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The Print
3 days ago
- Politics
- The Print
Chinese admiral sacked as Xi's purge of military brass continues, another CMC top dog still missing
Admiral Miao was the director of the CMC's political work department and was suspended from office, as announced by the Chinese Ministry of National Defence in November last year. At the time, he was 'suspected of serious violations of discipline'. The case surrounding Miao comes even as Second Vice Chairman of the CMC and Politburo member General He Weidong continues to remain missing since March. New Delhi: Admiral Miao Hua, a member of China's powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) which oversees armed forces operations, is suspected of 'legal violations', indicating charges against him are more serious than previously reported, and has been removed from the National People's Congress. However, in its latest statement, the political work department said it has been decided to remove Miao from China's top legislature—the National People's Congress—last month for 'suspected serious violations of discipline and law', the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported Friday. The political work department is responsible for ideological control and the management of personnel within the People's Liberation Army (PLA). According to the SCMP, the type of charges reported against Miao is more severe than what was first announced in November. Apart from this, no further details on the case have been reported till date. The news regarding Miao comes as another member of the CMC—He Weidong—continues to remain out of view of the public for almost three months. The missing General and Miao's downfall comes as Chinese President Xi Jinping continues his anti-graft drive amongst the top echelons of the PLA. A number of senior military officials, including two former ministers of defence, have been removed from their positions in recent years as a part of the anti-corruption drive. Miao was the seventh member of the all-powerful CMC to be removed from his post since Xi assumed power in 2012. In fact, one of Miao's predecessors, General Zhang Yang died by suicide in 2017, amidst an investigation into his ties with two disgraced former military individuals during Xi's anti-corruption drive at the time. Miao was the second CMC member to be removed from his position following the dismissal of Li Shangfu, the former minister of defence in 2023, since the current term of office for the leadership began in 2022. The CMC oversees the armed forces in China, in a change from other systems, where the role usually lies with the minister of defence. The minister of defence represents the PLA externally. The chairman of the CMC is President Xi, while there are two vice-chairpersons and other members of the powerful body. Xi has consistently pushed for ideological loyalty to the Communist Party amongst the senior leadership of the Chinese military. Miao remains a CMC member, however, his name no longer appears in the English website of the organisation. His career was shaped by Xi, with Miao becoming the youngest admiral in the PLA. He Weidong, the Second Vice Chairman of the CMC, missed a study session of the Politburo organised by President Xi in the end of April. His last public appearance is reported to have been on 11 March. Miao and He Weidong are the latest members of the CMC to come under the anti-corruption net. In June 2024, Li was expelled from the Communist Party and charged with graft. Li, a former head of the Rocket Force, was appointed Minister of Defence by Xi and held the post for roughly seven months before disappearing. His predecessor Wei Fenghe, who was also a commander in the Rocket Force was also expelled from the Communist Party on the same day as Li. (Edited by Ajeet Tiwari) Also Read: India helps China locate missing fishing vessel that capsized in Indian Ocean
Business Times
19-05-2025
- Business
- Business Times
Investment banks raise China's GDP forecast after tariff pause
[SHANGAHI] Global investment banks are raising their forecasts for China's economic growth this year, after Beijing and Washington agreed to a 90-day pause on tariffs, despite uncertainty around Sino-US trade negotiations. The deal reached between the US and China after bilateral talks in Geneva last weekend surpassed market expectations, as both sides agreed to significantly roll back most of the tariffs imposed on each other's goods since early April. The latest upgrade represents the third major revision by some banks in the past few months, largely due to rapidly evolving US trade policy under President Donald Trump and its impact on the world's second-largest economy. In mid-April, seven investment banks had downgraded their gross domestic product (GDP) forecasts for China to an average of about 4 per cent this year, compared to their previous predictions of 4.5 per cent. China's official target for full-year GDP is around 5 per cent. Here is a summary of some forecasts for China's GDP (new (previous)): CITI (2025: 4.7% (4.2%)) 'With trade tensions defused and domestic economy holding up well so far, we believe potential stimulus could be put on hold now. BT in your inbox Start and end each day with the latest news stories and analyses delivered straight to your inbox. Sign Up Sign Up 'We no longer expect any revision to the fiscal budget or government bond quota approved by the National People's Congress (NPC) for this year. If more support is warranted later, it is likely to come from policy banks or other quasi-fiscal tools, considering the PSL (pledged supplementary lending) rate was just cut.' UBS (2025: 4% (3.4%)) 'Lingering uncertainties may continue to weigh on corporate confidence, delay domestic capex plans, and lead to further supply chain shift outside of China. 'Front-loading of export shipments to the US may continue in the 90-day pause period, which may push up China's export growth in the near term but lead to a negative payback later this year.' Goldman Sachs (2025: 4.6% (4 %)), (2026: 3.8% (3.5%)) 'With the resumption of US-China trade talks, the left-tail risk of miscalculation between the US and China could be more contained vs. before, in our view. 'However, given still-elevated uncertainties around US-China relations, the private sector sentiment may remain fragile, and macro data could be volatile in coming months.' Commerzbank (2025: 4% (3.8%)) 'Beyond the 90-day period, it is too early to tell whether the truce will continue, and what the tariff rates will be. We also have doubts about the expansion in consumption despite Beijing's policy easing measures. 'Also, it is still unclear how the high-level plans on boosting household spending and income and supporting the service sector are being implemented at the local level. We therefore expect growth in H2 will be under pressure.' Societe Generale (2025: 4.6% (4%)), (2026: 4.2% (4%)) 'Probable export frontloading during the 90-day US-China tariff truce suggests we may not see sizeable weakening in overall economic momentum until mid-3Q. Therefore, Beijing will likely continue to withhold any significant increase in stimulus in the short term. 'There is a constant choice between maintaining economic stability and preserving policy room for worse outcomes, as the prospects of US-China negotiations remain uncertain. 'In terms of monetary policy, we are scaling back our easing calls to a 20-basis-point (bp) policy rate cut and a 50 bps reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cut by year-end, down from 40 bps and 100 bps previously.' Nomura (2025: 4.5% (4.0%)) 'The substantial tariff reduction will support a resumption of trade flows between the US and China, although its impact should not be overstated, as the remaining 30 per cent tariff could still depress exports of certain products, especially with the US economy slowing. 'The resumption of US-bound shipments will naturally reduce the need to re-route shipments. Front-loading will be inevitably followed by a significant payback effect after the 90-day pause ends on Aug 12. 'We still believe it will be quite challenging for Beijing to achieve its 'around 5 per cent' growth target unless it rolls out a sizable stimulus package. Considering the respite on the trade war, Beijing might be under less pressure to introduce the necessary stimulus and reforms.' REUTERS
Indian Express
13-05-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
Protracted conflict between India and Pakistan will mean tough choices for Russia and China
Written by Amit Kumar and Manoj Kewalramani On the intervening night of May 7 and May 8, India launched Operation Sindoor in response to a Pakistan-sponsored terror attack in Pahalgam, which claimed 26 innocent lives. India hit nine terror camps spread across Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK). India's strikes overlapped with Chinese President Xi Jinping's three-day visit to Russia. While the ensuing India-Pakistan conflict, which continued for another three days, was being watched closely around the world, it has certain ramifications for China-Russia relations as well. Jinping landed in Moscow on May 7, hours before India launched Operation Sindoor, to attend what Russia described as 'grandest ever' annual victory day parade on May 9 as its guest of honour. It marked his 11th visit to Russia since taking office in 2013. More than anything else, the visit was aimed at projecting and reaffirming the strength of the China-Russia relationship amid a turbulent external environment and shifting US policy. Despite the speculation around a potential rapprochement between Washington and Moscow amid the Trump administration's outreach, Russia's ties with the West remain difficult. Vladimir Putin has clear incentives to seek a rebalanced relationship with the US. But there is little certainty that any deal to that effect will be sustainable, given the deep antipathy towards Russia across the American domestic political spectrum. On the other hand, China believes it is locked in all-round strategic competition with the US. Jinping articulated this clearly in March 2023 during the session of the National People's Congress. China's framing of its response to Trump's 'Liberation Day' tariffs as a 'protracted war' are also indicative of this, as are its responses to US policy with regard to Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific at large. These concerns were reflected in three joint declarations that were issued after the Xi-Putin meeting. Each of these specifically underscore the threat perception with regard to the US, which Russia and China believe is pursuing a policy of 'dual containment'. A key component of this, the two sides argued, is the expansion of NATO, including in the Asia-Pacific. In fact, both sides were blunt in articulating that 'one of the strategic risks urgently needing elimination is the expansion of military alliances by certain nuclear-weapon states in sensitive regions surrounding other nuclear-weapon states'. Despite this strategic convergence, analysts and observers have, from time to time, pointed to existing tensions in China-Russia relationship. One such uncomfortable issue is the divergences in their outlooks with regard to India-Pakistan relations. The cross-cutting geopolitical cleavages involving the four countries complicate the China-Russia dynamics. Russia shares a 'privileged strategic partnership' with India, rooted in the experiences of the Cold War years. New Delhi is also Moscow's only major friend besides Beijing. This was evident in its reference to India, alongside China, as 'friendly sovereign global centers of power' in its Foreign Policy Concept paper released in 2023. Iran or North Korea, while close to Russia, are outcasts in the international order without any economic clout. Notwithstanding the friction in India-Russia relations owing to New Delhi's growing proximity and strategic convergence with Washington, bilateral relations remain strong. This has been evident in India's resistance amid pressure from the West since the war in Ukraine began, as it continued to engage Russia. Moreover, Russia's deep ties with India also serve as a strategic hedge vis-a-vis China. The Russia-Pakistan relationship, on the other hand, inherited the troubled past from the Cold War years. As a treaty ally of the US, Islamabad not only served as the base for American surveillance of Soviet territory but also played a central role in launching the Mujahideen resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. India-Pakistan enmity only compounded Moscow's calculations vis-a-vis Islamabad in the subsequent years. While Russia-Pakistan ties have improved since, the partnership is largely symbolic at present. China, in contrast, has a deep and long-standing relationship with Pakistan. The China-Pakistan entente, which began in early 1960s was, in large part, a product of a shared sense of strategic antipathy vis-a-vis India. Since then, the two have formed a symbiotic relationship, which is led by close defence ties. Today, Pakistan depends on China to achieve parity in conventional terms vis-a-vis India. Meanwhile, China counts on Pakistan to keep India preoccupied on its western border, thereby complicating New Delhi's resource allocation calculus and threatening a two-front confrontation. As the India-Pakistan conflict escalated rapidly after Indian strikes inside Pakistani territory on May 7, both China and Russia called for restraint and an early diffusion of the situation. China underlined that the situation was 'regrettable,' while calling on 'both sides to act in the larger interest of peace and stability'. Russia also took a similar tone, expressing that it was 'deeply concerned by the heightened military tensions' and called for 'restraint'. There were, however, important differences in their description of the source of the problem. Russia was categorical in terming the Pahalgam attack as an act of terrorism, while Beijing eschewed such framing. In fact, it was only on Saturday after the ceasefire was agreed that the Chinese government acknowledged that the Pahalgam attack was an act of terrorism. In any case, a protracted conflict between India and Pakistan will certainly mean tough choices for Moscow and Beijing. Beyond their different diplomatic stakes with India and Pakistan, Russia remains one of the largest weapons suppliers to India, while China is Pakistan's dominant defence partner. A prolonged war would likely result in India and Pakistan pressuring each of them to rush supplies and fulfill pending orders. Of course, this also gives both Beijing and Moscow some leverage over Islamabad and New Delhi respectively. Nevertheless, given their own strategic and security challenges, it is likely that China and Russia would prefer avoiding a situation like this. From a strategic perspective too, a lengthy conflict in the Indian subcontinent might further strengthen the US's role in the region, which would be a perverse outcome for both China and Russia. Kumar is a research analyst with Takshashila's Indo-Pacific Studies programme. Kewalramani is Fellow, China Studies and chairs the Indo-Pacific Studies programme at Takshashila Institution
Observer
12-05-2025
- Business
- Observer
State Council Chairman receives Chinese official
MUSCAT: Shaikh Abdulmalik bin Abdullah al Khalili, Chairman of the State Council, on Monday received Xiao Jie, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) of China, and his accompanying delegation during their two-day visit to the Sultanate of Oman. At the outset of the meeting, Shaikh Al Khalili welcomed the guest and his delegation, wishing them a pleasant stay. He highlighted the historical relations between Oman and China, expressing his aspiration to further develop bilateral ties across various fields and explore new avenues of cooperation under the wise leadership of His Majesty Sultan Haitham bin Tarik. The two sides reviewed bilateral relations and ways to enhance cooperation, in addition to exchanging views on regional and international issues of mutual interest. The Chairman of the State Council outlined the council's roles and responsibilities, including its efforts in studying key issues across various sectors, particularly in economic development in line with Oman Vision 2040. He emphasised the council's contributions to advancing the nation's development. The Chinese official expressed his pleasure with the visit and his delegation's eagerness to see further progress and prosperity in relations between the two nations. The meeting was attended by the Deputy Chairman of the State Council, several members and the Ambassador of China to Oman. Meanwhile, Tahir bin Mabkhout al Junaibi, Deputy Chairman of the Majlis Ash'shura, received at the Council's headquarters today Xiao Jie, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China, and his accompanying delegation. The Deputy Chairman praised the advanced relations between Oman and China, stressing the importance of further strengthening and expanding these ties to serve the mutual interests of both nations across various fields. — ONA
Mint
08-05-2025
- Business
- Mint
China's leaders reveal their plan to cope with 2025
It is not often that the world's two superpowers hold state-of-the-nation addresses back-to-back. But thanks to a quirk of scheduling and the magic of time zones, it happened this week. Li Qiang, China's prime minister, gave his annual report to the country's rubber-stamp parliament, the National People's Congress, in Beijing on March 5th. A few minutes later, President Donald Trump began a fiery speech to a joint session of Congress in Washington. The contrast was instructive. Mr Trump's speech, bombastic and bilious, was heckled by a congressman who had to be removed from the chamber for 'disruption of proper decorum". The president's words were punctuated by chants of 'usa, usa, usa!" and 'Fight, fight, fight!" and 'Na na na na, hey hey, goodbye!" Mr Li's speech had none of that. His audience—3,000 delegates assembled in the Great Hall of the People overlooking Tiananmen Square (pictured)—tried to look attentive. Tea was sipped, proper decorum preserved. Much of what Mr Li said was formulaic and predictable. As always, he heaped dutiful praise on his boss, Xi Jinping. But amid the platitudes and boilerplate, the fiscal numbers he provided were revealing about his government's mindset at a difficult time. China's economy faces a lingering property slump, chronic deflation and an intensifying trade war. The government's response has too much of what Mr Trump sorely lacks: caution. In his report, China's prime minister announced the same official economic growth target as last year: about 5%. He also provided a catalogue of ten 'major tasks" for the year ahead that echoed the list in 2024. Industrial modernisation, technological self-reliance and expanding domestic demand all featured prominently. But stimulating domestic spending was elevated from the third priority last year to the top task for 2025. Indeed, Mr Li mentioned consumption 32 times, a record. The previous peak (adjusted for the length of the speech) was 26 times in 2009, as China tried to revive spending in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Now, as then, the government is keen to restore consumer confidence, which has never recovered from the covid lockdowns. It also wants to steady the property market, which is struggling to find a bottom. Homeowners are no longer sure that their flats will hold their value. And homebuyers who have paid in advance are no longer confident their property will be built. These fears have contributed to a lack of demand and months of declining prices. America's trade war will not help. Mr Trump hit China with a fresh 10% tariff on the day before Mr Li's speech, following a similar duty a month earlier. Combined with older levies, they mean Chinese goods now face an average American tariff of about 34%, reckons Larry Hu of Macquarie, an Australian bank. China's government swiftly retaliated by imposing tariffs on a narrower range of American goods, from chicken to soyabeans. It also added more American firms to a blacklist that could curb their dealings with Chinese firms. 'If war is what the us wants, be it a tariff war, a trade war or any other type of war, we're ready to fight till the end," said the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To offset tariffs and deflation, China's economy needs a more forceful stimulus. 'It is better to act early than late," as Mr Li put it. Most economists have been expecting an extra fiscal push this year of about 2% of gdp or more. That would be enough to stop deflation worsening, though probably not much more. The fiscal package Mr Li actually announced had several parts. The target for this year's headline budget deficit will rise from 3% of gdp last year to 4% this year. The headline figure covers only a fraction of China's sprawling public finances, leaving out government-managed funds and financing vehicles sponsored by local governments, among other things. But the headline number sends an important signal. By tradition, China has tried to keep the official deficit at 3% of gdp or below, in keeping with old-fashioned international norms. A 4% deficit shows that it is willing to abandon fiscal piety for the sake of rescuing the economy. That was a good first step. As well as a bigger headline deficit, the central government will also loosen the financial reins on local governments. It will increase the quota of 'special bonds" they can sell from 3.9trn yuan ($540bn) last year to 4.4trn this year. These securities were once reserved for infrastructure projects that can earn some revenue. But local governments can now use the money to buy unsold flats and idle land from property developers. The larger quota was close to expectations: a satisfactory second step. But on the third step, the speech fell somewhat short. The central government will itself sell another batch of 'special" bonds worth 1.8trn yuan, including 500bn yuan to help recapitalise China's banks. That is more than it sold last year. But the figure is about 700bn yuan below expectations. All told, economists expect China's broad fiscal deficit to increase by a little less than 2% of gdp (see chart 1). The style of China's stimulus was also mildly disappointing. In the past the government has lavished money on bridges to nowhere and other white elephants. Whereas America fights downturns by printing money, China pours concrete. In his speech Mr Li promised to give greater priority to 'improving the people's well-being" and 'boosting consumption". The central government will, for example, devote 300bn yuan to its 'trade-in" scheme which encourages households to replace old appliances and cars with newer ones. China has also given civil servants a pay rise. And it will up medical-insurance subsidies for rural folk and city dwellers who are not covered by work-based schemes. Annual subsidies would rise to 700 yuan per person, an increase of 4.5%, according to the budget. The same groups will receive an increase in their basic pensions of 20 yuan a month, similar to last year. That is a large rise in percentage terms (almost 40% over two years) but tiny in absolute amounts. Nonetheless, of the extra fiscal stimulus provided this year, only about a quarter is related to consumption, calculates Robin Xing of Morgan Stanley. Boosting consumption is not the only priority. A new 'guidance fund" will also mobilise 1trn yuan in venture capital for new technologies. The budget for national defence will rise by 7.2%, before adjusting for inflation. In the past, China's economy has kept pace with increased military spending, through a mix of real growth and inflation (see chart 2). As a result, the official military budget has remained fairly steady as a percentage of gdp, fluctuating around 1.3%. But now that China has slower growth and deflation, the equation has changed. Last year, for example, gdp grew by only 4.2% in nominal terms, before adjusting for changing prices. Will the same thing happen this year? The government does not give a growth forecast for nominal gdp. But the fiscal arithmetic in Mr Li's speech implies he expects it to grow by about 4.9%. Since that is slower than the target for real, inflation-adjusted growth, the government must believe that economy-wide prices could fall again this year. Not even the government, then, expects their stimulus efforts to succeed in decisively defeating deflation. In his very different speech in Washington, America's president said he was looking forward to relentless success. 'Our country is on the verge of a comeback the likes of which the world has never witnessed," he said. More prudent leaders like to underpromise in the hope of overdelivering. But in the fight against deflation, that may be the wrong approach. Gloom can be self-fulfilling. In trying to restore confidence and revive animal spirits, then, a dash of bravado probably helps. The back-to-back speeches offered a stark contrast. Both would have been better if each had more closely resembled the other. Subscribers can sign up to Drum Tower, our new weekly newsletter, to understand what the world makes of China—and what China makes of the world.
