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NDTV
25-05-2025
- Politics
- NDTV
NDTV Ground Report: Extortion Part Of China's Unconventional War On India
Extortion, armed violence and drugs - this is the deadly trio used by China to wage its unconventional war against India, using armed insurgent groups that it has funded for decades. In some states in the northeast region, families live in debilitating fear - their children are at constant risk of either getting recruited into an armed insurgent group or of becoming drug addicts. Up to 22 per cent of the salaries of state government employees is deducted at the disbursal offices - this is an unofficial "sovereignty tax" imposed by armed insurgent groups like the National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) and the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA). The administration has bent over to keep the peace as these groups, armed with sophisticated Chinese-made weapons like AK 47s and rocket launchers, wield sway over most of the northeastern part of the country. "Even the state government has been paying taxes to some of the bigger groups," said KK Sema, a retired IAS officer who spearheaded a movement against Nagaland's "sovereignty tax". "Development funds come to the department. That department is told to pay 5-6 per cent to the groups from the headquarters itself. The money is then disbursed to the field, the field officers and contractors are also taxed. The state government will deny this. The state government employees are paying 22 per cent of their salary. This is being deducted at the disbursement office before it is paid to them. The disbursement officer would negotiate with the armed groups to reduce the 22 per cent to 10-12 per cent and the remaining amount would be paid to the government employee," he said. Everyone and everything is "taxed" by these armed groups. From vegetables and small businesses, to trucks and farm produce, groups like the NSCN-IM and the ZRA get a cut from all trades and commodities. The NSCN-IM's "Budget" NDTV got exclusive access to the NSCN-IM's "Budget" for fiscal year 2025-26. The amounts are staggering as they are a record of extortion of the people of Nagaland. This armed insurgent group plans to raise over Rs 158 crore in what they call "sovereignty tax", a fancy term for extortion. Everything from food items to fuel to construction materials is "taxed". Small shop owners too have to pay the NSCN-IM cadre. They cough up, staring at the barrel of a gun. Smuggling of cheap betelnut from Myanmar into India is also rife and provides a hefty sum for funding these armed insurgent groups. In this fiscal year, the NSCN-IM plans to raise Rs 2 crore from betelnut alone. Most of this betelnut from Myanmar heads to the factories of gutkha makers, according to highly placed sources. This fuels yet another illegal economy. As a result of this wanton extortion, the prices of goods and food in Nagaland can rise sharply without warning. "Because of the insurgency, there were many factions which were going out and taxing people. There is absolutely no reason for prices to rise. In the morning, a kilogram of tomatoes would cost Rs 30 and in the evening, it would cost Rs 60 without any real reason," Mr Sema explained. "Civil society started questioning why this price rise was happening. A few of us got together and sent out a group of youngsters to find out what was happening in the markets. They found that each commodity was being taxed in the market. They call it the 'sovereignty tax. It is called tax. But it is nothing but extortion," he added. Top sources told NDTV in confidence that a section of the local police and administration too actively aid these armed insurgent groups. Take for instance, the current Chairman of the Zomi Council, the mother organisation of the ZRA - Vumsuan Naulak. A retired Intelligence Bureau officer, he can be seen in this photograph awarding a child soldier at an undisclosed location in the Chin State of Myanmar. The Assam Rifles and a section of the state police are attempting to control the influence of these violent groups. On May 16, the Assam Rifles neutralised 10 cadres of an unnamed group and recovered seven AK-47 rifles, one RPG launcher, one M4 rifle and four single-barrel breech-loading rifles. They also found ammunition and war-like stores in Chandel district of Manipur, along the India-Myanmar Border. The Dimapur Police have stepped up efforts to file cases of extortion - 58 cases were filed between January 2024 and April 2025. 81 arrests were made and 78 weapons - from Chinese made AK 47s to Israeli Uzis - were seized. Special Operation Teams have also been set up to provide rapid action in cases of extortion. Police sources also told NDTV that Ikato Chishi Swu, son of one of the late founders of NSCN-IM Isak Chishi Swu, is currently in China. He had released a letter in April stating that he was quitting the NSCN-IM and would head to Myanmar to "continue the struggle" as the NSCN-IM had become a "corrupt" organisation. But flush with Chinese funding and sophisticated arms, these groups recruit more youth and the deadly cycle of violence continues unabated. Share
Scroll.in
24-05-2025
- Politics
- Scroll.in
Manipur: NSCN-IM objects to Meitei flag on peak held as sacred by Naga group
The National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah), the largest armed Naga group, on Saturday objected to armed Meitei group Arambai Tenggol allegedly displaying a Meitei flag atop a peak in Manipur held as sacred by the Tangkhul Naga community. The NSCN-IM raised objections to members of the Arambai Tenggol's Cobra Team-Unit 58 holding a seven-coloured Meitei flag on the Shirui peak in the Ukhrul district. The controversy erupted during the five-day Shirui Lily Festival, a cultural event organised by the state tourism department. The Naga armed group said that the Arambai Tenggol had 'courted controversy at the wrong time and wrong place' through the act. It said that the flag 'has no connection with the Tangkhuls whatsoever'. 'All said and done, Arambai Tenggol should tender 'unqualified apology' within 48 hours for their unwarranted intrusion at Shirui peak,' the NSCN-IM said. The Tangkhul Katamnao Saklong, the apex student body of the community, also described the act as a 'grave provocation', and claimed that displaying the flag on the peak was reckless and inflammatory. 'We will not tolerate any attempt to politicise our sacred spaces or challenge the historical and cultural ownership of our land,' the student body said. 'The Tangkhul Naga people have never and will never accept any imposed symbols, flags or slogans that undermine our identity and rights.' The Arambaii Tenggol, however, claimed that an image of its members holding the flag was being unnecessarily politicised. 'The flag symbolises the unity and peaceful co-existence of indigenous clans of Manipur and is a regular feature at expeditions, sporting events and cultural occasions – whether in India or abroad,' it said. The Meitei group said it holds deep respect for the indigenous Tangkhul community and their sacred hills. 'Our intent was never to offend or incite, but only to stand in solidarity with our traditions, just as others do across our diverse state and nation,' it said. The Shirui Lily Festival had courted controversy on May 20 as well, after security personnel allegedly stopped a group of 20 journalists in Imphal East district and directed them to hide the 'Manipur State Transport' sign on the government bus they were travelling in. The group was travelling to cover the festival in Ukhrul.
The Hindu
15-05-2025
- Politics
- The Hindu
The paradox of the approach to the Manipur issue
As the stalemated conflict in Manipur completes two years, the veritable wait for the Godot of political settlement continues to remain elusive. Despite unleashing a trail of devastation, the loss of over 250 lives and an unfolding human tragedy which compelled thousands of internally displaced persons to live in sub-human makeshift relief centres for over two years, Manipur's violence has not secured a high-order-of-national-priority. This is gallingly evident as Prime Minister Narendra Modi maintains his stoic refusal to visit the State and offer a definitive road map to break the impasse. This compares starkly with the topmost-priority accorded by him to the Pahalgam terror strike on April 22, which led to the curtailment of his official visit to Saudi Arabia and the announcement of policy measures. The very short military stand-off between India and Pakistan and the swift response made eminent sense given the overwhelming and dominant mood of the nation that something decisive had to be done not only to decimate terrorist infrastructure across the Line of Control, but also penalise Pakistan for its alleged sponsorship of cross-border terrorism. As the stand-off and the terms of the understanding/ceasefire likely to be agreed upon by the two nuclear powers continue to take centre-stage, it is highly unlikely that Manipur's continuing human tragedy and political impasse will get the serious attention it deserves. The approach to the northeast What explains this paradox? And in what way does this follow a broader pattern of New Delhi's engagement with Manipur, and, by extension, Northeast India? A clue lies in making a long-term assessment of New Delhi's approach to the Northeast, and for that matter Manipur, which is underscored by its obsession with national security and regime consolidation. Unlike Kashmir, which is the focus in a series of triangular conflicts with Pakistan and China, Manipur's case does not present an imminent threat to India's national security despite concerted efforts over the past two years to make this as such. Although both of India's adversaries were involved in the training of armed independentist groups such as the Naga National Council and its progeny, the NSCN-IM, the Mizo National Front, the United Liberation Front of Assam, and the United National Liberation Front, in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, their support to these groups remains remote and diminished. However, because the policy mandarins in Delhi best understand the language of national security, concerted attempts had been made by certain quarters of valley-based civil society groups and self-professed national security experts to squarely blame Manipur's violence on 'lungi-clad' Kuki armed militants across the India-Myanmar border. A case in point is the failed attempt to amplify this threat by the then Chief Minister's office in mid-September 2024 by invoking credible 'intelligent inputs' which forewarned imminent crossover and attack by over '900 Kuki militants' based in Myanmar with the capabilities to launch rocket launchers against Meitei villages. On hindsight, this security bluster was a half-clever ploy to whip up a majoritarian sense of insecurity and used that as a pretext to prepare the grounds for a series of offensive strikes against Kuki-Zomi-Hmar villages beyond the 'buffer zone' on the pretext of combing operations. Interestingly, the protagonists of national security remain conspicuously muted on the more serious threat posed by the large-scale mobilisation of valley-based insurgent groups, or VBIGs and their foot soldiers in the wake of this violence since May 3, 2023. One immediate consequence of this is the outsourcing of law and order to these groups on the pretext that the State fails to protect villages which remained exposed to transgressions and offensive attacks across the buffer zone. This zone, ideated and enforced by the Indian paramilitary forces after Home Minister Amit Shah visited the State towards the end of May 2023, lies in the foothills and marks the point of territorial and demographic separation between the Meiteis and Kuki-Zomi-Hmars. Such a problematic stance on a national security issue has also effectively neutralised the security gains obtained by India since it successfully flushed out VBIGs from their safe havens in the valley areas in Operation All-Clear (2004). Instead of prioritising substantive security issues such as an upscaling of intelligence-gathering capabilities, counterinsurgency skills, modernisation and professionalisation of the Indian Army and police, the Indian security policy continues to be stuck in a time-warp of political optics. The case of fencing as an obsolete outlook The unusual zeal with which New Delhi pushes the agenda of revoking the free movement regime and spending over ₹31,000 crore for fencing the 1,643 kilometre India-Myanmar border, including the 398 kilometre-long Manipur-Myanmar border, is clearly an instance of an obsolete security overdrive. While this may simultaneously cater to the perceived sense of insecurity whipped up by majoritarian groups based in the valley and eminently suit the pork-barrel brand of politics with promissory collateral benefits to contractors and brokers, the lines of divide are clearly apparent as the Naga, and Mizo, among others, have registered their staunch opposition. Unless such a policy framework is tailored to win the hearts and the minds of transborder people — which seems to be the case here — it is neither likely to augment India's national security nor promote India's neighbourhood first policy via the Act East policy across the India-Myanmar border and beyond. Unfortunately, a longitudinal assessment of India's national security policy framework across political regimes demonstrates that it is driven more by political optics in ways which help consolidate political regimes, rather than being hard-wired in upskilling security infrastructure. This explains why beyond the public spectacle of holding piecemeal arms surrender events, no sincere effort is made to recover sophisticated arms (numbering over 6,000) and ammunition (numbering over 5,00,000) given away to armed groups since the outbreak of violence. Notwithstanding this, barely around 4,000 of the 6,020 arms snatched away from the State armouries have so far been deposited in response to the State government's call. Interestingly, 894 of these were deposited in response to two deadlines — announced by Governor Ajay Kumar Bhalla, on February 28, which was extended to March 6, 2025. The self-congratulatory and nonchalant way in which voluntary arms surrender was pressed for political optics became evident on February 27, a day before the first dateline, when a cavalcade of the Arambai Tenggol, an armed militia accused of perpetrating atrocities against several Kuki-Zomi-Hmar villages, marched across the streets and surrendered 246 weapons at a police station in Imphal. Even though many of these so-called surrendered arms are country-made guns, there is neither a persistent follow-up action after the second deadline passed on March 6, nor any serious attempt to nab and prosecute defaulting individuals under the Arms Act. An incremental approach such as this may be the key to gradually stabilising law and order. However, the easy and abundant availability of arms and ammunition in the hands of armed groups in the State is likely to perpetuate the ethnic security dilemma even as there is no sustained and credible security guarantee from the State. The reluctant imposition of President's Rule on February 13, 2025 as a convenient escape route to an imminent and inglorious fall of the Bharatiya Janata Party government, after an open revolt within its ranks, and the change of political guard in the State seems to have signalled a subtle, yet stern, message to armed groups across the divide that violence is not going to be tolerated. Looking ahead A halting, yet incremental return to normalcy may, however, impel serious political engagements with rival stakeholders in ways that simultaneously accommodate legitimate demands and promote trust and legitimacy to state institutions. As rival parties respectively commemorated May 3 as 'separation day' and a 'day of remembrance and reflection' to push their divergent political agendas, breaking the political impasse and stabilising law and order require substantive policy reorientations that transcend political optics and regime consolidation. Kham Khan Suan Hausing is a Professor and former Head of the Department of Political Science, University of Hyderabad. He is also an Honorary Senior Fellow, Centre for Multilevel Federalism, Institute of Social Sciences, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal
Hindustan Times
07-05-2025
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Naga groups, tribal leaders reaffirm unity and inclusiveness in political process
Kohima, In a key step towards strengthening unity, Naga Political Groups , tribal apex bodies, and the Forum for Naga Reconciliation have reaffirmed that no political or civil group is excluded from the Naga political process, according to a statement. Naga groups, tribal leaders reaffirm unity and inclusiveness in political process The decision was taken by participants at a two-day conclave held on May 5 and 6 here to further the momentum of the ongoing reconciliation process based on the resolution on the historical and political rights of the Nagas. 'We stand for an inclusive approach, and as signatories, we urge all NPGs and civil society organisations to join hands in moving forward,' the joint statement said. Participants acknowledged the contributions of various individuals and groups working for Naga rights while urging those still disengaged to reflect on the importance of unity, it said, adding that the gathering emphasised that those who choose to remain indifferent would only be isolating themselves from a collective future. Adopting some key resolutions, they decided to hold a day of Prayer on May 18, in which tribal hohos will request all the respective church councils and associations to observe it as a special day of prayer dedicated to the people of the Naga areas while seeking divine intervention in the ongoing political issue. They affirmed that all Nagas must urgently converge on the shared political rights of the Naga people, encouraging efforts to build bridges across differences with grace and empathy, the statement said. With backing from the tribal hohos, the gathering declared that all Naga Political Groups must unite under a shared identity of common belonging, free from any group's hegemonic dominance. 'In our correctness, let us not fence ourselves out. Coming together is an instrument of liberation,' the resolution stated. The Centre and NSCN-IM entered into a ceasefire in 1997, beginning negotiations for an early political resolution to the long-standing Naga problem. After more than 70 rounds of talks, the government signed the Framework Agreement with NSCN-IM in 2015. However, the Centre has not accepted NSCN-IM's persistent demand for a separate flag and constitution for the Nagas. The government also entered into parallel negotiations with the WC NNPGs, a coalition of seven Naga groups, in 2017 and inked the Agreed Position in the same year. While the WC NNPGs have expressed willingness to accept whatever is possible and continue negotiations on other contentious demands, the NSCN-IM has declared it will not accept any solution without a separate flag and constitution. Meanwhile, the FNR has been working hard for reconciliation among the warring Naga groups since early 2008 which has led to stopping factional clashes among the groups. Of late, FNR has been initiating several measures to unite the groups for the common Naga cause. This article was generated from an automated news agency feed without modifications to text.
Scroll.in
30-04-2025
- Politics
- Scroll.in
Three suspected Naga militants killed in gunfight in Assam
Three suspected militants from a faction of the insurgent group National Socialist Council of Nagaland were killed in a gunfight with security forces in Assam's Dima Hasao district on Tuesday, reported NDTV. The incident took place in an area between N Kubin and Herakilo under the Haflong police station limits after the suspected militants entered the district from neighbouring Nagaland, unidentified police officers told NDTV. The gunfight broke out while personnel from the Assam Police Special Units and the Assam Rifles were conducting a search operation, unidentified police officers also told The Indian Express. The operation was launched on Saturday after the National Highways Authority of India in Dima Hasao received an extortion letter, the newspaper reported, citing a police statement. Details were also received about an armed group, allegedly responsible for the letter, hiding in the area, it added. 'This morning [Tuesday], the search parties came across an armed group, after almost 60 hours of the search, in the area between N Kubin-Hera Kilo,' the police said. 'The armed miscreants fired on the government forces, who retaliated. There was a heavy exchange of fire.' A cache of arms and ammunition was recovered from the site of the gunfight, according to NDTV. Several Naga groups, including the Isak-Muivah faction of the NSCN, claim that the Nagas neither agreed to be part of the Indian union, nor did they accept the Indian Constitution. The NSCN-IM is among the oldest such groups and had been engaged in a conflict with security forces for several decades. The Indian government signed a ceasefire agreement with the NSCN-IM in 1997. There was, however, little headway until 2015, when the Centre signed the Framework Agreement with the group – a development publicised as a breakthrough by both sides. Following this, conflicting claims about the agreement have led to a deadlock in the peace talks between the group and the Centre, including over the demand for a Naga flag and a separate Constitution. The NSCN-IM also claimed that the Centre had agreed to recognise the unique history of the Nagas and the concept of 'shared sovereignty'. However, the Centre rejected the claims and said that the group had misinterpreted the 2015 agreement. Over the past few years, the Assam government has also undertaken efforts to reintegrate militant groups in the state into the mainstream, according to The Indian Express. In 2023, a tripartite agreement was signed with the Dimasa National Liberation Army based in Dima Hasao. The district shares a border with both Nagaland and Manipur, where factions of the NSCN are active.
