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Asia Times
22-05-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
Plot against Diem in a house divided: Washington, Langley, Saigon
These materials are reproduced from with the permission of the National Security Archive. Washington, DC, May 22, 2025 – Early in the morning of October 7, 1963, the top leadership of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) gathered in the office of the director of central intelligence (DCI) to discuss the brewing crisis in South Vietnam and America's role in it. DCI John McCone warned his colleagues: 'Under no circumstances' should 'the Agency get into the subject of assassination or other highly sensitive matters with [US Ambassador Henry Cabot] Lodge.' The Ambassador had 'no concept of security,' McCone added, and tended to use the press to enhance his power, presumably at the expense of the CIA, according to a recently declassified account of the meeting published today by the National Security Archive (Document 9).[1] Twenty-six days later, South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were executed as part of a military coup d'état that would further destabilize the Southeast Asian country for years to come. In the years since, the extent of the US role in the coup and assassination has been hotly debated and disputed. For over two decades, the late John Prados shed light on the Kennedy administration's position toward the Diem coup in a series of National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Books.[2] This new EBB supplements those publications with recently declassified documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the JFK Assassination Files, the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, and the personal papers of George McTurnan Kahin, a prominent scholar on Southeast Asia and early critic of the Vietnam war.[3] It highlights the role of key CIA players – McCone, CIA Far East Division Chief William Colby, CIA Saigon Chief of Station John H. Richardson and contract officer Lucien Conein – and provides new details on how the coup emerged, almost organically, despite indecision, divisions between the leading agencies and bitter rivalries among the individual officials in charge. With Colby and McCone opposed to the coup, Conein, who was trusted by Lodge and keen to follow the ambassador's orders, became the key player on the ground. From the very beginning, government secrecy, obfuscation, lies, and the incomplete and contradictory statements of key American participants confused the record.[4] Less than two weeks after the coup against Diem, and on the day that President John F. Kennedy was assassinated, McCone – joined by Colby – told the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) that the CIA 'had no part in organizing the coup' and 'did not have information on and does not know about the assassinations of Diem and Nhu,' according to a document that was fully declassified for the first time this year as part of the final JFK assassination documents release (Document 18). Yet, a dozen years later, Colby, then the DCI and speaking to congressional investigators, expressed a more introspective tone and acknowledged the Agency role: 'I think when you support a coup through violent overthrow you have to understand that you are taking responsibility for people getting killed. Soldiers got killed and the head of the other side [Diem] got killed.'[5] Additional documents declassified last year under the FOIA, including a detailed CIA chronology of the entire episode, show that the US encouraged the coup plotters to take 'the earliest possible action' and provided assurances, money and other support that together 'constituted a clear call for action' (Documents 7 and 19). By the late summer of 1963, as meetings between the CIA's Lucien Conein and the plotting South Vietnamese generals continued, Washington had settled, based on Ambassador Lodge's recommendations, on a position of 'not thwarting' a coup, according to a document released earlier this year in response to a FOIA request from the National Security Archive (Document 8). Langley also instructed Conein to review the generals' plans, with the exclusion of any assassination plots. The US also promised that military aid would continue once the generals had removed the Diem regime. Caught off guard as the coup started, having received a much shorter warning than anticipated, Conein handed over the rough equivalent of $68,000 in bribes 'to reward opposition military units who joined the coup group,' according to a now declassified report from the CIA Inspector General (Document 19, below)), and sent frequent reports to Saigon and Langley from the Generals' headquarters (Document 17). Document 19 – Fully declassified CIA Inspector General report provides new details on US government role in coup against Diem This newly available historical evidence shows that the US was deeply involved with the key players who would ultimately overthrow and kill Diem and his brother, up to and including the day of the coup. While Colby and McCone were clearly opposed to the coup and made the strongest arguments against it, the senior CIA officials were overruled by the president and outmaneuvered by Lodge. In the end, they and their CIA colleagues 'faithfully carried out instructions' to support the coup-plotting generals, according to a long-awaited and now fully declassified CIA Inspector General report on the episode (Document 19).[6] Other notable documents published today include: An August 30 telegram from a CIA Saigon Station officer (likely Conein) reporting on an explicit discussion among the coup-plotting South Vietnamese generals about the need to assassinate President Diem for the success of the regime-change operation (Document 3). Reports providing additional details on Langley's initial reluctance to overthrow Diem – partly due to the Agency's long-standing relationship with his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu (Documents 4, 6, and 13). Documents showing that the US Embassy in Saigon was mired in dysfunction and mistrust, with Lodge blaming CIA Chief of Station John Richardson for the August coup failure and Richardson finding Lodge too gung-ho and untrustworthy (Documents 6 and 7). Records on McCone and Colby's growing distrust of, and contempt for, Ambassador Lodge, culminating in their failed opposition to replacing Richardson as CIA Chief of Station (Document 9). The fully declassified CIA personnel file on Lucien Conein—who would be awarded the CIA's 'intelligence star' for his efforts during the South Vietnamese crisis of 1963—suggests he played a more prominent role than previously acknowledged (Document 22). A document found among the personal papers of George McTurnan Kahin suggesting a new version of – and a new rationale for – the South Vietnamese generals' decision to murder Diem and Nhu: that, if they survived, Washington might change its mind and reinstate them in power (Document 23). Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem When the US government desires the overthrow of a foreign government, the ideal scenario for policymakers is that the US plays a minimal, deniable role, and that the government speaks with one voice. Part of the challenge in ascertaining the degree of US involvement in the overthrow and assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem – aside from secrecy – is the fact that the Kennedy administration's position toward the South Vietnamese president in the summer and fall of 1963 was marked by division, indecision, oscillation, distrust and bureaucratic chicanery. In retrospect, the fate of Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, was sealed during the 'Buddhist Crisis' of May 1963. On June 11, the images of the self-immolation of Buddhist Monk Thích Quang Duc in the name of religious freedom shocked the world and focused attention – including in Washington, DC – on the autocratic, repressive, unstable and corrupt nature of Diem's regime.[7] Diem and Nhu – the head of South Vietnam's secret police – began to be perceived as incapable of leading a united South Vietnam against the communist threat. By August 1963, several US officials had become so disgruntled with Diem, especially in the White House and State Department, that they began taking formal steps to create the conditions for a coup. On August 24, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger A. Hilsman sent a now-infamous State Department telegram (deptel) No. 243 to Saigon (first published in National Security Archive EBB 302 of 2009). Deptel 243 asked the embassy to make clear to the Vietnamese military that the US would support a new interim government. The ambassador and the country team were asked to 'urgently examine alternative leadership' and to make 'detailed plans' on how to 'bring about Diem's replacement if this should become necessary' (Document 19). Two documents now confirm that the CIA played no role in drafting deptel 243 and was not consulted during the decision-making process. Instead, Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms was only notified of the deptel once it had been cleared with 'Hyannis Port,' that is, with President Kennedy (Documents 16 and 19). US Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge In Saigon, CIA Chief of Station John Richardson later reported that Lodge interpreted the telegram as marching orders to orchestrate a coup (Document 9). Two days later, a CIA station telegram that was probably responsive to instructions from Washington further specified the position that the embassy and the station would take in their dealings with the coup plotters. Ambassador Lodge said the operation should be deniable; the US hand should not show. The telegram also contained nine points to guide the country team's approach to the generals. These included an agreement that Nhu had to go but also that the fate of Diem was up to the generals themselves. The document confirmed the US posture of deniability, telling the generals: 'Win or lose. Don't expect to be bailed out.' And yet, it also sets a clear system of incentives for the generals to proceed: Unless the Nhus were removed from power and the Buddhists were freed, the generals could expect an end to financial and military support (Document 1). As the CIA team was getting ready to meet the generals based on these guidelines, the situation changed on August 29. In the morning, CIA Chief of Station Richardson, CIA contract agent Lucien Conein and CIA station officer Alphonse Spera were shown a telegram from General Maxwell Taylor to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Commander Paul Harkins. The telegram hinted that Washington had 'second thoughts' regarding the coup (Document 7). With a meeting with the Generals already scheduled, Richardson ordered Conein and Spera to proceed but to provide no iron-clad assurances regarding US support. Having met with the generals, the CIA reported to Washington that they had a 'plan for a coup d'etat and will implement it when they are assured that the US government is fully behind them.' As proof of support, the generals asked the US to cut aid to the South Vietnamese government. The suspension of aid would signal U.S. support and alter the balance of forces in Saigon against Diem.[8] On the 30th, an exchange between the president and Lodge made clear that – while Washington had not completely changed its mind on a coup – Kennedy wanted to keep his options open until the last minute and support a coup only if it would be successful. As he told Lodge, 'When we go, we must go to win, but it will be better to change our minds than to fail.'[9] Lodge agreed with the president but also warned that – since this was primarily a Vietnamese affair – the U.S. government might not have the option to stop the coup once one was in motion.[10] General Duong Van Minh – Also known as Big Minh, one of the coup leaders. In the early afternoon of the 30th, the embassy in Saigon sent a telegram to the State Department. The telegram reported a conversation between a CIA CAS [controlled American source] officer (likely Conein) and Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao, who had recently attended a dinner with the plotting generals. Thao explained that Generals Tran Thien Khiem and Nguyen Khanh agreed to support General Duong Van Minh's coup, provided that Diem and Nhu were killed during the coup attempt. 'Generals,' the document continued, 'said that if first step of attempted coup is successful, i.e. the assassination of President Diem, they would then support the coup openly' (Document 3). Document 3 – South Vietnamese Generals openly discuss assassinating Diem. Half an hour later, the embassy reported with some apprehension that General Khiem, one of the main coup plotters, had been called to the Presidential Palace and had spent several hours there, while at the same time refusing to take US calls.[11] The coup seemed to be in peril. By the following day, the coup had indeed petered out. The US government had refused to cut US aid as the generals had requested.[12] General Khiem also claimed that the Generals did not have a favorable balance of forces, an assessment Harkins agreed with.[13] On September 10, during a PFIAB meeting, CIA director McCone expressed relief that the plan had been aborted (Document 4). He denied Vietnamese press allegations that the agency was behind efforts to remove Diem from power and said the plan to 'unload the Nhus' (contained in deptel 243) was misguided. The decision to send such a telegram was the result of 'miscalculation of the generals' true capabilities and intentions.' McCone reassured the Agency's overseers that such a policy was now on the backburner (Document 4). John McCone, director of central intelligence. In Saigon, though, the failure of the August coup became a main element of contention between the CIA, especially Richardson, and Lodge. The former believed that the coup had failed because the generals did not have the capabilities to carry it out, regardless of the extent of US assurances. In Richardson's assessment, 'there was a clear distinction between our full encouragement and actually being in a position to put together the ingredients for a successful coup' (Document 7). Lodge, though, came to see Richardson and his unwillingness to explicitly support the generals as the main reason for the August coup failure (Document 7). In mid-September, Lodge started calling for Richardson to be replaced as chief of station by General Edward Lansdale. On September 18, the prospect was raised during a meeting among McCone, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman (Document 5). While no clear policy on how to deal with Diem emerged during the meeting, several concerns were raised regarding the United States' and especially the CIA's relationship with Nhu. The CIA had been having weekly meetings with Nhu, and one was upcoming. Since Lodge was opposed, it was agreed to cancel the meeting. US officials continued to disagree on the future of Nhu. On the matter of replacing Richardson, McCone expressed his 'unalterable opposition' to sending Lansdale as new chief of station (Document 5). McCone repeated his opposition one day later in a strongly worded and personal letter to Lodge. 'General Lansdale,' McCone wrote, 'would not be acceptable to the organization nor to me personally' (Document 6).[14] The CIA's director was also very critical of Lodge's treatment of Richardson. Despite Lodge's claims that he had no problems with Richardson, intelligence collected by the Agency pointed to Lodge's efforts to ostracize Richardson. McCone did recognize, though, that Richardson was close to Nhu and believed that – were a coup to go ahead – he probably should be replaced (Document 6).[15] Lucien Conein, CIA contract officer and main U.S. liaison with the coup-plotting generals. In early October, the CIA's meetings with the generals restarted. By now, Conein had become the Agency's main point of contact with the Generals. Lodge, unlike Richardson, trusted him to execute his directives.[16] In a meeting on the 2nd between General Minh and Conein, the former asked for a confirmation of US posture towards a coup and assurances that the US would not 'thwart' a coup if one were to get underway. Minh stated that the Generals did not require US support and outlined three main options: i) the assassination of Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, keeping Diem in office, ii) the encirclement of Saigon by various military units, or iii) a direct confrontation between the coup plotters and the remaining troops (Document 19). On the 5th, Lodge asked State for confirmation of what Conein should tell the general the next time they met. Lodge agreed that the US should state that they would not thwart a coup; Conein should also offer to review the generals' plans, except for the assassination plans (Document 8). On the same day, a telegram to Lodge confirmed US government policy. 'No initiative should now be taken' the telegram read, 'to give any active covert encouragement to a coup.' US officials should work to identify possible alternative leadership, but this effort had to be 'secure and fully deniable,' as well as separated from the normal reporting work.[17] Two days later, on October 7, the crippling dysfunction and mistrust between Richardson and Lodge became evident during a meeting among McCone, Colby and Richardson, who had been temporarily recalled to the US (Document 9). Participants criticized the extensive compartmentalization of information and dysfunction in Saigon, with Lodge cutting the CIA country team out of the decision-making process. CIA leadership speculated that Lodge had used press leaks to further his position and undermine Richardson. The distrust between Lodge and the Agency had reached a boiling point. The State Department was also on the case. It wrote Lodge that David Halberstam had a quote from him stating that he would have been happier with a new CIA station chief. State asked for the leaks to stop and to work together to 'ensure a more accurate reflection of our common commitment to a single governmental policy.'[18] As detailed above, the assassination of Diem and Nhu had been openly discussed by the generals with CIA operatives as an essential element to the planned August coup (Document 3). In October, when the assassination (of Nhu and Can) was listed as one of the Generals' preferred options, a controversy ensued as to what the US government posture should be. With Richardson out, Acting CIA Saigon Chief of Station Dave Smith told Langley that he had discussed the latest Conein-Minh meeting with Lodge and his deputy William C. Trueheart. Smith recommended that 'we do not set ourselves irrevocably against assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a bloodbath in Saigon or a protracted struggle.' Having received Smith's cable and perhaps already unwilling to discuss assassination with Lodge, McCone sent a stern reply (written by Colby) to withdraw Smith's recommendation since the US could 'not be in a position of actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore.' A CIA cable from Saigon confirmed that McCone's directive had been acted upon, and that Lodge shared the DCI's view (Document 19). This exchange played a prominent role in the 1970s Congressional Investigations. Members of the Church Committee pointed out that McCone's directive – written by Colby – conformed with other last-minute telegrams that had been sent to distance the US government from any involvement in assassination.[19] A 'CYA' effort in the words of one of the Senators. During Colby's testimony, a key element of contention became whether Conein, the main contact with the generals, had been made aware of McCone's directive regarding assassination.[20] At the hearing, Colby had no specific answer. In a later correspondence between the CIA's William Elder and William Miller of the Senate Select Committee, the former had to admit that the cable traffic on the matter remained unclear (Document 21). As General Minh's conspiracy against Diem picked up steam, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) held an off-the-record meeting on October 8 to discuss the South Vietnamese general's coup proposal.[21] Although McCone and McNamara cautioned against Minh's plans, President Kennedy liked the proposal – given that it allowed the US to deny its involvement. 'I don't know whether Big Minh's going to do it or not,' the President explained, 'The only thing is, as I understand our position is, well, if he does it, all right, and if you don't do it, all right. We're not now – all this – the only difference is, we're not now going to him and asking him to do it.'[22] The coup was back on. The CIA's Conein became the key liaison between the US government and the coup-plotting South Vietnamese generals. While CIA headquarters expressed some concerns regarding a possible set-up and an effort by General Tran Van Don to – at a minimum – entrap Conein, the meetings continued.[23] In late October, Conein met Don at a dentist's office in Saigon to gauge Washington's appetite for a coup. Don told Conein that the generals were not ready to share the coup plan, but that he would receive it two days before the start of the coup. An agreement was reached that, when the coup began, Conein would be invited to the Joint General Staff (JGS) headquarters to secure a direct line of communication between the coup plotters and Ambassador Lodge. Before a redacted section, the last available paragraph reads: 'Without being questioned on this point, Gen. Don stated that Generals' Committee had come to the conclusion that the entire Ngo family had to be eliminated from the political scene in Vietnam'[24] A few days after the meeting, Lodge informed the Generals that Conein was authorized to speak for Lodge.[25] On October 26, less than a week before the coup, several American officials began to get jittery over the conspiracy against Diem. In a message to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, Lodge stated that he was unconvinced that a coup would take place, as he was not sure General Don had 'the iron in his soul' (Document 10). Lodge agreed with Bundy that a failed coup might have had negative repercussions for the US from 'persons who wish to damage us.' Yet, if the US government played its cards correctly, Lodge still believed that the US would be able to maintain a 'very vigorous denial' that it had played any role in the coup. Three days before the coup, top US officials met at the White House again to discuss the prospects and consequences of overthrowing Diem, but they remained divided (Document 11). Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor stated that, regardless of the outcome, a coup would be 'disastrous.' Building on Taylor, DCI McCone considered it unwise not to reconsider the US posture since the military adviser to the President (Taylor) was counseling against the overthrow of Diem and Nhu. The President worried about the risk of protracted fighting. Robert F. Kennedy doubted whether the US should proceed with a plan that might either fail or create instability even in case of success, especially since a coup might undermine the war effort. Bundy argued that the US could not reverse course and abandon the coup plotters. The record of the meeting makes clear that Washington had widespread knowledge of a growing conspiracy against Diem. The meeting concluded with an agreement to send a cable for a new assessment of the coup's prospects (Document 11). Four hours later, at another meeting in the White House, President Kennedy's doubts receded as he explained that 'the burden of proof should be on the coup promoters to show that they can overthrow the Diem government and not create a situation in which there would be a draw.'[26] The President was clear: he wanted a successful coup. That same day, from Saigon, Lodge dismissed Washington's concerns that a coup climate might remove the element of surprise since such a climate had existed for months (Document 12). Lodge also reminded US officials that the generals had not shown any reliance on UD support, nor had they made any specific request for support. If anything, they had demanded 'the least possible American involvement.' Lodge– aiming to strengthen confidence in Washington – was also firm in summarizing the US role. 'A point which must be completely understood is that we are not engineering this coup.' Under orders not to thwart the coup, the US role had been limited to observing and reporting developments and would rely on Conein's long-standing relationship with the generals. Lodge warned that requests for financial and military support had not yet been made but might be forthcoming in the future. Lodge concluded by restating that there was no way of stopping the coup except by betraying it to Diem. He also noted that – since the generals have moved from a 48- to a four-hour warning – he would not have time to check with Washington when the coup started. Consequently, Washington would not have the option to influence events on the ground. Even at this late stage, Colby provided a strong defense of Nhu – who had become the symbol of South Vietnamese instability for those in Washington who favored a coup (Document 13).[27] Nhu, Colby wrote, had been undermined by his reputation as 'intriguing, sinister and ruthless' and by his wife's 'harsh and sometimes hysterical utterances.' But Nhu had also been very supportive of US-backed initiatives, such as the strategic hamlet program. He had been successful in establishing the Republican Youth, though Colby did acknowledge the movement's 'fascistic' tendencies and the 'Potemkin village' character of this (and many other) ventures. Ultimately, Colby wrote, Nhu 'represents a strong, reasonably well-oriented, and efficient potential successor to Diem, and the image problems could be addressed through propaganda efforts. 'Nhu is a desirable rather than a catastrophic candidate.' On the same day, October 30, debates regarding Washington's options to stop the coup continued, with Lodge stressing that the only option was to betray the coup to Diem (Document 14). While Conein was set to meet the generals, Lodge also warned against sharing the Generals' coup plans with the US military, since the generals believed that it was US military personnel in Saigon who had leaked information to Diem. Lodge also made clear that he was prepared to wash his hands of Diem's fate and would stress to Vietnamese authorities that if President Diem, the commander in chief of the armed forces, proved unable to stop the coup, then there is nothing that the ambassador could do. Finally, Lodge also explained his views on making US funds available for the plotters: They should be made available only if they could be passed discreetly and the US government assessed that the coup would likely succeed. The coup started on November 1 at 1315 Saigon time. Conein was told only two hours in advance. He was asked to join the generals at the JGS headquarters and to take as much money with him as he could. Conein took 5 million piastres that had been stored in a safe in his house (Document 19). Various versions exist as to what use was made of the money. Having previously warned that the generals were likely to request money, Lodge was seemingly left out of the decision to pass the money on the day of the coup (Document 19). During his testimony to the Senate Select Committee, Conein said the money had come from the CIA and for non-controversial purchases like 'rice and bread' for troops – 'the most important thing' – and to set up medical facilities.[28] Then-DCI Colby told a different version in his testimony, stating that the money had been used to 'reward certain opposition units who joined the coup' and that there had been a second transfer of money the following day to provide insurance for the families of those who had died in the coup.[29] He later downplayed the role of the money transfer but admitted that it was likely used to buy the loyalty of additional troops.[30] The issue was so controversial that the part of the CIA Inspector General's report pertaining to the payoffs was not unredacted until 2024. Furthermore, Walter Elder, during an investigation in the aftermath of the 'Family Jewels' directive, told Colby that the 'accounting' for Conein's money 'and its use has never been very frank or complete.'[31] Document 22 – CIA's Lucien Conein is awarded the Intelligence Star for his role in the coup against Diem. In any case, as the coup was underway, Conein and other CIA assets sent regular reports about developments, providing a detailed analysis of the generals' thinking and their evolving views on Diem (Document 17). At one point, Conein reported that the generals were attempting to contact the presidential palace but without success. Their ultimatum was that, if the president were to resign immediately, they would guarantee his safety. If he refused, the palace would be attacked within an hour by air force and armored cars. As Conein wrote, the 'ultimatum appears final.' Later in the day, Conein reported that the generals had 'firmly decided there to be no rpt no discussion with the president. He will either say yes or no and that is the end of the conversation.' A later report said they were 'preparing heavy air bombardment on palace immediately.' Diem and his brother Nhu were eventually captured and assassinated in the back of an armored vehicle. Two controversies still surround their final hours. First, at one point, the generals asked for a plane to take Diem out of the country. Having reported the request to Acting Chief of Station Smith, Conein was told that 24 hours were needed to find a plane that could take Diem to the first country that would offer him asylum. Church Committee investigators identified this as a crucial decision in the Diem coup. Rhett Dawson, Minority Counsel in the Church Committee, wrote to Fritz Schwartz, the committee's chief counsel, that it was recommended that 'the committee examine McGeorge Bundy and others, if necessary, on the delays in air evacuation to asylum.' During congressional testimonies, several US officials, including Conein, Colby and Bundy, were indeed asked about the delay, but nobody could explain who had made the decision and why. As Dawson wrote, the decision 'casts a pall over American involvement in the assassinations of Diem and Nhu.'[32] A second element remains unclear when trying to ascertain the US role in the coup. The uncertainty is largely due to the different versions of events that have emerged over the years, primarily through one of its main protagonists: Lucien Conein. The problem with Conein, as journalist Stanley Karnow explained, 'is that he told you these marvelous stories, but they didn't always pan out.'[33] When asked by the Church Committee how the assassination happened, Conein testified that he had been caught by surprise. In fact, with the generals, he had worked on preparing the JGS for the arrival of the media and for a peaceful transfer of power.[34] The Generals, as he told the Committee, decided to kill Diem only at the last minute, angered by Diem's decision to secretly abandon the palace and defy the delegation sent for his surrender. In later years, Conein repeated the same version of events, with an emphasis on the peaceful transfer of power in various TV interviews.[35] Even before the Church Committee investigations, though, Conein had provided a different version. During a 1971 NBC News program, 'Vietnam Hindsight, Part II: The Death of Diem,' Conein explained how – when the generals wavered – he had offered incitement and support. As he recalled, he told the Generals, 'Once you are into the attack, you must continue. If you hesitate, you are going to be lost.' More importantly, Conein claimed that he could not explicitly discuss the Generals' decision on Diem, as he knew they were part of a 'blood oath' and he did not want to divulge 'privileged information.' However, Conein did agree that the generals' decision was not a last-minute one. There had been a vote among the generals, and they had decided to assassinate Diem (Document 20). In 1981, the Generals' decision to kill Diem was confirmed by General Tran Van Don.[36] Don admitted that the generals feared a change of heart by the United States. If Diem had been kept prisoner, 'perhaps after three months the Americans would have replaced him and the generals by bringing back the Nhus' (Document 23). A certain degree of mystery and obfuscation, then, remains regarding Diem's final hours and Conein's role in the coup. The 2025 release of Conein's personnel file seems to confirm that Conein was no mere passive spectator of the coup, as he was awarded the 'intelligence star' for his services during those critical months in Vietnam (Document 22). An intelligence star is awarded 'for a voluntary act or acts of courage performed under hazardous conditions or for services rendered with distinction under conditions of great risk.'[37] This suggests that the CIA saw Conein as much more than a simple bystander to the evolving coup. Document 1 Office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador (cover name for CIA Saigon Station) Telegram for CIA, Washington, D.C., [Role of U.S., Harkins, Conein, Spera], Secret, August 26, 1963 Aug 26, 1963 Source FOIA 2025 Release No. 239723 This important telegram from the CIA's Saigon station records a meeting shortly after Lodge's arrival that set the posture for U.S. actions going forward. At the meeting, Lodge decided that the 'American official hand should not show,' and there was agreement that Conein and Spera would limit contacts to only a few of the Generals. Importantly, the document also contains the nine points—based on DepTel 243—that Conein was to relate to the Generals. These included an agreement that the 'Nhu's [sic] must go' but that the 'question of retaining Diem or not up to them,' meaning the Generals themselves. The U.S. would not provide aid in the initial phase of the coup. 'Entirely their own action. Win or lose. Don't expect to be bailed out.' The U.S. would provide support to an interim government, however, and there were clear incentives for the Generals to carry out the coup: 'If Nhu's do not go and if Buddhist situation is not redressed as indicated, we would find it impossible [to] continue military and economic support.' Conein and Spera were also to convey to the Generals that the U.S. 'hoped bloodshed can be avoided or reduced to absolute minimum.' Document 2 General Paul D. Harkins, Commander Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Telegram for General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [Assessment of Situation in Vietnam], Top Secret/Eyes Only, Undated (circa late August 1963) Aug 1063 Source Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, White House Office Files, National Security Adviser, Saigon Embassy Files Kept by Ambassador Graham Martin: Copies Made for the NSC Staff 1963-1975 (hereafter GRFL Saigon Embassy Files) Box 8, Folder 'Henry Cabot Lodge, Including Diem Coup, 1963-65 (2)' This document sheds light on MACV Commander Paul Harkins' thinking when he said in a previous (and still classified) telegram that the 'die [was] cast.' According to Harkins, the U.S. government would lose all credibility if it withdrew support from the Generals in their effort to remove the Nhus. Interestingly, Harkins seems to point to a relatively strong U.S. role. 'Generals,' he writes, 'will not move without US support, and until detailed tactical plans are drawn, and forces aligned,' but the U.S. was cut out from the military planning. According to Harkins, the U.S. should not abandon two parallel efforts: supporting the Generals and continuing to reach out to Diem, but Harkins recognizes that Lodge disagrees with this double track. Harkins remains hopeful that 'skillful execution' could permit the Generals and the U.S. to achieve their objectives with minimal bloodshed. Document 3 U.S. Embassy Saigon telegram to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, [CIA Officer Conversations with Vietnamese Generals About Coup], Secret, August 30, 1963 Aug 30, 1963 Source John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, National Security File, Vietnam General, Folder, 'August 1963 24-31, CIA cables JFKNSF-198-009' The telegram reports a conversation between a CIA [CAS] officer and Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao. While we don't know the identify of the CIA officer, the colonel worked in the Strategic Hamlets Program; something Conein was heavily involved in. The colonel reports to Conein an explosive conversation among the plotting Generals during a dinner: The Generals openly discuss the assassination of Diem and Nhu. The two assassinations are considered a key step in gaining the loyalty of Generals Khiem and Khan. 'Generals said,' the document continues, 'that if first step of attempted coup is successful, i.e. the assassination of President Diem, they would then support the coup openly.' This document contradicts various statements by U.S. officials that the assassination of Diem was never in the cards during coup plotting. Document 4 A. R. Ash, Memorandum for the File, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 'Board Panel on Covert Action Operations,' Top Secret, September 10, 1963 Sep 10, 1963 Source John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (JFKAR), 2025 release, No. 206-10001-10016 At a meeting of the PFIAB, CIA officials deny recent press allegations that the Agency is behind efforts to remove Diem from power. The document also confirms the CIA's opposition to the August 24 telegram, which is described as 'hastily prepared' and a directive to 'unload the Nhus'—a signal to the Generals to 'get going.' According to the Agency, the telegram was the result of 'miscalculation of the Generals' true capabilities and intentions.' The Agency is pleased to see that, since then, the policy has been put on the back burner. Document 5 DCI John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Record, 'Discussion – Secretary Rusk's conference room – Tuesday evening – 6:00 p.m. – 16 September 1963,' Secret/Eyes Only, September 18, 1963 Sep 18, 1963 Source FOIA 2022 Release No. C06315672 At the start of the meeting, Rusk reports Lodge's request to replace CIA Chief of Station John Richardson with Edward Lansdale; something to be discussed with the President the following day. The group discusses a series of papers by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman that has identified two possible courses of action for U.S. policy in Vietnam: Track I would entail continuing to work with Diem, Track II would include progressively stronger measures to remove him. The paper and the two tracks are discussed, and an agreement is reached to modify them. There is, however, no agreement on policy toward removing Diem, with Under Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman in favor of replacing him and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara opposed. DCI McCone expresses no opinion but simply restates that separating Diem from Nhu is unlikely. Several concerns emerge regarding the U.S. and the CIA relationship with Nhu. The CIA has had weekly meetings with Nhu, with another one upcoming. With Lodge opposed, it is agreed to cancel the meeting, unless Lodge changes his mind. Views on the future of Nhu also diverge, with Harriman favoring the 'disposal of Nhu at all costs' and McNamara preferring a continued relation with him for the sake of continuing the war. As to replacing Richardson, it is agreed that further consultation is needed between McCone and Lodge, but Bundy reports the Agency's 'unalterable opposition' to Lansdale. According to McCone, Lansdale was unacceptable to the Agency due to 'past experience with him.' Document 6 DCI John A. McCone Letter for Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Secret/Eyes Only, September 19, 1963 Sep 19, 1963 Source FOIA 2024 Release No. C06593402 In this revealing letter, McCone flatly rejects Lodge's request to send Edward Lansdale as replacement for John Richardson as CIA Chief of Station in Saigon. Operatives need to be experts in Agency tradecraft and they have to be acceptable to the organization. 'General Lansdale,' McCone writes, 'would not be acceptable to the organization nor to me personally.' McCone is also explicit in criticizing Lodge's approach to Richardson, based on intelligence he has collected. Despite Lodge's claims that he has no problems with Richardson, there was extensive evidence suggesting that Lodge had tried to remove Richardson from the post. McCone does acknowledge that Richardson is close to the regime, including Nhu, and is of the opinion that the U.S. should continue working with the Diem regime. If the decision is taken to go ahead with a coup, Richardson should probably be replaced. McCone suggests that a possible role for Lansdale would be to simply have informal meetings with Diem. McCone also expresses his and the Agency's skepticism regarding the coup. There is no evidence that the regime can be 'disposed of' nor that a new regime would be better. McCone concludes by reporting a conversion with former president Dwight Eisenhower ('Ike'), who had lots of experience working with an intransigent Diem and who felt that 'his manner of governing his people … would come to no good end.' But Eisenhower also urged the U.S. to use 'great care and deliberation,' as 'carrying off a coup is no small task and even if successful the aftermath has its own special problems.' Eisenhower is also 'distressed over the violent press' and worried that the situation 'might make careful, objective appraisals difficult as was the case in Cuba in 1958.' Document 7 John H. Richardson, CIA Saigon Chief of Station, Memorandum for DCI John A. McCone, 'Chronology of Events, Contacts and Discussions Relating to the Saigon Station Coup d'Etat Activities of August 1963,' Top Secret, September 28, 1963 Sep 28, 1963 Source FOIA 2024 Release No. C06265874 In this detailed chronology, CIA Chief of Station John Richardson relates to DCI McCone the events and controversies surrounding the aborted August coup against Diem. The chronology starts with meetings between the CIA (Conein and Spera) and the Generals. Tran Van Don is keen to make clear that between Diem and Nhu, he would take Diem. Nguyn Khan appears concerned about the South Vietnamese government's openings to North Vietnam. Like other documents, the chronology confirms that DepTel 243 of August 25, 1963, was understood as a 'command decision' and the team's task was to support a coup. The only item for discussion was whether Diem should be given the option to remove Nhu, with only Harkins in favor. Meetings the following day also eschewed any discussion as to whether the coup was advisable. Richardson was instructed that the U.S. hand should not show, but also that the CIA country team should meet with the Generals. Throughout August, meetings between the CIA (Conein and Spera) and the Generals continued. Conein told Khiem the nine points (instructions) contained in DepTel 243. On August 27, Khiem told Conein that a coup would take place within a week. The situation changed in the early morning of August 29 when Richardson, Conein, and Spera were shown a cable from Gen. Taylor to Harkins suggesting the emergence of 'second thoughts' in Washington regarding the advisability of a coup. With a meeting with the Generals already scheduled for later in the day, Richardson decided that no explicit commitment should be made to them. As progress on coup preparation seems to stall, Harkins meets with General Khiem on August 31. The latter relates that the Generals do not have enough forces under their control. By then, the government of South Vietnam had become fully aware of the coup plotting, and the Army was in full alert. According to one of the generals involved in the plotting, 'they did not lack the will – they lacked the means.' On September 2, the Times of Vietnam published a headline story titled 'CIA financing planned coup d'etat'—so much for the U.S. hand not showing. In his concluding comments, Richardson stated that—through CIA contacts—the Generals were given a clear picture of DepTel 243 and of the U.S. government's 'nine points.' The country team, the Ambassador, and his deputy, Trueheart, agreed on the importance of starting a coup 'as soon as possible.' While the CIA made commitments to the Generals (such as financial support for their families), Richardson assesses that 'there was a clear distinction between our full encouragement and actually being in a position to put together the ingredients for a successful coup.' The Station was 'not in a position to engineer the actual coup.' Richardson also reports, though, that bitter recriminations emerged within the team after Taylor's cable to Harkins. Lodge berated him, suggesting that his decision to refrain from any commitment destroyed the coup. Conein sided with Lodge, while Spera pointed to the Generals' limited capabilities. In the aftermath of the botched coup, Lodge asked U.S. officials in Saigon to continue working with the Generals and—as far as Richardson is concerned—no change of policy had occurred. For the Generals, 'the USG call for coup action remains operative.' Document 8 Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Telegram for Secretary of State Dean Rusk and DCI John A. McCone, 'Conein Meeting,' Top Secret, October 5, 1963 Oct 5, 1963 Source FOIA 2025 Release No. 239723 Lodge writes to Washington seeking guidance regarding what Conein should say to General Minh the next time the latter approached the CIA operative. Lodge writes that he and Harkins agree that Conein should assure Minh that the U.S. will not 'thwart' the coup. Conein can offer to review the general's plans with the exception of those concerning assassination. Conein should also assure Minh that the U.S. government will continue aid if the new government seems likely to gain the support of the people and win the war. Document 9 Henry Knoche, Memorandum for the Record, 'Meeting in DCI's Office – 0800-0930 – 7 October 1963,' October 7, 1963 Oct 7, 1963 Source FOIA 2024 Release no. C06265893 This alarming memo showcases the dysfunctional relationship between U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Lodge and the CIA's country team, including Chief of Station John Richardson, who met with the DCI and others while temporarily recalled to Washington. Richardson says that Lodge felt that his relationship with Nhu had become 'undesirable' and that Lodge considered Nhu to be 'a symbol of evil.' Richardson makes clear that the August 24 cable (State DepTel 243) was interpreted by Lodge as an order to execute a coup. Having agreed to contact the Generals, Richardson was stopped in his tracks by Taylor's message to Harkins reporting that the cable was being reconsidered in Washington. Based on Taylor's message, Richardson told Conein and Spera of the CIA to still meet with one of the coup plotters but without expressing any firm commitment. According to Richardson, it was the Generals who ultimately decided to abort the coup due to the lack of troops and capability. And yet, Richardson reported how, in a meeting, Lodge berated him for disobeying orders to push for a coup. Looking at the broader picture, the memorandum makes clear the extensive compartmentalization of information and dysfunction in Saigon, with Lodge cutting the CIA country team out of the decision-making process and spreading stories about Richardson. Many attendees also hint at Lodge's use of press leaks to further his position and undermine Richardson. McCone discusses Lodge's request to replace Richardson with Lansdale, claiming that no decision has yet been made. The DCI closed with a set of recommendations and a warning for CIA officials. 'Under no circumstances,' should 'the Agency get into the subject of assassination or other highly sensitive matters with Lodge,' since the Ambassador had 'no concept of security' and tended to use the press to enhance his power. Document 10 CIA Station Saigon to CIA Headquarters, Washington, 'Eyes Only McGeorge Bundy from Ambassador Lodge,' Eyes Only, October 26, 1963 Oct 26, 1963 Source GRFL Saigon Embassy Files, Box 8, Folder 'Henry Cabot Lodge, Including Diem Coup, 1963-65 (3)' Ambassador Lodge reports to Bundy the 'prospects of action' toward a coup, saying he is still unconvinced that Gen. Don 'has the iron in his soul' to do so. Lodge agrees with Bundy that a failed coup might have negative repercussions for the U.S. from 'persons who wish to damage us,' but Lodge also believes that—if the U.S. government is careful—they will be in a position to maintain a 'very vigorous denial.' The Ambassador assures Bundy that, 'You can count on me to leave no stone unturned to give you every chance of judging and warning,' but again warns that the U.S. might not be able to stop a coup once it is in progress. Document 11 DCI John A. McCone, [Notes on two meetings on South Vietnam held at 3:30pm in the Cabinet Room and 4:00pm in the Situation Room on 29 October 1963], Top Secret/Eyes Only, October 29, 1963 (handwritten notes attached) Oct 29, 1963 Source FOIA 2024 Release No. C0624622 This telling summary of two meetings held at the White House Situation Room highlights major disagreements between high-ranking officials on the prospects for a coup in South Vietnam just a handful of days before the fall of Diem. At 3:30pm on October 29, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the president's military adviser, stated that regardless of the outcome, a coup would be 'disastrous.' For National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, the U.S. could not reverse course and abandon the coup plotters. Building on Taylor, CIA Director John McCone considered it unwise not to reconsider U.S. posture since the military adviser to the President counselled against the overthrow of Diem and Nhu. The meeting concluded with an agreement to send a cable to get a new assessment of the coup's prospects. At the 4:00pm meeting, which was attended by the President, Colby provided an assessment of the disposition of forces (for and against the coup), which in his view were balanced. The president worried about the risk of protracted fighting. Rusk suggested that Diem and Nhu were—by now—aware of U.S. talks with the coup plotters and that the U.S. government should reach out to the plotters to condition U.S. support to the possibility of the coup being carried out without a civil war. RFK doubted whether the U.S. should proceed with a plan that might either fail or create instability even in case of success, especially since a coup might undermine the war effort in any case. Bullet points at the end of the minutes suggest widespread knowledge of a growing conspiracy by South Vietnamese generals to overthrow Diem and a relatively balanced disposition of forces (but somewhat better than in August). They also restate the risk of protracted instability. Document 12 CIA Station Saigon, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to Rusk et al., DTG 29/1030Z, October 29, 1963 Oct 29, 1963 Source GRFL Saigon Embassy Files, Box 8, Folder 'Henry Cabot Lodge, Including Diem Coup, 1963-65 (3)' In this detailed telegram, Lodge reviews the balance of forces and the risks of a premature or unsuccessful coup. A key concern is the Generals' reluctance to reveal their military plans. Lodge dismisses concerns regarding the existence of a coup climate, noting that, while it is true this would normally reduce the element of surprise, such a climate has existed for months and—if anything—would contribute to a reduced degree of alertness. Lodge also reminds U.S. officials that the Generals have not shown any reliance on U.S. support, nor have they made any specific request for support. They have demanded 'the least possible American involvement.' Lodge is also firm in summarizing the U.S. role. 'A point which must be completely understood is that we are not engineering this coup.' The U.S. role has been limited to not thwarting the coup, to observing and reporting developments, and to relying on Conein's long-standing relation with the Generals. Although requests for financial and military support have not been made, they may be forthcoming in the future. Lodge concludes that there is no way of stopping the coup except by betraying it to Diem. Also, since the Generals have moved from a 48 to a 4-hour warning, Lodge will not have time to check with Washington when the coup starts, hence Washington won't have options to influence events on the ground. Document 13 CIA Far East Division Chief, William E. Colby, Memorandum for DCI John McCone, 'Leadership in Vietnam -Ngo Dinh Nhu,' Secret, Undated [ca. October 30, 1963] Oct 30, 1963 Source FOIA 2024, No. CO6672771 In this undated memorandum (the October 30 date appears on the CIA CREST website, but not on the document itself), Colby launches into a staunch defense of Nhu, seen by many as responsible for the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam. Contrary to earlier U.S. expectations, it is considered unlikely that the two brothers could be separated politically. Colby considers Nhu a complex figure that has been building up his political profile in recent times. This has been undermined by his reputation as 'intriguing, sinister and ruthless,' and by his wife's 'harsh and sometimes hysterical utterances.' Colby is clearly supportive of Nhu's approach and of his role in the Strategic Hamlet Program (something Colby also worked on). Colby also considers positively Nhu's role in establishing a 'Republican Youth Movement,' acknowledging, though, the movement's 'fascistic' tendencies and the 'Potemkin village' character of this and many other ventures. Colby also defines Nhu as 'non-corrupt' and grudgingly respected within and outside Vietnam. Vanity, an unfavorable public image, ruthlessness and a tendency to get involved in areas in which 'his hand is not welcome' are listed among the liabilities, as is the prominent role of his wife. Colby concludes by suggesting that Nhu 'represents a strong, reasonably well-oriented, and efficient potential successor to Diem' and that the image problems could be dealt with through propaganda efforts. 'Nhu is a desirable rather than a catastrophic candidate.' Document 14 Redacted telegram from McGeorge Bundy to CIA Station Saigon, 'Eyes Only for Amb Lodge from McGeorge Bundy,' Top Secret/Eyes Only, October 30, 1963 Oct 30, 1963 Source GRFL Saigon Embassy Files, Box 8, Folder 'Henry Cabot Lodge, Including Diem Coup, 1963-65 (3)' The telegram makes clear that even at such a late stage in the conspiracy against Diem, U.S. officials believe that the U.S. government's attitude towards the coup could still have a 'decisive effect' on the outcome. The telegram also stresses that betraying the coup to Diem is not the only way of stopping it. It asks Lodge, Harkins, and the CIA for their views on the balance of forces. With this assessment, the U.S. government will be in a position to tell Don whether it will maintain a hands-off policy, 'positively encourage' the coup, or discourage it. The U.S. government has also arranged for an aircraft to take Lodge to Washington, but the issue is debated as to whether having Lodge in Saigon during the coup would help. The telegram also asks for post-coup contingencies. The document concludes by stressing that the 'burden of proof' is on the Generals to demonstrate 'substantial possibility of quick success' without which the U.S. government should discourage them from proceeding. Document 15 CIA Station Saigon, [Flash Message from Ambassador Lodge to Rusk et al.], Top Secret/Eyes Only, October 30, 1963 Oct 30, 1963 Source GRFL Saigon Embassy Files, Box 8, Folder 'Henry Cabot Lodge, Including Diem Coup, 1963-65 (3)' In this long telegram, Lodge launches a detailed defense of his position regarding the coup and the U.S. government's last-minute options, making clear at the very end that Harkins does not concur with the telegram. Lodge restates that only betraying the coup to Diem would stop it. This would make traitors of the U.S. The Generals' heads would be on the 'chopping block,' and this would have negative repercussions for the continuation of the war. Conein is expected to meet with Don on the night of the 30th and morning of the 31st. Lodge also believes that the U.S. should not ask the Generals to share their military plans with the U.S. military. The Generals, in fact, believe that it is the U.S. military that leaks material to Diem. The administration has offered a military aircraft for Lodge. He will tell Pan American that he no longer needs their services, but use of the aircraft might raise the South Vietnamese government suspicions. Lodge is confident that he will be able to handle it. Lodge opposes the idea of having the U.S. military (Harkins) in charge of the political side of the plotting. Lodge understands that—as the coup starts—he and others will receive requests from the Vietnamese government to stop the coup. But at this stage, Lodge's posture is already one of washing his hands of the problem. He will stress that—if the President (Diem), who is also the commander in chief—is unable to stop the coup, U.S. officials will be even less likely to be able to exercise pressure. The U.S. could have a stronger role in case of a truce and if the two parties agree on the removal of key personalities; here, the U.S. could arrange for their transport (something the U.S. famously refused to do in the case of bringing Diem to safety). In case of requests for asylum in U.S. embassies, the U.S. would have to accept. Lodge also explains his position regarding funds for the coup plotters. The U.S. should make funds available provided they can be passed discreetly and if the U.S. considers that the coup has good chances of success. If the coup fails, the U.S. has had a commitment to the Generals since August to evacuate their dependents. In case of a protracted struggle, the U.S. should offer 'good offices' to find a solution. The telegram concludes with a call to action from Lodge. He is convinced of the sincerity of the Generals and of their willingness to risk their lives. He also reminds Washington that if he were convinced that the coup would fail, he would do everything to stop it. Document 16 DCI John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Record, 'Discussion with Governor Averell Harriman at Lunch, October 30th,' Secret/Eyes Only, October 31, 1963 Oct 31, 1963 Source FOIA 2024 Release No. C06246228 In a tense exchange with Harriman, McCone reports on the situation in Vietnam. He tells the Governor that the moment of decision has arrived: stick with Diem or shoulder the coup. McCone claims that he has not reached a definitive answer but that—after all—it is a policy decision. The two strongly disagree about the nature of the telegram sent on the 24th of August. McCone laments that the telegram was rushed, especially since no similar policy position had been achieved two days earlier in a meeting with the President. Furthermore, the telegram was presented as 'coordinated' with the CIA, but the CIA had been left out of the decision-making process. The Agency's opinion was never asked, and Helms was only notified once the decision on the telegram had been taken and was told that the telegram had already been cleared with the President and the Secretary of State. Document 17 Series of flash telegrams from CIA Station Saigon to CIA Headquarters, 'Immediate Attention for McCone,' Confidential, November 1, 1963 Nov 1, 1963 Source GRFL Saigon Embassy Files, Box 8, Folder 'Henry Cabot Lodge, Including Diem Coup, 1963-65 (3)' Although several flash cables from the Saigon station to Washington sent on the day of the coup remain classified, this document highlights some of the cables that are now available. The summaries below are organized by cable number. 2130: at 13:45 Saigon time, Conein is informed that the coup has started. Telecommunication center is taken, as is the Navy yard. 2131: Telegram makes clear that CAS Saigon has 'officers on the street.' Police compound and Ministry of Defense taken. Fighting reported by another CAS officer in Vietnamese Special Forces area at Tan Son Nhut (Air base), 2132: Telegram provides information from Conein 'from HGS HQS.' Col. Tung has been captured and ordered to call for ceasefire. Presidential guard barracks have been entered and the Presidential palace is surrounded. 2133: CAS officers report that fighting continues at the palace. Conein from JGS reports that the air force chief has been captured. 35 armored cars are travelling from JGS to the palace. 2134: Generals are attempting to contact the Palace without success. Their ultimatum is that, if the president resigns immediately, they will guarantee his safety. If he refuses, the palace will be attacked within an hour by air force and armored cars. 'Conein states ultimatum appears final.' 2136: 'Conein reports from JGS Gens firmly decided there to be no rpt no discussion with the president. He will either say yes or no and that is the end of the conversation.' Palace is still seemingly sending out radio messages that the insurgents have been arrested. [No number]: 'Conein report from JGS Gens preparing heavy air bombardment on palace immediately.' 2137: report from Conein at JGS regarding personalities at the JGS include anti-communist, pro-Western politicians. Generals seemingly have no ambition to rule the country and will turn over control in two, three days. Document 18 A.R. Ash, Memorandum for the File, 'November 21-22, 1963, Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,' November 22, 1963 Nov 22, 1963 Source JFKAR 2025 Release No. 206-10001-10003 In a PFIAB meeting held on the day of Kennedy's assassination, CIA Director John McCone discusses the Agency's role in the overthrow and assassination of Diem. He does admit that—starting in August 1963—the Agency had stopped reporting coup plotting to Diem. This was, in part, due to the latter's unwillingness to change policy. McCone flatly states that the CIA had 'no part in organizing the coup' and 'did not have information' and 'does not know about the assassination of Diem and Nhu.' Asked about the removal of Richardson, CIA Far East Division chief William Colby says that the former chief of station had become too identified with the Diem regime. At lunch, the meeting is interrupted by news of the President's assassination. Document 19 Inspector General Report, [CIA and U.S. Government Involvement in the Vietnamese Generals' Coup of 1 November 1963], Secret/Eyes Only, May 31, 1967 May 31, 1967 Source FOIA 2024 Release No. C00566276 With this FOIA release, the long-awaited Inspector General report on the Diem coup is now fully declassified. Some of the last secrets that the U.S. government withheld have to do with monetary payments made by the CIA's Lucien Conein to coup plotting Generals to encourage the removal of Diem. Passage of money took place on September 11 and again on the day of the coup 'Conein furnished General Don about $65,000 to buy off opposition military units while the coup was in progress.' The report also explains that a CIA source was present at the meeting that decided the fate of Diem. Document 20 Transcript, NBC News White Paper, 'Vietnam Hindsight: Part II: The Death of Diem,' December 22, 1971 Dec 22, 1971 Source Cornell University Library, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, McTurnan Kahin Papers, Box 33, Folder 56 (Thanks to Audrey Kahin for granting us permission to post this document) In this revealing 1971 TV program, Conein and other U.S. and Vietnamese officials discuss the events surrounding the Diem coup and assassination. In what appears to be a tense exchange, Conein admits his efforts to strengthen the Generals' resolve. 'Once you are into the attack, you must continue,' he reportedly told them. Later, Conein is shown an account of the death of Diem developed by associate producer Alvin Davis, who had spoken with several of the Generals involved in the coup. While he refuses to discuss details or to divulge what he considers 'privileged information,' Conein confirms that Davis' account is correct; Diem had been killed after a vote by the Generals. Document 21 CIA, Walter Elder Correspondence with William G. Miller, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Secret/Sensitive, July 29, 1975 Jul 29, 1975 Source JFKAR 2017 Release No. 157-10014-10111 This very short but ambiguous document provides an answer to a question asked to CIA Director William Colby during his June 20 testimony to the SSCIA regarding Diem. The question had to do with whether Conein had been told of Colby's telegram to the Acting Chief of Station regarding the need to dissociate from considerations of assassination. The response concludes that the cable traffic on the matter is unclear. [This at pp. 53-54 of Colby testimony above]. Document 22 CIA Lucien Conein Personnel File, Secret, Undated Aug 1, 1975 Source JFKAR 2025 Release No. 104-10222-10041 Conein's personnel file—now fully declassified—traces his intelligence career, including his employment in a 'civilian capacity' by the CIA between 1961 and 1968. Conein's cryptonym was SCHWICKRATH. Conein was contracted by the CIA under the ZRJEWEL program and was working in the Saigon Station as paramilitary staff officer and advisor on major counterinsurgency programs. The 'long-term objective' of ZRJEWEL is explained in a later document from 1961 as 'to provide the Clandestine service with an improved standby paramilitary power capability to assist the Operation Division in emergency situations.' The document reveals that Conein was awarded the CIA's intelligence star 'for his performance during the November 1963 coup in Saigon. Because of his extensive overseas experience with the Military and the Agency, especially in Vietnam, he has access to many Vietnamese, French and other target individuals in the Washington area. He is already acquainted with many of these people and both he and his wife have access to other potential target individuals in the foreign diplomatic community.' A fitness report for April 1963 – March 1964, states that Conein acted as senior advisor in selection and training of the South Vietnamese Prime Minister personal security force. 'Under COS direction maintain contact for intelligence and political action purposes with a variety of senior indigenous officers, including Chief of State, senior staff officers, Corps commanders, foreign minister, province chiefs, and lesser officers.' Ambassador Lodge and Edward Lansdale are listed as references in Conein's resume. Document 23 'Dinner with General Tran Van Don,' March 24, 1981 Mar 24, 1981 Source Cornell University Library, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, McTurnan Kahin Papers, Box 34, Folder 6 (Thanks to Audrey Kahin for granting us permission to post this document.) The document, found in the personal papers of George McTurnan Kahin, a scholar of the Vietnam war, summarizes a dinner with General Tran Van Don on March 24, 1981. Don, appearing somewhat tense according to the report, states that he was surprised to have heard Conein talk about a vote by the Generals. He admits that there might have been one while he was away. Don goes on to admit that his concern was that—had Diem and Nhu been kept alive—the U.S. government might have changed its mind. It might have decided to replace him and the Generals and bring back the Nhus. As the author of the report notes, with this 'throwaway remark,' Don threw away much of his book. [1] This shows McCone's views on assassination. During the Congressional investigations of the 1970s, McCone testified that for moral and – as in the case of Diem – strategic reasons he was opposed to and could not discuss assassination. In later years, his assistant William Elder had stated that McCone would ask CIA officials not to inform him of assassination plots. Here, he seems more open to talk about it. Luca Trenta, The President's Kill List (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2024), p. 99. [2] The episode has also been covered extensively. Scholarship on Vietnam is, of course, rich and diverse. Works that deal at length with the Diem coup include Howard Jones, Death of a Generation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); John Prados, Vietnam: the History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975 (University Press of Kansas, 2013); Nichter, The Last Brahmin; Lindsey O'Rourke, Covert Regime Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018); William J. Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam (New York: Da Capo Press,1985); Ken Hugues 'Silence: JFK's Role in the Overthrow and Assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngô Đình Diệm,' Miller Center's Presidential Recordings Digital Edition, and Trenta, The President's Kill List . The episode is also covered in Rust's biography of Conein in Studies in Intelligence, the CIA in-house journal. See William Rust, 'CIA Operations Officer Lucien Conein: A Study in Contrasts and Controversy,' Studies in Intelligence Vol. 63, No. 4 (2019), 43-58. [3] For his classic book on the Vietnam War, see George McTurman Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (Alfred A. Knopf, 1986). [4] For instance, Robert F. Kennedy (RFK) was adamant that his brother did not approve a coup against Diem. RFK was not present during most of the key meetings where the President argued in favor of a coup. See Luke Nichter, The Last Brahmin: Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. and the Making of the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020), pg. 209. [5] William Colby testimony, U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, June 20, 1975. JFK Assassination Records, 2017 release, 157-10014-10019, pg. 30. [6] Nichter's excellent biography of Lodge presents a different interpretation of the ambassador's position towards the coup as not fully supportive. We see Lodge as very much in favor of a coup, with Colby and McCone as the key actors opposed to the coup. See Nichter, The Last Brahmin , pg. 217. [7] Hugues, 'Silence.' [8] Telegram, CIA to White House situation room, 29 August 1963, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (JFKL), National Security File (NSF), Vietnam General, Folder 'August 1963 24-31, CIA cables, JFKNSF-198-009.' [9] Message From the President to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Lodge), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August-December 1963 , Document 18. [10] Lodge telegram to Kennedy, August 30, 1963, GRFL Saigon Embassy Files, Box 8, Folder 'Henry Cabot Lodge, Including Diem Coup, 1963-65 (2).' [11] Telegram, Saigon to Secretary of State, 30 August 1963, JFKL, NSF, Vietnam General, Folder, 'August 1963 24-31, CIA cables JFKNSF-198-009.' [12] Trenta, The President's Kill List , 139. [13] Telegram, CIA to State, 31st August, JFKL, NSF, Vietnam General, Folder, 'August 1963 24-31, CIA cables JFKNSF-198-009.' [14] It is not clear why McCone was so opposed to Lansdale as Saigon Chief of Station. Lansdale's poor performance leading Operation Mongoose against Cuba burned many bridges at Langley where he gained a a reputation as a 'wild man' within the CIA. See Max Boot, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam (Liveright, 2018), pg. 114. [15] Richardson would be replaced by his deputy David Smith who would become Acting Saigon Chief of Station. [16] Nichter, The Last Brahmin, pg. 220. [17] Telegram to Lodge, via CAS Channel, 5 October 1963, JFKL, NSF Vietnam Top Secret cables, Folder, 'Tab C, October 1963 JFKNSF-204-012.' [18] Telegram, State to American Embassy Saigon, 4 October, 1963, JFKL, NSF, Vietnam Top Secret Cables, Folder 'Tabs A-B, October 1963 JFKNSF-204-011.' [19] The same dynamic also emerges in other episodes of US government's involvement in assassination, such as the case of Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. It is also discussed explicitly in the 1970s Congressional inquiries. Trenta, The President's Kill List , pp. 124-125. [20] William Colby testimony, pg. 53-54. [21] Hughes, 'Silence.' [22] Hughes, 'Silence.' [23] Telegram, McCone to Saigon, 24 October 1963, JFKL, NSF, Vietnam Top Secret cables, Folder 'Tab C, October 1963 JFKNSF-204-012.' [24] CIA Saigon to Washington, 25 October 1963, GRFL Saigon Embassy Files, Box 8, Folder 'Henry Cabot Lodge, Including Diem Coup, 1963-65 (3).' [25] Telegram, Lodge to Secretary of State et al., October 28, 1963, GRFL Saigon Embassy Files, Box 8, Folder 'Henry Cabot Lodge, Including Diem Coup, 1963-65 (3).' [26] Memorandum of a Conference with President Kennedy, October 29, 1963. FRUS, Volume IV, Vietnam, August-December 1963, Document 235. See also Hugues, 'Silence.' [27] This document is undated and it is possible that it was written prior to late October. However, according to the CIA's FOIA webpage, the date of the document is October 30, 1963. [28] Lucien Conein testimony, U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, June 20, 1975. JFK Assassination Records, 2017 release, 157-10014-10094. [29] William Colby Testimony, U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, June 4, 1975. JFK Assassination Records, 2017 release, 157-10002-10172, pgs. 124-125. [30] Colby Testimony, June 20, 1975, pg. 46. [31] William Elder, Memorandum for William Colby, 'Special Activities,' June 1, 1973. [32] Rhett Dawson to Fritz Schwarz, 'Diem Assasination,' 7 July 1975. JFKAR 2025 Release, No. 157-10014-10152. [33] Rust, 'CIA Operations Officer Lucien Conein,' pg. 44. [34] Conein testimony June 20, 1975, pg. 55. [35] Lucien Conein, Interview, Vietnam: A Television History, 7 May1981. [36] In his memoirs, though, Don had provided a different narrative, he had denied that there had been a vote, stating instead that no vote was taken, and the lack of a clear decision was responsible for Diem's and Nhu's deaths. Tran Van Don, Our Endless War (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1978), pp. 110-111. [37] CIA Medals: Intelligence Star. New Light in a Dark Corner: Evidence on the Diem Coup in South Vietnam, November 1963 Nov1, 2020 THE DIEM COUP AFTER 50 YEARS Nov1, 2013 Kennedy Considered Supporting Coup in South Vietnam, August 1963 Dec 11, 2009 JFK and the Diem Coup Nov 5, 2003 The President's Kill List: Assassination and US Foreign Policy since 1945 (Intelligence, Surveillance and Secret Warfare) The Last Brahmin: Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. and the Making of the Cold War William Colby and the CIA: The Secret Wars of a Controversial Spymaster Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975
Time of India
02-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Pak may go for pre-emptive strikes against India in face of imminent war: US intel forecast
Guwahati: A recently declassified US intelligence report of 1993 evaluating the years ahead assessed that Pakistani war plans call for pre-emptive strikes against Indian forces if its leaders are convinced an all-out attack is imminent because it lacks the strategic depth to absorb such an attack and underlined that "intelligence failures could prove disastrous." Tired of too many ads? go ad free now The analysts in the report said, "If India's military leaders were convinced, rightly or wrongly, that Pakistani units were preparing another conventional assault on Kashmir, they probably would order armored strike units into wartime positions in Punjab and Rajasthan. That, in tum would prompt Pakistan countermoves." These forecasts were made by the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in its report, "India-Pakistan: Prospects for War in the 1990s", which added that in the event of a war, US believed "there was a strong possibility that such a conflict could lead to the use of nuclear weapons." Much of contents of the report was released by CIA in Feb in response to the National Security Archive's mandatory declassification review appeal. The analysts who authored the report found that heads of both countries want to avoid war, but underlined several events which could trigger an escalating confrontation, which include "a protracted surge of violence in ... Kashmir that threatened New Delhi's grip on the state." The report assessed that "India has no strategic interest in initiating a war with Pakistan" and "Pakistan has lost previous engagements, and its leaders probably believe another war could destroy the military or even the state." The report says existing crisis reduction mechanisms confidence building measures (CBMs) such as the military communications "hotline" between New Delhi and Islamabad, which have contributed to the lndo-Pakistani dialogue but "might prove irrelevant in a fast-moving crisis." Tired of too many ads? go ad free now It said that for US, its greatest concern is a breakdown of nuclear deterrence during a crisis. The report's "Indian and Pakistani Views on Nuclear Weapons" points out that India views nuclear weapons primarily as the coin of international power and prestige, deterrence against Pakistan, retaliation against a Pakistani first strike should deterrence fail, and a strategic equalizer with China. "India, though mindful of the high costs of a nuclear exchange, probably believes it could absorb a limited nuclear strike from Pakistan and then could retaliate" while "Pakistan sees nuclear weapons primarily as a deterrent and as insurance for its survival if a conflict developed with conventionally superior India." The analysts have also assessed that "powers with interests in the region want stability" and are pushing the two sides to avoid war. "Russia no longer has a strategic reason to back India against Pakistan. China does not want instability nearby to distract it from domestic issues. Support for either side by Middle Eastern states is unlikely to be pivotal," the analysts add. On "complications for the United States", the analysts stated that India and Pakistan likely will seek US assistance in reducing the risk of inadvertent war and "yes, the two countries are not impervious to US pressure."
News18
02-05-2025
- Politics
- News18
Pakistan Fears India's Rise In 2025, Just Like US Intelligence Document Had Predicted In 1993
Last Updated: Pahalgam terror attack: From the triggers to the response and reactions, the US intelligence document is significant in view of the India-Pakistan current scenario The more things change, the more they remain the same — Pakistan fears India's rise, in 2025, just as it did in 1993. As the tension between the two countries escalate, the 32-year-old assessment of the India-Pakistan dynamic by the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which is available on the National Security Archive website, still holds true. From the triggers to the response and reactions, the US intelligence document is significant in view of the current scenario. On April 22, an attack on tourists in Pahalgam's Baisaran left 26 dead. The Resistance Front (TRF), a shadow group of the terrorist outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), claimed responsibility, leading to strong retaliatory measures by India. Meanwhile, Pakistan, despite the incitement by its Army chief, denies its involvement. Among the flashpoints for a war, it stated 'a spectacular terrorist outrage that one side believed the other directed or abetted". The conclusion in the document, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), was even more apt. 'If war erupts, it will likely start with something like Kashmir, and Pakistan will be on the back foot from the beginning." 'INDIA OUTNUMBERS PAK IN MILITARY CAPABILITY' The NIE was prepared by Bruce Riedel, a seasoned CIA analyst, when India had just experienced the Babri Masjid demolition (1992), and Pakistan was facing internal instability. Nuclear weapons were not yet tested. The document noted that neither India nor Pakistan wanted war. However, Pakistan, feeling overshadowed by India's growing power, was likely to act out of fear. This included supporting proxy groups in Kashmir or forming alliances with terrorists to counter India's influence. The CIA analysts saw a '20 per cent" chance of full-scale war, but were concerned about a potential chain reaction. The document listed a few triggers: A protracted surge of violence in Indian Kashmir that threatened New Delhi's grip on the state. Large-scale military exercises in border areas, especially if one or both sides deliberately evaded prior notification requirements. A spectacular terrorist outrage that one side believed the other directed or abetted. An Indian military cross-border action, for example, to close infiltration routes along the Line of Control or to punish Pakistan for supporting terrorism. Protracted Hindu-Muslim carnage that spilled across the border. The report warned of Pakistan's strategy of arming and training anti-India militants to 'liberate Kashmir." Sounds familiar? 'Pakistan sees nuclear weapons primarily as a deterrent and as insurance for its survival if a conflict developed with conventionally superior India…," it added, in a bleak reminder of Pakistan Minister Hanif Abbasi's recent threat of 130 nukes. THE REACTION The document said 'most other Islamic states will give lip service to Pakistan's position on Kashmir, but will not risk mortgaging their relationship with India". 'Rapid Indian military improvements would strain Pakistan's ability to remain competitive. Islamabad would feel even more threatened by India's growing military edge and would rely more heavily on nuclear deterrence. As a last resort, a desperate government in Islamabad also might consider an extreme measure such as openly deploying nuclear weapons," it said. India was led at the time by Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and was growing. In contrast, Pakistan oscillated between military rule, political crises, and economic turmoil. The 1993 document predicted: 'Under certain extreme conditions, for instance, economic collapse and/ or a military dictator joining with militants-an Islamist government could be formed in Pakistan. A radical government almost certainly would establish an Islamic system of government based on its interpretation of shariah law and Islamic values. Such a regime would champion the cause of India's Muslims…It also would promote the liberation of Kashmir by openly arming and training anti-Indian militants." THE US top videos View all The NIE was to brief the White House and State Department. Then US president Bill Clinton visited India in 2000, coinciding with the Chittisinghpura massacre, where Pakistan's Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) killed 35 Sikh villagers. The CIA had a word of caution for the US. 'Confidence-building measures like hotlines and nuclear pacts were useful but might prove irrelevant in a real crisis. Verification was weak, and trust was thin. Once violence began, leaders would rely on instinct rather than protocol," it said. First Published: May 02, 2025, 17:42 IST News world Pakistan Fears India's Rise In 2025, Just Like US Intelligence Document Had Predicted In 1993
Yahoo
01-04-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Hillary Clinton sent emails ‘stamped' Top Secret? No, inquiries paint a different picture
Statement: 'Hillary Clinton was sending classified documents that were stamped TS or TSSCI.' After top U.S. national security leaders erroneously messaged a journalist sensitive operational details about impending military action, political figures on both sides of the aisle called to mind other classified documents incidents. Sen. Markwayne Mullin, R-Okla., posted a video on X, asserting that the Trump administration's use of the commercial messaging app Signal to discuss bombing Yemen was incomparable to Hillary Clinton's use of a personal email and private email server when she was President Barack Obama's secretary of state. "To compare the two, between Hillary Clinton and what President (Donald) Trump's cabinet members were doing is absolutely absurd," Mullin said March 26. "Hillary Clinton was sending classified documents that were stamped TS or TSSCI." The acronyms are intelligence shorthand for "top secret" and "top secret/sensitive compartmented information." On the contrary, in the Signal conversation among Trump administration officials, Mullin said no classified information was shared. That Clintonemailed information marked "TS or TSSCI" was not borne out in any of the investigations into her emails. Although FBI and State Department reports found that some classified material was included among some Clinton emails, none of them were clearly marked as classified or top secret, as Mullin said. As secretary of state, Clinton used a personal email address ending in @ which meant its data was housed on private servers in her New York home. The emails have been the subject of FBI and congressional scrutiny for years. A 2019 State Department report rebuts Mullin's statement that Clinton sent classified information. In 2016, the FBI reported that 113 of the approximately 30,000 emails it reviewed contained information that was classified at the time they were sent or received. Of the emails, the FBI reported that "a very small number" of emails containing classified information were duly marked signaling their classification. The State Department report said "instances of classified information being deliberately transmitted via unclassified email" were "rare." "There was no persuasive evidence of systemic, deliberate mishandling of classified information," it said. Thomas Blanton, the director of George Washington University's National Security Archive, said the National Security Archive team has reviewed thousands of the now-public emails from Clinton's private server. "None of them were stamped TS (Top Secret) or TSSCI (Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information) at the time they were sent or received," Blanton told PolitiFact. "None of them were even marked as classified at the time she sent or received them." He added that the State Department concluded the same thing after reviewing all the emails. We emailed Mullin's spokesperson and received no response. From July 2016 to September 2019, the State Department's Office of Information Security reviewed "tens of thousands" of documents, gathered statements from hundreds of past and current State Department employees and conducted dozens of interviews. The State Department team concluded that Clinton's "use of a private email system to conduct official business added an increased degree of risk of compromise," because a private system lacked the security capabilities of State Department networks. For the sake of speed, classified information was in some instances "inappropriately introduced into an unclassified system," but the people involved were "aware of security policies and did their best to implement them in their operations," the report said. The State Department report also said that "a typical security violation involves pre-marked classified information discovered" at the time of the incident, none of which was found. "None of the emails at issue in this review were marked as classified," it said. In 2016, the then-FBI Director James Comey said that of the approximately 30,000 emails the agency analyzed, eight email chains — containing an unspecified number of individual emails — contained information classified "top secret" at the time they were sent or received. Other email chains contained information classified at levels below top secret. Comey did not specify how many emails containing classified information Clinton sent compared to how many she received. But Comey said that emails containing classified information weren't properly labeled. "Only a very small number of the e-mails containing classified information bore markings indicating the presence of classified information," he said, without providing the number of emails marked appropriately. Comey testified on July 7, 2016, that classified documents come with headers signaling their classification level and acknowledged that the documents in Clinton's emails had no headers. He also said that three of the approximately 30,000 emails had classification markings. When asked whether emails lacking headers would have told Clinton that the material wasn't classified, Comey replied, "That would be a reasonable inference." The Justice Department's 2018 report on the FBI's handling of the Clinton email investigation said prosecutors found no evidence that Clinton or her aides intended to "communicate classified information on unclassified systems." The 2018 report also said that the classified emails weren't appropriately marked. "The emails in question lacked proper classification markings," it said. "The senders often refrained from using specific classified facts or terms in emails and worded emails carefully in an attempt to 'talk around' classified information." The 2018 report said prosecutors recommended against prosecuting because "none of the emails contained clear classification markings as required." Three email chains included paragraphs marked "C" for confidential. But that's not a complete or sufficient classification marking. Mullin said, "Hillary Clinton was sending classified documents that were stamped TS or TSSCI." Mullin provided no information supporting his statement and FBI and government reviews contradict him. In 2016, Comey testified that three of the approximately 30,000 emails reviewed had any classification markings at all, and those markings did not signal the documents were top secret or TSSCI. A 2018 Justice Department report reiterated that the emails "lacked proper classification markings." And a 2019 State Department report said "none of the emails" reviewed "were marked as classified." We rate this claim False. U.S. Sen. Markwayne Mullin X post, March 25, 2025 Email interview with Thomas Blanton, the director of the National Security Archive at George Washington University, March 27, 2025 PolitiFact, Clinton exaggerates absence of classified information in her emails, Sept. 13, 2022 PolitiFact, Comparing Hillary Clinton's emails and Donald Trump's boxes of files, Aug. 9, 2022 PolitiFact, Could Donald Trump declassify documents with just a thought? Three legal precedents say no, The Atlantic, The Trump Administration Accidentally Texted Me Its War Plans, March 24, 2025 The Atlantic, Here Are the Attack Plans That Trump's Advisers Shared on Signal, March 26, 2026 Office of the Inspector General U.S. Department of Justice, A Review of Various Actions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election, June 2018 Technology Transformation Services Handbook, Top Secret / Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) Clearance, accessed March 27, 2025 FBI, Statement by FBI Director James B. Comey on the Investigation of Secretary Hillary Clinton's Use of a Personal E-Mail System, July 5, 2016 US House Committee on Government Oversight and Reform, Hearing: Comey testimony, July 7, 2016 Politico, State Dept. finds no 'systemic' classified violation in Hillary Clinton private-server emails, Oct. 18, 2019 The Washington Post, Hillary Clinton's claim that 'zero emails' were marked classified, Sept. 8, 2022 Army Information Security, Classification Levels, accessed March 28, 2025 This article originally appeared on Austin American-Statesman: Claim that Hillary Clinton sent emails 'stamped' Top Secret is false
Boston Globe
22-03-2025
- Politics
- Boston Globe
Were the Kennedy files a bust? Not so fast, historians say.
It was just one paragraph in the roughly 77,000 pages the National Archives posted online this past week as part of the latest -- and supposedly final -- release of its vast collection of documents related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Get Starting Point A guide through the most important stories of the morning, delivered Monday through Friday. Enter Email Sign Up But for some of the scholars who immediately started combing through the documents, the brief passage, seen unredacted for the first time, raised eyebrows for sure. Advertisement 'This opens a door on a whole history of collaboration between the Vatican and the CIA, which, boy, would be explosive if we could get documents about,' said Peter Kornbluh, a senior analyst at the National Security Archive, an independent research center at George Washington University. 'Which of course,' he added, 'we will now try to do.' The document drop may have been a disappointment for those hoping for juicy revelations about the Kennedy assassination. But for scholars steeped in the history of intelligence agencies and the secret side of American foreign policy, there have been revelations aplenty. They include information about CIA involvement in various attempted coups, election interference in countries around the world and connections that ran to the top of some foreign governments. To see the documents all drop suddenly, without redactions, was remarkable to scholars. 'I didn't think I'd live to see it,' Kornbluh said. That the release included so much material with no obvious connection to the assassination reflected the broad intentions of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act, a 1992 law passed after the Oliver Stone film 'JFK' prompted a resurgence of conspiracy theorizing. Advertisement The law ordered that all government records related to the assassination and various investigations be gathered in one place and released within 25 years, with some exceptions for grand jury secrecy, tax privacy and concern for 'identifiable harm' to national security. And the law defined 'assassination-related record' broadly, taking in a swath of documents related to the inner workings and covert operations of the CIA and FBI, including many gathered by the Senate's Church Committee, established in 1975 to investigate abuses by the intelligence agencies. Before this past week, 99% of the roughly 6 million pages in the collection had already been made public. Only several thousand documents remained redacted, and as few as 50 withheld in full, according to past statements from the archives. Tulsi Gabbard, the director of national intelligence, said this past week that only a few documents, which remained under a court seal because of grand jury rules, were still secret. The federal government is working to get those documents unsealed. The release of the newly unredacted material had long been opposed by the CIA because it would give up the names of its sources. But equally important to the agency was the desire to protect its mid-20th-century tradecraft: how well it had penetrated the Egyptian government's communications, or the depth of its contacts in France. Unredacted passages in the new documents revealed how the CIA wiretapped phones in Mexico City in 1962. While that may be interesting in a Cold War spy movie kind of way, it has no bearing on whether American spy agencies can listen to a phone call made on an encrypted app on a modern cellphone. Advertisement But for historians, the agency's closely guarded 'sources and methods' are important to filling out the full historical picture. And some of the new material is startling, they said. Fredrik Logevall, a Harvard historian who is working on a multivolume biography of Kennedy, said that it was remarkable to see a full version of an unredacted 1961 memo by Arthur Schlesinger Jr., an aide to Kennedy, written shortly after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, warning of the growing power of the CIA and calling for it to be reorganized. Newly visible passages revealed, among other things, that nearly half of the political officers in American embassies around the world were working for the CIA. 'That's astonishing,' Logevall said. He also cited a now-unredacted 41-page memo of minutes from meetings between 1962 and 1963 of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which included many suggestive new details, including some related to surveillance of China's efforts to develop a nuclear bomb. There was also an unredacted 1967 report by the CIA's inspector general on the 1961 assassination of Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo that now shows the names of all the CIA agents involved in the plot. 'Without the 1992 law, all of this probably would have been under lock and key forever,' Logevall said. The revelation of sources' identities causes the CIA deep angst, on principle and because it undermines efforts to recruit sources today. 'These relationships are secret for a reason,' said Nicholas Dujmovic, a retired CIA historian. 'If people don't want others to know that they were cooperating with the CIA, for whatever reason, we have a moral obligation to keep these relationships secret, because that was the going in agreement.' Advertisement Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, a historian at the University of South Florida and researcher for the National Security Archive, said the documents also revealed efforts to interfere in elections in Finland, Peru and Somalia that had been rumored but undocumented, or entirely unknown. There was also new information, he said, about CIA involvement in failed and successful coups in various countries, including Brazil, Haiti and what is now Guyana. A 1964 CIA inspector general report on the workings of the agency's station in Mexico City was particularly significant, he said, because it contained one of the most detailed accounts available of how the agency organized its ground operations. A heavily redacted version was released in 2022. But newly visible passages revealed that Adolfo López Mateos, the president of Mexico, had approved a joint surveillance operation against Soviets in Mexico. The memo also described a 'highly successful project' aimed at 'rural and peasant targets,' led by a Catholic priest who had created an extensive network of youth groups, credit unions, agricultural co-ops and study centers -- presumably, Jimenez-Bacardi said, to make sure people 'don't go on the Soviet path.' The White House said Thursday that all remaining classified documents in the collection are now open for research at the National Archives, with additional pages still set to be digitized and posted online 'in the coming days.' Jimenez-Bacardi said he was eager to see the Church Committee interviews and depositions of former directors of the CIA, but had not yet found them. Parts were included in previous releases. 'But there are still secrets in those depositions,' he said. Advertisement This article originally appeared in
