endured by the Rohingya over many years in Myanmar. He shows how the army weaponised religion and ethnicity to cling to power. Ms Suu Kyi gets a gentle roasting too. The River of Lost Footsteps. By Thant Myint-U. Farrar, Straus and Giroux; 384 pages; $19. Faber & Faber; £10.99 For a longer perspective read Thant Myint-U's thoughtful 'The River of Lost Footsteps". This is part history, part memoir, by the anglicised scion of one of Burma's most influential families; he is the grandson of U Thant, former secretary-general of the UN. Thant Myint-U is a trained historian and the most helpful part of the book is his fluent narrative of the formation of the Burmese state from ancient times through to the early 19th century when the Court of Ava at Mandalay was one of the most dominant in South-East Asia. Thereafter, however, conflict with the rival empire of British India proved Burma's downfall. The author is particularly good at showing how the old patterns of monarchical rule were sundered by colonialism. The Glass Palace. By Amitav Ghosh. The Borough Press; 560 pages; £9.99 For a more imaginative take on the destruction of Burma's ancient monarchy, read 'The Glass Palace" by Amitav Ghosh, an Indian writer. It opens dramatically as British forces storm the Glass Palace of the Burmese kings at Mandalay, the climax of the third (and last) Anglo-Burmese war in 1885. Mr Ghosh follows the last king into exile in British India, where the hours accumulated 'like grains of sand until they buried him". A large cast of characters takes the reader on an intricate tour through familial, colonial and political struggles in India and Malaya as well as Burma up to the 1990s. It is a mini-epic, courageously sweeping through time and place, sometimes funny, often poignant and always wise. Blood and Silk: Power and Conflict in Modern Southeast Asia. By Michael Vatikiotis. Weidenfeld & Nicolson; 336 pages; £20 If Thant Myint-U provides the historical perspective on Myanmar, Michael Vatikiotis provides the regional context in 'Blood and Silk". The author packs 40-odd years of living and working in South-East Asia into one well-organised volume; Mr Vatikiotis was editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review and has worked as a conflict mediator in Myanmar, Thailand and the Philippines. His book demonstrates that even if Myanmar has failed to throw off the shackles of authoritarian rule, so too have most of its near neighbours. In Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and elsewhere progress towards democracy ebbs (mostly) and flows. Mr Vatikiotis shows how Myanmar might be judged by regional standards rather than what can seem like impossibly remote Western values. We reviewed this book in 2017. Being and Becoming Kachin. Mandy Sadan. Oxford University Press, 470 pages; £100 This is the only recent, high-quality account of one of the numerous ethnic groups, in this case the Kachin, that live on the geographical fringes of Myanmar. The outside world usually focuses on the struggle for democracy between Ms Suu Kyi and the generals, but Ms Sadan's rigorously researched book brings a reminder that ever since independence the country has seen almost continuous internal conflict between the majority ethnic Burman people, or Bamar, and minorities such as the Kachin and Chin. Our former correspondent wrote his own book, in 2015, on the subject: Blood, Dreams and Gold: The Changing Face of Burma. By Richard Cockett. Yale University Press, 296 pages; $35 and £18.99 How Burma, once one of the richest countries in the region, descended into decades of civil war and authoritarian government before embarking on a surprising attempt at political and social reform. The book gathers together diverse strands of the country's past—from drugs to warlords, Islam to illegal logging—to consider its pathologies. More from The Economist reads: Our Asia digital editor on seven books that best explain Hong Kong's history Our food columnist selects the seven essential cookbooks Our former Moscow correspondent picks seven books on Vladimir Putin Our Africa editor chooses five books, and one album, as an introduction to the great continent
Yahoo
06-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Myanmar's Earthquake Is Handing the Junta a Path Out of Isolation
After Myanmar was struck by a powerful earthquake on March 28, the leader of the country's military junta, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, issued a rare call for international aid. Teams of rescue workers were sent from across the region, with the bulk of support provided by China, India and Myanmar's fellow member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN. Previous military juntas in Myanmar have been known to refuse foreign help after disasters. It therefore came as a surprise to some that this inward-looking regime, which toppled the democratically elected government led by the National League for Democracy, or NLD, in a 2021 coup, should issue such a plea. Certainly the vast scale of devastation from the 7.7 magnitude earthquake played a role. The quake left almost 4,000 people dead and more than 5,000 injured, according to the latest reports. Near the epicenter in the central region of Sagaing, the destruction was extensive, with the country's second-largest city, Mandalay, among the hardest-hit areas. Hundreds of buildings there were flattened, leaving many people trapped under rubble. Yet there was arguably more than just the scale of the damage that prompted the call for help: The earthquake struck at a time when the junta was seeking legitimacy and recognition from abroad to shore up its fragile rule, after years of military losses at the hands of resistance forces. To get more in-depth news and expert analysis on global affairs from WPR, sign up for our free Daily Review newsletter. For their part, regional states also appear keen to resume engagement with the junta and step up their faltering diplomatic efforts to end Myanmar's post-coup conflict. In this sense, the earthquake may provide an opportunity to welcome Min Aung Hlaing back from isolation, in a way that previously would not have been politically tenable. ASEAN, with Malaysia as its chair for 2025, has made moves in this direction after Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim met Min Aung Hlaing in Bangkok alongside former Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in mid-April. That follows the junta's improved relations over the past year with neighboring powers China and India, both of which want a return to stability along their borders and aim to retain their strategic stakes in Myanmar, including large-scale infrastructure projects. Combined with those earlier efforts, the unfolding post-earthquake outreach by ASEAN leaders could yet offer the junta a lifeline. It also reflects the cold reality that the junta, which still enjoys a firm grip on Naypyidaw and central areas of the country, remains a primary actor that external powers must deal with if they are to influence events on the ground. Anwar's Outreach ASEAN's efforts to influence the trajectory in Myanmar over the past four years have made no headway. A five-point consensus agreed by the bloc in April 2021, just months after the coup, has served as little more than a loose plan for envisioned peace talks that have never taken place. The nonbinding consensus calls for the cessation of violence and dialogue among all parties, mediated by an ASEAN special envoy. Yet given ASEAN's principle of non-interference, it is effectively worthless without the junta's compliance, which has not been forthcoming. Instead, the regime's lack of engagement with the plan led ASEAN to bar senior figures from the junta-run government—known as the State Administration Council, or SAC—from attending high-level meetings of the bloc. In December, however, the bloc's foreign ministers reportedly held 'frank' discussions on how to move forward on Myanmar, with Thailand indicating for the first time that ASEAN may ultimately have no choice but to engage with the junta whether or not the regime is seen as legitimate in Myanmar. Indications of a shifting approach were further visible at the start of Malaysia's tenure as ASEAN's rotating chair in January. After a regional meeting held in Langkawi that month, Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan told reporters that his government 'wants to know what Myanmar has in mind,' though he was careful to add that halting violence must be the priority before any political resolution. In the aftermath of the earthquake, Anwar felt empowered to go further with this outreach, opening a direct dialogue channel with Min Aung Hlaing for the first time. During their April 17 meeting in Bangkok—the first between an ASEAN chair and the junta leader since the coup—Anwar said that, in addition to talks on humanitarian aid, he had discussed 'the importance of returning the country to normalcy' and pushed for the extension of a temporary ceasefire declared by the junta from April 2-22. Yet despite Anwar receiving 'assurances' from Min Aung Hlaing, the ceasefire was extended only for a short period, until April 30. The regime had declared its initial 20-day halt to fighting in response to earlier, unilateral ceasefires announced by forces affiliated with the opposition National Unity Government, or NUG, and by the Three Brotherhood Alliance of powerful ethnic rebel groups in Shan state. However, sporadic fighting has still been reported, including junta airstrikes on opposition-held areas, with aerial attacks continuing even after Anwar's pleas. Anwar held virtual talks with NUG representatives on April 18 and said ASEAN would look to maintain dialogue with both sides going forward. Yet critics argue that the junta should not be given a platform equal to the NUG, which includes elected NLD politicians who were ousted by the coup. ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, or APHR—a body composed of progressive regional lawmakers—warned that the Bangkok talks with Min Aung Hlaing risked 'legitimizing a regime responsible for widespread atrocities' and undermined efforts to restore democracy. It added that 'the people of Myanmar have made their rejection of the Junta's rule abundantly clear.' It is reasonable to assume that with Malaysia taking part in the talks and Thailand playing host, two of the most liberal-minded states in ASEAN are open to further engagement directly with the junta, absent preconditions. It is difficult to foresee any of the other seven ASEAN member states—with several authoritarian regimes among them—standing in the way of future talks. Regional Powers Such considerations for China have never been a problem. Until last year, though, Beijing had kept the junta at arm's length and provided tacit approval for rebel offensives against regime troops along its border. Beijing did not object, for example, when two powerful members of the Three Brotherhood Alliance with which it has long had close ties—the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDAA—launched the most audacious assault of the war in late 2023. Known as Operation 1027, the offensive saw rebels quickly capture swathes of territory in Shan state, eventually taking the regional capital, Lashio, last August. Yet reports suggest rebels are now preparing to hand the city back to the junta in a deal brokered by China. Fearing state collapse, and in a move to shore up the junta's status as the main power base in Myanmar, China has sought to reverse some of the gains of Operation 1027 and prevent rebels in the powerful Shan alliance from moving into central Myanmar, where NUG-affiliated armed groups have struggled to make inroads against the junta. After the fall of Lashio, China reportedly shut down trade along the border with rebel-held territories in eastern Myanmar, stemming the flow of weapons, ammunition and basic goods. In addition, power, water and internet connectivity were temporarily cut to the MNDAA's stronghold of Kokang. Chinese pressure was ultimately successful in reining in the rebels, leading to a ceasefire in Shan, while ensuring the junta's rule in the central plains. As Beijing's support for the rebel factions has waned, it has begun to more publicly back the junta. After four years of conflict, China appears to have calculated that Min Aung Hlaing is sticking around and is key to ensuring a stable environment for its Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects in the country. These include a planned railway and energy pipelines that will provide a shortcut connecting China to the Indian Ocean. Beijing has also thrown its weight behind the junta's plan to hold an election by early 2026 as a resolution to the ongoing political crisis. Many observers, though, consider that any such poll would be illegitimate, as the junta's main rival, the NLD, was dissolved in 2023 after failing to register under the regime's new rules on political parties. As a result, the political forces participating in the vote would likely be a collection of military proxies, with no real opposition representation. At best, this would leave Myanmar as a quasi-democracy with the generals still pulling the levers of power. But it's unclear what this would resolve, as the military has already tried releasing its grip on Myanmar once and did not like the outcome, allowing the NLD to govern after winning elections in 2015 and 2020, only to reverse course with its coup just months after the second vote. Meanwhile, after initially adopting a wait-and-see approach following the coup, India has also signaled its willingness to engage with the junta, although to a lesser extent than Beijing. Last June, Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar urged his Myanmar counterpart Than Swe to ensure that India's investment projects in the country, including in conflict-wracked Rakhine state, were protected. Just days after the earthquake, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Min Aung Hlaing on the sidelines of a regional summit for Bay of Bengal countries, also the first such meeting since before the coup. While not supporting the junta's planned elections per se, Modi indicated that democracy should be restored and that any such polls should be 'inclusive and credible.' He also stressed that there was 'no military solution' to the crisis that has unfolded since 2021. India's reason for maintaining a stake in Myanmar is clear. For New Delhi, Naypyidaw's closer relations with Beijing are a concern given the two Asian giants' strategic rivalry. India also has an obvious interest in maintaining stability along its 1,000-mile-long border with Myanmar in the northeast, mirroring China's own concerns on the other side of the country. Like China, too, India has concluded that the junta is still the primary actor to deal with. India's outreach will likely be aided by Myanmar's narrow range of allies, as New Delhi could provide a useful counter to overreliance on China as well as on longstanding supporter Russia. That these actors, and ASEAN, have provided the bulk of aid to Myanmar in the aftermath of March's earthquake is no surprise. It reflects not only their capabilities and geographical proximity, but also a willingness to cooperate with the junta. The United States, once a major donor, has abandoned its leading role under U.S. President Donald Trump, while European states are wary of sending aid via the regime in Naypyidaw. More broadly, the U.S. and Europe are preoccupied with their own disputes and the war in Ukraine. It is no surprise that many in Myanmar's pro-democracy resistance movement feel abandoned by the West, despite decades of support for Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. In the context of external efforts to help end Myanmar's conflict, it is only willing regional powers that really matter—presenting both the junta and the Myanmar people with few other options. Michael Hart is a writer and researcher covering conflict and postwar issues in Southeast Asia. He has researched for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), and has contributed to publications including World Politics Review, The Diplomat, and Asia Sentinel. He is Editorial and Social Media Coordinator at The Pacific Review journal, based at the University of Warwick. More Asia Coverage: Read all of our the Asia-Pacific region coverage here. The post Myanmar's Earthquake Is Handing the Junta a Path Out of Isolation appeared first on World Politics Review.
Yahoo
04-04-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Myanmar military's ‘ceasefire' follows a pattern of ruling generals exploiting disasters to shore up control
After a 7.7 magnitude earthquake struck Myanmar on March 28. 2025, the country's military and the myriad resistance groups fighting a yearslong civil war faced international calls for an immediate ceasefire. A pause in the fighting would enable vital aid to enter the major quake zones and allow rescuers to assist victims in a disaster that has already killed more than 3,000 people. The first to heed the call was the opposition National Unity Government, which unilaterally announced a two-week pause on attacks by its armed wing, the People's Defense Force, on March 29. The Three Brotherhood Alliance – a coalition of three ethnic resistance groups: the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army – likewise agreed to a temporary truce. But Myanmar's military demurred. Just hours after the quake, as rescuers continued to dig through rubble in search of survivors, the generals ordered airstrikes on enemy positions in Shan state and Karen state in the country's east – a decision that United Nations special rapporteur Tom Andrews described as 'nothing short of incredible.' The generals eventually yielded to pressure late on April 2 – some five days after the earthquake hit – announcing that they would halt fighting until April 22. But the statement appeared to be hollow, with reports just a day later that the military's bombing campaign and ground offensive were continuing unabated in Kachin state in Myanmar's north. As an expert on the political history of Myanmar, I believe the behavior of the country's military is of no surprise. The generals who have had a grip on the country for much of the past six decades have a track record of exploiting disasters for political gain. Weakened by years of entrenched civil war, they are now seeking an opportunity in the earthquake to rehabilitate their image overseas, while consolidating power at home. Myanmar's ruling junta has tried this tactic before. In 2008, a week after the deadly cyclone Nargis killed more than 100,000 people in Myanmar, the military proceeded to hold a constitutional referendum that would guarantee the military's control of government by reserving 25% of all parliamentary seats for officers while requiring 75% of votes for any future constitutional reform. It also allowed for the military to take over the country 'in the event of an emergency.' The referendum took place while much of Myanmar was still reeling from disaster, yet the junta announced a 98.12% turnout, of which 92.48% voted in favor of the new pro-military constitution. It paved the way to elections in 2010, which the military's Union Solidarity and Development Party won. Though that vote was boycotted by the opposition National League for Democracy, or NLD, Washington had by then signaled a shift in policy toward 'pragmatic engagement' with the then-ruling junta. This U.S. shift forced the recalcitrant NLD to cooperate in subsequent elections, giving legitimacy to a process that was stacked in favor of the generals. The latest disaster comes as the junta is again attempting to push for elections. Just a day before the earthquake, Myanmar's military chief, Min Aung Hlaing, confirmed plans for a December national vote and called on opposition parties to participate. But the proposed election in Myanmar is widely seen as a face-saving strategy for both the Myanmar military and, I would argue, an international community that has done little of any significance to end the civil war. In this context, elections would allow the generals to cover their 2021 power grab with a fig leaf of legitimacy. The entrenched civil war that was sparked by that military takeover – a coup that ended a 10-year experiment with limited democracy – derailed the military's initial plan to return to full control of the country. Four years of fighting a broad-based opposition that includes ethnic minority groups like the Karen National Union, Kachin Independence Army, Arakan Army, Ta'ang National Liberation Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, People's Defense Force and Bamar People's Liberation Army has taken its toll on the military. It has lost territorial control in many regions to the myriad resistance groups. Internationally, it has become more isolated through sanctions, and its largest trading partner, China, concerned over instability on its border, has slowed investments as it tries to play all sides of the conflict. In desperation, the generals have resorted to forced conscription for foot soldiers, while looking to Russia for arms and investment. What the military desperately needs now is a lifeline and a civil war exit plan. The earthquake could provide both, with a ceasefire – no matter how badly observed – providing a cover for allowing for a national vote. But as has been evident in the days surrounding the announcement of a truce, the military is likely to exploit the disaster to weaken the resistance along the way. It has said that it will take 'necessary' measures against any resistance group found to be regrouping or attacking the state during the ceasefire. Yet it has reportedly continued its own offensive. The earthquake has revealed the failures and brutalities of the military in other ways, too. In the aftermath of the disaster, the military shut down private clinics and hospitals in badly hit Mandalay for allegedly employing rebel doctors and nurses who were treating members of the resistance. As it was, many health care workers have been in hiding since the coup, and young people who could have been on the front lines of relief efforts have either joined the resistance groups or fled the country. The earthquake will also further hurt a Myanmar business community already suffering from the pullout of international businesses after the 2021 coup. Yet, the military may be hoping that it can use the disaster to rebuild its brand overseas. The surprise announcement of a ceasefire by the generals is part of that process. So, too, is the decision to allow in international rescue teams, after initially blocking relief workers from entering the country. It is the military's way of showing willingness to cooperate with the wider world. In short, disaster diplomacy has kicked in for Myanmar's military, as it did after 2008's Cyclone Nagris. That earlier cyclone provided an opportunity for the junta to present a different face to the international community. Elections were held, not once, but twice – encouraged by the U.S. and others – and investments rushed into Myanmar as the country was touted as 'Asia's next Tiger.' But the foundations of military-backed reform in Myanmar were built on fault lines that cracked and crumbled amid the 2021 coup. The military's exploitation of the 2025 earthquake will, I fear, result in similar ends. This article is republished from The Conversation, a nonprofit, independent news organization bringing you facts and trustworthy analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Tharaphi Than, Northern Illinois University Read more: Myanmar's civil war: How shifting US-Russia ties could tip balance and hand China a greater role Thousands are feared dead in Myanmar's quake. Trump's USAID cuts will cause even more unnecessary deaths Hotter and deeper: how NZ's plan to drill for 'supercritical' geothermal energy holds promise and risk Tharaphi Than does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The Independent
31-03-2025
- Politics
- The Independent
How the Myanmar earthquake could hasten the release of Aung San Suu Kyi
Aung San Suu Kyi, the elected leader of Myanmar, is reported to have survived last week's devastating earthquake unharmed in the prison cell where she is serving long terms in solitary confinement. But could the disaster prove the prelude for her return to power? If it did, it would be only the latest of the stunning reversals of fortune that have dotted her career. The former Oxford housewife – who, with her National League for Democracy (NLD), has won the only three fair general elections held in Myanmar in the past 65 years – was jailed on trumped-up charges in 2021. Now aged 79, it is feared she could die in prison. Suu Kyi's return to official favour is not on anyone's list of probable outcomes of the disaster. Her present situation is substantially worse than any she has endured in more than 20 years of official persecution. Her long years of house arrest after 1990 were punctuated by occasional peace overtures from the ruling generals, but this time around there has been nothing of the sort. She is not locked up in the modest comfort of her home, but a squalid jungle jail, and if there have been any approaches by the military, they have not been publicised. Everything possible has been done to turn her into an unperson. Two factors, however, make her dramatic rehabilitation possible. One is her legitimacy in power. Despite the generals' baseless claims to the contrary, Suu Kyi won the elections of 1990, 2015 and 2020 by landslide margins, results recognised by foreign monitors as fair. The other factor is the suddenly increased vulnerability of the ruling generals in the aftermath of the disaster. Legitimacy is the philosopher's stone for Myanmar's generals, the goal which eluded them for so many years after the great uprising of 1988. One military leader, Senior General Thein Sein, crafted a route for his country back into the company of nations. He set up a sort of Potemkin democracy in which the army's dominance was guaranteed but which permitted a token role for democracy and civilian politicians. The result was Suu Kyi's release from house arrest in 2010, her election to parliament the following year, the lifting of sanctions and Myanmar's return to some degree of respectability. All that was junked in February 2021 when Thein Sein's successor, Min Aung Hlaing, seized power. Today, Myanmar has never been more painfully isolated. China gives grudging support to the regime as the alternative to outright anarchy on its border; Russia's support seems more sincere. But otherwise Myanmar is as much of an international pariah as it was in the dark days after the suppression of the Buddhist monks revolt in 2007. There is no doubt that the army craves a return to international respectability. Military sources wax lyrical about the good old days of the 2010s when the economy was relatively buoyant and the army savaged the Rohingya minority in Rakhine state but, thanks to its democratic fig-leaf, was able to shrug off international criticism. Today, everything about the regime stinks – and there seems no way out of the mess. More than half the country is beyond the army's control. The civil war which started in 2021 rages unabated, prompting new air strikes in recent days on rebel-held areas, even those such as Sagaing, west of Mandalay, which were crippled in the earthquake. Why should Min Aung Hlaing care? On account of a little factor called karma. Myanmar is the most devoutly Buddhist nation on earth; the generals' regular attendance at temples and monasteries is their way of attempting to buy off the forces of divine disfavour. The earthquake, in which at least 10,000 have died, is the latest sign that it's not working. In 2007, the army waded in to crush the mass revolt of monks, killing many of them – an onslaught rapidly followed by Cyclone Nargis, which killed more than 130,000 in the south of the country. To western scientists, the cyclone's cause was meteorological; to superstitious Myanmar Buddhists, it was caused by the army's reckless killing of monks. It was karmic payback. And it's happened again. The earthquake struck only hours after the pomp and ceremony of the 80th Armed Forces Day. Many in Myanmar will have seen it as unmistakable sign that the regime is doomed. Desperate measures, the generals may decide, will now be required to cling to power.
The Independent
31-03-2025
- Politics
- The Independent
Why the earthquake could help hasten the fall of Myanmar's brutal dictator (cloned)
A group of Buddhist monks in saffron robes are gathered beside a shrine lying collapsed on the ground but seemingly intact, as if someone has pushed it over. They are not looking at this but at a mid-rise, primrose-yellow building a few hundred yards away. As the monks film on their phones – the building, seemingly solid one moment, suddenly collapses into itself, the upper storeys disappearing in a cloud of dust as the monks flinch, crouch and then quickly resume filming again. One can only hope that everyone inside had already got out. Meanwhile, the top of the spire of Shwe Sar Yan pagoda near Mandalay, near the epicentre of the earthquake, snaps off as onlookers scream and weep at the demise of this thousand-year-old pagoda. In Mandalay, the exquisite royal palace, built in the 1850s, has suffered damage too. Buildings across the country, from apartment blocks in cities to bamboo homes in refugee camps, have collapsed, with thousands of casualties likely trapped inside. It could not come at a worse time for Myanmar with the repressive military regime engaged in a brutal war against the population. Since the coup in 2021, five million people have been forced to flee their homes, and at least 6,000 have been killed by the country's military, who have carried out bombing campaigns on villages, schools and hospitals, executed prisoners, and carried out massacres. Mark Farmaner, the director of Burma Campaign UK, says: 'There's a feeling in Myanmar of: 'Not this, after everything else that we have suffered.'' Myanmar has indeed faced tragedy after tragedy in the last 80 years. The leader of its independence movement, Aung San, was assassinated in 1947, just as he was poised to become Burma's first post-independence prime minister. Then in 1962, just as Burma's ethnic minority groups were about to get greater autonomy, the military staged a coup, renamed the country Myanmar, and so began decades of repressive military rule that continues today. Aung San's daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi, has been imprisoned by the military on and off since 1989. In 2020, she led the National League for Democracy (NLD) to election victory, but the military prevented the NLD from taking power. In December 2022, they sentenced Aung San Suu Kyi to 30 years in prison, later reduced to 27, under trumped-up charges of corruption and treason, meaning that she will not be released until she is over 100. Myanmar is also one of the countries most severely affected by the climate crisis. In 2008, Cyclone Nargis caused devastating floods, as inland tsunamis ripped children from their parents' arms, and destroyed villages, towns and crops. With 2.4 million in desperate need of aid, the military regime preferred to let the survivors die from disease and starvation rather than allow aid agencies in. Convoys were turned back, and much aid was confiscated. We will never know the death toll, but it was estimated at 200,000, many preventable. Will things be different this time? The regime has – unusually – requested international aid. However, simultaneously, there are reports that they are taking advantage of the tragedy to bomb Shan State, one of the regions liberated from the regime. In the past, international aid agencies have routed their aid through Yangon. 'The danger is that if they do this, it won't get to where it's needed as the government will prevent it from reaching areas it doesn't control,' warns Farmaner. With the military government only in full control of around 20 per cent of the country, even if they are willing to allow international aid in, they will likely be unable to get the aid to the remote regions where it is needed. The charity Advance Myanmar has been providing emergency aid to tens of thousands of people in remote areas who have fled attacks by the military and where local administrations are working heroically to rescue people from collapsed buildings and treat the injured. They warn: 'The Myanmar military impose some of the most severe restrictions on humanitarian aid anywhere in the world ... We can't have another situation where international aid for a crisis in Myanmar is blocked or delayed by the Myanmar military.' Both the UK and US governments have recently announced savage cuts to international aid, which are already badly affecting the people of Myanmar, making their plight even worse. Because the earthquake struck during prayers on the last Friday of Ramadan, many of Myanmar's Muslim minority were trapped inside mosques that collapsed: the repair or building of mosques has been largely banned by the anti-Muslim military government since 1962. There is one glimmer of hope amid tragedy: the military regime is deeply superstitious. The fact that the earthquake happened hours after Armed Forces Day was celebrated may be another blow to the dictator, General Min Aung Hlaing, whose support among even the military is crumbling. Could the earthquake help hasten his fall? Burma is one of the most beautiful countries in the world. But it is also one of the most benighted. Denied democracy, devastated by natural disaster, its suffering but stoic people surely deserve our support in what may yet be their greatest hour of need.
